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ABSTRACT 
 
 
The internationalisation of emerging market MNCs (EMNCs) has been one of the 
most notable dynamics in international business in recent years. Despite the fact that 
there has been a growing literature over the last few years which has generated 
considerable knowledge about their motives to internationalise, their competitive 
advantages, their entry strategies, and their performance, we know very little about 
how EMNCs actually organise their work and manage their employees globally. With 
EMNCs taking their first steps towards internationalisation, studies of these infant 
firms are believed to yield insights about how firms become internationalised and 
provide us with a unique opportunity to challenge and extend existing IB theory. 
 
Drawing on an ethnographic study of a major Chinese firm, this study offers detailed 
accounts on how the company manages its European subsidiaries and employees. 
Focusing on the organisational control system, it reveals that Teleman’s control 
system is a highly centralised system with expatriates being placed at the centre, who 
are motivated by strong corporate culture and a well-designed reward system.  
 
This study takes a comparative institutional perspective, and investigates how such a 
control system has been developed in a Chinese context. Departing from the 
conventional wisdom about the deterministic nature of institutions, this thesis argues 
for a dynamic relationship between institutions and corporate actors, and suggests that 
the control system is the outcome of the company’s interactions with the institutional 
environment in China. An Actor/Institution Interaction Process Model has been 
developed to capture such a process. This study empirically demonstrates how firms 
as corporate actors interact with multi-dimensional institutional environments and 
develop their management strategies and systems in order to achieve their business 
objectives.  
 
This study contributes to the study of MNCs in a number of ways. First, by giving 
detailed accounts on micro-level internal organisation and management within the 
case company, it enhances our understanding of the internationalisation process and 
behaviours of EMNCs and MNCs in general. Second, with the Actor/Institution 
Interaction Process Model describing the steps and process by which the interactions 
between institutions and actors take place, this study opens the mysterious black box 
of how exactly institutions affect the behaviours of firms, and provides clear guidance 
on how institutions can be studied. In doing this, the study also demonstrates how 
studies of EMNCs can contribute to the extension of existing theories in IB. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction  
 
“Since the birth of the IB and strategy fields, there has been no richer 
opportunity than now to study how firms become MNEs, because the drama is 
unfolding before our very eyes across the developing world.’ ( Ramamurti, 
2012, p. 46) 
 
The ‘drama’ Ramamurti refers to is the internationalisation of multinational 
corporations (MNCs) from emerging markets, or EMNCs. Data from UNCTAD 
(2015) shows that the share of EMNCs in the world’s outward foreign direct 
investment (OFDI) in the past few decades has maintained an upward trend. While the 
figure was 0.35% in 1970, and 5.05% in 2000, it increased dramatically to 24.39% in 
2012 (cited by Ramamurti, 2014). In 2014, EMNCs’ share in global OFDI reached a 
record high of 35%; notably, for the first time, MNCs from developing Asia became 
the world’s largest investors, contributing almost one third of the total (UNCTAD, 
2015). 
 
The rise of EMNCs is said to be ‘the most notable dynamic in international business 
in the last few years’ (Kostova, Marano, & Tallman, 2016, p. 182). Although studies 
on EMNCs date back to the late 1970s and 1980s (Ghymn, 1980; Heenan & Keegan, 
1979; Kumar & McLeod, 1981; Lall, 1983; Lecraw, 1977; Vernon-Wortzel & 
Wortzel, 1988; Wells, 1983), EMNCs ‘were actually relatively rare firms on the 
world stage until the 2000s’ (Cuervo-Cazurra & Ramamurti, 2014a, p. 1), and it is 
believed that the internationalisation of EMNCs in the 2000s is ‘a qualitatively 
different phenomenon’ from that during the 1970s-90s (Jormanainen & Koveshnikov, 
2012, p. 713).  
 
Accordingly, since the last decade, increasing numbers of studies have been devoted 
to better understanding this new phenomenon, including those in the business press 
(e.g. BCG, 2006, 2008, 2009, 2011, 2013; Economist, 2008) and those of academics 
(Cuervo-Cazurra, 2012; Cuervo-Cazurra & Ramamurti, 2014b; Fleury & Fleury, 
2011; Guillén & García-Canal, 2012; Rugman, 2009; Williamson et al., 2013; Zeng & 
Williamson, 2007). 
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According to Cuervo-Cazurra & Ramamurti (2014a, p. 3), the first step in 
understanding the novelty of the EMNC phenomenon was to ‘gather basic facts about 
their origin and evolution’, and this task had been largely accomplished by 2013 
thanks to some case studies of leading EMNCs on their business models for 
internationalisation and how they compete with MNCs from advanced markets 
(AMNCs) (e.g. Casanova, 2009; Chattopadhyay, Batra, & Ozsomer, 2012; Santiso, 
2013; Sauvant, 2008). While prior works on EMNCs often highlight ‘the implications 
for theory’, Cuervo-Cazurra & Ramamurti suggest future studies should seek to 
improve our ‘theoretical understanding of EMNCs’ and contribute to ‘a deeper 
understanding of the internationalisation of process and the behaviour of multinational 
enterprises’ (2014a, p.3).  
 
Following this line of enquiry, this study investigates how EMNCs internationalise, 
how they manage the internationalisation process and why they manage in this way. 
This task is accomplished through an in-depth case study of a Chinese firm operating 
in the telecommunications industry.  
 
Rationale and approach of this study 
 
This study is mainly motivated by two reasons. The first is concerned with the 
potential contribution to theoretical extension by studying EMNCs, and the second is 
the dearth of research on micro-level management issues in EMNCs.  
 
Firstly, studying EMNCs provides a unique opportunity to enrich existing IB theory. 
Extant research generally points to the fact that EMNCs behave differently from 
AMNCs, and therefore IB theories, which are largely based on analysis of AMNCs, 
provide unsatisfying explanations to the behaviour of EMNCs (Bhaumik, Driffield, & 
Zhou, 2016; Cuervo-Cazurra, 2012, 2016; Guillén & García-Canal, 2009; Luo & 
Tung, 2007; Mathews, 2006; Ramamurti, 2012; Rugman, 2009; Williamson et al., 
2013). Ramamurti, for example, argues that when the IB field was born in the 1960s 
Western MNCs were already quite internationalised. Therefore, existing IB theories 
do not provide us with adequate knowledge of how firms become internationalised. 
Studying ‘infant’ EMNCs, that are taking the first steps towards internationalisation, 
can enrich our knowledge about the process (Ramamurti & Singh, 2009). Cuervo-
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Cazurra (2012) believes that by studying EMNCs’ differing behaviours, ‘unstated 
assumptions and boundaries’ can be revealed to extend existing theories and models, 
including the OLI framework, the product life cycle model, the incremental 
internationalisation process model, internalisation theory, the 
integration/differentiation model and the resource-based view. 
 
Secondly, although studies on EMNCs have developed rapidly in recent years, there is 
a notable gap in the area of micro-level management. In a review of studies published 
in top international management journals in the period of 2000-2010, Jormanainen 
and Koveshnikov (2012) find that research on EMNCs have mainly focused on five 
topics: EMNCs’ motives of FDI, the investment location patterns, their resources and 
capabilities that enable them to internationalise, their entry strategies and their 
performance. Half a decade has passed since this major review; however, studies of 
EMNCs still have ‘mainly examined the patterns, motivations, location choices and 
entry model selections of EMNEs’ (Liu et al., 2016a, p. 142). So far, we have 
generated relatively rich knowledge about why EMNCs internationalize (i.e. motives), 
what enables them to internationalise (i.e. capabilities and competitive advantages), 
where, when and how to internationalizs (i.e. locations and entry strategies), and what 
the outcomes are (i.e. performance); however, we still know very little about how 
EMNCs actually organise their works and manage their employees globally. This is 
even true with Chinese MNCs. Despite Chinese firms having been most studied of  
EMNCs (e.g. Jormanainen & Koveshnikov, 2012), studies on how Chinese MNCs 
manage their overseas operations and their employees have been largely absent 
(Smith & Zheng, 2016; Zhu & Wei, 2014). 
 
Given the important implications of EMNCs to theory development, and the dearth of 
micro-level management research, this study seeks to contribute to a better 
understanding of how EMNCs, in the process of internationalisation, manage their 
overseas subsidiaries and global workforce. Drawing on an ethnographic study of a 
major Chinese firm, this study offers detailed accounts on the company’s international 
management system and employees’ working life within this system. Focusing on the 
company’s control system, the study reveals that the company has developed a unique 
expatriate-centric control system to support its internationalisation ambition.  
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Most importantly, this study takes a comparative institutional perspective, and 
investigates how such a control system has been developed in a Chinese context. It 
takes the notion of ‘what sets DMNCs (developing market MNCs) apart as a different 
phenomenon is their country of origin’ and follows the suggestion that ‘Studies of 
DMNCs that want to extend theory by using DMNCs as a laboratory need to be 
explicit about which conditions of the country of origin they study and explain how 
they impact firm behavior’ (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2012, p.162). Thus in this study, two 
major institutional domains are examined, i.e. the Chinese labour market, and the role 
of the Chinese state government, and an Actor/Institution Interaction Process Model 
has been developed to capture the dynamism between institutional environments and 
corporate actors. It departs from the conventional wisdom about the deterministic 
nature of institutions, and empirically demonstrates how firms as corporate actors 
interact with multi-dimensional institutional environments and develop their 
management strategies and systems in order to achieve their business objectives.  
 
Overview of this thesis 
 
This thesis is organised as follows: In Chapter 2, a literature review is presented, 
focusing on three areas: the study of EMNCs, the role of home country institutions in 
general MNCs study, and control mechanisms. This review points to the prominent 
role of home country institutional environments in shaping EMNCs’ behaviours, and 
the need to study EMNCs from an institutional perspective. To capture the process of 
home country institutions affecting firms’ behaviours, this chapter develops an 
analytical framework to study organisational control systems in EMNCs.  
 
Chapter 3 deals with the methodological issues. It discusses the philosophical 
underpinnings of this study, and explains how a single case study approach is selected 
to answer the research questions. It also gives details about how data has been 
collected with a combination of participant observation, in-depth interviews and 
content analysis.  
 
Chapter 4 and the following four chapters present the empirical findings of this study. 
They provide detailed accounts on how Teleman manages its overseas operations and 
employees with a unique control system, and how employees respond to such a 
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management approach. Following Chapter 4, which provides an overview of the 
organisational contexts of Teleman’s control system, and sets the stage for later 
discussion on Teleman’s four types of control, Chapter 5 focuses on personal 
centralised control, highlighting the critical roles played by expatriates, and the 
frequent involvement of China HQs in decision making, which lead to an exclusion of 
European and locally hired Chinese employees from participating in decision-making, 
and the gloomy career prospects for them.  
 
Chapter 6 looks at bureaucratic formalised control, focusing on the rules, processes, 
and systems in Teleman.  One major finding of this chapter is the ‘rigid rule-changing 
rule- no rule’ paradox within the company; that is, whilst there are some rigid rules 
for the employees to follow, there are also rules that keep changing, thus leading to a 
situation of no rule. This chapter also discusses how local employees and local 
Chinese constantly challenge the company’s control efforts through voicing their 
complaints and criticisms.  
 
Chapter 7 shows how organisational control is accomplished through controlling 
employees’ identity. It reveals four distinctive characteristics of identity control in 
Teleman: 1) the highly militarised nature of managerial discourses; 2) employees as 
willing participants in the control programme; 3) weak resistance from employees; 
and 4) Chinese employees as the only control target.  
 
Chapter 8 examines the reward system as a control mechanism in Teleman. It looks at 
two types of rewards, compensation and career development, with the former being a 
financial control mechanism, and the latter non-financial. Drawing on labour process 
theory and Smith’s (2006, 2010) concept of ‘labour mobility power’, this chapter 
argues that a reward system in Teleman functions to weaken the threat posed by 
employees’ mobility power. 
 
In Chapter 9, I offer an explanation on the underlying generative mechanisms that 
produce the observable empirical events discussed in the previous five chapters. From 
an institutional perspective, I argue that the control system adopted by Teleman is an 
outcome of a process of interactions between Teleman as a corporate actor and 
China’s different domains of institutions. To capture this process, an Actor/Institution 
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Interaction Process Model is constructed to explain how two domains – the Chinese 
labour market and the politicised business environment - affect the behaviours and the 
management approach of Teleman.  
 
In the final Chapter of this thesis, I relate the Teleman case to the on-going debate 
about EMNCs in IB study, and demonstrate the value of studying EMNCs. I provide 
answers to three important questions frequently asked by IB scholars: Do EMNCs 
internationalise differently from AMNCs? Can existing theory explain EMNCs’ 
differing behaviours? And how can studying EMNCs contribute to theory extension? 
Limitations of this study and suggestions for future research are also discussed.  
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Chapter 2: The study of EMNCs and the role of home country institutions 
 
This chapter reviews extant studies on the role of home country institutions in 
EMNCs and general MNC literature. It provides theoretical underpinnings on why 
EMNCs are studied and how they should be studied; it also identifies key areas to 
which this study can make contributions.  
 
Three strands of literature are examined: first, the literature on EMNCs. EMNCs as a 
fast growing research field is introduced as providing unique opportunities to extend 
existing IB theories. In particular, the review focuses on how EMNCs so far have 
been studied, highlighting 1) the prominent role of home country institutional 
environments in EMNCs’ internationalisation, necessitating study of EMNCs from an 
institutional perspective, and 2) the need to study EMNCs at a more micro-level, e.g. 
how EMNCs actually organise their work activities and manage their employees 
globally. Furthermore, a review on EMNCs studies also indicates that although it is 
often acknowledged the behaviours of EMNCs are affected by home country 
institutional environments, the ‘how’ issue is not clear. In most cases, studies make 
assumptions about the deterministic nature of institutions, and unconvincingly show 
the outcomes, rather than the process of how institutions affect the behaviours of 
EMNCs.  
 
This leads to further exploration of how institutions affect the behaviours of MNCs in 
the second strand of literature, i.e. the role of home country institutions in general 
MNCs studies. It is found that most of the studies only provide a snapshot of patterns 
of the influence of institutions on MNCs, and they fail to clarify which element of 
institutions and how it shapes the behaviours of firms. Fortunately, a relatively small 
but burgeoning body of studies has been identified, which proposes an actor-centred, 
more dynamic relation between institutions and firms. Theorising these studies (e.g. 
Aoki, 2007; Deeg & Jackson, 2006; Jackson, 2010; Morgan, 2005, 2007; Streeck & 
Thelen, 2005) provides the basic theoretical underpinnings for this study.  
 
The third strand of literature is concerned with control mechanisms in MNCs. Review 
in this area helps to determine what aspects should be examined to show how MNCs 
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organise their work and manage their employees. In this regard, Harzing’s (1999) 
framework about four types of control mechanisms provides helpful guideline.  
 
Based on the review of these three strands of literature, an analytical framework is 
developed to look at the role of home country institutions in shaping EMNCs’ 
behaviours, i.e. how they control their overseas operations and employees with a 
sophisticated control system. 
 
2.1 The study of EMNCs: an opportunity for theoretical extension  
 
Studies on EMNCs date back to the late 1970s and 1980s (e.g. Ghymn, 1980; Heenan 
& Keegan, 1979; Kumar & McLeod, 1981; Lall, 1983; Lecraw, 1977; Vernon-
Wortzel & Wortzel, 1988; Wells, 1983). However, the 2000s has witnessed a new 
wave of internationalisation of EMNCs, and accordingly, some renewed interest on 
this topic because of the proliferation and global success of these firms (e.g. 
Ramamurti & Singh, 2009; Ramamurti & Cuervo-Cazurra, 2014). According to 
Jormanainen and Koveshnikov (2012, p.713), the internationalisation of EMNCs in 
the 2000s is ‘a qualitatively different phenomenon’ from that of the 1970s-90s on 
several dimensions:  the wider variety of institutional pressures they are subjected to, 
the variety of ownerships of these firms, their wider arrays of geographic origins, and 
their aggressive behaviours in the process of internationalisation. Ramamurti (2009, p. 
4) believes that the rise of these firms is ‘a long-term trend with important 
consequences for the global economy, rather than a flash in the pan’, and he predicts 
that more MNCs are expected to spawn from emerging markets.  
 
Given the increasingly important role EMNCs are playing in the international 
business arena, an on-going debate in IB research is whether existing IB theories can 
fully explain the novelty of this new phenomenon in recent decades, and, if not, 
whether and how studying EMNCs can contribute to new theory development 
(Bhaumik, Driffield, & Zhou, 2016; Cuervo-Cazurra, 2012, 2016; Guillén & García-
Canal, 2009; Luo & Tung, 2007; Mathews, 2006;Ramamurti, 2012; Rugman, 2009; 
Williamson et al., 2013). 
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Discussions in this field, as Cuervo-Cazurra (2012, p.154) observes, have generated a 
‘Goldilocks debate’ with two camps at two extremes and the third group taking a 
middle ground position. On one extreme, authors such as Guillen and Garcia-Canal 
(2009), Luo and Tung (2007) and Mathews (2006) claim that existing IB theories are 
based on analysis of MNCs from advanced economies, and therefore new theories are 
required to explain EMNCs as a new phenomenon. To this end, Matthews (2006), for 
example, introduces the Linkage-Leverage-Learning (LLL) framework to explain 
how EMNCs internationalise through acquiring advantage externally (i.e. linkage), 
using networks to obtain resources (i.e. leverage), and learning to upgrade (i.e. 
learning). Luo and Tung (2007) propose a springboard perspective, suggesting that 
EMNCs use internationalisation as a springboard to acquire strategic resources and 
reduce their institutional and market constraints at home, thus overcoming their 
latecomer disadvantage.  
 
At the other extreme, authors such as Dunning, Kim and Park (2008), Narula (2006) 
and Rugman (2010) believe that there is nothing new about EMNCs and existing 
theories are adequate to explain their behaviours. For instance, Rugman (2010, p.82) 
claims that ‘existing international business theory fully explains the nature and 
positioning of emerging market MNEs’; therefore, no new theory is needed. One 
model, he suggests, is the country-specific advantage/ firms-specific advantage 
framework (Rugman, 2006, 1981). 
 
Between these two extremes are those who take a middle ground position (Cuervo-
Cazurra, 2012; Cuervo-Cazurra & Ramamurti, 2014b; Hennart, 2012; Meyer, 2014; 
Ramamurti, 2012). To this group of authors, existing IB theories provide ‘unsatisfying 
explanations’ to some of the puzzles about EMNCs (Ramamurti, 2012), and the 
analysis of EMNCs can ‘contribute to the extension and modification of existing 
theories by clarifying their assumptions and boundaries’ (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2012, 
p.155).  
 
According to Ramamurti (2009, p. 4), existing IB theories can explain a lot about 
EMNCs, but ‘not everything of interest to managers and policy makers’. He contends 
that studying EMNCs is ‘a way to enrich existing IB theory, particularly about the 
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process by which firms internationalise and become multinational enterprises.’ He 
suggests three important reasons for studying EMNCs.  
 
First, studying EMNCs provides the opportunity to enhance our understanding of 
early-stage internationalisation. He argues that when the IB field was born in the 
1960s, Western MNCs were already fairly internationalised. Therefore, existing IB 
theories do not provide us with adequate knowledge of how firms become 
internationalised. Studying ‘infant’ EMNCs, that are taking the first steps towards 
internationalisation, can enrich our knowledge about the process.  
 
Second, to study EMNCs is to ‘bring context more explicitly and comprehensively 
into IB theory’. This includes home-country context, industry context, and macro 
international context. For example, in terms of home-country context, it is pointed out 
that emerging markets tend to have distinctive and idiosyncratic characteristics, and 
they shape the country-specific advantages (CSAs) and firm-specific advantages 
(FSAs) of EMNCs. Given that ‘CSAs and FSAs seem to have a more complex 
relationship than is recognized in IB theory’, studying how and why country-specific 
advantages translate into firm-specific advantages for EMNCs should ‘yield rich 
theoretical dividends’ (2009, p.422).  
 
Third, studying EMNCs highlights ‘the value of studying internationalisation in a 
more strategic and managerially relevant manner than is normally the case in IB 
research’.  He argues that many IB theories look at internationalisation in a piecemeal 
fashion, and research on EMNCs ‘provides the opportunity to make such horizontal 
connections between islands of IB theory’. In short, Ramamurti (2009) believes that 
EMNCs can be used to ‘buttress’, to ‘challenge and debunk’, and to ‘enrich and 
extend’ existing mainstream IB theory (2009, p.423).  
 
One example of theory extension is reflected by authors such as Cuervo-Cazurra 
(2012), Hennart (2012) and Narula (2012) on Dunning’s OLI model (Dunning, 1977, 
1988, 1995). Based on Dunning’s original model, a firm will internationalise on the 
basis of a definable competitive advantage, which allows them to secure enough 
return to cover the costs and risks caused by such internalisation activities. In other 
words, a firm internationalises to exploit its ‘ownership advantage’ it currently has. 
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Such an advantage, as discussed in literature, mainly refers to cutting-edge 
technology, innovative designs, well-known brands, etc. (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2012; 
Bhaumik et al., 2016). However, as observed by many authors, EMNCs seem not to 
possess this technology, brand, or management advantage (e.g. Ramamurti, 2012). 
Then how have EMNCs internationalised and achieved tremendous success in the 
past two decades?  
 
Studies in recent years have generally agreed that EMNCs ‘do possess ownership 
advantages, but these are different from the ones we have been trained and 
conditioned to see’ in traditional MNCs, which include ‘their deep understanding of 
customer needs in emerging markets, the ability to function in difficult business 
environments, their ability to make products and services at ultra-low costs, their 
ability to develop “good enough” products with the right feature-price mix for local 
customers, and so on’ (Ramamurti, 2012, p.42). Therefore, with reference to the 
explaining power of Dunning’s model on EMNCs, Ramamurti (2012, p.45) 
concludes: 
 
The notion that firms must have ownership advantages before they can engage 
in market-seeking internationalisation seems to hold up well even for EMNEs. 
However, we must be open to the possibility that EMNEs have different 
ownership advantages than DMNEs, reflecting the distinctive conditions of 
their home market. Prima facie, there is no reason to believe these ownership 
advantages are less valuable or special than those of DMNEs, especially when 
applied to emerging markets, which are now the world’s growth engines.  
 
Regarding the theoretical extension of the OLI model, Cuervo-Cazurra (2012, p.160) 
further points out that the study of EMNCs also ‘draws attention to the existence of 
disadvantages that the OLI framework’s focus on advantages neglect’, because on the 
one hand, EMNCs ‘are more likely to move abroad not only to exploit O advantages 
developed in the home country, but also to reduce O disadvantages’; on the other 
hand, EMNCs ‘may invest abroad to escape L disadvantages at home in the form of 
poor institutions or asphyxiating regulation’.  
 
Henart (2012) also acknowledges the difficulty the OLI model has when explaining 
EMNCs’ foreign investment, especially their intangible-seeking investments in 
developed countries. He extends the framework by arguing that location advantages 
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(CSAs) are not freely available to all firms operating there; EMNCs control location 
advantages at home and use this monopoly power to obtain their FSAs they lack 
through intangible-seeking investments in developed countries, thus competing with 
FSA-rich MNCs (i.e. those from advanced markets) in their home market and then 
internationally. Similarly, Narula (2012) extends the OLI framework by focusing on 
the impact of home country location conditions on the ownership advantages of 
MNCs. It is argued that EMNCs and AMNCs are different in the level of location 
advantages, which leads to different internationalisation patterns. It is predicted that 
as EMNCs evolve, the difference between these two groups will diminish.  
 
In addition to the OLI framework, Cuervo-Cazurra (2012) believe that by studying 
EMNCs’ differing behaviours, ‘unstated assumptions and boundaries’ can be revealed 
to extend existing theories and models, including the product life cycle model, the 
incremental internationalisation process model, internalisation theory, the 
integration/differentiation model, and the resource-based view. By summarising these 
key theories of the MNCs and their extension from the analysis of EMNCs, he 
contends: 
 
Existing models and theories have been developed by observing and analysing 
the behaviour of AMNCs. In many cases, they have taken for granted certain 
conditions of the advanced country and the global environment at the time 
when they studied AMNCs. The analysis of DMNCs can help identify these 
assumptions and extend the predictions of the theories; the interaction between 
theory and observed reality can lead to more powerful explanatory engine… 
(2012, p.158) 
 
To sum up, studying the internationalisation and behaviours of EMNCs could yield 
some new knowledge about MNCs, thus extending existing IB theories.  
 
2.2 Studying EMNCs from an institutional perspective  
 
This section examines existing literature on EMNCs. It first looks at ‘what’ has been 
studied. It reveals that four themes dominate current studies of EMNCs: the motives 
to internationalise, the competitive advantages of EMNCs, their entry strategy, and 
their performance. This section then turns to the ‘how’ question, which shows that 
institutional perspective is advocated as suitable for the study of EMNCs.  
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2.2.1 Dominant themes in current studies  
 
In a review of studies published in top international management journals for the 
period 2000-2010, Jormanainen and Koveshnikov (2012) find that research on 
EMNCs has mainly focused on five topics: EMNCs’ motives of FDI, the investment 
location patterns, their resources and capabilities that enable them to internationalise, 
their entry strategies and their performance. Since Jormanainen and Koveshnikov’s 
review, although studies on EMNCs have been growing rapidly in recent years, they 
have still ‘mainly examined the patterns, motivations, location choices and entry 
model selections of EMNEs’ (Liu et al., 2016, p142). My review indicates that 
existing research on EMNCs largely concentrates on the following four themes: ‘Why 
internationalise?’ (i.e. motives), ‘What enables them to internationalise?’ (i.e. 
capabilities and competitive advantages), ‘Where, when and how to internationalise?’ 
(i.e. locations and entry strategies), and ‘What are the outcomes?’ (i.e. performance).  
 
The motives to internationalise 
 
On the ‘why’ question, following a well established belief that EMNCs 
internationalise to acquire strategic assets in order to overcome latecomer 
disadvantages and address competitive weakness (Agyenim, Wang, & Yang, 2008; 
Boisot & Meyer, 2008; Child & Rodrigues, 2005; Deng, 2009; Li, Li, & Shapiro, 
2012; Luo & Tung, 2007) recent studies have continued to explore the antecedents, 
process, and nature of strategic asset seeking of EMNCs (Anderson, Sutherland, & 
Severe, 2015; Awate, Larsen, & Mudambi, 2015; Liu & Woywode, 2013; Nicholson 
& Salaber, 2013). For example, Zheng et al. (2016)identified the nature of strategic 
assets sought after by Chinese MNCs, and found that Chinese firms seek 
complementary strategic assets in a similar domain, but at a more advanced level, and 
they achieve this through a partnering approach which emphasises limited structural 
integration. Anderson et al. (2015) looked at how Chinese MNCs acquired codified 
strategic assets such as patents for the purpose of imitation and exploitation in the 
domestic Chinese market, and Cui et al. (2014) found that Chinese MNCs’ strategic 
asset seeking intent is influenced by three factors: their exposure to foreign 
competition, their governance structure, and relevant financial and managerial 
capabilities. 
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Another related often-discussed motive for EMNCs to internationalise is knowledge 
seeking. Previous studies have found that given their disadvantaged competitive 
position, EMNCs tend to adopt learning-based knowledge-seeking strategies in order 
to improve their technological and commercial capabilities (Luo & Tung, 2007; 
Makino, Lau, & Yeh, 2002; Mathews, 2006, 2002; Narula, 2012; Rugman, 2009). 
Following this line of enquiry, recent studies have continued to examine the 
international knowledge-seeking activities and knowledge flows of EMNCs (Awate et 
al., 2015; Giuliani et al., 2014; Jindra, Hassan, & Cantner, 2016; Liu & Giroud, 2016; 
Nair, Demirbag, & Mellahi, 2015; Thite et al., 2016). For example, Jindra et al. 
(2016) reveal that agglomeration economies and knowledge externalities in the EU 
have attracted OFDI from EMNCs because they are considered as potential sources to 
propel learning and technological catch- up, and a study by Thite et al. (2016) shows 
how Indian firms become global players by leveraging on their learning through 
acquisitions in developed markets. 
 
The capabilities and competitive advantages of EMNCs 
 
Academics have not recognised the fact the EMNCs have competitive advantages in 
the global market until recently (Williamson et al., 2013). It was generally believed 
that their success originates from the ‘country-specific advantages’ (CSAs) such as 
cheap labour and natural resources, not firm-specific ownership advantages ( Rugman 
& Verbeke, 2001; Rugman, 2009). However, this view has been challenged by a 
growing body of studies that draw a similar conclusion; that is, EMNCs do possess 
ownership advantages, but they are different from that observed in western firms (e.g. 
Rammaurti, 2009, 2012, 2013). Although most EMNCs lack traditional ownership 
advantages such as cutting-edge technology and strong brands, the special types of 
advantages they have such as their flexible approach to products and to cater for 
customers’ needs, their ability to function in a unstable institutional environment, and 
their innovative capabilities contribute to their global success (Cuervo-Cazurra & 
Genc, 2008; Govindarajan & Ramamurti, 2011; Guillén & García-Canal, 2009; 
Williamson et al., 2013)  In recent years, more studies have been conducted along 
these lines (Bhaumik et al., 2016; Hashai & Buckley, 2014; Kim, Hoskisson, & Lee., 
2015; Kirca, Fernandez, & Kundu, 2014). 
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In a volume edited by Williamson et al. (2013), the authors examined the three 
potential sources of EMNCs’ competitive advantages (i.e. innovation, value-chain 
configuration, and cross-border merger and acquisitions) in Brazil, Russia, India and 
China, and found that these three factors ‘closely interact to facilitate the process of 
learning and to transform that learning into new capabilities that can then be exploited 
for competitive advantage both in their home market and in foreign markets’. 
Therefore, EMNCs do have their own firm-specific advantages, and for most of them, 
internationalisation is ‘as much about accessing new resources and knowledge to 
enable them to extend their competitive advantages, as it is a route to exploiting 
existing advantages over a larger set of markets’ (Williamson et al., 2013, p.291).  
 
Surveying 61 Brazilian multinationals, Fleury et al. (2013) identified their four 
approaches to innovation, i.e. business models, customization of products and services 
for niche markets, product innovation in global value chains, and commodity 
innovation, and claimed that Brazilian firms’ internationalisation process relies on 
their innovation capability. The authors argued that although Brazilian firms do not 
possess strength in R&D, they ‘are able to combine skillfully their organizational 
competences, manage to develop innovative capabilities which allow them to 
internationalize successfully’ (2013, p.260). 
 
Entry strategies 
 
Previous studies have examined EMNCs’ different organisational modes for 
international expansion and various factors that contribute to their strategies. For 
example, various studies have revealed that aggressive M&As are particularly 
favoured by EMNCs and this makes them very different from AMNCs (Aybar & 
Ficici, 2009; Deng, 2009; Gubbi et al., 2010). Authors have investigated different 
factors, particularly institutional factors to explain EMNCs’ choice of entry mode 
(e.g. Ang & Michailova, 2008). For example, with reference to EMNCs’ preference 
for M&As, it is argued that such entry mode is an outcome of firms taking advantage 
of political and financial support from the government and avoiding ‘institutional 
voids’ of their home country environments (e.g. Deng 2009). In terms of location 
choice, studies focus on EMNCs’ strategic motivations in making the choice (e.g. 
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Demirbag & Glaister, 2010; Miller et al., 2008). For example, Li and Yao (2010) 
discussed the imitation effect among Chinese MNCs and Miller et al. (2008) argue for 
the critical role of location in Latin American banks’ survival.  
 
Studies of EMNCs entry strategies in recent years have continued the tradition of 
identifying patterns and analysing factors. Whilst Jindra et al. (2016) discuss how 
EMNCs’ location choices are positively affected by agglomeration economies and 
knowledge externalities, Wei et al. (2014) look at how internal factors (i.e. 
productivity, technology-based capability, and export experience), industry entry 
barriers, and institutional environment (i.e. subnational institutions, and intermediary 
institutional support) affect Chinese firms’ decisions on the entry mode.  
 
In these studies, institutional factors are frequently examined. For example, Lu et al. 
(2014a) study the moderating effects of home country government support and host 
country institutions on Chinese firms’ FDI location choices, and Meyer et al. (2014) 
reveal that Chinese state-owned enterprises are subject to more complex institutional 
pressures in host countries than private firms, due to a weak legitimacy of ‘state 
ownership’ in some countries; and accordingly they adapt their foreign entry 
strategies in order to reduce potential conflicts and to enhance their legitimacy.  
 
The performance of EMNCs 
 
The performance of EMNCs has been an important topic for researchers. Whilst some 
researchers have focused on whether mergers and acquisitions by EMNCs lead to 
value destruction or value creation (e.g. Aybar & Ficici, 2009; Gubbi et al., 2010; Rui 
& Yip, 2008) others have examined the overall internationalisation performance of 
these firms (e.g. Chittoor & Ray, 2007; Contractor, Kumar, & Kundu, 2007). In 
addition, various factors that affect EMNCs’ performance have been discussed, such 
as the firms’ network capabilities (Musteen, Francis, & Datta, 2010), adaptive 
capabilities (Lu, et al., 2010), realised absorptive capacity (Kotabe, Jiang, & Murray, 
2010), and alliance experience in home countries (Thomas et al., 2007).  
 
Dealing with similar topics, studies in recent years have continued to contribute to a 
better understanding of EMNCs performance in international markets ( Liu et al., 
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2016b; Narula, 2015; Wu et al., 2016; Yuan, Pangarkar, & Wu, 2016). For example, 
Du and Boateng (2015) looked at the value creation in Chinese firms’ cross-border 
acquisitions activities, and Wu and Voss (2015) discussed the relationship between 
absorptive capacity and the international performance of Chinese firms. Whilst 
Sanfilippo (2015) found that EMNCs operating in Europe are at the bottom of the 
productivity ladder, with an average productivity gap of around 30 percentage points 
compared to more established competitors, Bello et al. (2016) recognise the critical 
role of innovative services and firms’ capabilities (i.e. entrepreneurial orientation of 
management and expert human capital) in the performance of professional service 
firms from India.  
 
Given the extant literature’s dominant focus on these four themes, studies exploring 
management issues at a more micro level are rare. Even for Chinese MNCs, which are 
the most heavily studied compared with other EMNCs, research on micro-level 
management issues is limited (e.g. Smith & Zheng, 2016; Zhu & Wei, 2014). 
According to Deng (2012), issues such as organisational design and structure (e.g. 
expatriate management, multinational team management), and subsidiary role and 
control are largely ignored. According to the author, research on the 
internationalisation of Chinese MNCs to date has been ‘fragmented and piecemeal’, 
and many theoretical and empirical areas have been ‘significantly underinvestigated’. 
More longitudinal, qualitative work and multi-level studies are suggested in this 
regard.  
 
2.2.2 Studying EMNCs studies from an institutional perspective  
 
One of the central threads when discussing the above themes (i.e. the motives, the 
capabilities and competitive advantages, the entry strategies, and the performance), is 
how institutional environments at home affect EMNCs in these four areas. A general 
observation about EMNCs is that they behave differently from AMNCs (e.g. Guillen 
& Garcia-Canal, 2009; Ramamurti, 2012), and a growing body of studies attributes 
such difference to where they come from (e.g. Luo & Tung, 2007). Therefore, an 
institutional perspective is advocated by a number of authors as a fruitful approach to 
study EMNCs (e.g. Cuervo-Cazurra, 2012). This is in line with the broader 
discussions of placing ‘contextual variations at the centre of explanations of business 
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phenomena’ in ‘emerging economy business research’ (Meyer & Peng, 2016, p.3) and 
in ‘strategy research in emerging economies’ (Hoskisson et al., 2000; Wright et al., 
2005).  
 
Hoskisson et al. (2000, p. 253), for instance, highlight the potential importance of 
institutional theory for explaining firm behaviours in emerging economies. They 
argue that emerging economies are ‘characterized by trends towards "marketization" 
and privatization but still heavily regulated’; because of the speed and nature of 
institutional change and the impact on firms’ strategy, they ‘provide the necessary 
institutional influences in developing and testing theories’. They suggest:  
 
In the early stages of market emergence, institutional theory is preeminent in 
helping to explain impacts on enterprise strategies. This is because 
government and societal influences are stronger in these emerging economies 
than in developed economies. (2000, p.252) 
 
Meyer and Peng (2016) propose an institution-based view when conducting emerging 
economy business research, including studying MNCs from these countries. They 
argue that the business environments of emerging economies ‘are characterized by 
diversity and instability’, and context-specificity should become ‘a defining feature of 
emerging economy business research’ (ibid, p.16). Furthermore, they contend that the 
institution-based view has become ‘an integrative paradigm’, and its significance lies 
in ‘its challenge to context-free approaches to building theory in management 
research’ (ibid, p.14). Therefore, they suggest, one way to advance the emerging 
economy business research agenda is to explore ‘how firms engage with different sets 
of potentially conflicting institutions at multiple levels and locations’ (ibid, p.3).  
 
Such an institution-based view, when adopted in the study of internationalisation of 
EMNCs, is to examine the distinctive characteristics of the institutional environments 
at home, and analyse how they influence the behaviours of EMNCs. The key to using 
EMNCs to extend theory, Cuervo-Cazurra (2012, p.163) suggests, is to ‘focus on their 
uniqueness – the country of origin – and study how this affects their global strategy’.  
 
In sum, the ability to use DMNCs (developing country multinational 
companies) to extend theory depends on whether researchers focus on the 
specific differential conditions of the home country and how these affect the 
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internationalisation of the firm, or whether they merely analyze how DMNCs 
behave. What sets DMNCs apart as a different phenomenon is their country of 
origin. Studies of DMNCs that want to extend theory by using them as a 
laboratory need to be explicit about which conditions of the country of origin 
they study and explain how they impact firm behavior. The question that 
researchers need to ask when analyzing DMNCs is whether the same 
arguments, logic, and behavior can be found in AMNCs. If the answer is yes, 
the study is not about DMNCs but MNCs that happen to come from 
developing countries. (2012, p.162) 
 
A review of existing literature in EMNCs shows that the role of home country 
institutions has been studied mainly from two angles: home country institutions as 
capabilities and ownership advantage builder, and home country institutions as 
escapism driver.  
 
Institutions as advantages builder 
 
Discussions on EMNCs internationalisation tend to be associated with answering a 
basic question: what are the firm-specific advantages (FSAs)? In most cases, the 
answers are related to another concept, i.e. country-specific advantages (CSAs). To 
many researchers, what makes EMNCs fundamentally different from AMNCs is their 
home country environments, which endow them with distinctive CSAs; such CSAs 
lead to a unique set of FSAs for firms, which further result in different patterns and 
features of internationalisation (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2012; Fleury & Fleury, 2014; Fleury 
et al., 2013; Ramamurti, 2012; Rugman & Nguyen, 2014; Rugman, 2010; Rugman & 
Li, 2007). 
 
Based on Rugman’s (2006, 1981) CSA-FSA framework, it is argued that successful 
MNCs, no matter where they come from, are often built on interaction between strong 
CSAs and strong FSAs; and when they go abroad, they need to transfer their FSAs 
from the home country to host country. Given the large distance in the conditions of 
these countries that hinders such transfer, MNCs also need to develop host country-
based FSAs.  
 
Using the CSA-FSA framework to analyse EMNCs, Rugman and colleagues 
(Rugman, 2010; Rugman & Li, 2007; Rugman & Nguyen, 2014) argue that  
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EMNCs largely rely on their CSAs such as natural resources, low capital costs, low 
labor cost and government support to develop their FSAs. They point out that EMNCs 
build their FSAs primarily through ‘recombinations with the complementary assets of 
home CSAs’. Therefore, EMNCs ‘ follow a linear one-way street from home CSAs to 
home-country-based FSAs, but go off the tracks in seeking to develop host-country-
based FSAs’ (Rugman & Nguyen, 2014, p.53).  
 
These home-country-developed and home-country-based FSAs possessed by EMNCs, 
Williamson (2015) observes, include ‘capabilities for cost innovation’, ‘efficiently 
unlocking latent demand in low-end segment’, ‘optimising products and processes for 
emerging markets’, ‘dealing with weak institutions and infrastructure’ and ‘optimising 
their value chains globally in ways that allow their low-cost talent and resources to be 
leveraged effectively in emerging markets’ (Cuervo-Cazurra & Genc, 2008; Morck, 
Yeung, & Zhao, 2008; Prahalad, 2006;  Ramamurti & Singh, 2009; Williamson & 
Zeng, 2009; Williamson et al., 2013; Zeng & Williamson, 2007) 
 
Thus, an underlying argument made by home country institutions as FSAs builder 
thesis is that the home country institutions affect the internationalisation of EMNCs 
by defining their capabilities and their ownership advantages, which EMNCs go 
abroad to further develop and to exploit.  
 
Institutions as escapism driver 
 
Home country institutions are not always positive, and studies have revealed that 
going abroad can be an escape response to home country institutional constraints for 
MNCs (Caves, 1996; Gordon & Hines, 2002; Schoppa, 2006; Witt & Lewin, 2007). 
For instance, Witt and Lewin (2007) suggest that escape is a possible outcome of 
responses by firms to misalignment between their needs and the institutional 
environment at home. To avoid such misalignment and associated costs, firms shift 
some of their activities or assets to another institutional environment through OFDI.  
 
Given the underdeveloped and unstable institutional environment in most emerging 
markets, using internationalisation as a means to escape the domestic environment 
seems to be particularly relevant to EMNCs from these economies (Cuervo-Cazurra, 
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2016; Fleury et al., 2013; Le & Zak., 2006; Liang, Lu, & Wang, 2012; Luo & Tung, 
2007; Makino et al., 2002; Mathews, 2006b) 
 
Luo and Tung (2007, p.486), for example, contend that EMNCs ‘use international 
expansion as a springboard to alleviate domestic institutional constraints’, which 
include institutional voids such as ‘lack of legal protection for property rights, poor 
enforcement of commercial laws, non-transparent judicial and litigation systems, 
underdeveloped factor markets, and inefficient market intermediaries’ and political 
hazards such as ‘political instability, unpredictable regulatory changes, government 
interference, bureaucratic red tape, corruption in public service and government 
sectors, and extremely discretionary explanation or enforcement of ambiguous laws 
and rules’. These domestic institutional constraints, they argue, undermine the 
competitiveness of the firms, and propel them to go to another more efficient, 
transparent and encouraging institutional environment. In this way, they suggest, 
EMNCs are able to ‘concentrate on building, exploiting and upgrading their 
competitive advantages in international markets’. Le and Zak (2006) empirically 
demonstrate that political instability, economic risk, and policy uncertainty drive 
capital flight in developing countries. 
 
Focusing on EMNCs from Latin America, Cuervo-Cazurra (2016) looks at four 
distinctive characteristics for their home countries, i.e. political uncertainty, violence, 
pro-market reforms and reversals, and geographic isolation, and examines how these 
home country conditions become ‘the escape driver’ and induce firms’ 
internationalisation. An extreme case cited by the author is that the rum producer 
Bacardi relocated from Cuba to the Dominican Republic after the revolution in Cuba 
in order to escape the new government policies (Inamete, 2014).  
 
However, no matter whether institutions are studied as advantage builder or escapism 
driver, a thorough examination of these studies reveals that they are often 
underpinned by an assumption of the deterministic nature of the institutional 
environments. For instance, Cuervo-Cazurra (2012) argues that poor governance, high 
uncertainty and fewer rights and freedoms in developing countries mean that EMNCs 
become resilient to the uncertainty and volatility and accustomed to poor governance 
and regulation. Accordingly, when it comes to internationalisation, EMNCs enter 
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advanced economies with resilient innovations that address extreme conditions, and 
they tend to exercise higher levels of control in their foreign operations. Similarly, 
Fleury and Fleury (2014) argue that distinctive home country institutions in Brazil 
(i.e. the industrialization policies, macroeconomic policies, and the Brazilian cultural 
legacies) on the one hand, have led to Brazilian MNCs’ firm-specific advantage 
which is based on manufacturing excellence and mainly derived from innovative 
business models; on the other hand, they resulted in Brazilian firms’ concentration on 
low-tech industries, resistance to long term investments, and conservative and risk-
averse decision making.  
 
To these authors, home institutional environments play critical roles in the 
internationalisation of EMNCs in the way they determine the capabilities and 
behaviours of EMNCs. However, it is largely unclear how this happens. Without 
specifying the agency of corporate actors and their interactions with specific aspects 
of institutions, such arguments are more like assumptions and fail to offer any 
valuable insights.  
 
2.3 The role of home country institutions in general MNCs study  
 
This section investigates how the role of home country institutions has been studied in 
general MNCs literature. It starts with studies adopting a comparative institutional 
perspective to examine home country effect in MNCs; then it focuses on a relatively 
new and small body of literature advocating an actor-centred approach to study the 
dynamic relations between institutions and actors.  
 
2.3.1 Comparative institutional analysis and home country institutions  
 
It has been argued that MNCs are deeply rooted in the institutional environments of 
their home country, and their behaviours are influenced by the institutional 
arrangements at home. Much research has identified distinctive patterns of the 
international management approach, particularly in the area of human resources 
management, taken by MNCs of different nationalities (Almond et al., 2005; Edwards 
& Ferner, 2004; Ferner, Quintanilla, & Varul, 2001; Ferner, 1997; Harzing, 1999; 
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Noorderhaven & Harzing, 2003; Pudelko & Harzing, 2007; Tüselmann, McDonald, & 
Thorpe, 2006). 
 
This distinctive strand of studies has been conducted to examine the role of home 
country institutions in shaping MNCs’ behaviours, a phenomenon labelled as the 
‘home country effect’. Although the home country effect has been conceptualised in 
different ways (Zhu, Zhu, & Cieri, 2014), sometimes manifested by consequence of 
ownership nationality (e.g. Bae, Chen, & Lawler, 1998; Harzing, 1999; Wang, Clegg, 
& Kafouros, 2009), and at other times manifested by transfer of home-country 
practices (e.g. Collings, 2003; Ferner et al., 2001), transfer of management ethos (e.g. 
Almond et al., 2005; Tüselmann et al., 2006), and competitive disadvantage (e.g. Zhu 
et al., 2014), studies examining the home country effect often share a similar belief, 
that is, nations vary in the way economic activities are organised, and the firms’ 
strategies, structures and management practice correspond to national institutional 
arrangements. With reference to MNCs, their behaviours at international level are 
informed by management routines developed at home and are influenced by the home 
country’s institutional environments (Morgan, Kristensen, & Whitley, 2001; Morgan, 
2007b, 2011; Whitley, 2001). For this reason, MNCs from the same institutional 
environment are expected to display patterns of similarities in managing their 
overseas operations, particularly in the field of human resources management.  
 
For example, the literature generally indicates that Japanese MNCs tend to adopt a 
highly centralised management approach and heavily rely on expatriates to manage 
their overseas operation; MNCs from liberal market economies such as the UK and 
US typically appear to manage their overseas subsidiaries through budget-setting and 
monitoring systems and tight financial and performance control; and German MNCs, 
influenced by the long-termism in their home environment, have much fewer short-
term performance requirements, and rely less on formal financial control measures, 
but more on formal feedback and communications.   
 
These discussions on home country effect in MNCs often adopt a comparative 
institutional perspective, which examines how institutions across several economic 
domains interact to form distinctive national systems, and how such national systems 
affect the strategy, structure, and organisation of firms and the interrelationships 
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between firms (Amable, 2003; Hall & Soskice, 2001; Whitley, 1999).  Several more 
specific research programmes, such as the varieties of capitalism approach (Hall & 
Soskice, 2001; Hancke, Rhodes, & Thatcher, 2007), the national business systems 
approach (Whitley, 1999, 2007), the regulation school approach (Amable, 2003; 
Boyer & Drache, 1996; Hollingsworth & Boyer, 1997), and the societal effects school 
approach (Maurice & Sorge, 2000; Sorge, 2005) have been taken in regard to this 
research agenda. In general, these authors share a similar focus on the ‘system’ nature 
of institutional arrangement and focus on how these institutional arrangements lead to 
the emergence of special types of firms, with distinctive forms of configuration of 
labour, management, capital, inter-firm relations, and innovation (Morgan, 2011).  
 
For instance, Hall and Soskice (2001) make distinctions between liberal market 
economies and coordinated market economies. Four institutional domains, namely 
financial systems and corporate governance, industrial relations, education and 
training systems, and the inter-company system have been discussed to show how 
firms are embedded in an institutional context that define their incentives and 
constraints. For instance, according to the authors, in liberal market economies, such 
as the US and UK, the market plays the dominant role in coordinating economic 
behaviour, and they are, therefore, characterised by short-term oriented company 
finance, a deregulated labour market, general education and strong inter-company 
competition. Firms in liberal market economies can benefit from the institutional 
advantage of radical forms of innovation. On the contrary, firms from coordinated 
market economies, such as Germany and Sweden, benefit from the competitive 
advantage of incremental forms of innovation, provided by institutional contexts 
characterised by long-term industrial finance, cooperative industrial actions, high 
levels of vocational and firm specific training, and close collaboration among 
companies.  
 
Whitley’s (1999) ‘national business system’ framework extends the impact of 
institutions on firms at national level to international level, and can be used to predict 
the behaviours of MNCs in foreign contexts.  Whitley (2001) identifies three types of 
business environment: Particularistic, Collaborative and Arm’s length, and argues 
that they generate three ideal types of firms with distinctive characteristics (i.e. 
opportunistic, cooperative hierarchy, and isolated  hierarchy), which pursue 
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particular patterns of internationalisation strategies. For example, opportunistic firms, 
which are products of particularistic business environments, tend to adopt flexibility 
and responsive competitive strategies because of the unpredictable environmental 
changes. Ownership control is typically direct and personal, and they barely develop 
complex and stable organisational capabilities for managing activities and resources 
across geographic boundaries. Thus, in terms of internationalisation strategies, 
opportunistic firms have limited willingness to transfer or invest major resources into 
different kinds of business system; rather, they tend to invest in geographically or 
culturally proximate territories so that close supervision and tight control can be 
exercised. To summarise, Whitley (2001, p.38) states: 
 
‘These environments are dominated by different institutional arrangements 
controlling access to capital and skills that encourage different ways of 
coordinating and controlling economic activities, and hence lead to contrasting 
strategic priorities, forms of owner control and authority-sharing, and varied 
collective competencies. Firms’ management of risks, perceptions of dominant 
interests, and competitive strategies all differ as a result and affect their 
predilection for, and management of, internationalization.’  
 
Studies on the role of home country institutions from a comparative institutional 
perspective generally stress the prerequisite importance of the home country’s 
institutional environments for MNCs, and make connections between the firms’ 
behaviours and the features of dominant institutions. However, my review indicates 
that most of the studies suffer from a lack of systematic analysis on institutional 
settings and their impact on the behaviours of MNCs, and only achieve the task of 
revealing the observable patterns of management in MNCs from a certain country. 
They fail to, first, identity what the elements of national business system they referred 
to, and second, provide detailed accounts of how these elements influence the 
behaviours of the firms. For example, in Harzing and Sorge’s (2003, p. 206) 
important study, they compare the organisational control practices in European, US 
and Japanese MNCs, and find that ‘control mechanisms remain firmly and primarily 
impregnated by the country of origin’; however, such a claim is questionable since it 
reveals nothing about the institutional environments of the home country, and it fails 
to confirm why such differences in control practice can be attributed to the country of 
origin; and if they do, in what way.  
 
 
26 
Edwards and Kuruvilla (2005) also observe the inadequate conceptualisation of 
national influence. They point out that a particular problem in many studies of the 
home country effect is their failure to locate themselves in a detailed account of the 
national systems of HRM in question. One example they refer to is the study of Bird 
et al. (1998) in which they claim that some Japanese MNCs have undertaken  a 
‘wholesale transplant of the HRM system from the parent company to the affiliate’; 
however, they do not describe the Japanese system in sufficient detail, thus remain 
unconvincing.  Ferner et al. (2004a, p. 368) make a similar point. They argue that 
existing literature on the home country effect tends to provide ‘a broad snapshot of 
patterns’, and they contribute such a shortcoming to the overwhelming survey-based, 
quantitative research methods used in these studies.  
 
Two exceptions are worth mentioning here. The first is by Ferner (2000) who looks at 
the embeddedness of US multinational companies in the US business system and the 
implications. In his study, he systematically examines seven domains of the US 
business system, namely: the products market, the role of the state and interest 
associations, financial markets, labour markets, capital and labour, work organisation 
and skill formation, and organisation of the personnel/ IR function, and then relate 
these factors to the behaviours of US MNCs. For example, he argues that the 
American pattern of work organisation has been strongly influenced by the legacy of 
standardised mass production, which provides the habitat for scientific management. 
This, together with other factors, generates a tendency for ‘the codification, 
formalisation and bureaucratisation of management functions’, and as a result, 
‘codified and reproducible management systems exist that can be transferred easily to 
other contexts and which are not highly dependent on tacit knowledge’. In terms of 
international HRM, this can be translated into ‘standardisation and formalisation of 
centrally propagated policies’, and ‘broader management controls and accountability 
as reflected in budgets, plans, etc.’ (2000, p. 36). Through linking these distinctive 
features of various business institutions in US to the behaviours of American MNCs 
in the areas of HRM and industrial relations, the author convincingly demonstrates 
that US multinationals are embedded in their home country business system, and their 
behaviours are affected by the home country institutions.  
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Another good example in successfully building the linkage between the national 
business system and MNCs’ behaviours is provided by Lane (2000), who discusses 
the impact of globalization on the German model of capitalism. Three ‘central 
components’ of the German business system are analysed: the financial system, the 
innovation system, and the industrial relations system. With regard to Germany’s 
financial system, for example, it has been founded on bank credit and an 
underdeveloped stock market, and has fundamentally shaped the pattern of ownership 
and governance of firms. It is believed that such a financial system has formed the 
basis for the long-termism in German firms' investment decisions in capital, labour 
and knowledge, and leads to the notion of stakeholder capitalism. Under the impact of 
globalization, Germany's financial system has witnessed some new development, 
namely the modernization of the German stock market, the Anglo–American model 
and weakening of ties between German banks and firms. Such a new institutional 
arrangement, the author observes, has driven many German MNCs to become quoted 
on the New York Stock Exchange in order to finance their expansion and innovation 
cost, and to pay more attention to shareholder value. In addition, there is also 
organisational restructuring taken by German MNCs to realise a market-oriented 
network structure with more organisational flexibility and financial transparency. 
Although the study does not discuss the home country effect directly, it shows how 
the national business system influences the German MNCs’ strategy and management 
process.  
 
In summary, the role of home country institutions has been studied under the label of 
‘home country effect’ using comparative institutional theories. Such an effect can be 
traced back to the varieties of institutional arrangements in different markets, and 
reflects the resulting difference in the configuration of labour, management, capital, 
inter-firm relations, and innovation. However, a review of literature reveals the 
limitation of existing studies of only providing a broad snapshot of patterns, rather 
than a systematic analysis. To fill these gaps, more efforts are needed to identity 
concerned institutional domains and provide convincing accounts on how these 
institutional domains influence the behaviours of firms.  
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2.3.2 The dynamic relation between institutions and actors  
 
When adopting comparative institutional theories such as the Varieties of Capitalism 
approach (Hall & Soskice, 2001) and the national business system approach 
(Whitley,1999) to analyse the role of home country institutions, existing studies tend 
to treat institutions as a deterministic context for the actions of firms, and firms are 
considered as passive institution-takers. In other words, the relationship between 
institutions and actors is static.  
 
However recently, a growing literature has rejected this notion, and proposed an 
actor-centred, more dynamic relation between institutions and firms. Proponents of 
this approach (e.g. Aoki, 2007; Deeg & Jackson, 2006; Jackson, 2010; Morgan, 2005, 
2007; Streeck & Thelen, 2005) recognise the importance of actors and their creative, 
entrepreneurial nature, and suggest taking a ‘constitutive approach’ to conceptualise 
‘actors and institutions as being mutually interdependent and reflexively intertwined 
with one another’ (Jackson, 2010, p. 65). To this group of researchers, 
institutionalisation is a dynamic and actor-centred social process, and actors have 
skills and capabilities, and are ‘active participants in their own fate’ (Morgan, 2005, 
p.417). Based on this central idea, a number of arguments have been made. 
 
First, they challenge the notion of institutional complementarity in the traditional 
literature, which is commonly recognised as a central idea in institutional analysis. 
Hall and Soskice (2001, p.17) define complementarity as when ‘the presence (of 
efficiency) of one [institution] increases the returns (or efficiency) of the other’ and 
similarly Aoki (1994) defines it as when the enhancement of one will facilitate the 
provision of the other. While Amable (2000) uses the concept to support the 
assumption that the national system should possess overall internal congruence, both 
Deeg (2005) and Whitely  (2005) conceptualise complementarity as ‘a logic of 
synergy’ whereby particular economic rationalities and patterns of behaviour 
encouraged by one  institution domain will influence institutional arrangements in 
another one. Although these definitions may have different emphasis and expressions, 
they share a common implication; that is, strong complementarity between institutions 
gives rise to a strong institutional lock-in and a strong set of ‘rules of the game’ that 
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constrain actions; and because such complementarity arises from path dependency, it 
would be costly to move in a new direction.  
 
However, Morgan (2005) argues that this notion has a number of problems: first, it 
does not consider the capacity of actors to search for new complementarities; second, 
it fails to recognise that new combinations of institutions and contexts can occur. 
According to Morgan, existing institutions or historical institutional legacies can be 
drawn upon to reactivate new types of complementarities, and because institutions in 
a particular society ‘differ in their degree of malleability and significance for the 
dominant social bloc’, new complementarities ‘can be picked out’ (2005, p.441). This 
leads to the next point on how institutions are conceptualised.  
 
Second, the idea of dominant institutions and their constraining and determinative 
nature have been questioned. This group of authors argue for a recognition of 
heterogeneity and diversity of institutions in particular societies. Crouch (2005, p.64) 
suggests describing our societies as ‘containing much internal diversity and 
unresolved contradictions and tensions’.  As Morgan (2007, p.363) puts it: ‘there is no 
single logic in a society but a series of different logics sustained by local and regional 
conditions, by sectoral differentiation, and by social and political factors (e.g. the 
degree of cohesion in particular societies). Sometimes these different logics become 
complementary in the sense of being different but reinforcing. Sometimes these logics 
may be similar. Sometimes these logics may become relatively autonomous and 
deemed irrelevant to economic issues.’ Jackson (2010) introduces the concept of 
institution ambiguity, suggesting that ‘institutions can take on two or more specific 
meanings depending on the situational context’; and because institutions are 
understood in more than one way, gaps between ‘institutionalized expectation’ and 
‘strategic action’ are filled by actors through creative ‘interpretation’, ‘application’, 
and ‘enactment’ in the process of ‘iteration, projection, and evaluation’. Therefore, he 
suggests, ‘no society or business system can be said to empirically consist of fully 
integrated and complementary elements’ (2010, p.78).  
 
These arguments emphasised the multi-dimensions of institutions, thus downplaying 
the determinative nature of institutions. To these authors, institutions are just ‘one 
element of a situation’ (Jackson, 2010, p.77), and ‘an imperfect guide for action’ 
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(Deeg & Jackson, 2006, p.162). Most important, Morgan (2005) argues, they are 
‘weak’ in the sense that ‘they do not have a centre of decision-making’:  
 
‘They grow out of historical circumstance and this means that in any particular 
context, there are a diverse range of institutions, where complementarities are 
many and varied, where not all institutions contribute to this complementarity 
and where the selection pressures on institutions to ‘make’ them contribute are 
weak. There are multiple institutional legacies, memories, and possibilities 
that vary in their significance across institutional contexts… thus firms and 
other actors have diverse options open to them and ‘paths’ are much less 
determined and much more varied (2005, p. 424). ’  
 
Third, with the nature of institutions being reassessed, these authors argue for an 
actor-centred approach to conduct institutional analysis, which ‘allows for the non-
identical nature of those actors across societies, sectors, or over time’ (Jackson, 2010, 
p. 81). Under this approach, actors are regarded as both ‘rule-makers’ and ‘rule-
takers’, being the former but defining their identities and interests based on existing 
rules, and being the latter but modifying or overturning those rules from time to time 
(Jackson, 2010). Here, institutions are defined in terms of a dynamic process of 
institutionalisation, being produced and reproduced by the behaviours of actors, as 
Aoki (2007, p. 8) states: 
 
‘An institution as a summary representation of equilibrium is produced and 
must be repeatedly reproduced as an endogenous outcome of strategy 
interplays of all the agents in the domain…while it appears as if it were an 
external entity beyond their individual control which needs to be taken into 
consideration for individual choices.’  
 
In a similar vein, Hall and Thelen (2005) suggest that institutions are best seen as 
‘resources’ that actors can use to achieve their ends, rather than as a matrix of 
incentives and constraints. Institutions provide opportunities for particular types of 
actions, and actors constantly assess the institutions, test the limits of existing 
institutions, and engage in different types of experimentation, thus becoming what 
Crouch (2005) describes as institutional entrepreneurs.  
 
For this reason, Jackson (2010, p.81) claims that ‘institutions are not the product of 
the same actors playing the same game with different outcomes’; rather, ‘different 
actors may play different games with the same outcomes’.  
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Lastly, there is the question of how actors actually work.  This group of authors has 
made attempts to show how actors initiate and engage in dynamic relations with 
institutions.  Both Jackson (2010) and Streeck and Thelen (2005) emphasise the 
ambiguity of institutions, and thus actors need to constantly reinterpret institutional 
opportunities and constraints, and then adapt or modify institutional rules accordingly. 
 
Morgan (2007) emphasises the diversity of institutions and contends that in any 
particular society, institutions and logics operate at multi-levels, and pull in different 
ways, and actors can use this to develop their own distinctive trajectories. He pays 
particular attention to those ‘partially embedded institutions’, ‘some of which have 
moved from the institutional centre of the periphery, some of which never became 
fully established but were given enough of a life to keep ticking over after the initial 
flush of enthusiasm for their establishment has long passed’, and argues that actors 
can pick up and develop these partially embedded institutions and look for new ways 
to do things (Morgan, 2007, p.361).  
 
Crouch (2005) also emphasises the heterogeneity and diversity of institutions, but 
with the idea of institutional entrepreneurs breaking out from a suboptimal path 
dependence and moving onto a new path. The basic idea of his argument is that there 
is always more than one path of institutional development, and alternatives always 
exist somewhere within an agent’s repertoire. He states (2005, p.88): 
 
‘Path dependence theory necessarily deals only with situations in which actors 
can pursue one and only one path. This has been a useful base for most neo-
institutionalist theory, which assumes, or asserts, that actors are confined to 
one typical course of action, usually dictated to them by their nation-state 
context. However, if we model the responses of entrepreneurial actors, it is 
essential that this assumption is relaxed, since entrepreneurial action consists 
of springing surprises, and clearly this is not possible if actors are constrained 
to one predictable repertoire. If the diversity available to them is very 
extensive, then path dependence does not apply; actors can more or less 
choose as they wish from an open menu of repertoires. Our concern here is 
with the scope for innovation available to actors subject to path dependence 
constraints. This scope can exist if such actors are involved in a small number 
(greater than one) of constraining paths, movement between which is difficult 
but not impossible.’ 
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Based on this, the author extended the path dependence theories, and identified a 
number of path-changing possibilities for actors. For example, actors can use the 
‘hidden or dormant alternatives within their own repertoires’, transfer experience 
from different action spaces, and transfer experience from other agents through 
networks of structured relationships (ibid, p. 99). An important argument made by the 
author concerns the importance of institutional heterogeneity. He argues that 
institutional heterogeneity will facilitate innovation, because it presents actors with 
alternative strategies when existing paths are blocked and it allows actors to make 
new combinations among elements of various paths; therefore, he contends, ‘the more 
heterogeneous the context within which actors operate, the more opportunity they will 
have of encountering practical knowledge which they have not used before in the 
immediate context, but which is part of the more general repertoire they have acquired 
or which is relatively accessible to them’ (ibid, p.71) . 
 
In summary, a recent development in the institutional analysis has challenged the 
conventional view of ‘strong institutions’ and ‘weak actors’. This group of researchers 
maintains that institutions are multi-levelled, contested, and liable to be reconstructed; 
actors are creative, skilled, and entrepreneurial so redefine institutions to pursue their 
interests; and an actor-centred approach is required to study the dynamic process of 
institutionalisation and the relationship between institutions and actors. These 
arguments point to a new approach to study the dynamic relationship between MNCs 
and the home country institutions. Through taking an actor-centred approach in the 
analysis of how country institutions affect the behaviours of MNCs, we might be able 
to generate a deeper understanding of the distinctiveness of the institutional 
environment in society, and the distinctiveness of firms from their particular societies.  
 
2.4 The study of control mechanisms  
 
To explore how home country institutions affect the behaviour of MNCs, researchers 
have examined different aspects of the organisational behaviours of firms, such as 
human resource management (e.g. Ferner et al., 2001; Ferner & Quintanilla, 1998; 
Ferner, 2000), the corporate production systems (e.g. Herrigel, 2010; Herrigel, 
Wittke, & Voskamp, 2013), and the national innovation systems (e.g. Lundvall, 1992; 
Nelson, 1993; Patel & Pavitt, 1991, 1997). In this study, the aspect to be examined is 
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control mechanisms, a topic which has been heavily studied in general MNCs studies 
(Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1989; Belizon, Gunnigle, & Morley, 2013; Brenner & Ambos, 
2013; Ferner et al., 2013; Harzing, 1999; Jaussaud & Schaaper, 2006; Prahalad & 
Doz, 1981; Pudelko & Harzing, 2007). These studies generally point to two issues: 
the varieties of typology of control mechanisms, and a close relation between control 
mechanisms and MNC nationality of origin. Given that the ‘home country effect’ has 
been discussed in the previous section, in this section, my review focuses on different 
types of control mechanisms discussed in existing literature. Particularly, it looks at 
Harzing’s (1999) typology, which will be adopted in this thesis.  
 
The definitions of organisational control vary with different authors, but often point to 
two important elements: the control target and the control goal. According to Child 
(1984, p. 136), for instance, organisational control is ‘a process whereby management 
and other groups are able to initiate and regulate the conduct of activities so that their 
results accord with the goals and expectations by those groups’. Similarly, Snell 
(1992, p. 293) sees organisational control as ‘any process that helps align the actions 
of individuals with the interests of their employing firm’. A more recent definition is 
offered by Cardinal, Sitkin and Long (2010, p. 57), which defines organisational 
control as ‘any process whereby managers direct attention, motivate, and encourage 
organizational members to act in ways desirable to achieving the organization’s 
objectives’. Based on these definitions, organisational members are the control target, 
and the control goal is to regulate their activities and achieve interest alignment 
between organisational members and organisations.  
 
To achieve this goal, organisations develop and use various control mechanisms, 
which refers to ‘the individual molecular units of organizational control (e.g. 
standards, policies, norms) that are applied in control processes’ (Cardinal et al., 
2010, p. 57). They include formal policies (Barnard, 1938; Selznick, 1957), rational-
legal authority and rules (Weber, 1946), cultural norms and rituals (Trice & Beyer, 
1984, 1993), incentive systems (Dale, 1958; Whyte, 1955), direct supervision 
(Mintzberg, 1979), work design such as assembly lines (Richardson, William, & 
Walker, 1948; Taylor, 1911) and others (Cardinal et al., 2010).   
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Efforts have been made by a number of authors to categorise these different 
individual control mechanisms. For example, Ouchi (1977) identifies three types of 
control: behaviour control, output control, and ‘ritual’; Snell’s (1992) categorisation 
includes behaviour control, output control and input control; and Child (1972, 1973) 
makes a distinction between bureaucratic control and centralised control.  Some of the 
often-discussed types of control include the following: 
 
Behaviour control: behaviour control is based on direct and personal surveillance of 
behaviour, and involves monitoring ongoing employee activities in order to get things 
done (Eisenhardt, 1985; Ouchi, 1977; Snell, 1992). It can be achieved by setting up 
rules and procedures, and closely monitoring employees’ compliance with these rules 
and procedures (Cardinal, 2001). In some studies, behaviour control is also referred to 
as structural control, bureaucratic control, or process control (Blau & Scott, 1963; 
Jaeger & Baliga, 1985; Lebas & Weigenstein, 1986; Snell & Youndt., 1995; Turner & 
Makhija, 2006). 
 
Cultural control: cultural control is based on informal socialisation mechanisms 
which aim at creating shared value, beliefs, and understanding among organisational 
members (Govindarajan & Fisher, 1990; Ouchi, 1979, 1980; Rowe & Wright, 1997). 
This type of control is achieved through exercising normative pressure to employees 
to ensure social obligation and inspire goal congruence and common interests among 
organisational members. In some studies, cultural control is also referred to as social 
control, clan control or input control (e.g. Cardinal, 2001; Ouchi, 1979, 1980; Snell, 
1992).  
 
Output control: This type of control focuses on the outcomes and results specified by 
the organisation. Different from behaviour control’s focus on ‘means’, output control 
focuses on ‘ends’ (Eisenhardt 1985; Ouchi 1977, Snell 1992). It can be achieved by 
setting targets and providing rewards/ punishment for success or failure in achieving 
targets (Cardinal 2001; Turner & Makhija, 2006). In some studies, output control is 
also called outcome control (e.g. Brenner & Ambos, 2013; Turner & Makhija, 2006). 
 
As a special form of organisation that comprises ‘geographically dispersed’ subunits 
operating ‘in environments of varying degrees of complexity, heterogeneity, stability, 
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and hostility’ (Baliga & Jaeger., 1984, p. 25), MNCs exercise different types of 
controls to their overseas subsidiaries in order to  ‘reduce the uncertainty of their 
investment’ and ensure that ‘the behaviors originating in separate parts of the 
organization are compatible and support common goals’ (Chang & Taylor, 1999, p. 
542).  
 
Although studies on this topic have been ‘largely atheoretical in nature’ and define 
control in many different ways (Chang & Taylor, 1999, p.542), my review indicates 
that in general control mechanisms have been studied as a tool of integration and 
coordination for MNCs HQs to reduce uncertainty, increase predictability, and ensure 
that ‘behaviours originating in separate parts of the organization are compatible and 
support common organizational goals’ (Egelhoff, 1984, p. 73). Therefore, ‘control’ in 
an MNC context can be considered as the means to achieve the specific ends; that is, 
coordination among and between HQs and different overseas units (Harzing, 1999; 
Schreuder, Spangenberg, & Kunst, 1988). Perhaps it is for this reason that in many 
studies ‘control mechanisms’ and ‘coordination mechanisms’ are sometimes used in 
an interchangeable way (e.g. Martinez & Jarillo, 1989; Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1989). 
 
Martinez and Jarillo’s (1989) review conducted nearly three decades ago still sheds 
light on how control mechanisms have been studied in an MNC context. They trace 
the study on this topic back to Barlow’s work in 1953, which examines structural and 
formal mechanisms that U.S. MNCs use to control their Mexican subsidiaries. This 
was the start of a strand of studies on control mechanisms which concentrate on 
control through organisational structure and other formal mechanisms (Egelhoff, 
1982; Fouraker & Stopford, 1968; Franko, 1976; Stopford & Wells, 1972). 
The second strand of studies, according to Martinez and Jarillo (1989), focuses on the 
study of centralisation of decision making and bureaucratic control. The degree and 
extent of formalisation, centralisation, and standardisation in different MNCs and in 
different functions are key themes of these studies. For example, it was reported that 
financial and R&D are the most centralised functions in MNCs, personnel the least, 
and production and marketing in between. This strand of studies also revealed that 
U.S. MNCs tend to rely more on bureaucratic control through higher formalisation of 
policies and procedures compared to MNCs from other countries such as Japan and 
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Germany (Negandhi & Baliga, 1981; Negandhi & Prasad, 1971), a finding 
consistently echoed by later studies (Ferner et al., 2013, 2001; Ferner, 1997). 
 
The third strand of studies deals with subtle control mechanisms. In this regard, 
special attention has been paid to ‘cultural control’ in Japanese MNCs, which is based 
on the use of expatriates, high frequency of visits, a policy of transfer of managers, 
and a strong socialisation process (Egelhoff, 1984; Jaeger & Baliga, 1985; Jaeger, 
1983).  
 
As pointed out by Cardinal et al. (2010, p.55), extant research on control suffers from 
a lack of conceptual consensus and fragmentation. Although the control literature has 
a long history and strong tradition, it consists of a ‘fragmented and largely 
independent collection of typologies and concepts’, and as a result, control research 
has not ‘coalesced around common frameworks’. Therefore, one important step in 
studying control mechanisms in MNCs seems to be deciding on typology and 
frameworks. Following other important works in this field, this thesis adopts 
Harzing’s (1999) classification. Based on two dimensions, i.e. personal or impersonal, 
and direct or direct, the author produces four types of control mechanisms as shown 
below.  
 Personal/cultural Impersonal/Bureaucratic/Technocratic 
Direct/Explicit Personal centralised control Bureaucratic formalised control 
Indirect/Implicit  Control by socialisation and 
networks 
Output control 
 
Figure 2.1: Classification of control mechanism on two dimensions (Harzing, 1999) 
 
 
Personal centralised control  
 
Control mechanisms in this category are mainly concerned with centralised decision 
making and personal surveillance of their execution. This type of control is similar to 
what other authors refer to as centralisation (Child 1973; Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1989), 
direct supervision (Mintzberg, 1979, 1983), and personal supervision (Blau & Scott, 
1963).  
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In the case of MNCs, personal centralised control can be reflected by the fact that 
decision-making is centralised in HQs, leaving little autonomy to subsidiaries, and 
large numbers of expatriates are designated to work in overseas subsidiaries. In some 
studies, particularly about Japanese MNCs, centralised decision making and use of 
expatriates are coupled and supplemented with each other. For example, Morgan et al. 
(2003) report that in Japanese banks, while ultimate decision-making powers in most 
cases rested with head office, many Japanese managers are staffed in the UK 
subsidiary, acting as gatekeepers in this process and their UK colleagues depend on 
them to get approval. Through these actions, the expatriates closely control the 
subsidiary operation in line with the requirements and expectations of HQs. This 
makes Ferner (1997, p. 22) claim that ‘the foremost characteristic of Japanese 
companies…is the strong but informal centralised coordination of their foreign 
operations, highly reliant on establishing an international network of Japanese 
expatriate managers’. Bartlett and Ghoshal (1989) also suggest that centralisation is 
the dominant type of control mechanism in Japanese MNCs.  
 
Bureaucratic formalised control 
 
Control mechanisms falling into this category are indirect and impersonal. A key 
feature of this type of control is concerned with the high degree of formalisation and 
standardisation through written rule procedures. This type of control is also labeled by 
other authors as ‘rules and regulations’ (Blau & Scott, 1963), ‘paper system’ 
(Lawrence & Borsch, 1967), ‘standardisation of work process’ (Mintzberg, 1979), and 
‘formalisation’ (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1989). Edstrom and Galbraith (1977, p. 250) 
refer to this type of control as ‘ a mechanism to control behaviour indirectly by 
relying upon procedures and records as methods of limiting discretion’ and Martinez 
and Jarillo (1989) include such devices as written definitions of jobs, procedures and 
rules to their category of formalisation and standardisation. Studies generally indicate 
that U.S. MNCs rely more on this type of control with formalised, codified and 
standardised global policies and monitoring systems (e.g. Ferner et al., 2013;  
Harzing, Sorge, & Paauwe, 2002).  
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Control by socialisation and networks 
 
Control mechanisms in this category are said to be informal, subtle and sophisticated, 
and are similar to what I have discussed as cultural control, or social/clan control. The 
author identifies three subcategories in this large group: socialisation (e.g. 
value/vision/mission statements, selection, internal transfer); informal, lateral or 
horizontal exchange of information (e.g. daily communication, feedback, training, 
meeting); and formalised lateral or cross-departmental relations (e.g. task force, cross-
functional teams). A common goal of these wide ranging mechanisms is that through 
socialisation, communication and formalised relations, a homogeneous culture is built 
within the organisation and employees share the common organisational values and 
goals.  
 
Output control  
 
Consistent with what has been discussed, control mechanisms in this category are 
concerned with outcomes and results, and may include detailed figures about sales, 
productivity and investments, and goals setting. Some other authors associate this 
type of control with ‘planned targets’ (Galbraith, 1973), ‘result’ (Merchant, 1985, 
1996), ‘performance records’ (Blau & Scott, 1963), and ‘coordination by plan’ 
(Thompson, 1967). 
 
Harzing’s typology provides a useful framework to discuss different types of control 
mechanisms used by MNCs to control their overseas subsidiaries. In particular, it 
highlights a particular control mechanism, that is, expatriate. Based on this model, the 
use of expatriates falls into the ‘personal centralised control’ category; however, 
expatriates are considered to ‘effectuate’ other types of control, such as bureaucratic 
formalised control and cultural control.  
 
Such conceptualisation clarifies some of the confusion and helps us to better 
understand the role of expatriates discussed in other studies.  For example, it has been 
discovered that MNCs consider sending expatriates abroad as an effective way to 
control and coordinate overseas operations (Belderbos & Heijltjes, 2005; Kabst, 2004; 
O’Donnell, 2000). This could be expatriates exercising personal supervision (i.e. 
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personal centralised control); it could also be monitoring their compliance to rules and 
procedures (e.g. bureaucratic formalised control). It is also argued that expatriates 
have a good understanding and buy-in of the HQ’s procedures, values and goals (Doz 
& Prahalad, 1986; Kobrin, 1988). Therefore, employing expatriates is one of the most 
effective ways to exercise behaviour and cultural control at subsidiaries (Chang & 
Taylor, 1999; Groot & Merchant, 2000; Rosenzweig & Singh, 1991).  
 
However, one problem about Harzing’s classification is that because this model is 
developed to specifically examine the relations between HQs and overseas 
subsidiaries, it might miss out some mechanisms that MNCs use to target employees 
at headquarters. For example, MNCs might use high salary and good career 
development opportunities to regulate employee behaviour, and under such 
circumstances, related devices would be considered as a particular type of control 
mechanism. However, it would be difficult to locate them in Harzing’s typology. 
They are neither about rules and procedures (i.e. bureaucratic formalised control), nor 
about target (i.e. output control); and they are obviously not personal centralised 
control, or control by socialisation and networks. They are closer to cultural controls; 
that is, they control employees’ behaviours through creating a culture of working 
hard, earning more, and developing fast. In this sense, they belong to Harzing’s fourth 
type, i.e. control by socialisation and networks.  
 
2.5 An analytical framework  
 
So far, my literature review has concentrated on three areas: EMNCs, the role of 
home country institutions in general MNCs study, and the study of control 
mechanisms. This review highlights the following points. First, existing IB theories 
fail to fully explain the behaviours of EMNCs; for this reason, the study of EMNCs 
provides an opportunity for theoretical extension.  
 
Second, studies on EMNCs so far have pointed to the prominent role of home country 
institutional environments in shaping EMNCs’ behaviours. However, institutions tend 
to be studied as deterministic contexts without paying attention to the agency of firms. 
Furthermore, existing studies are mainly concerned with such high-level issues as 
internationalisation motives, competitive advantages, entry strategies, and 
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performance. We know very little about micro-level management issues such as how 
EMNCs actually organise their work activities, and manage their employees.  
 
Third, the role of home country institutions has been widely discussed in general 
MNCs study; however, most of the studies only provide a snapshot of patterns of such 
influence, and fail to clarify which element of institutions and how they shape the 
behaviours of firms. Furthermore, similar to the case of EMNCs, a deterministic view 
of institutions also dominates these studies, neglecting the process of interactions 
between institutions and corporate actors.  
 
These three arguments on EMNCs and home country institutions pose a couple of 
important questions: How do EMNCs organise work and manage their employees 
globally? Why do they manage in this way? How do home country institutions affect 
the way of management? How do we interpret this phenomenon with reference to 
existing IB theories and MNC theories?  
 
Answering these questions highlights the need to study the process of home country 
institutions shaping firms’ behaviours in EMNCs contexts. To capture this process, 
this thesis follows the suggestion of Child and Rodrigues (2005) and uses a single 
case of a Chinese firm to make such an attempt. According to Child and Rodrigues, 
studying the internationalisation of Chinese MNCs would offer an opportunity to 
extend present theorizing in home country effects, particularly through looking at the 
following two areas: institutional analysis and the role of government, and the 
relations between entrepreneurs and institutions.  
 
Firstly, they emphasised the role of institutional environments in the 
internationalisation of Chinese MNCs. They suggest that ‘the process of 
internationalization by Chinese firms appears to be significantly impacted by 
institutional factors’ (ibid, p.404). ‘A specific issue raised by consideration of Chinese 
internationalization’, they argue, ‘concerns the extent to which the pattern of firm 
internationalization is institutionally embedded rather than reflecting a strategic 
choice by the leaders of firms’. And their analysis concludes that ‘although the 
motivation to internationalize among Chinese firms can be explained in terms of the 
same strategic factors that apply to western firms, namely the need to compete by 
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exploiting or seeking assets, the decisions that they make about the pattern of 
internationalization will be informed by established mind-sets and existing practice, 
reinforced by institutional norms’ (ibid, p.405).  
 
Secondly, they point to the role of agency of Chinese firms and managers, or 
‘institutional entrepreneurship’ in Chinese firms’ internationalisation process. They 
observe that ‘the Chinese entrepreneurs who have successfully steered their 
companies into internationalization appear to have found ways of accommodating to 
the institutional embeddedness that remains in China’. They suggest that the China 
case ‘calls into question assumptions widely made by institutional theorists 
themselves that institutional dependence means path dependence and a constraint 
upon the exercise of entrepreneurship by the firms concerned’ (2005, p.404). They 
further suggest that ‘it is likely that the interaction between the institutional legacies 
of developing economies and the dynamic capabilities of their corporate entrepreneurs 
will be crucial for understanding the internationalization strategies that the latter 
pursue’ (ibid, p.405).  
 
Thus, to make a contribution to the theoretical extension, one potentially fruitful 
approach to study Chinese MNCs is to capture the uniqueness of institutional 
environments in China, and examine how firms, as institutional entrepreneurs, engage 
themselves with these institutional settings and turn those available institutional 
opportunities and constraints into resources, thus developing their unique business 
strategies and management systems in the process of internationalisation. To this end, 
this thesis focuses on control mechanisms, and explores how Chinese MNCs control 
their overseas operations and employees by various mechanisms, and how such a 
control system has been established in a unique Chinese institutional setting. An 
analytical framework is developed (see Figure 2.2 on next page) to guide the process 
of research.  
 
Based on this framework, MNCs’ control strategy is the outcome of the interactions 
between institutional environments and corporate actors, and the resulting control 
strategy impacts the working life of employees in different ways. This framework 
highlights two tasks of this thesis.  
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Figure 2.2: An analytical framework for the study of home country institutions and the 
behaviours of EMNCs 
 
First, it seeks to provide detailed accounts on how Chinese MNCs manage their 
overseas operations and employees. To achieve the goal, this thesis examines a wide 
range of control mechanisms used by the company to manage the overseas 
subsidiaries; and most importantly, discusses how employees respond to these control 
mechanisms.  
 
Secondly, this thesis seeks to capture the process of home country institutions shaping 
MNCs’ behaviours. To achieve this objective, this thesis examines two major 
institutional domains in China, i.e. the Chinese labour market, and the role of Chinese 
state government, and demonstrates how Chinese firms engage with these two 
domains in order to make the most out of them.  
 
To accomplish these two tasks, this thesis chooses a single case study as the 
investigation strategy and conducts an ethnographic study on a major Chinese MNC 
operating in the telecommunications industry. This will be discussed in the next 
chapter in more detail.  
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Chapter 3 Methodology  
 
This chapter explains the ‘methodological strategy’ of this study, ‘the logic by which 
you go about answering your research questions’ (Mason, 2002, p. 30). It is divided 
into six sections. Section 1 introduces the philosophical position of this study. By 
looking at the ontology and epistemology of critical realism, it highlights ethnography 
as an ideal choice for retroductive investigation when located within the critical realist 
framework. Section 2 discusses the strengths and the scarcity of qualitative research 
and ethnographic study in the field of international business, justifying the research 
methods adopted in this study. Section 3 and 4 present the research design and data 
collection process and Section 5 details how data was analysed. This chapter 
concludes with a summary of the methodology followed in this study and a brief 
discussion on the validity and generality issues.  
 
3.1 Philosophical position: a critical realist perspective  
 
Ontology and epistemology are concerned with what constitutes reality and how 
knowledge of reality can be produced. Burrell and Morgan’s (1979) typography of 
different ontological and epistemological assumptions points to the fact that in social 
science research, different paradigms are associated with distinctive ‘understandings 
of the nature of the world and the people in it’ and ‘preferred methods for discovering 
what is true or worth knowing’ (Alvesson & Deetz, 2000). In other words, one’s own 
philosophical position determines the way in which research is undertaken.  
 
In the field of IB, research has long been dominated by positivist perspectives 
(Birkinshaw, Brannen, & Tung, 2011). Such a methodology can be observed in many 
studies of control mechanisms in MNCs, where researchers assume the existence of 
an ordered social reality, and try to identify a set of variables that explains the 
presence of control mechanisms in MNCs (Chang & Taylor, 1999; Harzing, 1999; 
Harzing & Sorge, 2003). Ragin (1989) contends that such an approach leads to the 
loss of identities of the sample cases and an unequivocal answer to the research 
question. Given the multi-cultural, multi-dimensional and dynamic nature of IB, 
Birkinshaw et al. (2011) suggest a broader range of research methodologies in this 
field, rather than a single positivist-dominant one.  
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This research adopts a critical realist position in order to overcome the limitations of 
the positivist tradition in the IB field, and accordingly the critical realist ontological 
and epistemological assumptions shape the research design, data collection, and data 
analysis of this study. Ontologically, critical realism proposes a ‘double recognition’ 
of social reality: on the one hand, it holds that there is a reality out there independent 
of our knowledge of it; and on the other, the social world consists of subjective 
interpretations (O’Mahoney & Vincent, 2014, p. 2). According to Bhaskar (1975), 
social reality is stratified into three domains: the empirical, the actual and the real. 
Thus, social reality exists not only in the objective world but also in our minds 
(Ackroyd & Fleetwood, 2000). Bhaskar (2014, p. ix) contends that the social world ‘is 
an emergent, concept- and activity-dependent, value-drenched, and politically 
contested part of the natural world. In it, social structures pre-exist and enable or 
constrain human activities’. Therefore, to understand the social world is to understand 
the underlying structures and mechanisms that produce empirical events, rather than 
the empirical events in themselves. The focus is on the domain of the real, rather than 
the actual or empirical (Reed, 2005). 
 
Epistemologically, critical realism (CR) posits that social phenomena occur in an 
open system, which is characterised by both complexity and emergence. Events are 
determined by a multiplicity of mechanisms, and more importantly, mechanisms 
operate dependently of their contexts. For this reason, critical realists emphasise the 
quartet of context, structure, mechanism and outcome. To understand the complex 
social reality, it is suggested that the underlying structures and mechanisms have to be 
theoretically constructed and modeled through a process of conceptual abstraction and 
retroduction (Reed, 2005).  
 
Underpinned by such ontological and epistemological assumptions, critical realists 
study the social world with particular research strategy and design. First, CR-guided 
research is typically exploratory, and primarily interested in explanation (Ackroyd & 
Karlsson, 2014; Bhaskar, 2014). Focusing on structures and mechanisms, research 
typically seeks to identify, discover and explain how they produce empirical events 
and regularities under certain conditions (Reed, 2005). Second, a ‘retroductive’ 
research strategy, rather than ‘deductive’ (i.e. characteristic of positivism) or 
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‘abductive’ (i.e. typical of constructionism and postmodernism), is often adopted 
(Reed, 2005). The core of retroduction is ‘transcendental argumentation’, seeking to 
‘clarify the basic prerequisites or conditions for social relationships, people’s actions, 
reasoning and knowledge’ (Danermark et al., 2002, p. 76). Third, CR research is 
characterised by an active engagement with theory. Studies from a CR perspective 
usually contain a thick description of empirical events, as well as an analysis that 
theorises the mechanisms that generate these events, featuring ‘a movement from 
consideration of the intransitive world of actual events, mechanisms, and structures to 
the transitive world of measures, descriptions, and theories’ (O’Mahoney & Vincent, 
2014, p.11). 
 
The distinctive ontological and epistemological position of critical realism and the 
implications to research make ethnography, or to be more specific, critical realist 
ethnography, a perfect choice for conducting a certain type of research.  
 
First of all, ethnography is ideally suited to facilitating the retroductive process. 
Critical realism proposes a complex view of society in which human agents, being 
neither passive products of social structure nor entirely their creator, are ‘placed in an 
iterative and naturally reflexive feedback relationship to them’ (Davies, 2008, p. 26). 
To understand the social reality, the key is to examine the underlying ‘generative 
mechanisms’, which can only be understood through retroduction, a process of 
conceptual abstraction which leads to ‘a view of scientific explanation as entailing the 
identification of underlying and unobservable structures or mechanisms acting in 
particular social situations and contexts so as to generate observable tendencies or 
regularities and their effects’ (Reed, 2005, p.1631).  Methodologically, this requires a 
research method that can identify and explore details of studied phenomena, and 
reveal the complex interaction between relevant corporate agents, structured 
conditions and situational contingencies (Reed, 2005). It is suggested that 
ethnography, ‘entailing direct, detailed, and sustained contact with individuals over 
time, is ideally suited to facilitating this retroductive process’ (Rees & Gatenby, 2014, 
p. 139).  
 
Secondly, ethnography can be strengthened by recourse to critical realism; in other 
words, ethnography is ‘most useful when located explicitly within a realist 
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framework’ (Rees & Gatenby, 2014, p.146). Porter (2002) points out the weakness 
when ethnography is guided by alternative paradigms such as phenomenology and 
postmodernism. According to Porter, the problem with study from a 
phenomenological standpoint is that ‘ the restriction of the interpretation of behaviour 
to the subjectivity intended meanings that immediately generated it obviate the 
possibility of deeper analysis of the social situation encountered by the 
ethnographer…While understanding the interpretations of the social actors is a 
necessary condition for sociological knowledge, it is not a sufficient one’ (ibid, p.57). 
For study with a postmodernist position, the difficulty is that ‘if ethnographies are 
simply authorial inventions, rather than reflections, of greater or lesser accuracy, of 
social reality, then what is the point of ethnography?... If absolute uncertainty and 
relativism are accepted, there is little else for ethnographers to say about the social 
world, for what they say can claim no superiority in terms of adequacy over that 
which anyone else says’ (ibid, p.59). Alternatively, Porter proposes critical realism as 
a suitable philosophical underpinning to ethnography, which ‘accepts that there is a 
reality beyond individuals, but which does not over-extend its claims about how much 
we can know about the reality (in response to postmodernism) or that the degree to 
which external reality controls the decision of individuals (in response to 
phenomenology)’ (ibid, p.60). Davies (2008, p.18) echoes this point, claiming that 
effective ethnographic research ‘requires both an ontology that asserts that there is a 
social world independent of our knowledge of it and an epistemology that argues that 
it is knowable’. It is suggested that critical realism offers such suitable ontological, 
epistemological, and methodological positions (Rees & Gatenby, 2014).  
 
Thus, critical realist ethnography has three core tenets: 1) it posits a stratified 
emergent ontology; 2) it takes structures and generative mechanisms as its objects of 
inquiry; and 3) it understands events as the outcome of multiple causal processes 
(Rees & Gatenby, 2014). Following these contentions, it is suggested that critical 
realist ethnography could be usefully applied to studying the dynamics of relations 
and processes within MNCs. This can be done through examining three layers of 
reality: observable events and experiences in the empirical domain, social events and 
headquarters-subsidiary relations in the actual domain, and then the conditions, 
contexts, and reasons for events happening in the real domain (Rees & Gatenby, 
2014). 
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The ontological, epistemological, and methodological positions of critical realism 
provide foundational orientations to this study in terms of research strategy, research 
methods, data collection, and data analysis.  
 
First, it is clear that the social reality under study in this thesis is the international 
management and control system in Chinese MNCs, and the object of the inquiry is the 
underlying generative mechanism; that is, the factors contributing to such a system. 
As pointed out by critical realists, social reality is stratified into three domains: 
empirical, actual, and real, and they can be understood through a process of 
retroduction. To study the international management system as a complex social 
reality, ethnography is selected to facilitate such a retroductive process, which reveals 
three types of reality: employees’ working life, which can be observed and 
experienced (i.e. empirical domain of reality), the company’s management practices, 
some of which can be observed and experienced and some of which cannot (i.e. actual 
domain of reality), and China’s institutional environments, which lead to the first two 
types of events (i.e. real domain of reality). The ultimate goal of this study is first, to 
use ethnography to first describe events, and second to explain how they are caused 
by structural factors.  
 
Second, as will be discussed in more detail in the following sections, data collection 
and data analysis in this study are also strongly informed by critical realism. For 
instance, it takes an ‘inclusive’ approach to collect data, and incorporate date from 
three different sources (O’Mahoney & Vincent, 2014); when collecting data through 
semi-structured interviews, I took a critical realist approach and paid special attention 
to assessing the comparative adequacy of informants’ accounts, and adopting an 
analytical framework when interviewing (Smith & Elger, 2014). In terms of data 
analysis, grounded theory methods and coding techniques are used to allow ‘higher 
levels of abstraction’; and they reflect the critical realist retroductive approach, which 
‘encourages the utilisation of theory and metaphor to enable exploration of the 
stratified reality’ (Kempster & Parry, 2014, p. 98).  
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3.2 Studying MNCs with qualitative methods and ethnography 
 
This section discusses the situation of qualitative research and ethnography in the 
field of IB. It is noted that although their strengths in opening the black box of 
organisational process and their potential contribution to theory building are well 
recognised, they are in a marginalised position in the existing literature. This not only 
justifies the research approach adopted in this study, but also points to its 
methodological contributions to this field.   
 
3.2.1 Qualitative research in IB 
 
Qualitative research has been gaining momentum in social science since the 1960s 
due to factors such as the inadequacies and growing disillusionment with quantitative 
research, the promotion of self-reflection, and the diffusion of phenomenology 
(Alvesson & Deetz, 2000; Bryman, 1988).  
 
Compared to quantitative methods, a qualitative approach allows researchers to 
establish sustained contact and an interactive relationship with the subjects, and 
enables them to access first-hand experience and information, thus capturing the full 
extent of their subjects’ accounts of a variety of phenomena (Alvesson & Deetz, 2000; 
Burns, 2000; Sayer, 1992). A qualitative approach, characterised by greater flexibility 
and lack of structure, also provides the researcher with freedom to use a variety of 
data collection techniques to address different layers of reality, and to access 
unexpected important topics and change the ideas and research direction, thus 
enhancing the scope and the breadth of the research (Bryman, 1988; Whyte, 1984). 
Furthermore, qualitative research is characterised by a preference for contextualism, 
emphasising that an understanding of events and behaviours must be set in the context 
of the values, practices, and underlying structures of the entity as well as the multiple 
perceptions that pervade that entity (Bryman, 1988).  
 
In the field of IB, although a rich qualitative research legacy can be found ( e.g. 
Crozier, 1965; Fayerweather, 1969; Johanson & Vahlne, 1977; Kindleberger, 1956; 
Wilkins, 1974), qualitative research has been ‘progressively marginalised’ with 
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quantitative, positivist methodologies becoming the norm (Birkinshaw et al., 2011, 
p.573).  
 
Marschan-Piekkari and Welch (2004) attribute the low status of qualitative research in 
IB to a number of reasons. For instance, there are assumptions that qualitative 
research does not constitute a theoretical contribution and therefore it is not 
universally accepted as ‘legitimate’ science; and there is also a strong preference in 
the IB community for ‘hard science’ that equates rigour with quantifiable data. Doz 
(2011, p. 583) argues that it is ‘the intrinsic difficulties inherent in high quality 
clinical studies of multinational companies’ that stop IB researchers from taking a 
qualitative approach.  
 
The marginalised pursuit of qualitative research in IB has resulted in some ‘missed 
opportunities’ in a number of areas, particularly the internal organisation and 
management of MNCs. According to Birkinshaw et al. (2011), landmark studies by 
such authors as Bartlett and Ghoshal (1989), Hedlund (1986) and Prahalad and Doz 
(1987) adopt a qualitative case study approach to examine the internal dynamics of 
large MNCs and focus on topics such as interaction between formal and informal 
organisation; however, such an approach has been largely abandoned over the past 
two decades, and studies of the internal organisation of MNCs have been rare. The 
consequence, Doz (2011, p.587) points out, is that ‘we know less about how 
multinationals actually operate today, or about their current “globalisation”, than we 
did about multinationals’ in the 1970s and 1980s.  
 
As observed by Doz (2011, p.587), ‘the pipeline of qualitative research on the 
management of leading international companies, and more generally the empirical 
research stream on the functioning of the multinational companies, have largely dried 
up’, and IB researchers need to ‘rekindle’ the tradition of qualitative research, 
otherwise ‘they risk becoming radically irrelevant, caught between an inability to 
develop original theory and the difficulty of analysing empirical phenomena’.  
 
Fortunately, it is observed that there has been a growing recognition of the value of 
qualitative research in IB, with some important attempts at ‘reclaiming a place’ for 
qualitative methods in IB research (Birkinshaw et al., 2011). It is suggested that the 
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multidisciplinary nature of IB study (e.g. Cheng et al. 2009) calls for more qualitative 
research. As Birkinshaw et al. (2011, p.573) note:  
 
While there are clear merits associated with quantitative methods, the multi-
cultural, multi-dimensional and dynamic nature of the field of IB lends itself 
to a broad range of research methodologies, qualitative methods being one of 
them. In order to understand the complexities of emergent and evolving 
phenomena scattered over distance, and the differentiated contexts typical to 
many topics under investigation in IB, it is often inappropriate to engage in 
large-scale, cross-sectional studies or reductionist methods in the absence of 
well-developed theory. Rather, thick description, exploratory research and 
comparative case analysis that focus on inductive theory building and 
hypotheses generation may be more suitable. 
 
Given the unique strengths of qualitative research discussed earlier, it is argued that 
qualitative methods are particularly suited to ‘unpacking’ phenomena of interest (Van 
Maanen, 1979, p. 520) and ‘opening the black box’ of organisation process and the 
‘how’, ‘who’ and ‘why’ of individual and collective organised action (Doz 2011, p. 
583). For this reason, researchers have particularly highlighted the critical role of 
qualitative research in theory building within IB. Doz (2011), for example, contends 
that qualitative research can make a contribution to theory building within IB in the 
following ways.  
 
First, qualitative research provides rich, thick descriptions of phenomena and allows 
richer and stronger conceptualisation. In this way, new theory ‘is shaped 
progressively, in the mind of the researcher, over time, in an interactive “constant 
comparison” and recursive interplay between rich data and emerging conceptual 
insights that can be related to existing theories and also allow one to create new 
theoretical insights’ (ibid, p.584).  Second, qualitative research enables researchers to 
examine a phenomenon through various theoretical lenses and to compare the nature 
and extent of insights offered by different theories. For example, researchers can 
compare the prediction of a theory with the observable facts, so as to extend or 
challenge the theory.  
 
Third, qualitative research helps to achieve a better communication of a theory by 
showing its applicability and emphasising the key relationships in the theory. Fourth, 
qualitative research plays an important role in ’surfacing contextual dimensions in IB, 
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such as differences between countries’. As contexts are difficult to specify from 
outside, conducting qualitative research in a new context is a way to ‘learn about that 
context up close, rather than risk assuming away contextual differences’. In this way, 
qualitative research makes contributions to the contextualisation of general theories.  
 
Last, qualitative research provides ‘a strong inspiration for new ideas and research 
agendas’, and thus enables researchers to discover ‘the importance of a hitherto 
neglected phenomenon’ or ‘the relevance of a particular theoretical perspective to that 
phenomenon’. Doz (2011, p.584) argues:  
 
In a domain-defined field like IB where new phenomena of interest arise 
rapidly, qualitative exploratory research may help identify and understand new 
phenomena as they arise and assess the extent to which they are worthy of 
academic research. Emerging market multinationals provide a current 
example: they are certainly empirically important, but do we need new 
theoretical developments to understand them, or is what we know about 
multinationals sufficient to shed light on this phenomenon? 
 
To sum up, it is suggested that as a discipline that lacks the sophisticated theory 
development and relies on borrowings and juxtapositions (Buckley, 2002; Wilkins, 
1997), IB requires more exploratory and theory-generating qualitative research 
(Marschan-Piekkari & Welch, 2004; Mendenhall, Beaty, & Oddou, 1993).  
 
3.2.2 Ethnography in IB  
 
Creswell (2007) discusses five approaches to conduct qualitative inquiry: narrative, 
phenomenological, grounded theory, ethnographical, and case study research. The 
approach this study adopts is ethnography.  
 
Ethnography, according to Hammersley and Atkinson (1995), is based on a 
‘naturalistic’ view of social reality. Such naturalism proposes that the social world 
should be studied in its ‘natural’ state; ‘natural’ settings, rather than ‘artificial’ 
settings, should be the primary source of data. `Therefore, ‘in order to understand 
people’s behaviour we must use an approach that gives us access to the meanings that 
guide the behaviour’, and ethnography is such an approach that turns researchers into 
participant observers and allows them to ‘learn the culture or subculture of the people 
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we are studying’, and ‘come to interpret the world in the same way as they do’ (1995, 
p. 8). 
 
Thus, what distinguishes ethnography from other qualitative approaches is its 
experiential aspect (Van Maanen, 1979), and accordingly Watson (2011, p. 205) 
defines it as a research practice which ‘draws upon the writer’s close observation of 
and involvement with people in a particular social setting and relates the words 
spoken and the practices observed or experienced to the overall cultural framework 
within which they occurred’. Similarly, Sanday (1979) considers ethnography as ‘a 
research process in which the researcher’s experiences, as observer and participant, 
form the core of the methodology and analysis’ (Moore, 2011, p. 655).   
 
Ethnography has a relatively well-established tradition in management and 
organisation studies. As argued by Watson (2011, p.204), ‘we cannot really learn a lot 
about what “actually happens” or about “how things work” in organisations without 
doing the intensive type of close-observational or participative research’. Therefore, 
although it is ‘a painful way of doing research’, ethnography has made great 
contributions to enhancing our understanding of human behaviours and organisational 
life. Some classic organisation and management studies include Becker et al. (1961) 
on medical school, Dalton (1959) on managerial work, Roy (1958) on group 
behaviour, and Lupton (1963) on factory life, and more recent works such as Kunda 
(1992) on culture in a high-tech company, Watson (2001) on managerial work in a 
UK Telecom company, Down (2006) on entrepreneurship, Fischer (2012) on 
organisational turbulence, Bruns (2013) on collaboration across expert domains, 
McCann et al. (2013) on professionalisation, and Perezts et al. (2015) on the life of 
anti-money laundering analysts.  
 
Despite its well-recognised merits and potential contributions to better understanding 
of social reality and theory development, there is very little ethnographic study within 
IB. Such scarcity can be attributed to various factors such as the difficulty of getting 
access to multinational companies, the time-consuming nature of ethnographic data 
collection, and the ‘arbitrary configuration’ of the IB discipline (Chapman, Mattos, & 
Antoniou, 2004). Moreover, there is the tendency of using ethnography as a means of 
generating case studies and exploring hypotheses produced by other methods, i.e. 
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‘wider perspectives on organisations are provided by quantitative methods, or 
broader-based qualitative methods, and ethnographies serve mainly as means of 
fleshing these out’ (Moore, 2011, p. 655).  
 
Nevertheless, a number of researchers have adopted an ethnographic approach to 
study MNCs and empirically illustrate how ethnography can provide us with detailed 
information and rich knowledge about ‘how things work’ in MNCs (Moore, 2005, 
2011, Sharpe, 2004, 2006; Yagi & Kleinberg, 2011). Moore (2011), for example, 
conducts an ethnographic study on cross-border acquisitions in BMW MINI, and 
highlights the use of ethnographic techniques in ‘exploring the role played by national 
identities and cross-border mergers and acquisitions, and the mutual impact of worker 
and manager perspectives on acquired organisations, as well as clarifying the actual 
impact of cross-cultural discourses on the success of post-acquisition integration’ 
(2011, p.669). She further suggests that ethnography is useful in analysing cross-
cultural management issues and understanding multiple groups engaged in complex 
social relations. In a similar vein, Yagi and Kleinberg (2011) demonstrate the value of 
ethnography for understanding complex organisational processes and for the study of 
international management by using an ethnographic study of a Japanese-US firm to 
contribute to theory on boundary spanning with a cultural identity negotiation 
conceptual framework. 
 
Sharpe’s (2004, 2006) study and arguments are particularly relevant to my study. 
Drawing on Morgan’s (2001) conceptualisation of MNCs as a ‘transnational social 
space’, Sharpe (2004) argues that the conventional underlying assumption about 
MNCs as rational, economic actors has discouraged the adoption of ethnographic 
approaches in IB; however, studying MNCs from a standpoint of the organisation as 
socially embedded and contextually rational means that ethnographic research can 
contribute to IB research through taking into consideration the historical context, and 
linking micro-level analysis to a macro-level analysis of institutional structures. For 
instance, when studying the topic of globalisation, an ethnographic approach will be 
able to ‘delve into the ways in which people experience globalisation, be they shop-
floor workers in a multinational, executive directors of these organisations or local 
communities that interface with and are affected by the foreign subsidiaries’ 
activities’ (2004, p.320). Following this line of thought, Sharpe (2004) conducts an 
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ethnographic study of control and resistance in the UK subsidiaries of a Japanese 
MNC, and offers important insights into the managerial control process and outcomes 
in different contexts, thus making a contribution to labour process theory and the 
comparative business systems and divergent capitalism literature.  
 
To summarise, qualitative studies and particularly ethnographic studies are limited in 
IB study. However, they promise to be able to provide thick and rich description of 
how things actually work in an organisation and are particularly suitable for studying 
new phenomena, thus have great potential in making contributions to theory 
development in IB. As Chapman et al. (2004, p. 303) put it: 
 
We have floundered into theory building without paying sufficient attention to 
our knowledge of the empirical realities. We have built theories and 
hypotheses on dubious conceptual bases, and acquired questionnaire data that 
is thin, trivial and dubious. We have analysed these using statistical analysis 
that is at once rigorious and meaningless. We need real basic well-founded 
knowledge about what companies do, and why they do it. Ethnographic 
research is one sure way of providing good detailed information. Let’s try it.  
 
3.3 Research design  
 
The design of this research first considers a selection between quantitative and 
qualitative methods and according to Sayer (2000, p. 19), such a choice ‘should 
depend on the nature of the object of study and what one wants to learn about it’.  
 
As stated earlier, a major task of this study is to provide detailed accounts on how 
Chinese MNCs manage their overseas subsidiaries and their employees. This research 
agenda is based on two facts discussed: first, the internationalisation of Chinese firms, 
as well as other EMNCs, is a relatively new and underexplored phenomenon. Second, 
in general, studies of internal organisation and management of MNCs are rare and we 
do not know much about how multinationals actually operate today (Doz, 2011).   
 
To open the black box of how MNCs, particularly Chinese MNCs, actually organise 
work and manage their global workforce, it is felt that a qualitative approach is most 
appropriate, because it enables me to access first hand experience and information and 
to explore incidents in great detail about the management system of the company, and 
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employees’ lived experiences of the management system. Only by recording rich data 
on how employees’ respond to the company’s control system, can we have a full 
picture of what the control system is like, capture the true reality of such a 
phenomenon, and provide a valid explanation for it. The rich and thick descriptions of 
phenomena establish a strong basis for theoretical conceptualisation.  
 
Furthermore, a qualitative research approach was also chosen for its preference of 
contextualism, which not only provides compelling arguments about how things work 
in a particular context, but also produces well-founded cross-contextual generalities, 
through highlighting the intimate connection between context and explanation 
(Mason, 2002). As discussed, the study of EMNCs provides a good opportunity to 
extend the established IB and MNC theories, and this could be achieved by learning 
about the context up close and by contextualising the general IB theories.  
 
In relation to organisation studies in China, Whetten, for example, distinguishes 
between ‘theories in context’ and  ‘theories of context’ (Whetten, 2009). The latter 
involves bringing an existing theory into the Chinese context and testing it in this 
context. By comparison, Whetten states that ‘contributions to theory can be 
characterised as a shift in focus from ‘looking through the lens’ to ‘improving the 
lens’ (2009, p.35). He continues that ‘instead of using context effects to contextualise 
organisational theories, context effects are used as theories (i.e. explanations….)’ 
(ibid, p.40). Child, commenting on Whetten, emphasises that if we are to treat the 
Chinese context in this way then ‘when comparing Chinese context and management 
with those elsewhere, we should not overlook the dynamics through which both have 
evolved over time. There is a risk that the debate over a Chinese theory of 
management versus a theory of Chinese management is being couched in overly static 
terms’ (Child, 2009). ‘One feature that has characterised China above all since the end 
of the 1970s is the rapid change and hectic growth it has experienced…we cannot 
therefore treat the context of China’s management as a fixed or even uniform 
phenomenon…It has developed a number of constituent business systems..’ (Child, 
2009, pp.68-9). My approach in this study reflects these strictures; I am not testing 
existing theory but seeking to extend it by identifying key aspects of the changing and 
paradoxical Chinese context. This involves first describing some empirical results 
about Chinese MNCs’ international management and control system and how 
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employees in European subsidiaries respond to it, and second developing a theory 
about how these empirical events are produced by a specific Chinese context. In this 
thesis, existing theory about how institutions shape the behaviours of MNCs is 
extended by a three step model which captures the interactive relationship between 
institutions and corporate actors.  
 
It was recognised from the start that there has been very little research examining 
Chinese subsidiaries from the perspective described. Therefore, it was felt that a 
qualitative research design would be most suitable. As authors such as Yin ( 2009) 
and Eisenhardt (Eisenhardt, 1989; Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007) have pointed out, it 
is useful in the early stages of theory formulation to engage in the sort of intensive 
qualitative case study research which if done properly reveals where the key questions 
for theory are emerging.  
 
After the selection between quantitative and qualitative research, it was also decided 
that ethnography is the best approach to study the complex organisational process and 
dynamic social relations within Chinese MNCs, because its experiential aspect will 
enable me to collect data on how things really work and what actually is happening 
there. Such a decision, on the one hand, is justified by the well-established tradition in 
organisation studies of taking an ethnographic approach, and on the other hand is 
motivated by the intention to fill the methodological gap resulting from the scarcity of 
ethnographic studies in MNCs studies.  
 
Although some scholars have advocated multi-sited (Falzon, 2016; Marcus, 1995) or 
multi-local (Hannerz, 2003) ethnography, ethnography research is primarily 
conducted in a single site aiming to gain in-depth and fine-grained understanding of a 
small scale society or community (Geertz, 1973; Hannerz, 2003). A large body of 
recent organisational ethnographic research also takes such a single site (e.g. 
Alvesson, 1998; Kaplan, 2011; Orr, 1996; Rouleau, 2005; Samra-Fredericks, 2003; 
Zilber, 2002). Given the commonly-recognised difficulty in getting access to MNCs, 
particularly to Chinese firms (Smith & Zheng, 2016; Wei, Clegg, & Ma, 2015), a one-
sited ethnographic approach in this study seems to be a feasible choice. 
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There were a number of considerations when selecting the research site for this study. 
Firstly, I wanted to look at firms with high levels of overseas employment and 
commitments, rather than just a few scattered outposts as this would lead to a greater 
likelihood of the difference between host and home contexts becoming visible. 
Secondly, and related to this, I wanted to examine subsidiaries in host contexts that 
were relatively strongly institutionalised, i.e. in Europe, rather than contexts with 
more limited forms of institutionalisation such as Africa. This was because I wanted 
to focus on the interaction of the two institutional contexts and where one is seriously 
weaker than the other, different considerations may come into play. Thirdly I wanted 
to look at Chinese firms engaged in technologically advanced sectors with high levels 
of internationalisation rather than areas of Chinese internationalisation such as 
extractive mining, or simple assembly manufacturing where interactions with local 
contexts were likely to be less.  
 
Based on these three dimensions, I initially approached four Chinese firms in the 
telecommunications industry based in the UK, and eventually was able to gain access 
to one of them, known as Teleman to avoid breaching confidentiality agreements. 
Teleman met the criteria of having large overseas commitments (over 7000 
employees in Europe, and about 1000 in the UK), operating extensively in Europe 
(having teams of marketing & sales, project management, service, and R&D), and 
working in a high technology environment which required innovation and learning. A 
more detailed description of Teleman is presented in the next chapter.  
 
3.4 Fieldwork: data collection  
 
In line with the ethnography tradition (e.g. Hammersley & Atkinson, 1995; Moore, 
2011; Sanday, 1979), data for this study were collected from multiple sources, 
including participant observation, semi-structured interviews and documents, which 
took place between 2013-2015. Such data-source triangulation allowed the 
comparison of data relating to the same phenomenon but deriving from different 
phases of the fieldwork, different points in the temporal cycles, and different 
informants, thus providing a validity check and giving added depth to the description 
of the social meanings (Hammersley & Atkinson, 1995).  
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3.4.1 Phases of data collection  
 
Data collection for this study began in February 2013 and was completed in 
December 2015. The three year period can be divided into three phases when 
distinctive sets of research activities were conducted, although some of them spanned 
these phases such as documentation review and interview transcribing. Major research 
activities are summarised in the table below.  
 
Phases Major Research Activities 
 
Phase 1 
 
2/2013 
- 
4/2014 
• Secondary	data	review	of	four	Chinese	companies	(e.g.	website,	press	reports,	industry	reports),	including	Teleman	
• Preliminary	interviews	with	Teleman	employees:	No.=2	
• Formal,	recorded	interviews	with	21	employees:	15	from	Teleman,	6	from	others		
• Collecting	and	reviewing	Teleman	People	newspaper	and	magazine	
• Collecting	and	reviewing	Teleman	Writings	Collection	
• Collecting	and	reviewing	Teleman	annual	reports	
• Collecting	and	reviewing	media	reports		
• Interview	transcribing			
• Initial	data	analysis		
 
Phase 2 
 
5/2014 
– 
10/2014 
• Participant	observation	at	Teleman’s	UK	head	office:	3	months		
• Participant	observation	at	Teleman’s	Bristol	office:	2	weeks		
• Informal	conversations	and	interviews	with	Teleman	people	
• Fieldnote	taking		
• Continuous	data	analysis		
• Continuously	collecting	and	reviewing	related	documents		
 
 
Phase 3 
 
11/2014 – 
12/2015 
• Formal,	recorded	interviews	with	18	Teleman	employees		
• Interview	transcribing		
• Continuously	collecting	and	reviewing	related	documents		
• Coding	and	analysis	of	interview	data	
• Coding	and	analysis	of	document	data	
• Coding	and	analysis	of	fieldnote	data	
• Memo-making		
 
 
 
Summary 
• Participant	observation:	3	months	and	2	weeks	
• Formal	interviews	with	Teleman	employees:	N=35	
• Formal	interviews	with	industry	insiders:	N=6	
• Total	formal	interviews:	48		
• Documents:	109+59+14+10=192,	plus	dozens	of	media	reports	
• Fieldnotes:	over	41,000	words	in	68	pages		
 
 
Table 3.1: Research phases and major research activities   
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Phase 1: February 2013 - April 2014 
 
Data collection for this study started in February 2013 after the decision was made to 
conduct an ethnographic study on Chinese telecommunications firms in the UK. In 
order to have a deeper understanding of the telecommunication industry and the 
general operation of Chinese firms in this industry, I identified four firms (i.e. Firm A, 
B, C and Teleman) and began collecting secondary data through reading press 
articles, visiting their corporate websites and reviewing industry reports.  
 
Since this study was designed to take an ethnographic approach, a major task in this 
period was to get access to these companies and study them in an immersive way. To 
do this, I started with sending emails and making calls to HR departments in these 
four firms. Unfortunately and expectedly, I did not receive any reply or positive 
feedback. Realising I could not rely on conventional ways to get access, I decided to 
explore my existing Guanxi (i.e. personal connections) and continuously expanded it 
through adding potential interviewees from these four firms to my social media 
network (i.e. LinkedIn). Eventually, my Guanxi and the resulting snowballing 
approach led to two preliminary, un-recorded interviews with Teleman employees, 
and several formal, recorded interviews with other employees from both Teleman and 
the other three firms.   
 
During this period, one important decision was made; that is, this study would be a 
piece of single-sited ethnography of Teleman. This was for two reasons: first, I found 
that Teleman had made more resources available on its corporate websites, including 
annual reports, internal employee publications, and other internally produced 
materials, which were of great value for the research purposes. Second, after 
exploring my personal networks, I found that Teleman employees were more 
approachable, and I was able to tap into a much larger interviewee pool.  
 
After the decision was made to focus on Teleman and its employees, I began to 
download and review four types of documents from the company’s official website: 
Teleman People, the company’s internal publication for employees, which is in both 
Chinese (as a newspaper) and in English (as a magazine); book volumes entitled 
Teleman Writings Collection, which contained various types of articles such as CEO 
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speeches, meeting diaries, articles selected from the newspaper, and annual reports. 
More formal interviews with Teleman employees were also conducted.  
 
In addition to getting access to large amounts of data about Teleman’s organisational 
structure, human resources polices, business model, products and markets, 
internationalisation strategies, as well as employees’ working lives, one unexpected 
outcome of the first phase of research was that I obtained some insider information 
about the company’s business situation and recruitment practice. That is, the 
company’s HR team was hiring a contractor to deliver a recruitment project for its 
two new R&D centres in the UK, and the contractor was hired through an external 
agency. This piece of valuable information led to my contact with the Agency and my 
eventual access to the company to conduct the participant observation as a researcher 
through taking a full time recruitment specialist role.  
 
Phase 2: May 2014 - October 2014 
 
This phase of research consisted of two periods of participant observation. The first 
was conducted in Teleman’s UK head office from May 1st to August 15th, 2014, and 
the second was in Teleman’s Bristol office, which lasted for 2 weeks in October 2014.  
 
I began the participant observation and my writing of fieldnotes during the interview 
period. After I was told by an insider that the Agency was helping the company to 
recruit contractors, I contacted the agency with my CV and was invited for an 
interview for the position of Project Assistant on May 1st, 2014, followed by another 
interview with a hiring manager from a project team on May 9th. However, I was 
rejected by the hiring manager on the grounds that I was ‘ too mature’ and that it 
would be difficult for me to ‘adapt to the semi-militarised management system’ of the 
company (source: quote from the hiring manager). On May 12th, I was invited for 
another interview with the HR team for the position of Recruitment Specialist where I 
was told that they were desperately looking for someone like me who had years of 
working experience, spoke both Chinese and English fluently, and could handle ‘the 
complexity of working with different departments’ (source: quote from the 
interviewing HR manager). Then I was asked to start the job the next day on May 
13th. On my first day as a recruiter, I informed my two supervisors that I was 
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conducting research on Chinese firms in the UK and was collecting data for my 
thesis, and I was allowed to do so on the condition that I would not disclose the 
company’s name and its products.  
 
In the first period of participant observation, I worked in the company’s HR 
department as a full-time employee, i.e. for 5 days per week and 8 hours per day. My 
work was recruiting new employees for the company’s two new R&D centres in 
Bristol and Cambridge, as well as for the Teleman UK head office. On each working 
day, I recorded my activities and observations with a notebook in the form of key 
points and short sentences; and then after work, I spent about 2 hours on writing the 
fieldnotes in full accounts. This period of research was characterised by active 
participation in the company’s various events, close observations on events happening 
around me, large numbers of informal conversations with different employees, and 
detailed fieldnotes recording my observations, participation and thoughts. This lasted 
for three months until mid August when I felt no significant new data had emerged in 
the company’s UK head office.  
 
In the second period of participation, I conducted the research in a similar way but 
was working in the company’s Bristol office for two days per week. The stay was 
planned to be another three months; however, after two weeks I decided to end the 
participant observation and leave the company for two reasons: first, since the Bristol 
office was newly established, the team was very small with only 6 employees 
including myself, and several employees seemed to have a flexible work arrangement, 
which meant that the office was always empty; second, during my second week in the 
office, the company was relocating the newly hired engineers to another big office 
room, and when this was completed, I would share an office with a woman who was 
in charge of administrative business such as hotel bookings, stationary supply, and 
office decoration. I felt that my interaction with employees in the Bristol office was 
very limited, which became a challenge for me to get access to new data. In mid 
October, I ended my participant observation and moved onto the third phase.  
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Phase 3: November 2014 - December 2015 
 
As will be discussed in more detail in the following sections about how interview data 
was collected and how data was analysed, the third phase of data collection in this 
study was also a step in data analysis, i.e. theoretical sampling. A total of 18 
interviews was conducted with Teleman employees. Compared with interviews in the 
first phase, interview questions at this stage were more specific and had a clearer 
focus on different types of organisational control and how employees responded and 
experienced these controls. Puzzles and inconsistencies I experienced in the first and 
second phases were also important parts of my conversations with informants.  
 
As illustrated, these three phases of data collection had a different focus, with the first 
phase focusing on interviews and collecting documents, the second phase on 
participant observations, and the third phase on interviews. However, it should be 
pointed out that they were not clear cut, because some activities such as collecting 
data through documents and interview transcribing were carried out throughout the 
whole nearly three year period.  
 
Furthermore, as Hammersley and Atkinson (1995) have pointed out, a prominent 
feature of ethnography is the emergent nature of its formulation of precise problems, 
hypotheses, and an appropriate research strategy. As typically happens in many 
ethnographic studies, this research project developed in a funnel manner, with 
research questions and research activities getting more and more focused as time went 
on. The process of progressive focusing means that the data collection in this study 
has been guided by an ‘unfolding but explicit identification of topics for inquiry’. 
During this prolonged process, large amounts of notes and memos had been produced, 
and they constituted preliminary analyses, providing guidance through the corpus of 
data (Hammersley & Atkinson, 1995, p.191). 
 
3.4.2 Collecting data through participant observation  
 
‘One becomes an ethnographer by doing it,’ Van Maanen (2011, p. 219) says. 
According to the author, a ‘definitional’ feature about ethnographic fieldwork is its 
being ‘immersive’. Based on the original ideas of the Chicago school of sociology, 
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ethnographic researchers are expected to leave their ivory towers, get closely involved 
with the people and community under study, and ‘actively interact and share 
experiences with them in a manner going beyond simple observation’ (Watson, 2011, 
p. 206).  
 
Indeed, ethnography is a research approach ‘under the stiff but precise tag, participant 
observation’ (Van Maanen, 1979, p. 539); as such, participant observation is 
commonly recognised as a key method for collecting data (e.g. Hammersley & 
Atkinson, 1995). Conducting participant observation means that ‘the researcher 
engages with the people being studied, shares their life as far as possible, and 
converses with them in their own terms’ (Gellner & Hirsch, 2001, p. 1). Under such 
circumstances, the researcher not only observes activities, but also participates in 
them, takes part in conversations, and reads relevant documents (Watson, 2011). It is 
suggested that compared with interview-based studies, ‘participant observation 
provides greater informational yield as well as more detailed descriptions of 
workplace behaviours and ground dynamics’ when it is used in organisation studies 
(Tope et al., 2005, p. 471). 
 
Consistent with this tradition, this study uses participant observation as a major 
method to collect data. Working as a full-time contractor and a critical member of the 
recruitment team, I was deeply immersed in the social world I studied and managed to 
collect large amounts of high quality data for this research.  
 
During the period of May-October 2014, I took on the role of Recruitment Specialist 
at Teleman’s UK head office, and was responsible for hiring employees for its two 
newly-established R&D centres in England, as well as for its head office. The 
recruitment team at Teleman UK consisted of four members at the beginning: the 
recruitment manager, a British woman; the HR manager, an expatriate designated to 
lead the delivery of the recruitment project for the two R&D centres; a recruitment 
assistant, a locally-hired Chinese woman, and myself. In the last two weeks of my 
stay at the head office, another British woman joined the team as Recruitment 
Specialist.  
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Given that I was the most experienced recruiter in the team who could speak both 
English and Mandarin fluently, I was given a wide range of responsibilities, including 
talking with hiring managers in different departments, meeting with senior executives 
from China to brief the recruitment status, contacting senior managers in China and 
Germany to arrange interviews, and attending different events such as meetings, 
interviews, and job fairs. I once even represented the company to talk in front of the 
camera when approached by a TV crew from South Korea in a job fair. My relatively 
senior role in the team provided me with privileges other researchers might not have 
had in terms of meeting people, building relations, attending events, and making 
observations. For example, I once had the opportunity to attend an individual meeting 
with Mr. Q, the most senior manager who was in charge of the company’s global 
R&D activities; and after our discussion on the recruitment status, we discussed the 
reasons for the company’s setting up R&D centres in two different locations in the 
UK. On other occasions, I had in-depth conversations with several departmental 
managers who were hiring and was able to explore what kind of candidates they were 
interested in, and why and how they made their decisions. I also joined these 
department managers and the HR manager in several interviews. In general, during 
my stay with Teleman UK, I was largely treated as an insider, and people were 
willing to talk with me and share with me their thoughts and viewpoints about the 
company and about working with the company.  
 
As pointed out by Atkinson (1992, p. 5), ethnography is created through ‘a double 
process of textual production and reproduction’, and this process starts with day-by-
day writing up of fieldnotes which are ‘observations and reflections concerning “the 
field”’. As with other ethnographic researchers, I used fieldnote writing as the major 
method of ethnographic recording (Hammersley & Atkinson, 1995). On each working 
day, I had my notepad on my desk, or carried it with me when attending meetings, 
and took notes about what happened around me whenever I had the chance. The notes 
sometimes were key words, phrases, symbols, shorthand; other times they were what 
individual employees said and what I heard verbatim as much as possible. After I 
finished my work and arrived home, I then used these notes to jog the memory in 
order to ‘recall and reconstruct in close detail significant scenes and events’ 
(Emerson, Fretz, & Shaw., 2001, p. 356). 
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My final version of fieldnotes, which was over 41,000 words in 68 pages, mainly 
contained three categories of recording: descriptive scenes and events, personal 
feelings and emotions, and analytic writing.  
 
Consistent with common practice in ethnographic research, the majority of my 
fieldnotes provided descriptive accounts of whom I met, what I did, and what I heard 
and saw, accounts that did not have much explicit theorising and interpretations. They 
did not have sustained logic or underlying principle, but contained ‘bits and pieces of 
incidents, beginnings and ends of narratives, accounts of chance meetings and rare 
occurrences, and details of a wide range of unconnected matters’ (Emerson et al. 
2001, p.353). According to Hammersley and Atkinson (1995, p.181), this kind of 
recording minimised the level of inference and facilitated the construction and 
reconstruction of the analysis.   
 
I also recorded my personal feelings and emotions with fieldnotes following the 
guidance that accounts of personal feeling and emotional reactions should be included 
in core fieldnote accounts (e.g. Emerson, Fretz, & Shaw, 1995; Johnson, 1975; 
Kleinman & Copp, 1993). It is believed that the researcher’s emotional responses to 
events in the field may mirror those that naturally occur in the setting, and provides 
important analytic leads. Furthermore, it enables the researcher to ‘read through 
fieldnotes to identify biases and prejudices as well as the changing attitudes toward 
people and events’ (Emerson et al. 1995, p.361). My fieldnotes, for example, recorded 
many occasions when I felt exhausted because of the heavy workload, and felt 
sympathetic about my Chinese co-workers’ situations in terms of poor salary and 
career development. I also recorded my feelings about being verbally abused by an 
expatriate manager. This kind of recording turned out to be valuable because they 
revealed a lot about the lived experience of locally-hired Chinese employees, given 
that I was essentially one of them. The value of these types of fieldnotes, Emerson et 
al. (1995, p.361) point out, is that they ‘provide particularly rich accounts of the 
processual nature and full complexities of experience which cannot be conveyed 
through descriptions of behaviours obtained by direct observation or interview 
questions alone’, and therefore ‘offer major advantages for developing and refining 
methodological and theoretical insights’.  
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The last category of my fieldnotes was analytic writing (Emerson et al., 2001), or 
what Schatzman and Strauss (1973) label as ‘theoretical notes’. This type of fieldnote 
scattered throughout the 68 pages, but many were recorded at a later stage, typically 
in the last few weeks when some specific issues had been identified and some analytic 
ideas and inferences began to occur to me. Writing such theoretical notes was a 
reflection of my seeing previously unappreciated meanings in particular happenings, 
making new linkages with previous experiences, and contrasting new and old 
observations (Emerson et al., 2001). For example, after some immersive research, it 
became clear to me that in Teleman UK, locally hired Chinese employees were the 
least favoured employee group, paid below the market rate and facing gloomy career 
development. At this point, I started to try to make sense of this with reference to such 
concepts as core and peripheral employees, and some of my fieldnotes had engaged 
Lepak and Snell’s (1999, 2002) framework with some initial interpretations and 
discussions on uniqueness and strategic values of different groups of employees. 
However, it needed to be pointed out that such ‘in –process analytic writing’ was 
different from the more systematic procedure of coding in the final stage; 
nevertheless, it recorded observations that ‘confirm, modify, or reject inprocess 
interpretations’, and enabled me to ‘carry forward analysis contemporaneously with 
the collection of field data’ (Emerson et al., 1995, p.105).  
 
Through conducting my participant observation in Teleman and recording descriptive 
accounts, personal feeling and emotions, and theoretical notes, I collected large 
amounts of high quality data about the internal organisation and management of 
Teleman and about employees’ lived experience, and I came to discover what really 
happened within the company and how things worked there. I felt that such richness 
of data would not be possible to achieve without the immersive approach of 
participant observation taken in this study.  
 
3.4.3 Collecting data through semi-structured interviews 
 
Interviews in ethnographic research usually consist of two types: spontaneous, 
informal conversations, and formally arranged interviews. Given the very blurry 
dividing line between participant observation and informal conversations 
(Hammersley & Atkinson, 1995), interviews in this study refer to formal interviews 
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taking place in bounded settings out of earshot of other people and out of the 
workplace, whereas informal conversations are considered as part of the participant 
observation.  
 
This study took a semi- structured interview approach where an interview guide was 
used to follow questions and specific areas of interest during the interview (Bryman, 
2004). The value of semi-structured interview lies in its recognition of 
manoeuvrability in the interaction, which, on the one hand, provides interviewees 
with a degree of space to respond to questioning ‘on their own terms’, and on the 
other, allows researchers to be more responsive to answers and thus explore 
unforeseeable research avenues (Bryman, 2004). Consequently, a semi-structured 
interviews take place more like a dialogue rather than a question-answer format; 
however, its semi-structure-ness allows for comparability across responses because 
similar topics are discussed (May, 2001).  
 
A total of 48 interviews were conducted in this study with 41 informants. Forty-two 
interviews were with Teleman’s current (n=31) and former (n=4) employees, whilst 
the other six interviews were with those who worked with Teleman’s key competitor 
and clients, and therefore had good knowledge about Teleman as well as the industry. 
Interviews were held in Chinese (n=45) and English (n=3), and lasted between 1 to 3 
hours. Except for the first two preliminary interviews and two interviews with non-
Teleman informants, all other interviews were recorded and later transcribed.  
 
With reference to the selection of interviewees, this study did not aim to seek a 
representative sample, as ‘a representative sample of informants is not always what is 
required in ethnography’ (Hammersley & Atkinson, 1995, P.137); rather, the aim was 
to target those informants who were especially sensitive to the area of concern, and 
those more-willing-to-reveal informants (Dean, Eichhorn, & Dean, 1967; 
Hammersley & Atkinson, 1995). Particularly in the first phase of this study, the 
sampling was undertaken with a snowballing method, leaving very little room for me 
to control the sample. However, in the first phase, a basic criterion for selecting 
Teleman employees was that they should have worked with the company for over 2 
years in one of its European subsidiaries. The same criterion was applied to the 
interviewee selection in the third phase. However, for the second round of interviews, 
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I was able to exercise more control over the sampling, as most of the interviewees 
were those I met when conducting participant observations in Teleman’s head office. 
The resulting sample of informants in fact represented a rather diversified background 
of interviewees in terms of job level, ranging from engineers, sales managers, project 
managers to account directors, department heads, senior executives. Furthermore, 
they had the UK, Germany, the Netherlands and France as their major work locations 
and other host countries included Spain, Italy, Sweden, Czech Republic, Poland, and 
Romania.  
 
As a critical realist, I conducted the interviews in a way that reflected some of the 
distinctive features of the critical realist approach to interviewing discussed by Smith 
and Elger (2014). According to the authors, whilst critical realists (CR) share a 
common recognition with constructionists and realists that interviews are a fluid 
interactive process between interviewers and interviewees formulating perspectives, 
observations, experiences, and evaluations, they also hold some unique assumptions. 
It is believed that CR interviews give researchers access to two aspects of knowledge: 
the attitudes and emotions of informants, and the ‘richly textured accounts of events, 
experiences, and underlying conditions or process, which represent different facets of 
a complex and multi-layered social reality’ (ibid, p. 119). In other words, CR 
interviews do not simply generate narrative accounts, but also provide insights into 
events and experiences, which form the basis for analysing the interplay of social 
contexts and generative mechanisms.  
 
However, such knowledge about events, processes, causes and underlying conditions 
is not a simple and transparent product of interactions between interviews and 
interviewees. In order to gain insights, first, a theory-led interviewing approach is 
proposed (Pawson & Tilley, 1997), which requires conversations and interactions 
between interviewer and interviewee to be informed by an appropriate analytical 
framework. Second, it is highlighted that informants’ accounts should be subject to 
critical scrutiny not only in their own terms but also in relation to other sources of 
data. Only after they are assessed in terms of their comparative adequacy or 
completeness, can they be used to test and develop explanatory theories.  
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Because of their emphasis on a theory-led approach and scrutiny of accounts, critical 
realists treat interviews as a ‘cumulative and iterative’ process, rather than a simple 
indicator of attitudes or sources of narratives. It is suggested that such an approach 
enables researchers ‘to identify and explore contrasting accounts and gaps in our 
knowledge; ask more focused and meaningful questions; elicit comments on views 
expressed by others; and probe matters that might be glossed over’ (Smith & Elger, 
2014, p.127).  
 
Guided by this CR approach, interviews in this research paid special attention to two 
aspects: assessing the comparative adequacy of informants’ accounts, and adopting an 
analytical framework when interviewing.  
 
As indicated earlier, interviews in this study were conducted in two time phases: the 
pre- and post observation period. In the pre-observation period (i.e. Phase 1: February 
2013- April 2014), twenty-five interviews were conducted, aiming to have good 
knowledge of four interlinked aspects: the industry (e.g. market competition in China 
and Europe, and how Teleman is fighting against and collaborating with other 
players), the business (e.g. the products and services Teleman offers, the business 
lines, the historical development, its international operations), the management (e.g. 
Teleman’s organisational structure, human resource polices, organisational culture), 
and the people (e.g. career history, team members, experience with colleagues and the 
company, difficulty and challenges when working abroad).  
 
Although this study was about how the company manages its overseas subsidiaries, it 
was believed that the best way to flesh this out was to examine how employees 
actually experience it. Therefore, from the very beginning, interviews in this study 
abandoned the conventional, rational, economic approach to study MNCs by asking 
grand questions; instead, the ‘transnational social space’ framework (Morgan, 2001; 
Morgan et al., 2001) was adopted to guide the interview process, which proposed 
sociological accounts of a company as ‘a structured set of relations between a range of 
actors with their own powers and interests’ (Morgan, 2001, p. 10). Underpinned by 
this theoretical framework, interviews in Phase 1 largely centred around the work 
experience of individual employees and their social relationships with colleagues 
within the company. However, it was not their experience and social relationship that 
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I was interested in; rather, they were important because they reflected underlying 
social contexts and the unobservable part of social reality in the ‘actual’ domain, 
because employees’ work experiences were shaped by internal factors such as 
organisation structure, role and responsibility, cultural values, HRM practices, and 
personal career ambitions, and by external factors such as the company’s overall 
business strategy, market regulation, market competition and client collaboration. 
Furthermore, I paid special attention to the cumulative and iterative nature of 
interviewing, and frequently referred to insights gained from earlier interviews during 
my interactions with new interviewees, a move to elicit comments on views expressed 
by others, and identify and explore contrasting accounts and gaps in my knowledge. 
Such a CR interviewing approach proved to be of great value in enabling me to ask 
more focused and meaningful questions, and discover matters that might be neglected 
(Smith & Elger, 2014). More importantly, as these interviews were conducted in 
phase 1, they laid a good basis for research in the later phases in that they revealed 
lots of puzzles and inconsistencies, which directed my particular attention for further 
clarification and exploration.  
 
In this regard, a good example was that informants from Teleman seemed to have 
contrasting accounts about local European employees in terms of their power and 
status within the company, and about their relationship with these local employees. 
Whilst some informants considered local European employees as being well respected 
and compensated for their expertise (i.e. local market knowledge) and enjoying high 
status, others believed they were marginalised within the company. Such seemingly 
contrasting accounts, as we will see in later chapters, in fact pointed to the underlying 
control mechanism the company used to manage this group of employees. One 
unexpected phenomenon was also revealed through comparing these different 
accounts: there was another employee group with the company, i.e. locally hired 
Chinese, which made social relationships complex within the company and brought 
difficulty to informants in assessing the relative social status of different groups.  
 
Similarly, interviews in the post-observation period (i.e. Phase 3: November 2014- 
December 2015) also took a CR approach, but reflected even stronger CR 
characteristics. First of all, many informant accounts had been accumulated at this late 
research phase. Therefore, frequent cross-checking and comparison for their adequacy 
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and completeness were possible during the interviews. Secondly, after the first two 
phases of research, based on continuous initial data analysis and interpretation during 
the process, it was decided that organisational control would be the most appropriate 
theoretical framework for the whole thesis; therefore, interviews in this phase were 
strongly theory-driven, exploring how different groups of employees experienced the 
company’s organisational control system. Interview questions at this stage focused on 
particular events and individuals’ experiences in specific settings. Informants were 
asked questions mainly on the following three aspects: specific events and phenomena 
(e.g. the CEO’s speech as an identity control mechanism), their personal experience 
(e.g. whether or how they are influenced by the corporate culture, for example do they 
work long hours), their viewpoints on this event (e.g. how they think of identity 
control). On many occasions, informants were asked questions related to some of the 
puzzles and inconsistencies I had during the participant observation period. Such 
questions included: why the company used so many expatriates, why so many local 
British employees quit the company, and why locally hired Chinese did not quit given 
their poor pay and career prospects, etc. Owing to the theory-driven approach, 
interviews in the post-observation period provided me with rich knowledge about the 
company’s management approach, and enabled me to get closer to the social reality 
under study, both the empirical domain of reality (i.e. employees’ working life) and 
the actual domain of reality (i.e. the company’s management and control system).  
This laid a solid foundation for contextualisation and theory development at a later 
stage, leading to the discovery of the real domain of reality (i.e. the impact of 
institutions).  
 
3.4.4 Collecting data through documents  
 
Documents as a data source have their historical place in the intellectual tradition of 
interpretative social science and ethnographers often take account of documents as 
part of the social setting under investigation (Hammersley & Atkinson, 1995).  In 
more recent studies, for instance, both Kunda (1992), Moore (2011) and Fischer 
(2012) have included document data in their analysis.  
 
There are some arguments about documents, particularly those official sources, being 
biased and distorted. However, according to Hammersley and Atkinson (1995), all 
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types of data have a similar problem, since they are all produced socially and cannot 
be treated as an unproblematically neutral presentation of reality; therefore, there is no 
logical reason to consider documents as especially problematic. Documents are 
important sources of data, because they not only provide information, but also open 
up a range of analytic problems. As the authors suggest (1995, p.173-4): 
 
The presence and significance of documentary products provide the 
ethnographers with a rich vein of analytic topics, as well as a valuable source 
of information. Such topics include: how are documents written? How are they 
read? Who writes them? Who reads them? For what purpose? On what 
occasions? With what outcomes? What is recorded? What is omitted? What 
does the writer seem to take for granted about the reader(s)? What do readers 
need to know in order to make sense of them? The list can be extended 
readily, and the exploration of such questions would lead the ethnographer 
inexorably towards a systematic examination of each and every aspect of 
everyday life in the setting in question.  
 
Furthermore, information provided by documents may be different from those 
accounts in interviews or observations, or even missing from other sources of data. 
From a critical realist perspective, documents generate another set of data, which can 
be used to cross-check their comparative adequacy and completeness in relation to 
other sources of data (Smith & Elger, 2014). In addition, texts from documents endure 
and therefore can offer historical insight, since ‘there is no “original” or “true” 
meaning of a text outside specific historical contexts’ and they ‘have to be understood 
in the contexts of their conditions of production and reading’ (Hodder, 2003, p. 156). 
Such an emphasis on context is in line with critical realists’ particular attention to the 
historical dimensions of analyses. As suggested by Mutch (2014), a range of 
generative mechanisms combine to create the social reality, and such mechanisms 
operate at a number of levels and at a range of timescales; historical investigation can 
give us temporal contrasts to inform the contrastive explanation and satisfy the need 
of retroduction, which sends us back in time to look for antecedents. Therefore, 
documents, which are in physical form and record events at a wide range of 
timescales, facilitate the process of understanding the contexts and knowing the 
emergent and stratified social reality.  
 
In conducting this study, five types of documents were examined, which included the 
following: 
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• Teleman	People	newspaper:	this	newspaper	was	produced	by	the	Teleman	Communication	team	in	China	first	monthly	and	then	bi-weekly	and	then	distributed	to	offices	around	the	world.	A	total	of	109	copies	were	collected	from	2001	to	2015.	Every	issue	published	from	2009	to	2015	was	collected,	but	many	issues	from	2001-2008	were	missing.	This	paper	was	published	in	Chinese.		
• Teleman	People	magazine:	this	magazine	was	launched	by	the	company	in	2009	and	it	was	published	in	English.	A	complete	collection	of	59	copies	from	2009-2015	was	reviewed.	This	magazine	was	also	produced	by	the	China	team	and	distributed	to	every	one	of	its	offices	around	the	world.		
• Teleman	Writings	Collection:	these	were	volumes	consisting	of	various	types	of	articles,	such	as	articles	from	the	newspaper,	executive	teams’	speech,	important	meeting	summaries,	employees’	articles,	etc.	They	were	placed	online	under	the	‘corporate	culture’	category	on	the	company’s	corporate	website.	A	total	of	14	volumes	were	reviewed.		
• Annual	reports:	Teleman	published	annual	reports	despite	the	fact	that	it	was	not	a	publicly	listed	company.	Annual	reports,	both	in	Chinese	and	English,	from	2006	-2015	were	available	online	and	therefore	examined	in	this	study.		
• Media	reports:	because	of	Teleman’s	important	position	in	the	industry,	it	was	subject	to	frequent	media	exposure.	Dozens	of	media	reports	were	collected	and	reviewed.		
 
In total, over 200 copies of documents were examined in this study; however, my 
content analysis mainly focused on the first four types of internally produced 
publications (i.e. the newspaper, magazine, writing collection, and annual reports) and 
excluded external source (i.e. media reports) on the basis that 1) internally produced 
materials reflected how the company portrayed itself, how the company managed its 
culture (i.e. identity control), and how employees experienced the company’s 
management system (i.e. through their writings in the newspaper); and 2)  by 
excluding media reports,  the confidentiality of the company was protected.  
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The examination of these documents provided rich data on Teleman at two levels. At 
company level, large amounts of data on the company’s history, corporate values, 
business developments, products and services, HR policies, management philosophies 
and practices, and internationalisation strategies were obtained. Particularly, from an 
organisational control perspective, these documents represent ‘the voice of 
leadership’, and they ‘distill management’s collective preferences into abstract 
principles, catchphrases, and key words openly designed to educate and influence’ 
and ‘reflect management’s desires, even wishful thinking, in formulations removed 
from everyday reality’ (Kunda, 1992, 2006, pp. 57–58). At the employee level, as 
demonstrated in Chapter 7, these documents, particularly the newspaper, contained 
large amounts of personal stories of individual employees, and they offered invaluable 
data on employees’ feelings, attitudes and identity. From a critical realist perspective, 
such data, of course, should not be taken at face value. They however enabled me to 
identify contrasting and complementary accounts and events in interviews and 
observations, thus enhancing the validity of my data, and gaining a better 
understanding of the underlying structures and mechanisms (Downward & Mearman, 
2007; Hammersley & Atkinson, 1995; Yin, 2009). 
 
3.5 Data analysis  
 
Ethnography is characterised by a ‘dialectical interaction’ between data collection and 
data analysis (Hammersley & Atkinson, 1995, p.205). It is pointed out that in 
ethnographic research, data analysis begins when data collection begins (Spradley, 
1980, 1979), and data analysis is not a distinct stage of ethnographic research 
(Hammersley & Atkinson,1995).  
 
Following this tradition, this research project has a characteristic ‘funnel’ structure of 
ethnographic study, which progressively became more and more focused, with 
research problems being developed and transformed during the course and eventually 
its scope being clarified and delimited  (Hammersley & Atkinson, 1995). In this 
sense, the data analysis process of this study may be considered to begin when the two 
preliminary interviews were conducted with Teleman employees, which, underpinned 
theoretically by the ‘transnational social space’ framework, began exploring the 
underlying social contexts and generative mechanisms of individuals’ experiences and 
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social relationships. And such an analysis process continued into the participant 
observation period, when analytic notes were recorded.  
 
Nevertheless, systematic data analysis for this study took place in 2015 after some of 
the formal and recorded interviews were conducted with Teleman employees in the 
post-observation phase. Following the guidance of Charmaz and Mitchell (2001), this 
study adopted a modified grounded theory method in analysing the data, which is said 
to ‘increase the analytic incisiveness’ (ibid, p.160) and ‘sharpen the analytic edge and 
theoretical sophistication’ of ethnographic research (ibid, p.161). The same method 
has been used by Fischer (2012) to analyse organisational turbulence in a mental 
health setting. The data analysis of this study consisted of the following five steps, 
although the actual process was less linear and less clear-cut.  
 
Step 1: Reading 
 
I started the formal, systematic data analysis process with several rounds of careful 
reading of the corpus of data to ensure I became thoroughly familiar with it. Extensive 
facts, stories, rumours, numbers, reflections and thoughts contained in the interview 
transcripts, fieldnotes, and a collection of important articles published in the 
company’s newspaper and magazine were carefully examined. At this stage, the task 
was to ‘see whether any interesting patterns can be identified; whether anything 
stands out as surprising or puzzling; how the data relate to what one might have 
expected on the basis of common sense, official accounts, or previous theory; and 
whether there are any apparent inconsistencies or contradictions among the views of 
different groups of individuals, or between people’s expressed beliefs or attitudes and 
what they do’ and ‘the aim is to use the data to think with’, laying a solid foundation 
for the second step (Hammersley & Atkinson, 1995, p.210).  
 
Step 2: Coding  
 
Coding involves developing comparison among what happens at different places and 
times in order to identify stable features of people, groups and organisation, and the 
ultimate aim is to reach a position where the researcher has a stable set of concrete 
and analytic categories for organising the data (Hammersley & Atkinson, 1995). 
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Blumer (1954, p. 7) refers to these categories as ‘sensitizing concepts’, which give 
‘the user a general sense of reference and guidelines in approaching empirical 
stances’, and ‘suggest directions along which to look’. Therefore, identifying and 
developing these sensitizing concepts are important, because they are ‘the germ of the 
analysis’ (Hammersley & Atkinson, 1995, p.212). 
 
Following grounded theory methods, an open coding technique was used to generate 
categories by looking for key events and instances in the texts of interview transcripts, 
fieldnotes, and documents (Strauss & Corbin, 1998, 1990).  Using a constant 
comparative approach, I made attempts to ‘saturate’ the categories; that is, to identify 
key events that represented the categories and to continue looking until the new 
formation obtained did not further provide insight into the category, and a new 
category had to be invented (Creswell, 2007). Drawing on my general, common-sense 
knowledge, personal experience, and existing concepts in the literature, a loose 
collection of over 50 analytical concepts were initially developed, but were not well-
defined elements of an explicit analytical model (Hammersley & Atkinson, 1995). 
However, the process of coding the data was a recurrent one, with new categories 
emerging and existing categories being combined and reduced. Eventually, a list of 41 
analytical concepts or themes was finalised, as shown in Table 3.2 on next page. 
These sensitizing concepts represented an important step of ‘data reduction’, which 
allowed me to think about the data in new ways (Coffey & Atkinson, 1996), and to 
get ready for the next step, memo-making.  
 
Step 3: Memo-making 
 
According to Charmaz and Mitchell (2001), memo-making is a step between coding 
and the first draft of a paper, involving writing preliminary, partial and correctable 
memos. It is an ‘on-going process of analysing and writing’ and therefore ‘reduces 
writer’s block and increases fluidity and depth’ (2001, p.167). During this process, the 
research elaborates materials subsumed by a code, plays with ideas, tries them out, 
and checks their usefulness by going back and forth between writing and social 
reality; by doing this, amorphous ideas and ambiguous questions become clearer.  
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Coding: Themes and analytical concepts  
Employee Level Company Level 1. Working	habits		&	style	2. Job	responsibility		3. Career	development		4. Compensation	&	benefits		5. Criticism	about	the	company	6. Criticism	about	co-workers		7. Loving	the	company	8. Loving	the	job	9. Cultural	and	social	conflicts		10. Global	mobility		11. Identity		12. Power		13. Frustration	&	complaints		14. Competition		15. Cooperation	&	team	work		16. Personal	network		17. Unfairness	and	inequality		18. Resistance	and	negotiation		19. Personal	sacrifice		20. Quitting	the	company	21. Commitment	&	devotion	
1. Business,	products	&	service		2. HQ	involvement	&	interference		3. Chinese-ness	4. Organisation	structure	5. International	staffing		6. Bureaucracy	&	rules	7. Internationalisation	&	localisation		8. Communication	&	coordination		9. Control		10. Knowledge	management		11. Leadership		12. Global	HR	policy		13. Reporting	&	approval		14. Corporate	culture		15. Nationalism		16. Rewards			17. Recruitment	&	retention		18. Militarised	management		19. Work	atmosphere		20. Decision	making		
 
Table 3.2: Coding: Themes and analytical concepts 
 
This free-writing or pre-writing stage (Charmaz, 1995; Elbow, 1981), broadly based 
on the above analytical concepts, produced lengthy memos on the following six 
topics:  
• The	working	life	of	expatriate	staff	
• The	working	life	of	local	British	staff	
• The	working	life	of	locally	hired	Chinese	staff	
• Managing	people	in	Europe	
• Managing	people	in	China	
• Expatriates	and	internationalisation		
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These writings were highly descriptive and full of tales and narratives (in fact, they 
were so descriptive that one of my colleagues, thinking they were draft versions of my 
thesis, highly criticised my approach and urged me to pay more attention to theories), 
and they mainly focused on comparison between different employee groups, and 
different locations. Such approach proved to be highly rewarding, since ‘making 
explicit comparisons helps ethnographers discern patters and establish variations from 
which they can outline theoretical relationships’ (Charmaz & Mitchell, 2001, p. 167). 
It was after this step that my original codes were turned into theoretical categories, 
and I had a clear idea of how they were connected in a larger, overall process. At this 
point, organisational control was chosen as the major theoretical framework of this 
study.  
 
Step 4: Theoretical sampling  
 
Theoretical sampling, Charmaz and Mitchell (2001) contend, aims to develop a 
theoretical analysis or to fill out the ethnographic accounts. It involves ‘going back to 
the field to gather specific data to fill gaps within categories, to elaborate the analysis 
of these categories, and to discover variation within and between them’ (2001, p.168). 
In this step, the research is not to seek any statistical representation, but to selectively 
obtain data from a particular person for a particular reason. The focus is to get access 
to data about certain experiences or issues to develop needed theoretical categories.  
 
After the memo-making, it was clear that organisational control would be the most 
suitable theoretical framework to explain what was happening in Teleman, and in 
order to acquire such social reality, analysis on different types of control and various 
forms of responses to such control would inevitably be a major part of the discussion. 
Therefore, in order to make sure that I had reached the state of ‘saturation’, that is, all 
categories are filled with data, and variation has been established and accounted for 
(Charmaz & Mitchell, 2001), I conducted a total of another 18 interviews, focusing on 
five commonly discussed control types (i.e. behaviour, output, input, cultural and 
bureaucratic control) and how employees perceived and responded to them. As 
discussed in the data collection section, interview questions at this step tend to be very 
specific and the conversations centred around the idea of control and 
response/resistance. Theoretical sampling here helped to develop a theoretical 
 
79 
analysis of the data; by the end of this step, the previously ambiguous international 
management issue had been clearly defined in relation to organisational control, and 
data was well categorised and organised for a more nascent theoretical framework.  
 
Step 5: Integrating the analysis  
 
The last step in data analysis is to integrate categories into a theory, and to construct 
an integrative framework to frame the story (Charmaz & Mitchell, 2001). Such a 
process involves trial and error, and is about ‘locating and mapping while keeping 
empirical locations in mind’ (2001, p.169). One action to facilitate this process is to 
complete a literature review.  
 
For the data analysis in this study, several rounds of literature review were conducted. 
The final literature review, which was conducted along with the memo-making, 
identified Harzing’s (1999) framework as the one that could offer the most complete 
explanation of empirical reality. The framework, specifically developed in an MNC 
context, offers a synthesis of various classifications of controls, and integrates many 
of the classifications previously discussed. Based on this framework, I further 
explored the theoretical relationship between the 41 analytic categories, and 
eventually organised all the data into four large groups based on a conceptual 
framework of control and response/resistance. The structure of this thesis basically 
follows these four groups of data, namely personal centralised control, formalised 
bureaucratic control, identity control, and control by rewards.  
 
In summary, data analysis for this study adopts the grounded theory methods, which, 
according to Charmaz and Mitchell (2001), are characterised by the following 
strategies: simultaneous data collection and analysis, analytic codes and categories 
developed from data not from preconceived hypotheses, theory development during 
each step of data collection and analysis, memo-making, theoretical sampling aimed 
toward theory construction, and a literature review carried out after developing an 
independent analysis (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). Such an approach proves to be 
beneficial and effective in moving the ethnographic study towards theoretical 
interpretation, thus sharpening the theoretical sophistication of this study.  
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3.6 Conclusion  
 
This chapter presented the methodology followed by this study to examine the 
international management and control system in Chinese MNCs. Underpinned by a 
philosophical position of critical realism, this study recognises that there are three 
domains of reality: employees’ working in the empirical domain, the company’s 
control and management practices in the actual domain, and the impact of China’s 
institutional environments in the real domain. To study the underlying mechanisms 
and structures which generate the empirical events is to examine how institutions 
affect the behaviours of MNCs, which in turns leads to employees’ unique work 
experiences.  
 
To study such generative mechanisms, an ethnographic approach was adopted to 
facilitate the retroductive process, advancing from empirical observation of events 
and arriving at a conceptualisation of transfactual conditions (Danermark et al., 2002). 
Multiple data collection methods, i.e. participant observation, semi-structured 
interviews and documents, were used to generate different types of data for 
comparative adequacy and completeness assessment, a triangulation technique to 
enhance the data validity (Hammersley & Atkinson, 1995; Smith & Elger, 2014).  
 
One of the main critiques of qualitative research is concerned with the generalisation 
issue. Taking a critical realist position, I follow Danermark et al. (2002) who argue 
for two different ways of defining and using the concept of generality: whilst 
generality is often about ‘how large a group of events or other phenomena an 
empirical observation can be generalized to’ (2002, p.76), as in the case of 
quantitative studies, a realist concept of generality is more about ‘transfactual 
conditions’, which ‘are the conditions for something - a social relationship, an action, 
an institution or a social structure - to be what it is and not something completely 
different’ and such transfactual conditions ‘can be more or less general’ (2002, p.78). 
This contention is similar to what Yin (2003) and Maxwell (1992) emphasise in 
qualitative research: the role of theory. According to them, generalisation in 
qualitative research is more about analytic generalisation, in contrast to statistical 
generalisation; and the generality of qualitative studies occurs when a theory is 
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developed from the data, which can be applied to similar situations, or in realist 
vocabulary, which can be applied to explain similar ‘transfactual conditions’.  
 
Thus by ethnographically depicting what happens and how things work in Teleman, 
this study makes no attempt to claim that similar control systems and outcomes exist 
in other Chinese MNCs or EMNCs. Rather, by investigating the underlying 
generative mechanisms of Teleman’s control system, this study seeks to develop a 
theory on the dynamic relationship between institutions and corporate actors, and it is 
on this theory that generalisation can be claimed. 
 
To develop such theory to capture the interaction between institutions and corporate 
actors, observable empirical events are regularities that first need to be identified and 
analysed. The following five chapters take on this task and present empirical findings 
of this study, with Chapter 4 providing an overview of Teleman’s business, 
organisational structure and workforce composition, Chapter 5 on personal centralised 
control, Chapter 6 on bureaucratic formalised control, Chapter 7 on identity control, 
and Chapter 8 on control by rewards. A theory is developed to explain why and how 
this happens (i.e. the generative mechanisms) in Chapter 9.  
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Chapter 4: Overview of Teleman, its organisational structure and employee 
groups  
 
4.1 Introduction  
 
It’s Monday morning again. Fang arrives at the office at 8:15. She briefly 
checks her email at her desk, and then goes down directly to the reception with 
her laptop. Next to the reception, a small table and a chair has been set up by 
the receptionists. Fang sits down, and starts her registration work.  
 
Fang is an HR Administrator working at the UK office of a Chinese firm in 
the telecommunications industry, and most of her work is involved with 
Chinese expatriates.  In her daily work, she spends lots of time on issuing 
invitations to Chinese employees in China HQ, and helping them to apply for 
work permits or visas.  
 
When these expatriates arrive at the company on their first day, they will come 
to see Fang and register their attendance. Fang keeps a record of every 
expatriate’s visa status, and sends out a reminder when the visa expiring day is 
approaching.  
 
Monday is always a busy day for Fang, as many expatriates choose Monday as 
their first day of working in the UK. For this reason, every Monday morning, 
Fang works beside the reception, and at around 8:30, a queue starts to line up. 
At 10:00 am, Fang finishes her registration work, and goes back to her desk on 
the 4th floor.   
 
For Fang, dealing with Chinese expatriates is her daily job. Every week, she 
issues 10-15 invitation letters to HQ employees for visa applications; then on 
Monday, she receives probably 10 of these expatriates and registers their 
attendance.  On other weekdays, there are often two or three people every day, 
dragging their huge luggage, coming to her desk to report their arrival.  
 
 
These literary paragraphs serve as the beginning of my reports on the empirical events 
and findings I observed in Teleman, an anonymous name for the case company in this 
study. In this chapter and the following four chapters, I will provide detailed accounts 
on how Teleman manages its overseas operations and employees with a unique 
international management and control system, and how employees respond to such a 
management approach. These five chapters aim to capture the ‘empirical’ and ‘actual’ 
domains of the social reality under study, and to lay a good foundation for exploring 
the ‘real’ domain and explaining the generative mechanisms in Chapter 9.  
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Whilst the next four chapters focus on four different types of control, this chapter 
provides an overview of the organisational contexts of Teleman’s control system. 
Three aspects are examined: the business of Teleman, its organisational structure, and 
its employee composition.  
 
4.2 Who is Teleman?   
 
Teleman is a private company headquartered in China, which manufactures 
telecommunications equipment for and provides related services to local and 
international clients. Teleman’s business is categorised into three groups: Operator, 
Consumer and Corporate. The Operator business, which contributes to over 60% of its 
total revenue in 2015 (source: Teleman 2015 Annual Report), is to provide 
telecommunication operators (e.g. BT, O2, and Orange in the UK) with services 
ranging from consulting to network-site building to network management. It also 
produces and sells related equipment and products to operators. The Consumer 
business (30% of revenue in 2015) is mainly concerned with self-branded mobile 
phones and tablets. The Corporate business (less than 10% of revenue) builds internal 
communication networks and data centres for corporate clients. There are four 
distinctive features about Teleman, which are important for us to understand its 
control system discussed later. 
 
First, Teleman is a relatively young company and therefore has a relatively short 
history of internationalisation. Established in the late 1980s, Teleman started as a 
sales agent for a Hong Kong company, which produced Private Branch Exchange 
(PBX) switches. In 1990, the company started its independent research and 
commercialisation of PBX technologies targeting hotels and small enterprises. In 
1992, it launched the rural digital switching solution. In fact, during these years and 
until 1998, the company’s business was largely limited to China’s rural areas, and 
later expanded into China’s cities. Teleman started its internationalisation activities 
around the mid-to late 1990s and accelerated the process in the early 2000s. The 
company focused its internationalisation efforts initially on Russia and the CIS region 
in 1996, the Latin American markets in 1997, and the African market in 1998. Since 
2000, the company has begun to pay attention to South East Asia, the Middle East and 
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Europe. The corporate website indicates that it set up offices in both the UK and 
Germany in 2001.  
 
Second, Teleman is a highly successful company. Despite less than 30 years of 
history, Teleman has quickly become an industry leader in recent years with 
tremendous business success. Based on its annual reports, its revenue has increased 
steadily every year in the past decade. For example, in 2014, its revenue increased 20% 
from the previous year, and in its recently released 2015 Annual Report, this figure 
reached 37%. A comparison with Ericsson, one of Teleman’s major competitors, 
reveals a clearer picture. Ten years ago in 2006, when Ericsson, the Swedish company 
established in 1876, recorded an annual revenue of USD 25.9 billion, Teleman’s 
revenue was only 8.5. While both companies witnessed growth in the following years, 
Ericsson’s annual revenues in the last 3 years remained more or less similar (35.3 
billion in 2013, 33.3 in 2014, and 30.43 in 2015), but the annual revenues Teleman 
generated were 39.5 billion in 2013, 46.5 in 2014, and 60.8 in 2015 (sources: Annual 
reports of Ericsson and Teleman). Teleman currently runs business in over 170 
countries through a network of 100 overseas subsidiaries and 14 regional 
headquarters. Revenues generated overseas reached over 60% of its total revenue in 
both 2014 and 2015.  
 
Third, Teleman is a knowledge-intensive company. Due to its business nature, the 
majority of its employees are from a computer science and engineering background. 
In 2015, approximately 79,000 out of its total 170,000 employees were based in 
Research and Development functions. And in 2015, the company invested 15% of its 
revenue in R&D. Currently, Teleman claims to have 16 R&D centres in Germany, 
Sweden, the US, France, Italy, Russia, India, and China (source: 2015 Annual 
Report). 
 
The fourth feature about Teleman is that it has large operations in Europe, particularly 
West European countries such as the UK, Germany, France, and the Netherlands. 
According to its website, it employs a total of 9900 employees in Europe, and 1100 in 
the UK alone. Teleman is engaged in relatively extensive activities in Europe, with 
marketing & sales, and project delivery as the core functions. In more recent years, 
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Teleman has also started to build up its R&D activities in this region. For example, 
two new R&D centres have been established in the UK since May 2014.  
 
In summary, Teleman is a relatively young yet highly successful, knowledge-
intensive company with large operations in Europe. These four characteristics have 
important implications to how Teleman controls its subsidiary units and employees in 
Europe.  For example, as will be discussed in Chapter 6 on bureaucratic formalised 
control, Teleman’s relatively short history and limited internationalisation experience 
means that it cannot exercise centralised control over its subsidiaries through 
‘codified and reproducible management systems’ as US MNCs do (Ferner et al. 2004, 
p. 367), since management systems in Teleman are not well established and many 
rules and procedures are not fixed but subject to change. Rather, it heavily relies on 
expatriates to effectuate its centralised control (Harzing, 1999). Also because of its 
rapid development and tremendous success in overseas markets, this requires 
Teleman to mobilise its Chinese employees to take on various foreign assignments, 
thus a need to exercise identity control to its expatriates and turn them into ‘corporate 
soldiers’ (discussed further in Chapter 7). Furthermore, the company’s good financial 
performance makes it possible for Teleman to accomplish this task with strong 
financial incentives, a control mechanism to regulate their commitment and mobility 
power (discussed further in Chapter 8).  
 
4.3 The matrix structure of Teleman 
 
This section provides an overview of the structural context, where Teleman’s control 
system is embedded.  I argue that a matrix structure has been developed by Teleman 
to manage its overseas subsidiary units.  
 
‘What’s the link between TigerCo and Teleman? Do we own the company?’ 
Sarah asked Emma. Emma moved herself closer to Sarah and started to 
explain the history of TigerCo, and the relationship between TigerCo and 
Teleman. Emma said that Teleman 100% owned TigerCo, and it can be 
considered as a department of Teleman. ‘Let me draw a map for you’, Emma 
said and then showed it to Sarah.  ‘Can I keep it?’ Sarah asked. ‘Sure,’ Emma 
responded and passed the map to her. 
 
Later in the afternoon, I joined Emma in a meeting with the procurement 
manager Emily. We planned to discuss purchasing the recruitment service 
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from two headhunting agencies for the R&D centres project we were working 
on. When we met, Emma and Emily started their conversation with how much 
bigger the company was becoming and how complex the organisation 
structure was. Then Emma talked about the relationships among TigerCo, the 
UK R&D centres, the European R&D centres, Teleman UK, and Teleman 
Ireland, and explained why two more agencies were needed.  
 
My above fieldnotes on 19th May 2014 provide some indications of Teleman’s highly 
complex organisational structure in Europe. The complexity not only confused Sarah, 
the British HR manager who had worked for the company for 4 years, but also Emily, 
the expatriate who had worked in the China HQ for 5 years and then in the UK office 
for another 5 years.   
 
Studies on organisational structure have yielded a variety of structures. For example, 
the classic study by Pugh, Hichson and Hinings (1969) produced a sevenfold 
classification of organisational structure (i.e. full bureaucracy, nascent full 
bureaucracy, workflow bureaucracy, nascent workflow bureaucracy, preworkflow 
bureaucracy, personnel bureaucracy, and implicitly structured organisation), and 
Mintzberg (1979) identified five types: professional bureaucracies, simple structure, 
machine bureaucracy, the divisionalised form, adhocracy. In these studies, three 
structural dimensions were often examined: centralisation, formalisation, and 
complexity (Pleshko & Nickerson, 2008).  Based on these three dimensions, the 
organisational structure in Teleman more resembles what authors such as Galbraith 
(2000, 2009) and Habib and Victor (1991) call ‘matrix structure’, which is ‘an 
overlaying of two or more elementary or single-dimension structures’ (Egelhoff, 
Wolf, & Adzic, 2013, p. 205), or in Davis and Lawrence’s (1977) term, a ‘multiple 
command’ or ‘two-boss’ structure.  
However, different from most MNCs that adopt a two-dimension structure, which 
originates either from functional divisions x geographic regions, or product divisions 
x geographic regions (Egelhoff et al., 2013), Teleman’s matrix structure has a lot 
more flexibility and over-crossings. Broadly based on a matrix structure of functional 
divisions x geographic regions (e.g. in the case of R&D centre), there are also 
elements of product divisions x geographic regions, as indicated by the existence of 
various product/service teams (i.e. project team) managed in a national or global 
fashion. Therefore, in Teleman’s case, it is not a ‘two-boss’ structure; rather, it is a 
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situation of ‘multiple bosses’.  
To understand Teleman’s organisational structure in Europe, a good place to start is 
its two new R&D centres (i.e. R&D Bristol and R&D Cambridge), for which I was 
delivering the recruitment project. Both R&D Bristol and Cambridge belong to 
TigerCo in China, which is the legacy of Teleman’s ‘unsuccessful business 
diversification’ (quote from interview with expatriate HR) in the early years. In 2004, 
TigerCo was turned into a research and development facility, employing over 5000 
employees globally and managing the company’s various R&D institutes/centres 
around the world. Although TigerCo has its own corporate name, website, and email 
address (i.e. an email address ending with tigerco.com, rather than Teleman.com) for 
its employees, and in daily work, it operates as a department of Teleman.  
 
Therefore, in Europe, TigerCo oversees the European Research Institute, which 
consists of units in several countries such as the UK (i.e. the UK Research Institute), 
France (i.e. France Research Institute) and Germany (i.e. Germany Research 
Institute). In each of these countries, these research institutes manage different R&D 
centres, such as R&D Bristol and R&D Cambridge in the UK.  And within each 
individual R&D centre, there might be one or more teams taking on different 
responsibilities of developing a certain product. For example, in R&D Bristol the 
whole team is working on Product X, whereas in R&D Cambridge, two teams are 
working on Product Y and Z respectively.  
 
Within Teleman a system of  ‘One Country, One Platform’ has been established, 
which means that within a single country, one large team provides back- office 
support to all different entities and business lines or groups. So the two R&D Centres 
in the UK, although they do not belong to Teleman UK legally, are in fact highly 
embedded in the company’s UK office, and receive services from it in the areas of 
recruitment, finance, administration, etc. In daily operations, R&D activities in UK 
R&D centres are directly supervised by TigerCo in China, while the general 
administrative management is co-exercised by the European Research Institute, the 
UK Research Institute, and Teleman UK office.  
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However, Teleman’s ‘One Country, One Platform’ system is complicated by the fact 
that within a certain country, there are many sub-units, which do not legally fall under 
the administration of this country, but still use the shared country services. For 
example, in the UK office there is a consumer product marketing team, which in fact 
is part of a larger team based in the Netherlands. People in this team report directly to 
the Netherlands. However, this team also relies on the UK HR team to help them on 
recruitment. Another example is a unit called ‘Wonder’, which serves a major 
telecoms operator. This unit globally has 195 people, and in the UK alone there are 75 
employees. Although this unit is based in a UK office, it has its own HR team. 
However, their new hires are subject to the approval of the UK HR director and the 
UK CEO.  
 
To make things even more complicated, in Teleman’s overseas subsidiaries the major 
business activities are organised in the form of project teams, and each project team, 
which serves different or the same clients, are managed by the subsidiary where they 
are based (e.g. UK subsidiary) or by higher customer groups based in regional HQs 
(e.g. the Vodafone West Europe Group based in Germany). Furthermore, each of 
these project teams is made up of three groups of employees: sales, products, and 
project delivery (including team members based in Europe and the R&D team based 
in China), which is called the ‘Iron Triangle’ of the company. These three groups of 
employees have different employment contracts with the company and thus different 
reporting lines. Whilst they all directly report to the project director, employees in the 
sales function (who are mainly local employees with employment contracts with local 
entities) also report to their account directors or sales directors in the UK; on the other 
hand, employees in product and project delivery functions, many of whom are 
expatriates, also report to their department heads in China. Furthermore, depending on 
the nature of projects, the UK project directors may report to people based in China 
HQ and/or to people based in Germany, where the company’s West Europe HQ is 
based. However, some business units or groups may have their West Europe regional 
HQ in France or the Netherlands.  
 
A good illustration of Teleman’s complex organisational structure is the hiring 
process of an Office Administrator for R&D Cambridge, who is responsible for 
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reception, purchasing, travel booking, office renovation, and other office 
administration works. A total of six interviews were involved.   
 1. As	the	recruitment	specialist,	I	conducted	brief	interviews	with	10	candidates.	Based	on	their	work	experience	and	eligibility	to	work	in	the	UK,	I	selected	5	candidates	and	sent	their	CVs	to	Vivien,	the	Administration	Manager	of	the	UK	Research	Institute.		2. Vivien	conducted	telephone	interviews	with	these	5	candidates,	and	shortlisted	4	candidates	for	the	next	round.		3. These	4	candidates	attended	a	face	-to	-face	interview	with	Vivien	and	Wilson,	the	Operational	head	of	the	UK	Research	Institute.	Two	candidates	survived	the	interview	(both	Vivien	and	Wilson	were	based	in	an	office	away	from	the	UK	HQ).		4. These	two	candidates	were	invited	to	the	UK	HQs	to	attend	the	final	interview.	The	four	interviewers	were:	the	Administration	Manager	of	Teleman	UK,	the	HR	manager	of	the	two	new	R&D	Centres	(an	expatriate),	the	Administration	Manager	of	a	Munich	R&D	Centre	(an	expatriate),	the	Administration	Executive	of		the	Munich	R&D	Centre	(an	expatriate).	The	interviewers	from	Munich	were	linked	via	a	video	conference	system.	After	this	interview,	they	decided	to	offer	the	job	to	one	candidate.		5. Sarah,	the	HR	manager	of	Teleman	UK,	talked	with	the	candidate	over	the	telephone	and	negotiated	the	salary.		6. On	the	first	day	the	candidate	came	on-board	and	another	interview-like	meeting	was	arranged	between	the	candidate	and	the	Operational	Head	of	the	European	Research	Institute	based	in	Munich.		
 
Therefore, for this role of Office Administrator, a total of 9 people were involved in 6 
rounds of interviews. Because so many managers were involved, the candidate 
herself, on her first day, felt confused about whom she would report to in her position. 
The expatriate HR manager later explained that she was expected to report directly to 
the UK Admin Manager and the UK Research Institution Operation Head, but at the 
same time report to the Administration Manager in Munich. As I will further discuss 
in Chapter 6, I argue that Teleman’s matrix structure is part of the bureaucratic 
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formalised control system, and it itself has become a key control mechanism to 
regulate employees’ work activities.  
 
 
4.4 Teleman’s three employee groups  
 
 
Compared to most MNCs studies involving employees, Teleman’s case is particularly 
interesting because of its workforce composition. My study reveals that there are three 
distinctive employee groups working in Teleman’s European units. The first group is 
expatriates, who are sent from China; the second group is local European employees, 
which I refer to as local employees hereafter; and the third group is locally hired 
Chinese employees, referred to as local Chinese hereafter.  
 
My first encounter with Teleman’s unique employee composition was in early 2013, 
when I started this research project by interviewing expatriates. From these interviews, 
I made two observations: first, I was very surprised by people’s accounts of their daily 
working life, which revealed the presence of large numbers of expatriates in the 
company’s UK, France and Germany units. Second, when I asked questions about 
‘local employees’, my interviewees frequently made the distinction between 
‘foreigners’ and ‘Chinese’.  
 
I obtained a clearer picture about these three employee groups when conducting the 
participant observation in Teleman’s UK head office. During my three-month stay 
with the company, on several occasions, I asked my co-workers about the headcount 
percentage of expatriates and locally hired employees, and was told the same answer: 
half of them are Chinese expatriates, and another half are locally hired employees, 
that include half of local British and half of local Chinese. On another occasion, when 
having lunch with the British HR manager, she claimed that 60% of the workforce is 
locally hired, while the rest was Chinese expatriates. Based on these accounts, the 
total workforce in Teleman UK is estimated to consist of roughly 50% expatriates, 
25% local employees, and 25% local Chinese. Put together, about 75% of the total 
population is ethnic Chinese. Bearing this in mind, it was not surprising for me, on 
one occasion, to hear two Chinese interns working in the HR team claiming that they 
felt it was like working in a foreign company in China, where most people are 
 
91 
Chinese with a small number of Westerners. The UK Finance team is a good example 
to illustrate the unique workforce composition in Teleman. In the Finance team, out of 
its 21 team members, 7 are expatriates, 9 are local Chinese, and the other 5 are British 
employees. In the following paragraphs, I will provide a brief description of these 
three employee groups.  
 
4.4.1 Local Employees  
 
Most local employees in Teleman are engaged in customer-facing work, such as sales, 
client relations and service management. Even though many of them are based in 
project delivery or technical teams, their main responsibilities involve direct 
communications with clients. As one of the primary activities of Teleman in Europe is 
to sell its project-based services, an important role played by local employees is to 
introduce the company and its product to the local market, maintain a good 
relationship with clients, and generate sales and income for the company. It is clear 
that local employees’ biggest advantage over the other two groups is their rich 
knowledge of the local market and customers. From the company’s perspective, a 
good strategy is to make best use of such advantage. As one expatriate put it, 
 
‘We hire local employees, that’s because we like the advantages they have. 
For many local employees, particularly our client managers, maintaining client 
relationships is where they can use their advantages easily. It is true that very 
few foreigners are good at the internal communications. (However) when 
British people go to meet a British client, the situation is much better than a 
Chinese person meeting a British client. You are different from foreigners.’  
 
A second important and related feature about local employees is that most local 
employees are mature working professionals with years of experience in the telecoms 
industry. In many cases, they worked for telecoms operators (i.e. Teleman’s corporate 
clients) before they joined Teleman. Given the importance of industry experience and 
networks in sales and marketing activities of Teleman, adopting a ‘high payment, high 
position’ strategy for this group tends to staff middle-senior positions with local 
employees, and offer them above-market payment packages. One important reason, 
several of my interviewees suggest, is that it still remains difficult for Teleman to hire 
top talent in Europe for various reasons such as China’s image, Chinese culture, 
Teleman’s association with the Chinese government; therefore, higher payment is a 
 
92 
reasonable strategy to solve this problem. A reflection of local employees’ seniority in 
terms of industry experience is their ages. Based on my interviews and observations, 
most local employees are older than their Chinese peers. For example, in the UK 
financial team, while the team leader (an expatriate) is in his early 30s, four out of the 
five local employees are in their mid-40s or early 50s.  
 
As we will see, local employees’ job responsibilities (focusing on external 
communications) and their seniority in terms of industry experience and age have 
important implications for how they respond to the company’s control strategy. For 
example, they leave as a consequence of personal centralised control because they 
have no opportunity in participating in decision-making (further discussed in Chapter 
5) and they ignore the bureaucratic formalised control because they are not familiar 
with internal rules as a result of their focus on external communications (further 
discussed in Chapter 6). Furthermore, local employees’ job responsibilities and 
industry experience also lead to their potential high mobility power in external labour 
markets, and this causes the company to take a non-control approach in terms of 
reward incentives (further discussed in Chapter 8).  
 
4.4.2 The local Chinese 
 
A typical local Chinese is a young woman in her 20s or early 30s, originally from 
China, who has completed her bachelor’s or master’s degree study in Europe and 
managed to get a job at Teleman. Local Chinese is a large and unique group in 
Teleman’s European subsidiaries, particularly in the UK, Germany, France and the 
Netherlands, countries that are attractive to most Chinese people as destinations for 
study and for migration. For example, in 2014 when I conducted research in 
Teleman’s UK office, the UK HR team, which in total consisted of 11 members, had 
6 local Chinese; and in Germany, 6 of its 19 HR team members were local Chinese. 
Depending on the immigration regulations of the specific country they are in, the local 
Chinese have different types of visa and might or might not have changed their 
nationalities. For example, in the UK office, most of them are on a dependant visa 
(e.g. marrying someone with UK/EU passport, or with Work Permit; or their partners 
are doing a PhD), thus having the right to work in the UK.  
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An important feature about the local Chinese is concerned with their job 
responsibility. As my research reveals, the local Chinese are mainly hired to leverage 
their Chinese speaking skills and to support the work of expatriates. Therefore, they 
tend to work in junior, low-skilled positions. With a few exceptions, the majority of 
the local Chinese are at junior staff level either in supporting functions such as 
administration, procurement, HR, Finance, and PR, or in project delivery teams as 
Project Co-ordinators. They are heavily involved in working level communications 
with people in China and/or in Germany, where the company’s Western Europe 
Regional HQ is based. A good illustration is the work of Lucy, who was my co-
worker in the recruitment team.  
 
Lucy is in her late 20s, and joined the company in 2013 after she completed her 
Masters study in Human Resource Management in a reputable university in England. 
She is currently on a dependant visa with her husband, who is working in an 
investment bank with a work permit. Lucy’s daily work involves applying new 
headcounts from China, getting approval for UK new hires from China and Germany, 
submitting new hires’ materials to China to apply for IDs for them, and talking with 
people in China and handling all kinds of online systems to facilitate the recruitment 
process, etc. Given the company’s strong bureaucratic controls with rigid yet ever-
changing rules and procedures that easily put local employees off (further discussed in 
Chapter 6), like many local Chinese, Lucy is heavily immersed in dealing with the 
company bureaucracy. She commented:  
 
‘…there are so many processes and procedures in Teleman… all things, even 
tiny tiny things, need to go to West Europe and Headquarters to get approved. 
It is impossible for foreigners to do these procedure works. We are such a 
hierarchical company... And this is our job to make a balance and get things 
done.’  
 
As we can see here, and discussed further later, the local Chinese play important roles 
in implementing the company’s bureaucratic formalised control and centralised 
control in the subsidiary units through, for example, facilitating the approval process 
and decision-making process. However, given the dominant positions of expatriates in 
the company, the importance of the local Chinese is downplayed by the company, and 
they are staffed to fill junior positions and engage in low-skilled work. Their low 
status in the company means that they have weak bargaining power, and when faced 
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with various controls from the company, they find it difficult to resist. Whilst local 
employees can fight back or quit to resist control, criticism and complaints are major 
forms of response of local Chinese to organisational control.  
 
4.4.3 Expatriates  
 
Expatriates are the dominant group in Teleman’s European subsidiary units both in 
terms of population and power. They can be grouped into many categories by 
different criteria. By hierarchical ranking, they could be country manager, department 
directors, business unit directors, project managers, and engineers. By function, they 
may be in a sales team, a project delivery team, a service team and other supporting 
teams such as marketing, finance, purchasing, administration, and HR. By assignment 
time period, expatriates are on assignments ranging from 3-6 months to 3-5 years. 
Based on my interviews and my own observations, the majority of the expatriates are 
based in project delivery and service team, dealing with technical issues. Roughly half 
of them are on 3-5 year long-term assignments, and the other half are on 3-6 month 
short-term assignments, travelling between different projects.  
 
Two occasions are the best time to observe the strong presence of expatriates in 
Teleman’s UK office. The first is in the morning, even before you arrive at the office. 
On every working day between 8 to 8:30, on the buses from the town centre to the 
business park, in which Teleman is located, if you ask the passengers about their 
employers, half of them would tell you they work with Teleman. When the bus comes 
to its final stop next to the company’s massive office building, you will see of the 20 
or so people leaving the bus, about 15 of them are Chinese. The second occasion is 
lunch time. Between 11:30 to 1 pm on a working day, if you go to the company’s 
canteen on the first floor, you will probably be struck by the large population of 
Chinese employees, and most of them are expatriates from China. They sit in groups, 
chatting in Chinese, talking about their work, and enjoying the delicious, most likely 
Chinese, but sometimes western, food provided by the company. Non-Chinese 
employees are seen scattered among them in different groups.  
 
Due to the large numbers of expatriates present in the UK office, the term ‘Waipai’ 
(which is the Chinese equivalent for ‘expatriate’) pervades in daily organisational 
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discourse. For example, in the HR team, there are two staff responsible for employee 
payroll, one for local employees, and another solely dedicated to ‘Waipai’. Therefore 
when an employee, who is ethnically Chinese, comes to the HR team to ask about a 
salary issue, the first question he will be asked is, ‘Are you Waipai or local?’, and he 
will be directed to the person in charge. There is another HR staff member who is 
responsible for visa, reception, and registration issues of expatriates. Inside the 
elevators, there are all kinds of posters and most of them are bilingual; however, 
sometimes a notice in Chinese will be there, starting something like ‘Dear Waipai, 
please note that… ’. In the canteen, there are two tills, and at certain periods during 
lunch time, one till is open to Waipai only, and they use a different food card to pay, 
which is subsidised by the company.  
 
If a portrait needs to be drawn about expatriates, it will be like this. They are between 
23-40 years old, they have a university degree in a subject such as engineering and 
computer science, and some of them have Masters degrees or even PhD degrees from 
top Chinese universities.  They typically join the company right after graduation from 
university or after a couple of years in other companies, most of them are single 
young men or women, and for those who are married, it is highly likely that they work 
and live alone in foreign countries without their families.  
 
In addition to these demographic data, two distinctive characteristics of expatriates 
distinguish them from the other two employee groups. The first is about their global 
mobility, and the second about the many ‘hardships’ that they endure during their 
overseas assignments.  
 
Global Mobility: A typical career path of expatriates in Teleman is ‘China- foreign 
country A – foreign country B – foreign country C/D/E- China’. As most of them 
joined the company right after university, they have no family obligations and often 
happily accept overseas assignments and take it as a chance to see the world. Below is 
a project list provided by one of my interviewees Daniel.  
 
• 08/2009-	05/2010	Norway,	X	project	Phase	I				
• 06/2010	–	02/2011	Norway,	X	project	Phase	II					
• 03/2011-	08/2011	Croatia,	T	project	Phase	I			
• 10/2011	–	12/2011	Norway,	X	project	Phase	III							
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• 01/2012	–	02/2012	Bulgaria,	V	project							
• 03/2012	Croatia,	Y	project		
• 04/2012	Moldova,	V	project		
• 05/2012	–	06/2012	China,	T	project			
• 07/2012-	02/2013	Poland,	P	project																					
• 03/2013	–	07/2013	Iceland,	B	project		
• 08/2013	–	03/2014		Austria,		Multiple	projects	
 
Daniel is a core network engineer with Teleman. When the interviews were conducted 
in 2014, he was working in Poland. Daniel joined the company in 2008 after he 
graduated from a top university in Shanghai with a bachelor’s degree in Information 
Engineering. After one year’s training and working in China, he starts his global 
journey. During my fieldwork period, I have come to know many expatriates who had 
a similar experience. For example, Lucas, a 35-year-old Chinese man, worked in 
Germany, France, Spain and Italy for a total of 5 years before he moved back to 
China. Jake, who joined the company in 2001, similarly worked in South Africa for 5 
years, and then in the Netherlands, France and Germany for a total of 3 years.  
 
A document published in February 2015 by the company on its intranet platform 
clearly illustrated the global mobility of Teleman employees. According to this 
document (titled ‘Teleman People Flying Data’), in 2014 a total of 107,523 
employees had travelled 630,749 times, which means on average each employee 
travels 4 times annually. The ‘most diligent’ employee travelled 123 times in 2014, 
which means he/she travels once every three days. The total travelling distance 
reached 1,158,410,832 km, representing 28905 laps around the earth; and the most 
frequent overseas destinations are: Jakarta, Indonesia; Dusseldorf, Germany; London, 
UK; Bangkok, Thailand; and Mexico City, Mexico. Although this document does not 
refer to expatriate activities specifically, given the large and dominant population of 
this group, it serves as an indication about their global mobility.  
 
Enduring Hardship: As is further discussed in Chapter 7, in Teleman, expatriates 
had to endure hardship in either a ‘harsh environment’ or a ‘harsh role’. Here, a harsh 
environment can be best reflected by the working locations, such as working in a 
desert, at sea, in a war region, or in epidemic areas. Harsh roles can be best illustrated 
when working in more developed markets, such as Europe, where the telecoms 
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industry is highly developed with fierce competition from competitors and clients 
being demanding.  
 
As mentioned earlier, Teleman initiated its internationalisation activities first in 
Russia and the CIS region in1996, Latin American markets in 1997, and the African 
market in 1998. Therefore, almost all the older-generation expatriates have 
experienced the hardship in these developing regions. In recent years, the company 
has put into place the policy that for fresh graduates, underdeveloped or developing 
regions which are most likely characterised by a harsh environment, should be their 
first destination of expatriation. Only those who have survived and proved themselves 
can be sent to developed markets. Therefore, for many expatriates, the first thing they 
need to deal with is the ‘harsh environment’.  
 
Since part of the services Teleman offers to clients is to set up communication 
networks like building up transmission towers and arranging cables, expatriates are 
seen working in such ‘harsh’ natural environments as deserts, plateaus, rain forests 
and oceans. For example, one expatriate once worked in the Arctic Circle, in two 
locations within Siberia restoring two transmission towers.  The expatriate and his 
team, including several other expatiates and local Russians, experienced the most 
serious blizzard in 30 years, and an extremely low temperature of minus 50 Celsius 
degree (source: Teleman People newspaper, 2002). 
 
In addition to a ‘harsh’ natural environment, many expatriates also have direct contact 
with social unrest in some Middle East and African countries.  For example, in 
Pakistan, an expatriate was checking on the engine room destroyed by demonstrators 
when a grenade exploded 10 metres away. When he left the place and on his way 
back, he was caught in the middle of gunfire between two armed groups. The bullets 
hit the trunk, but fortunately he was protected by the sponge of the seats (source: 
Teleman People newspaper, June 2009).  
 
Based on the content analysis of the newspaper, the ‘harsh environment’ also includes 
virus outbreaks and natural disasters, when expatriates are still required, or choose, to 
continue their work. For example, in 2007, large scale Elbola struck the Kananga 
region of Congo, where Teleman people were delivering a project. Informed by the 
 
98 
World Health Organisation, they moved to another area to work. However, in order to 
ensure the project was completed by the end of the year, an expatriate team leader 
himself insisted on staying in the plagued region and continued his work on 
rectification and inspection of the network (source: Teleman People newspaper, 
February 2012). Furthermore, to many expatriates, working in natural disasters such 
as earthquake and flooding is part of their working life, because when that happens, 
transmission towers might be destroyed, and communication networks might break 
down. This is the very moment they are needed by the clients. For example, in 2010 
when a severe earthquake hit Haiti, four expatriates led a team to restore the 
completely collapsed communication systems in the country. To be closer to the 
engine room, they lived next to the ruins and worked until 4 am (source: Teleman 
People newspaper, September 2011).  
 
If harsh natural environment, wars and riots, virus outbreaks, and natural disasters are 
experienced by expatriates working in developing countries, then challenges for 
expatriates in Europe are brought about by severe market competition. In Europe, in a 
highly mature market with well established industry standards and seasoned players, 
expatriates from China face great difficulties in selling their products and services 
and, after they eventually do, in delivering projects to meet the requirements of its 
demanding clients. This was particularly true a decade ago and is true today. Teleman 
employees, therefore, need to work hard to compete with its strong competitors, many 
of them having hundreds of years of history in this market. My content analysis of the 
company’s internal newspaper indicates that many expatriates have experienced pain, 
frustration, and failure when dealing with European clients and competitors. One 
expatriate refers to such an experience as a process of ‘cutting one’s feet to fit the 
shoes’, that is, changing and improving themselves to fit an advanced and 
international market.  
 
4.5 Conclusion  
 
This chapter has provided an overview of the organisational contexts of this study and 
has sought to set the stage for later discussion on Teleman’s international 
management and control system. The three aspects discussed in this chapter (i.e. 
Teleman being a young yet successful, knowledge-intensive company with large 
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operations in Europe, its matrix structure, and its three employee groups) are inter-
connected in that matrix structure is required by successful global business, and the 
functioning of such structure is supported by the unique workforce composition of the 
three employee groups.  Overviews in this chapter also provide us with contextual 
knowledge about the four types of control discussed in the following four chapters.  
 
As we can see later, broadly in line with what has been discussed in literature 
(Cardinal et al., 2010; Ouchi, 1979, 1977; Snell, 1992), Teleman relies on a 
combination of various types of control to regulate the activities of its subsidiaries and 
its employees. However, there are two aspects that make Teleman a particularly 
interesting case. First, Teleman’s control system seems to be based on a pragmatic 
mentality, and targets different groups of employees with tailored control mechanisms. 
Whilst the first two types (i.e. the personal centralised and bureaucratic formalised 
control) are used to control its overseas subsidiaries, thus targeting all employees 
working in Europe, identity control and control by rewards are only used to regulate 
its expatriate employees. Second, different from most MNCs studies which typically 
have discussions on ‘home country nationals’ and ‘host country nationals’, the 
workforce composition of the three employee groups in Teleman’s European units 
makes the control/resistance issue in Teleman exhibit much more dynamism. While 
existing studies tend to locate the issue of control/resistance to the debate of HQs 
centralisation and subsidiary autonomy through the lens of politics and power struggle 
(e.g. Birkinshaw, 1996, 2000; Dörrenbächer & Geppert, 2009; Morgan & Kristensen, 
2006), the Teleman case shows how different groups of employees respond to various 
types of controls differently or similarly, given their unique background, job 
responsibilities and personal interests. Describing employees’ experiences and 
reactions, I argue, is an important way to paint a full picture of the company’s control 
system.  
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Chapter 5: Personal centralised control in Teleman  
 
5.1 Introduction  
 
This chapter focuses on how Teleman controls its European units with a personal 
centralised approach. My analysis points to the critical roles played by expatriates, 
who are used to effectuate the company’s centralised control strategy. In addition, 
personal centralised control is further strengthened when China HQ frequently 
involves itself in directly making decisions for subsidiaries. Consequently, such a 
strong centralisation approach excludes local European and locally hired Chinese 
employees from participating in decision-making, and leads to their gloomy career 
prospects within the company. Fighting against control, submitting to control, and 
quitting to resist control are observed from these employees.  
 
 
5.2 Personal centralised control in Teleman 
 
According to Child (1977), centralisation is an approach where control is exercised by 
confining decision-making to a small group of senior people or even one man. This 
can be achieved either through well- established and formalised management systems 
(e.g. a budgeting system and an approval system), or through a more personal 
approach that is using expatriates (Ferner et al., 2004b).  
 
In Teleman’s case, centralisation is notable. The company largely confines its 
decision-making to the China HQ, and delegates little autonomy to its European 
subsidiaries. This is achieved mainly by a personal approach with expatriates heavily 
involved in the daily operation of subsidiary units.  
 
5.2.1 Expatriates as a control mechanism  
 
As discussed earlier, employees in the company’s European units consist of three 
groups: expatriates (50%), local employees (25%), and local Chinese (25%). Such an 
expatriate rate of around 50 per cent is uncommonly high, even compared to Japanese 
MNCs, where the heavy use of expatriates is a tradition (Legewie, 2002). My research 
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reveals that expatriates in Teleman play two key roles in their daily work: coordinator 
and controller.  
 
Expatriates’ role as coordinator can be reflected in their heavy communication 
activities with HQs. As my research reveals, an important feature about working in 
Teleman is the large amounts of internal communication required between China HQ 
and overseas subsidiaries, and expatriates play a critical role in facilitating such 
internal communications, particularly those related to technical and business issues.  
In fact, many expatriates position themselves as coordinators. For example, one 
expatriate describes his job as the following:  
 
 ‘We do internal management, dealing with people inside the company. 
Vertically we talk with HQs, and horizontally, we talk with people in different 
countries. The majority of people in the HQ are Chinese, so this is not what 
foreigners are good at. Therefore, foreigners focus on external clients, and the 
Chinese focus on internal affairs.’ 
 
Expatriates’ coordinating role can be best illustrated by how they are involved in 
delivering projects. The project delivery process in Teleman is undoubtedly complex, 
but can be summarised into the following. First, a project plan will be proposed by 
Teleman for bidding purposes based on the client’s specific needs. Second, if 
Teleman wins the deal, the next step will be developing and manufacturing related 
products based on the host country’s telecoms infrastructure and the client’s existing 
system. Third, Teleman will send employees to install this equipment. The installation 
site can be in desolate and uninhabited areas such as the Arctic Circle; it could also be 
at the client’s office site. Fourth, the service team will serve the clients whenever any 
technical issues come up. Of course, there are always clients managers keeping 
contact with the clients, and trying hard to win the next project. 
 
Needless to say, the above four steps largely simplify the process Teleman people 
need to go through to complete a project. First and foremost, there is the issue of 
getting the business. When Teleman entered the international market, the first 
problem it faced was the bad reputation of made-in-China products and the close-to-
none awareness of the company. Even today with Teleman becoming a big name in 
the telecoms industry, it needs to fight hard against other western MNCs with long-
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established reputations. To get the business, large numbers of expatriates have been 
sent from China to every corner of the world to ‘open up’ the market and win deals.  
 
After winning the deals, Teleman people need to work even more closely with their 
clients. In the product development stage, they need to maintain close 
communications with the clients to understand their real needs and study the 
feasibility and challenges of implementing the project. In fact, many expatriates I 
know work on the client side. At this stage, the project scale might change, and 
clients’ ideas and needs might change. Therefore, there are lots of communications 
involved between client and expatriates, and between expatriates and 
development/manufacturing teams in China. When it finally arrives at the installation 
stage, expatriates are also directly involved. They need to roll up their sleeves, and put 
their hands on the equipment. After all this is done, they also need to stand by for 
technical problems that might occur at any time.  If they cannot solve the problem 
themselves, they need to ask for help from technical experts based at the HQ.  
 
Therefore, the project delivery process in Teleman is highly technical and complex 
and might last for several years. During this process, expatriates function as 
coordinators, making connections between clients and the company, between China 
and foreign units, and between different functions such as sales, R&D, production and 
project implementation.  
 
Expatriates’ second role as controller is, first of all, to supervise locally hired 
employees in order to make sure that they behave in accordance with the company’s 
requirements and in line with the interests of the China HQ (i.e. ensuring compliance 
to bureaucratic rules); and secondly, to make decisions on behalf of the China HQ. In 
Harzing’s (1999, p.126) terms, the former is referred to as ‘direct supervision’, and 
the latter ‘a quasi-centralization of decision making’.  Such direct supervision and 
quasi decision-making, as I observed, are activated and made possible by expatriates’ 
endowment of controlling power, which is both institutionalised and non-
institutionalised.  
 
Expatriates’ institutionalised power results from their hierarchical positions in the 
company. In Teleman UK, for example, the CEO position is occupied, expectedly, by 
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a Chinese expatriate. The director positions in the company’s several business units 
are all staffed with expatriates. Even for supporting functions such as finance, legal, 
and procurement, the directors are sent from China. The only exception is in the HR 
team, which is headed by a British woman, and in the administration team, which is 
supervised by a locally- hired Chinese man. Apart from the departmental director 
positions, large numbers of middle positions are also staffed with expatriates, such as 
project directors, project managers, senior engineers, engineers, procurement 
managers, financial managers, etc. Such institutionalised power gives legitimacy to 
expatriates to supervise local operations and make decisions on behalf of China.  For 
instance, my fieldnotes on July 21st records my conversation with a local Chinese, and 
shows how institutionalised power enables expatriate managers to act as controllers.  
 
…Besides, I was very surprised to know that the department manager, Tim, 
was so young. He was born in 1983, and is only 31 this year. I asked how the 
several senior local employees (four of them in their late 40s, and one of them 
a similar age to Tim) felt about working under Tim. She said, ‘Well, 
everybody respects the fact that he is the boss.’ She explained that although 
they don’t treat the boss as the Chinese do, they do ‘listen to him’. This 
reminded me of what happened a couple of days ago when Rose (a British Tax 
manager in the financial team) and I were discussing the two shortlisted 
candidates for the Tax Specialist position. ‘It’s really difficult to choose, isn’t 
it? Both of them are so good,’ I said. Rose smiled, and said, ‘Tim will decide.’ 
 
In addition to such institutionalised power originating from their hierarchical 
positions, expatriates also possess non-institutionalised power. Such power is 
invisible, but can only be felt when they are reaching out to people in the China HQ, 
and making important decisions for the subsidiaries. In this regard, one good example 
is concerned with those expatriates who are in ‘deputy’ positions. Based on my 
interviewees and my own observation, in Teleman UK and other European Teleman 
offices, it is common that for local managers there tend to be expatriates acting as 
their deputies. According to my interviewees, there are two major reasons for such an 
arrangement. First, to ‘answer questions’ from local managers regarding internal 
bureaucratic procedures and ensure that local operations comply with the company’s 
internal policies (i.e. bureaucratic formalised control); second, to facilitate the 
communications with HQs and sister subsidiaries. According to an expatriate 
manager, this is an important ‘localisation strategy’ of the company.  
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‘By doing this we want to emphasise the idea that no matter who is the 
manager, local or Chinese, it is normal for us... we want local employees to 
better understand some internal requirements. We won’t get rid of their 
Chinese deputy, and we want to force them to learn. At the same time, this 
also brings challenges to people in the HQ. In the past when managerial 
positions were all occupied by Chinese, if they wanted anything they just gave 
a call... now you have to speak English with our local managers. If you cannot 
speak English, find someone who can. We want to use local managers, even if 
this means that we need to sacrifice some of our work efficiency.’  
 
Hierarchically, these Chinese expatriates are the subordinates of local managers, and 
their job is to assist their supervisors (i.e. local managers) in daily management. In the 
company’s logic, the relationship between local managers and Chinese subordinates is 
more like a king-minister relation in ancient China, with Chinese subordinates acting 
as ministers and providing advice and assistance to local managers, particularly in the 
areas of internal policy and procedures; and local managers as kings following such 
advice. Of course, this is the perfect situation; in reality, the outcome is that the king-
minister relationship endows more non-institutionalised power to expatriates at the 
expense of local managers.  
 
The British HR manager Sarah observes this phenomenon. According to her, Chinese 
people either in the UK or in the China HQ are ‘the true decision makers’ with the 
company. Even if they are in a lower position than local (British) managers, they have 
more power and say in the decision-making. She comments: 
 
‘There is always something you don’t know about the company, about the 
company’s business; however, the Chinese managers know everything… 
sometimes Chinese managers will override the power of local managers, and 
make things work in their way.’   
 
Another source of non-institutionalised power for expatriates is the company’s blurred 
reporting lines in its European subsidiary. In addition to the fact that the company’s 
matrix structure has created multiple bosses for their employees, another noted feature 
about Teleman is that there is no organisation chart made public, either at company 
level or at department level. Furthermore, an individual employee’s job title is not 
something you can see clearly. Different from other organisations where one may be 
able to get such information from internal portals, in Teleman such information is 
simply not available. When working in the UK office, I once asked the expatriate HR 
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manager Emma for the organisation chart of TigerCo (Teleman’s R&D facility), 
trying to understand it better, and Emma simply responded, ‘it’s confidential.’ In 
terms of job title, there is an internal portal where you can find all sorts of 
information, such as contact methods and department information, but not job titles. 
And in all email communications, most Teleman people don’t put their job title at the 
bottom of the email as part of the signatures.  
 
The consequence of such blurred reporting lines is that people have limited 
knowledge about where someone sits in the hierarchy, and how much authority you 
have or someone has. However, this arrangement lends more power to expatriates, 
since they can leverage their close connections with China, and become an important 
resource for the Chinese management team, thus getting involved in the decision-
making process, and helping the company to exercise control over overseas subsidiary 
units.  
 
Expatriates acting as coordinators and controllers in Teleman make them very similar 
to their counterparts in Japanese MNCs. Studies reveal that personal centralised 
control is prominent in Japanese MNCs, with a high presence of expatriates in their 
subsidiaries (Kopp, 1994; Legewie, 2002; Tung, 1982). A primary role of Japanese 
expatriates is coordinating ( Yoshihara, 1996, 2005). For example, in Whitley, 
Morgan, Kelly and Sharpe's (2003) study of Japanese car manufacturers, they find 
that Japanese expatriate managers and technical staff were predominantly in 
coordinating roles after the UK plants had been established successfully. In terms of 
their role as controller, it was discovered that a Japanese expatriate’s job is to ensure 
that the interests of the parent company are protected. In daily work, this can be 
reflected by the fact that Japanese expatriates frequently consult their counterparts or 
superiors in Japan head offices, and control the decision-making process in 
subsidiaries (Elashmawi, 1990; Thome & McAuley, 1992). Morgan et al. (2003) also 
report that in Japanese banks, while ultimate decision-making powers in most cases 
rested with head offices, Japanese managers in the UK always acted as gatekeepers in 
this process and their UK colleagues depended on them to get approval. Through 
these actions, the expatriates closely control the subsidiary operation in line with the 
requirements and expectations of HQs. Therefore, Ferner’s (1997, p. 22) description 
about Japanese MNCs that ‘the foremost characteristic of Japanese companies…is the 
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strong but informal centralised coordination of their foreign operations, highly reliant 
on establishing an international network of Japanese expatriate managers’ seems to be 
also applicable to the case of Teleman.  
 
5.2.2 HQs’ direct involvement in decision making  
 
In addition to heavy reliance on expatriates in implementing its centralised control 
strategy in overseas subsidiaries, Teleman’s HQ also frequently involve themselves in 
direct decision-making, or as one local employee put it, there is always a ‘boss’ in the 
company who will make a decision. This ‘boss’, as discussed earlier, can be those 
powerful expatriate managers based in the subsidiary and on many occasions, are 
senior managers based at the China HQ or regional HQs.  
 
I once asked Emma, who worked in China HQ for 7 years, whether she feels any 
difference when in the UK. Without any hesitation, she answered: 
 
“No. There is no difference. It’s all Teleman. Everywhere is Teleman. Leaders 
have the final say…the biggest strength of Teleman is non-localisation.’  
 
Emma’s observation can be supported by the prolonged approval process of new hires 
for the two new R&D centres discussed earlier. When I was with Teleman, all 
positions for the R&D centres started from Grade 16 (manager level). Most of them 
are positions of Grade 17 or 18, which could be considered as the equivalent of a 
senior manager or director in other organisations, and several are 19 and above. 
According to the company’s policy, all these new hires need to be approved by 5-7 
people based in China. And for any position with Grade 19 or above, Teleman’s most 
senior HR officer, the HR VP, needs to get involved. Sitting in China, these senior 
managers nevertheless decide the job title, job grade, and compensation and benefit 
packages for new employees in the UK.  
 
Furthermore, Chinese senior managers also frequently involve themselves in the 
interview process. My fieldnotes recorded many occasions when senior managers in 
China stepped in even after the candidate had been interviewed several times. Such 
direct involvement from the China HQ undoubtedly is at the expense of local 
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managers’ decision-making power. My following fieldnotes on July 15th show that 
local British managers are left out of the final decision-making process even if they 
are recruiting their subordinates.  
 
… The principle consultant Ken (British) in the UK office had interviewed 
several candidates and shortlisted three of them for the final interview with a 
Chinese manager in China. When Sarah designated this task to me and I 
looked through the email, I found that in fact Ken had already emailed John, 
the Chinese manager, asking for his availability. However, he didn’t get any 
response from John. I guess this was because his long email was in English. I 
wrote an email to John yesterday, and got his immediate response this 
morning. He said he would be in Poland next Monday, and should be available 
for the interview. However, he didn’t mention a specific time slot. I called him 
directly, and we quickly decided three time slots in the morning for the three 
telephone interviews. I guess Ken must feel frustrated when he sent out an 
email to John but just didn’t get any response.  
 
…(regarding another role, the Marketing Director one) The British hiring 
manager Steven has shortlisted two candidates for the final interview with a 
Chinese manager. And when I got this task, Steven was actually talking with 
the Chinese manager through emails, back and forth, several times, trying to 
decide on the specific date. However, because the Chinese manager is 
travelling, it seemed that it was extremely difficult to agree on a time. After I 
took over this task, I realised the first thing is to confirm the Chinese 
manager’s schedule. I talked with his assistant Candy on the phone, and then 
asked her to inform me when she can find some availability of the Chinese 
manager for the interview. We started talking last Thursday and today 
(Tuesday) there is still no confirmation. I called her again, and was told that 
the interviews might be scheduled for next Thursday and Friday when the 
Chinese manager is in China.  
 
These two cases indicate that the China HQ direct involvement in decision-making 
has sidelined local employees and undermined their powers, which should have been 
endowed to them in line with their seemingly high hierarchical positions. In this 
regard, one expatriate manager made the following observation: 
 
‘From a cultural perspective, Teleman still belongs to a strong centralisation 
model. If the localisation level is higher, Teleman doesn’t need so many 
(expatriate) people abroad to manage things. On the surface, the localisation 
level looks pretty high, because you can see many foreigners there. But in fact, 
I don’t think it is high… In Teleman, many leaders cannot speak good English, 
therefore most of the meetings, internal communications, strategies are in 
Chinese. In most cases, foreigners become ‘flower vases’, a decoration to 
Teleman’s localisation. In many areas, key decisions are made by Chinese 
people, and this is the challenge for them (local managers).’  
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In fact, the ‘boss-making-decision’ mentality seems to be well accepted by Teleman 
employees. As one local Chinese put it,  ‘I think it’s all about what the leaders say. No 
matter how ridiculous the decisions are, what we need to do is to follow’. On another 
occasion, a local Chinese employee told me the following story: A British consultant 
based in the UK office was sent to the China HQ for a short assignment. And within 
one week, he learned his first Chinese vocabulary ‘Laoban’ (boss), because he 
discovered that this was the most frequently used word in the company, which 
referred to the number one man in the company.   
 
In summary, Teleman’s personal centralised control approach is characterised by a 
heavy reliance on expatriates and direct HQ involvement. Such an approach is closely 
related to Teleman’s global configuration of assets and capabilities (Barlett & 
Ghoshal 1989). As mentioned in Chapter 4, Teleman claims to have operations in 
over 170 countries. However, based on my interviewees’ accounts, the company’s 
overseas subsidiaries are more like sales representative offices, where people win 
business deals, pass the deals to China, wait to get products manufactured by China, 
and then deliver the products and services to clients. In fact, in the daily 
conversations, overseas subsidiaries are referred to by employees as ‘representative 
offices’. For example, the UK subsidiary is called ‘Ying Dai’ (UK representative 
office). Furthermore, although the company currently runs sixteen R&D centres 
globally, most of the critical R&D projects are done by its eight huge R&D centres in 
China. In addition, the company’s entire manufacturing activities are based in China. 
Such an arrangement makes Teleman a typical ‘global’ company in terms of 
competitive strategy, which takes global efficiency as its top priority, and manages 
their overseas subsidiaries in a standardized manner to achieve efficiencies and 
economies of scales (Barlett & Ghoshal, 1989). Like other MNCs following a global 
strategy, Teleman seems to organise its international activities based on a hub-and-
spoke model in which many strategic functions are centralised at headquarters and 
overseas subsidiaries are mainly acting as pipelines of products and strategies, thus 
leading to the fact that overseas subsidiaries have a high level of dependence on HQs 
and are subject to heavy control from HQs (Barlett & Ghoshal, 1989; Harzing, 2004; 
Porter, 1986). Accordingly, the company relies on large numbers of expatriates in 
overseas offices to facilitate the complex bureaucratic procedures, centralised 
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decision-making, and top-down communications. The following remarks made by an 
expatriate manager also illustrate this point:  
 
‘China back home provides huge amounts of support in terms of resources, 
and this is the competitiveness of Chinese companies. Chinese expatriates play 
the role of connection and translation between globalisation and localisation, 
which are the core element of Chinese companies’ unique competitiveness in 
overseas markets… For example, Nokia can run the whole range of activities 
in Europe for its mobile phones, from design, raw material purchasing to 
manufacturing, sales and post-sales service. However, Teleman and Company 
X basically only do sales and after-sales here; the rest of the activities are all 
in China. From the process management point of view, it is long and relatively 
risky, but cost and the effect of economic scale is the basic competitive 
advantage of Chinese products in European and American markets, which 
should not be given up. Expatriates play a big role in this process, linking 
market needs to R&D and manufacturing.’ 
 
 
5.3 Response to personal centralised control  
 
Existing studies on MNCs tend to locate the centralised control/ resistance issue in the 
discussion of HQs centralisation and subsidiary autonomy (e.g. Ambos, Asakawa, & 
Ambos, 2011; Fenton-O’Creevy, Gooderham, & Nordhaug, 2008).  Loosely centred 
around the theme of ‘micro-politics’ (e.g. Clark & Geppert, 2006; Dörrenbächer & 
Geppert, 2009, 2011), studies have shown how managers in subsidiaries respond to 
HQs controls in a different way.  
 
For example, Birkinshaw and colleagues (e.g. Birkinshaw, 1996; Birkinshaw, 2000; 
Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 2008) demonstrate that some subsidiaries possess 
‘entrepreneurship’ in challenging HQ authority and control because of their control of 
critical resources. Ferner et al. (2004) studied the dynamics of centralised control and 
subsidiary autonomy in US MNCs in the UK, and show policy creation and policy 
implementation to be two arenas of negotiation between HQs and subsidiaries. 
Morgan and Kristensen (2006, p. 1467) show that ‘The head office managers transfer 
practices, people and resources to subsidiaries in order to maintain control and 
achieve their objectives’; and with two different strategies, i.e. a ‘boy scout’ strategy 
and ‘subversive’ strategy,  ‘local subsidiaries have differential capacities to resist 
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these transfers or to develop them in their own interests depending on their 
institutional context’. 
 
In these studies, employees in subsidiaries tend to be regarded as a unified group, who 
collectively resist the centralised control from HQs and bargain with HQs for more 
autonomy. In the Teleman case, however, employees are fundamentally different in 
terms of work experience, job responsibilities, and personal interests. Therefore, they 
have a different response to even the same types of control. Since expatriates have 
themselves become a control mechanism, this section will focus on how local 
employees and local Chinese experience and respond to the company’s control 
efforts. My analysis indicates that while local employees and local Chinese are both 
subject to personal centralised control, it is the local employees who suffer most. In 
contrast, local Chinese are more victims of bureaucratic formalised control, which 
will be discussed in the next chapter.  
 
As illustrated earlier, personal centralised controls in Teleman are manifested, first, by 
the heavy presence of expatriates, who are endowed with institutionalised and non-
institutionalised power, and second by the direct involvement of the China HQ in 
decision-making. In both scenarios, locally hired employees are deprived of the 
opportunity to truly participate in the decision-making process. This has become a 
particularly serious concern for local employees, who tend to be mature professionals 
with years of work experience in the telecoms industry and in middle or senior level 
managerial positions.  
 
Local employees respond to such centralised control in three ways: fighting, 
submitting, and quitting. To fight against the centralised control, one strategy is to 
promote localisation at subsidiary level by employing more local nationals, which can 
be illustrated by the following story. In a subsidiary in Western Europe, the position 
of head of delivery had long been occupied by several Chinese expatriates. So when 
the position was open again, naturally a Chinese expatriate, who had delivered super 
performance in the subsidiary, came to the management team’s mind as a perfect 
candidate. However, in the Western Europe Regional Head Office, a local Vice 
President was determined to implement a localisation strategy through promoting 
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local employees. The story ends with a local manager being promoted as the new 
head of delivery, and the Chinese candidate transferred to another subsidiary.  
 
Given the highly complex organisational structure and existing strong bureaucratic 
and centralised control over subsidiary units, it might be very difficult to achieve 
success fighting with a localisation strategy, and therefore would less likely to be 
taken by local employees. More prominent strategies, as my research indicates, are 
submitting and quitting.  
 
Submitting to the company’s centralised control is to respect the institutionalised and 
non-institutionalised power possessed by expatriates without challenging it. This, for 
example, can be reflected by the way local employees try hard to accommodate 
expatriates’ requests, and carry out expatriates’ decisions. My fieldnotes on July 16th 
record an occasion that shows how local British managers, as well as the local 
Chinese, work hard to entertain the requests from expatriate managers, although they 
believe that the expatriates’ ideas are wrong.  
 
Sarah and Lucy had some disagreement with the hiring manager Toby 
regarding the package of a candidate. Based on the market rate and her 
conversation with the candidate, Sarah proposed 85k for the candidate; 
however, Toby insisted that 80K should be enough. I heard Sarah explaining 
the situation to Toby over the telephone. After she hung up the phone, Sarah 
said Toby actually was shouting at her. What is more ridiculous was that he 
also wanted to reduce the salary of a candidate, who has accepted a previous 
offer and already signed a contract with the company.  
 
We discussed that Toby had a wrong mentality, and he always believed 
everybody wanted to work for Teleman, as people did in China. ‘Not everyone 
here has the loyalty to the company as he does.’ Sarah said. According to 
Sarah and Lucy, Toby was also commonly recognised to have a terrible 
temper. Sarah emphasised that he actually shouted at everyone in his team, 
and he didn’t trust local people. ‘He thinks all local people are useless,’ Sarah 
said. ‘So how do local people in his team feel about his bad temper?’ I asked. 
Sarah responded, ‘Billy left.’ She explained that Billy was a local member of 
staff in a senior position, who had worked with the company for a couple 
years, until Toby transferred from Switzerland to the UK about 1 year ago.  
‘He thought I was arguing with him, but I was not. I was advising,’ Sarah said 
emotionally, ‘he doesn’t like people challenging him.’ 
 
Later, Toby called Lucy and they talked in Chinese. Lucy appeared very 
obedient over the phone, with lots of “Yes” replies. ‘Lucy is so submissive.” 
Sarah looked at Lucy and said to me. ‘He seemed to talk to you in a nice way!’ 
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I said to Lucy after she finished. ‘Well, I never challenge him… when he said 
these kinds of people are very easy to find, I totally disagree, but what I said 
was yes, they are very popular these days, and maybe we should pay a bit 
more.’  
 
As illustrated by the above case, local managers, as well as local Chinese, submit 
themselves to the centralised control without challenging the authority of expatriate 
managers. Respecting the rules set by China HQ and maintaining the status quo 
seemed to be a common strategy among local employees, even for local managers in 
senior positions. For example, when I was conducting my research at Teleman’s UK 
office, on one occasion the British HR director removed herself from an important 
meeting with senior managers from Germany and China, because right at the 
beginning of the meeting, the meeting chairman announced that the meeting would be 
conducted in Chinese. In such circumstances, the HR director did not argue but 
withdrew herself. 
 
Another common strategy for local employees to resist such control is to quit, a 
strategy also taken by many local nationals in Japanese multinationals who complain 
about not being involved in the decision-making process (e.g. Legewie, 2002). As 
discussed in Chapter 8, turnover rate of local employees is remarkably high in 
Teleman’s European offices; for example in the UK, the turnover rate was between 
20-30% in 2014. In certain offices like Norway, the figure reached 50%. Such a high 
turnover rate, I argue, is an important manifestation of local employees’ resistance, 
and it can be attributed to several factors caused by the company’s centralised control. 
First, the heavy presence of expatriate managers occupying the senior positions in the 
subsidiaries largely eliminates the career development opportunities for local 
managers and, second, the heavy involvement of the China HQ leaves little 
opportunity for local managers to participate in decision-making, even in hiring their 
subordinates.  
 
Third, on a more surface level, the company’s centralised control approach, when 
coupled with the bureaucratic control, has created a corporate environment of strong 
Chinese-ness where Mandarin speaking has become a norm. Whilst centralised 
control heavily relies on a large population of expatriates (e.g. 50% of total workforce 
in the UK office), the bureaucratic control requires a large population of local Chinese 
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to perform internal communication tasks (e.g. 25% of total workforce in the UK 
office), thus leaving local employees as the minority group.  
 
During my stay with Teleman, I discovered that although English is the official 
language in the company, it is not uncommon for employees to receive emails in 
Chinese, and to organise meetings or hold conversations in Chinese, even in the 
presence of local non-Chinese employees. In the worst scenario, because ethnic 
Chinese is the dominant population within the company and thus Mandarin speaking 
becomes a norm, local employees are excluded from daily management activities. The 
story about the HR Director withdrawing from a Chinese-speaking meeting reflects 
this. Another example can be seen in my fieldnotes on July 9th 2014, involving a 
local British employee in the company’s purchasing department.  
 
In the afternoon, Sarah told us that an employee, Simon, might leave the 
company. I recalled that he had only joined a few weeks ago. And Sarah 
explained that the employee felt very bad because in his team he was the only 
local (British) employee, and the others all speak Chinese. Lucy then told me 
that the department head doesn’t like foreigners and he doesn’t speak good 
English. ‘Just imagine if your boss never speaks to you,’ Sarah says.  We 
discussed that maybe in the future the department head will only hire Chinese 
speakers.  
 
The above story about Simon illustrates how the company’s centralised control 
approach and the resulting ‘Chinese’ environment leads to the exclusion of local 
employees, and they resist such control through leaving the company.  
 
Whereas the local employees’ career prospects within the company have been 
undermined by the company’s personal centralised control, the local Chinese 
experience is one of increased workload resulting from such an approach. Due to the 
relatively lower positions and status of the local Chinese, they are in a much weaker 
position. While local employees respond to centralised control with multiple 
strategies such as fighting, submitting and quitting, the local Chinese tend to choose 
to submit themselves to such control. Complaints and sometimes anger are observed.  
 
As discussed in the previous chapter about the company’s matrix structure, job 
responsibility is not clearly defined in Teleman. Therefore, when there are new tasks 
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emerging, expatriate managers tend to pass them to the local Chinese. On the one 
hand, it is easier for them to talk and discuss the tasks in Chinese. On the other hand, 
it is reported that even if expatriates try to allocate the tasks to local employees, local 
people can either refuse to do so arguing that the tasks are out of their job scope, or 
they find the tasks very difficult because they think requirements are not clear enough. 
As one expatriate manager explained:  
 
‘Foreign employees want tasks from their supervisors to be specific. What do 
you want me to do, and this should be consistent with their job description... 
however, one feature of our company is that there are lots of things which are 
not that clear, but they should be done. The boundary is very blurred. There 
are good reasons to ask you to do it, and there are also good reasons to ask 
somebody else to do it. And it makes sense to allocate the task to anyone. But 
in most cases, we find that it is easier to use Chinese staff.’  
 
Consequently, it is found that local Chinese tend to undertake a heavier workload, and 
in many cases, overtime working is unavoidable.  When this is coupled with the fact 
that Teleman tends to offer a low salary to the local Chinese (further discussed in 
Chapter 8), a perceived unfairness prevails among Chinese employees. Based on my 
interviews, the local Chinese commonly complain about their jobs, and voice their 
dissatisfaction, and sometimes anger, about the company. One of them made the 
following remarks:  
 
‘To many Chinese people, when you join the company, you have a kind of 
patriotic feeling, because it is a Chinese company. Then you feel that since it 
is a Chinese company, at least it would take good care of Chinese staff. 
However, after you join the company, you find that many years have passed 
but no development, and you quit. Put in a way that may sound bad, you work 
as hard as a dog, but you earn little. After three or four years, you actually earn 
less than foreigners who just joined the company. You then definitely quit and 
jump to another company. You earn more and work less.’  
 
Another local Chinese employee, who eventually left Teleman and joined a Western 
company in London, claimed that the company’s expatriate-centric management 
approach creates a new form of ‘discrimination’.   
 
 ‘Why do the Chinese always work overtime. This doesn’t mean that Chinese 
people have low efficiency. You allocate work to foreigners, and they will say 
I only work 8 hours a day, so I cannot do this. Then all things go to the 
Chinese...then a very odd phenomenon happens. In a Chinese company, 
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Chinese employees feel they are discriminated by their Chinese managers, 
because you pass all the work to me, which foreigners don't want to take. This 
brings a big challenge to Chinese managers, because not only do local 
employees feel unfairness in the company, but also Chinese employees feel 
the unfairness... I take more work because I am Chinese.’  
 
The above two quotes clearly illustrate the frustration and anger of local Chinese 
employees about the company’s personal centralised control. However, since it is 
difficult for local Chinese to respond to such control with fighting or quitting, for 
most of them, voicing complaints and anger is the way they resist the organisational 
control.  
 
5.4 Conclusion  
 
Focusing on the first type of control, i.e. personal centralised control, this chapter 
revealed the dominant position of expatriates both in terms of their population and 
their powers. It was found that expatriates play two critical roles in the subsidiary 
units, that is, as coordinator and as controller. Endowed with institutionalised and 
non-institutionalised powers, expatriates helped the company to exercise personal 
centralised control over its overseas subsidiaries.  
 
This chapter also revealed that although both local employees and local Chinese 
suffer from this type of control, it is the local employees that experience most direct 
impact on their career prospects. For this reason, local employees exhibit the strongest 
form of resistance, that is, quitting. Regarding the local Chinese, they are burdened 
with an increased workload as a result of the presence of expatriates and their 
management approach. However, it is the bureaucratic formalised control that makes 
them suffer most. This will be discussed in the next chapter.  
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Chapter 6: Bureaucratic formalised control in Teleman  
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
In the previous chapter, I discussed personal centralised control in Teleman, which 
involves a large population of expatriates and direct decision-making by the China 
HQ. In this chapter, I will look at another type of control, i.e. bureaucratic formalised 
control, which is ‘impersonal’ and ‘indirect’, a contrast to the ‘personal’ and ‘direct’ 
feature in the former case (Harzing, 1999). According to Harzing, bureaucratic 
formalised control aims at ‘pre-specifying… the behaviour that is expected from 
employees’ (1999, p.21), and it is similar to what has been discussed in previous 
studies, such as ‘formalisation’ (Child, 1973), ‘rules and regulations’ (Blau & Scott, 
1963), ‘paper system’ (Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967), and ‘work process’ (Mintzberg, 
1973).  
 
Therefore in this chapter, I will focus on the rules, processes, and systems in Teleman. 
Three major items are examined: the reporting and approval system, the global job 
grading and internal qualification system, and the working procedures. One major 
finding in this regard, however, is the ‘rigid rule-changing rule- no rule’ paradox 
within the company. That is, while there are some rigid rules for the employees to 
follow, there are also rules that keep changing, thus leading to a situation of ‘no rule’. 
I argue that this is an outcome of the inherent defects of its management systems, and 
its heavy use of expatriates.  
 
This chapter also discusses how local employees and the local Chinese constantly 
challenge the company’s control efforts through voicing their complaints and 
criticisms. In particular, I highlight how local Chinese become victims of bureaucratic 
formalised control, partly because local employees tend to deliberately ignore the 
company’s rules and in doing so pass the compliance work to local Chinese.  
 
6.2 Bureaucratic formalised control in Teleman  
 
In a study of a British company called Beverages, Ferner (2000) discusses 
bureaucratic control with reference to the company’s standardised systems to control 
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and monitor subsidiaries’ investment plans and key HR issues, the common 
international policies and guidelines in the area of managerial performance appraisal, 
and a document to codify formal authority levels and approval procedures for decision 
making. In Teleman’s case, similar patterns are observed. Reporting and approval 
systems, consistent global HR systems, and rigid working procedures are some of the 
major control mechanisms Teleman uses. However, as my study reveals, Teleman’s 
bureaucratic formalised control suffers from a ‘rigid rule-changing rule – no rule’ 
paradox.  
 
6.2.1 Rules and procedures in Teleman  
 
Activities in Teleman subsidiary units are, firstly, closely monitored through 
reporting and approval systems. According to my informants in recent years the 
control from China HQ over subsidiaries has been getting tighter and tighter. 
Quarterly reports have been replaced by monthly reports, general guidance replaced 
by detailed requirements, and KPIs for managers are specified. Many expatriates are 
required to submit to the China HQ a weekly and monthly report on their work. For 
example, the expatriate HR manager Emma, who worked together with me on 
delivering the recruitment project for the new R&D centres, submitted her weekly 
report every Friday containing detailed information such as how many candidates 
were interviewed for certain positions, how they were found (e.g. via headhunting 
agencies, self-application, etc.), feedback for each candidate from different interviews 
at each stage (e.g. technical interview, departmental interview, and HR interview), 
how many offers were sent out, accepted and rejected, the major problems (e.g. lack 
of candidates for certain positions), and other information.  
 
A significant manifestation of such bureaucratic formalised control is the approval 
system which aims at ensuring that important matters are subject to the approval of 
regional or China HQs. In Teleman, a system of ‘Group Decision Making’ has been 
established, which means that multiple parties will be involved in making a single 
decision and, consequently, it is a prolonged process. For example, on one occasion, I 
was told by HR colleagues that one expatriate waited for 6 months and still could not 
get his RMB 50,000 expense (about £5000) reimbursed. ‘Ten people are involved in 
approving, and anyone could reject,’ one of them said.  
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Tight control through the approval system can be best illustrated by how new 
employees are hired in Teleman UK. Here, the whole recruitment process starts with 
UK HR applying for new headcount numbers from HQ. After the application is 
approved and the headcount number is issued, HR begins the regular recruitment 
activities, such as posting job advertisements, involving agencies, interviews, etc. As 
illustrated in a later section in more detail, during the interview process, managers in 
regional and China HQ are heavily involved in senior level appointments, and 
sometimes even for mid or junior level. After the candidates are successfully 
identified, the UK HR needs to submit all related information and documents through 
an online system to receive formal approval from the management team based in 
Germany, the company’s Western Europe HQ. Finally, UK HR is required to submit 
related documents for the new hires to the China HQ in order to generate an ID for the 
employee.  
 
In the case of recruitment activities in the new R&D centres, control is even stronger 
in that all new hires need to be approved by the China HQ in terms of their salary and 
job grades. In some cases, as I observed, there were arguments between recruiting 
team/hiring managers in the UK and people in China, because the new employees’ 
salary and job grades, which are proposed by the UK team, might be downgraded by 
China HQ. The approval process is undoubtedly long, since it involves a number of 
senior managers in China, who tend to be flying around the world. And because of 
this prolonged approval process, the company’s internal recruiters (like myself) are 
frequently pushed by external head-hunters, who are eager to close a deal, about 
‘when will the approval be out?’. For a similar reason, everybody will be very happy 
when the approval finally comes out. The text below from my fieldnote on June 30th 
sheds some light on this.  
 
The approval process of a candidate was finally completed, and everybody, 
including Emma, Sarah, Chris (from the headhunting agency), and myself, 
were very happy. On the approval form, six senior managers signed with their 
signatures to approve, and all of them are based in China. After the approval 
form arrived, Sarah and Lucy will start working on the paper work and issuing 
the offers and contracts.  
 
Secondly, similar to other MNCs exercising bureaucratic formalised control over their 
overseas subsidiaries, Teleman has also sought to establish a consistent global HR 
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system. In this regard, a key component is the company’s global job grading and 
internal qualification system, which was introduced in China around 2000, and to all 
overseas subsidiary units in 2013.  
 
Based on this system, all positions, first of all, are graded between 13 (i.e. 13A, 13B, 
13C) and 22 (i.e. 22A, 22B, 22C), with 13A the lowest for fresh graduates. Then, 
based on their job categories (in total there are 11 job categories such as Client 
Management, Product, HR, and Process Management), each position is matched with 
a qualification level ranging from 1 to 6. In order to be promoted from a current job 
grade (e.g. 13A) to the next higher job grade (e.g. 13B), one is required to obtain the 
corresponding level of qualification (e.g. Level 4). This can be illustrated by the 
diagram below.  
 
 
Figure 6.1: Teleman’s global job grading and internal qualification system  
 
Take the case of engineering graduates, for example. As fresh graduates, they 
normally join the company at grade 13A. Depending on their job groups (e.g. Product, 
or Client Management), after they pass probation, they need to apply for the Level 1 
qualification. If they fail the Level 1 qualification, they will not be able to be 
promoted to Grade 13B. And if they succeed in obtaining the level 1 qualification, 
and have been upgraded to Grade 13B, their next target would be passing the Level 2 
qualification, before they could get promotion again.  
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There are two basic criteria for an employee to apply for the qualification upgrading: 
first, the employee needs to have been with the company for over 1 year; and second, 
the employee’s annual performance review should be rated B or above (i.e. B+, A). 
After meeting both criteria, they can embark on the qualification process, which 
involves six steps: self- assessment, an application form submission, exams and tests, 
defence meeting, a company review, and result release.  
 
Exams and tests, and defence meeting are considered the most important elements. 
Whilst the exams and tests can be either on-line tests or hands-on technical problem 
solving, the defence meeting is an occasion where candidates are examined by several 
internal judges, who are experts in particular areas. In the meeting, applicants are 
asked questions based on their application materials, and they are expected to 
demonstrate relevant work experience, knowledge and competencies accordingly. The 
higher the level of the qualification, the stricter the process is. For example, in the 
defence meeting for a Level 4 qualification for sales people, it is required that at least 
two judges based in regional offices are involved, and they must come from different 
regions (e.g. West Europe, North East Europe, China, etc.).  
 
A formalised and consistent global job grading and internal qualification system not 
only enables Teleman to control overseas subsidiaries through regulating the units’ 
hiring activities, but also helps the company to regulate employees’ competencies, 
learning, and promotions, an effort to internalise local employees and build a more 
stable workforce. One HR respondent clearly sees it as a mechanism to control 
employees’ mobility.  
 
‘I think they want to keep people. It is like telling you that if you stay with 
Teleman, this stuff is very useful for your development. However, if you want 
to leave Teleman, I am sorry, these things are useless to you if you walk away 
with them.’ 
 
For these reasons, Teleman seems to attach great importance to it. In the UK, for 
example, one HR professional is designated to fully look after related matters, such as 
reminding people the deadline of the application, preparing paper work, coordinating 
between employees and internal examiners, and following up results.  
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The third aspect of Teleman’s bureaucratic control is manifested in the large number 
of working procedures designed for subsidiary employees to follow. In many cases, 
these are related to the approval system discussed earlier; and in most cases, they are 
facilitated by various on-line systems. One example is the purchasing process, which 
includes the following eight steps:  
 1. When	the	UK	HR	team,	for	example,	decides	to	involve	external	headhunting	agencies	in	recruiting,	they	need	to	contact	several	service	providers,	and	provide	them	with	several	forms	for	them	to	fill	in.		2. After	receiving	the	completed	forms,	together	with	related	documents	from	the	agencies,	the	HR	team	conducts	a	comparison	among	these	service	providers	in	terms	of	quality	and	service	fee,	and	fills	in	a	paper	document	called	the	‘Group	Decision	Form’,	listing	HR’s	proposed	choices	about	which	agency	is	best,	the	reasons	for	this,	together	with	key	information	of	several	other	potential	choices.		3. HR	collects	signatures	from	four	department	heads	(i.e.	HR,	Finance,	Legal,	Procurement)	to	support	the	decision.		4. HR	produces	some	presentation	slides,	based	on	a	template,	explaining	why	a	new	agency	is	required,	how	it	was	chosen,	why	it	is	better,	etc.	,	and	submits	these	slides,	together	with	the	Group	Decision	Form	to	the	Procurement	Department	in	the	UK,	which	will	contact	the	Procurement	team	in	Germany,	and	arrange	a	‘Vendor	Qualifying	Meeting’.		5. HR	attends	the	‘Vendor	Qualifying	Meeting’,	joined	by	members	of	the	UK	Procurement	Commission,	which	include	senior	managers	such	as	the	UK	HR	Director,	the	UK	Procurement	Director,	the	UK	Procurement	Manager,	and	members	of	the	West	European	Procurement	Commission,	who	are	connected	through	the	video	conference	system.		In	the	meeting	the	HR	team	member,	who	proposes	the	purchasing	order,	will	be	asked	to	justify	their	purchasing	request.		6. If	the	purchasing	request	is	approved,	the	HR	staff	will	lodge	a	formal	purchasing	request	through	an	online	system,	and	wait	for	official	approval	from	Germany,	which	involves	several	senior	managers	clicking	on	a	button	through	the	online	system.		
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7. When	all	approvals	are	done,	HR	will	submit	all	related	materials	to	a	specialist	team	based	in	Germany,	who	will	then	issue	a	purchasing	number.		8. With	this	purchasing	number,	HR	produces	a	contract	with	the	selected	agency	and	starts	using	their	service.		
 
As we can see here, working procedures and approval routines are specified, and 
employees are required to follow them closely. A key element of Teleman’s control 
system, therefore, is formalisation, which Barlett and Ghoshal (1989, p. 80) define as 
‘institutionalisation of systems and procedures to guide choice’. Formalisation in 
Teleman is accomplished through its management systems such as the reporting and 
approval system, the global job grading and internal qualification system, and 
working procedures. In this regard, Teleman bears some similarity with US MNCs, 
which tend to use formalised methods to control their overseas subsidiaries such as 
budget-setting and monitoring systems (Almond & Ferner, 2006; Ferner et al., 2013; 
Ferner, 2000; Harzing et al., 2002; Harzing, 1999). However, as to be discussed 
further in the following section, the degree of formalisation in Teleman is much lower 
than that in US MNCs because of the ambiguous and ever-changing nature of its 
management systems.  
 
6.2.2 The ‘rigid rule- changing rule-no rule’ paradox  
 
When working in Teleman, I was often puzzled by the ‘rigid rule- changing rule-no 
rule’ paradox. Given the formalised systems and procedures described, one is 
expected to face large amounts of rigid rules and procedures. However, at the same 
time, she/he might be surprised to find that in some areas, there are no rules or 
procedures at all, and in other areas, rules and procedures are underdeveloped but now 
being upgraded; or they are relatively well developed, but now being revamped. And 
sometimes, an established rule might change just because someone in a senior 
position makes up their mind to do so.   
 
An example of ‘no-rule’ is the documentation system in the project team. As reported 
by our interviewees, Teleman has a documentation system of poor quality, since 
people are too busy to do the filing and are not well trained in this regard 
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professionally. However, documentation is very important for late -comers, like local 
British employees who join the project team later, because they need to refer to 
related old documents. ‘Foreigners come to ask me about old documentations, but we 
don’t have any, ’ one expatriate engineer said, ‘in Teleman, things are passed down 
mouth-to-mouth!’  
 
The changing-rule situation can be best illustrated by the 8-step purchasing process. 
In fact, the whole process changed several times during my 3-month stay. At the 
beginning, I was told that the ‘Group Decision Form’ was to be filled out by several 
department heads; however, when I submitted the form to the Procurement Manager 
Emily, she said that ‘the procedure has changed’, that the form now has been replaced 
by a presentation in front of Purchasing Committee members where collective 
decisions are made. Knowing about this change, my co-worker Lucy made the 
following comment: 
 
‘Sometimes, no one knows what exactly the procedure is, and when you have 
managed to figure it out, it changes after two weeks’ 
 
Indeed, about two weeks later, when I submitted all documents to a specialist team in 
Germany to get a purchasing number for the contract, I was asked, ‘where is the 
Group Decision Form? It is missing.’ I explained that there was no Group Decision 
Form, because now we adopted the practice of Supplier Qualification Presentation. 
And when I told him that I was guided by the procurement manager in the UK, he 
replied, ‘How come I didn’t know? I am in the Procurement team of Western Europe,’ 
he said, and explained that without the Group Decision Form, the system would not 
be able to proceed. The end of the story is that I went back to fill in the Group 
Decision Form, collected signatures, and rushed to close this case.  
 
Based on my research, I argue that Teleman’s ‘rigid rule- changing rule-no rule’ 
paradox can be attributed to two factors. The first is concerned with its relatively short 
history (i.e. less than 30 years) and fast development at an extraordinary pace in the 
past decades. As a latecomer but rapidly growing company, Teleman is still at the 
early stage of internationalisation, transforming itself from a Chinese indigenous firm 
into a multinational company with a business operation in over 170 countries. In 
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recent years, as reported by my interviewees, the company has been actively engaging 
international consulting firms such as IBM and Hay Group in an effort to improve its 
management systems, as well as the competencies of it managers. During this process 
of transformation, rule changing, upgrading and revamping are to be expected.  
 
Another factor my research reveals is concerned with the extensive presence of 
expatriates. As the company opts for a ‘collective decision-making’ system, a 
relatively large number of senior managers are involved in making one single decision; 
this is a rigid rule.  However, due to the lack of well-defined rules or criteria to guide 
such action, individual managers can only rely on their own experience to make 
judgments, thus with different inputs and outcomes.  These variances, when coupled 
with the prolonged decision-making process, become ‘changing rules’ to employees. 
And when rules keep changing, one might actually feel there is no rule.  
 
During my 3-month stay with the company, I had considerable experience of how to 
work hard to keep up with changes resulting from one person’s sudden decision. 
Several of my fieldnotes in June 2014 alone record how I experienced such a situation.  
 
On June 10th:  
When I saw that Emma had finally finished her meeting, I asked about 
whether we were going to attend the job fair in Bristol this Friday. Last week, 
based on previous discussion, she wanted me to do some research on this job 
fair in Bristol, and I contacted that organiser, and obtained some basic 
information such as the price. ‘They thought attending the job fair might not 
help us a lot. So let’s drop the idea.’ she said.  
 
About 2 hours later, she came to my desk and said, ‘we just met David, and he 
said it is good opportunity to promote Teleman in the job fair. So we will do 
that’. David is the head of the X product research line, and he flew from the 
China HQ to do interviews and to meet head-hunters. So I quickly contacted 
the organiser again, and submitted the booking form.  
 
On June 12th: 
 
The R&D centre is recruiting an IT administrator. On the JD, this position is 
based in Cambridge. However, Emma said, in fact, this position can be based 
anywhere, either Cambridge, Reading or Bristol, because the job holder is 
supposed to travel between these places. I told her that yesterday one 
candidate doesn’t want to come for an interview just because of the location. 
He wants to be based in Reading, rather than Cambridge. Later in the 
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afternoon, Emma came to me and said, ‘They decided to hire another IT to be 
based in Reading. So now you can contact the candidate.’ She continued, ‘the 
best way to sort things out is face to face. See, if we didn’t meet, we would 
never have known they want to hire one more guy.’ 
 
On June 16th: 
In the afternoon, Emma suddenly told me that they would like to organise a 
paper test exam for the position of Graduate Engineer. As far as I know, this is 
completely unplanned, and the idea was brought up by X, the hiring manager 
(an expatriate). What amazed me most is that the technical test is scheduled 
for next Monday. Therefore, in the afternoon, I quickly produced a break-
down of the activities in the following days, such as test paper development, 
candidate invitation, on-site reception, etc.  
 
In the afternoon, I had a meeting with X, Emma and Z (the office 
administrator), and went through the document. After the meeting, Emma 
continued to discuss the test with me, and she said that I could contact the 
candidates for test in several batches, maybe some on Tuesday, some on 
Thursday and Friday. ‘Would it be too rushed for the candidate to receive the 
information on Friday and then travel to Cambridge to take the test on 
Monday?’, I asked. ‘Not at all,’ Emma replied, ‘this often happens in 
Teleman.’ 
 
As we can see here, rules and procedures in Teleman are not fixed, but always subject 
to change due to the sudden decisions of expatriates. This makes bureaucratic 
formalisation control in Teleman very different from that in US MNCs. Whilst 
formalisation in US MNCs is based on ‘codified and reproducible management 
systems’ (Ferner et al., 2004b, p. 367) which tend to have high ‘context 
generalisability’ (Taylor, Beechler, & Napier, 1996), management systems in 
Teleman seem to have much lower levels of formalisation, due to the fact that the 
company itself, as well as rules and procedures, is in a process of transformation, thus 
the ambiguous nature of rules and the ‘rigid rule- changing rule-no rule’ paradox.  
 
6.3 Response to bureaucratic formalised control  
 
Teleman’s bureaucratic formalised control has important implications for employees’ 
working life. In this section, I will examine how employees respond to such control 
efforts. As expatriates are part of the bureaucratic formalised, as well as the personal 
centralised, control system, I focus on the experience of local employees and local 
Chinese. In addition to their response to the rules, processes, and procedures 
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discussed in the previous section, I will first look at how they experience the matrix 
structure described in Chapter 4, since organisational structure itself is a control 
mechanism, and a critical part of a bureaucratic system.  
 
6.3.1 Experiencing the matrix structure  
 
Organisational structure has long been recognised as an indispensable element of a 
bureaucracy and an important component of an organisation’s control system (e.g. 
Anderson & Warkov, 1961; Child, 1972; Terrien & Mills, 1955). Max Webber’s  
(1947) discussion is essentially concerned with ‘a theory of bureaucratic control or of 
bureaucratic structure or both’ (Ouchi, 1977, p. 95). According to Child (1972, p. 2), 
organisational structure is ‘the formal allocation of work roles and the administrative 
mechanisms to control and integrate work activities’. Based on this definition, 
‘control’ is clearly the main objective of organisational structure.  
 
As discussed in Chapter 4, Teleman’s organisational structure resembles a ‘matrix 
structure’ coined by authors such as Galbraith (2000, 2009) and Stopford and Wells 
(1972). The structure spells out explicit multiple-command and multiple-boss 
requirements and expectations from employees, which directly regulate their 
activities.  
 
The direct implication of Teleman’s matrix structure is that employees tend to have 
multiple reporting lines and multiple bosses. Even if their reporting lines are clearly 
defined, they often need to serve multiple teams and accommodate requests from 
these teams. Under such circumstances, confusion and frustrations, thus complaints, 
from employees are unavoidable. For example, on one occasion, two British 
employees from a project team came to the HR department and complained that they 
had been designated to the wrong department on the system. And later it turned out 
that the same mistake happened to a small group of employees in a project team.  The 
reasons for this, according to HR, is that ‘No one knows which department these 
people belong to, because they report to so many people’. However, such information 
is important to employees, because it has a direct impact on their performance review 
and resulting bonus.  
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A more common problem caused by the complex organisational structure is the daily 
frustration experienced by the local employees and local Chinese. As I have 
demonstrated in the case of hiring an administration manager where 9 people were 
involved in 6 rounds of interviews, coordination among multiple managers, units, and 
countries is the daily work of many local Chinese employees. For Lucy, the local 
Chinese HR staff, her frustrations stem from getting signatures and approvals for each 
new hire of the UK office from people based in Germany and China. And for me, a 
local Chinese recruiter, my frustrations resulted from the large amounts of time on 
checking the availability of multiple interviewers in different locations, booking video 
conference meeting rooms in China, the UK and other European offices, and 
coordinating the interview processes between these interviewers and candidates. And 
for Sarah, the British HR manager, her frustrations were from the workload and extra 
efforts required because of the complex organisational structure.  
 
As the recruitment manager at Teleman UK, and having an employment contract with 
Teleman UK, Sarah is in charge of all recruitment for the UK office. However, due to 
the matrix organisational structure, Sarah is also responsible for recruitment activities 
for teams that are not part of Teleman UK, but are based in the UK office. 
Furthermore, she seems to be increasingly involved in recruitment for teams based in 
France and Germany, because of the teams’ over-crossing business among these 
countries. For these reasons, Sarah seems exhausted every day, and often complains 
about her workload openly in the office. My fieldnotes record several occasions when 
she expressed her frustration and complaints by saying things like ‘there is so much 
work’, ‘I am doing all this crap’, ‘that’s really too much’. For example, on July 16th, 
2014: 
 
In the morning, I heard Sarah talking with someone over the phone. ‘ I am 
hired by Teleman UK, but 70% of my work is non-UK stuff,’ she said. She 
talked about things she was asked to do by a colleague in Germany to 
advertise jobs and recruit people. ‘They have a big team in Germany but do 
nothing.’ Sarah was also asked to help recruit people for the R&D centre in 
Dublin, and she said that things there are changing every day, and she could 
not stand it. Once she was told that she needed to hire 10 people for Dublin, 
and later was told to hire only 2. Obviously Sarah was pissed off, and she said, 
‘It’s not part of my KPI, and they are completely unrelated.’ Then she said, ‘It 
is all politics… They need me more than I need them.’  
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My fieldnotes on July 22nd 2014 further describe how Sarah tried to put away extra 
work resulting from the company’s matrix structure.  
 
In the morning, Rebecca (a hiring manager from the marketing department) 
checked with me through Talk (the company’s internal on-line tool for chat) 
about when Sarah would interview the candidate who completed his first 
interview last Friday. I asked Sarah, and she seemed to be very unwilling to do 
this HR interview. She repeated several times that she didn’t think the 
candidate was suitable for the Social Media Manager role, as he didn’t have 
related experience. She even asked me to deliver this message to Rebecca on 
Talk. I did so, and Rebecca replied that she and another interviewer actually 
found that the candidate was the best, and he made a fantastic presentation.  
 
A few minutes later, both Rebecca and I received an email from Sarah. In the 
email, Sarah once again repeated her viewpoint and she said she would decide 
whether to do an HR interview after she met another candidate on this Friday.  
 
The thing is that this hiring manager in fact is not working for Teleman UK. 
She is based in the UK, but belongs to the West Europe Corporation Business 
team, and most of the people in this team are based in the Netherlands. I guess 
that’s why Sarah seems to be very reluctant to provide recruitment support for 
her.  
 
Last Friday, the candidate actually travelled a long way from Manchester to 
attend the first interview. As planned, after the first interview, Sarah would do 
the HR interview, so that all things were done in one day. However, even 
before the interview, Sarah kept saying that the candidate was not suitable for 
this position. At 5 pm, she announced that she had some other interviews to 
attend and could not ‘move this back’. ‘I don’t want to be late on weekends, I 
think the candidate doesn’t want to be late on Friday night either,’ she said. 
Therefore, we had to let the candidate go and said that we would follow a 
telephone interview.  
 
Here we can see that extra work resulting from the company’s matrix structure is not 
welcomed by local employees. They increase workloads and work pressures. As a 
result, Sarah responded to such organisational complexity with complaints and 
attempts to shirk her job responsibilities.  
 
6.3.2 Experiencing the rules and procedures  
 
In my discussion of personal centralised control in Chapter 5, I mentioned that local 
employees suffer most from personal centralised control, because they, being mature 
professionals with extensive industry experience, are more concerned with their 
career development which, however, is constrained by the heavy presence of 
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expatriates and direct involvement of the China HQ. Here, I argue that local Chinese 
are the group who suffer most from bureaucratic formalised control. This is because, 
first, local Chinese are the ones who are heavily immersed in work related to 
reporting and approval systems; and second, local Chinese also need to take on 
responsibilities related to working procedures from local employees, who are put off 
by the complexity of rules.  
 
As discussed earlier, due to the company’s bureaucratic control approach, there is a 
large amount of work related to reporting and approval and as a result, there are 
heavy internal communications and coordination among the China HQ, regional HQs, 
and subsidiary units. While expatriates are responsible for certain higher level, 
technical and business related communications, daily routine communication tasks, 
such as administrative reporting, are largely performed by local Chinese.  
 
For example, in the UK site, every project team has hired a couple of local Chinese as 
project coordinators who are responsible, for example, for arranging the business trips 
of expatriates from China. In the HR team, one local Chinese is mainly in charge of 
helping Chinese colleagues to get work visas, and the responsibility of another is to 
apply for new headcounts from regional HQs, get new labour contracts approved by 
the Chinese management team in regional HQs and the China HQ, and help new 
employees to apply for employee IDs, etc. As my research reveals, such deep 
immersion of local Chinese in internal communications contributes to their poor 
career prospects within the company, which will be discussed in more detail in 
Chapter 8. Accordingly, the local Chinese complain about the corporate red-tape they 
are required to deal with in their daily work. A good example to illustrate this point is 
the story of my co-worker Lucy. The following two fieldnotes record how she 
responds to the company’s complicated reporting and approval system with 
complaints because her immersion in the work becomes an obstacle to her career 
development.  
 
I have been very curious about Lucy’s job title and job responsibility. I asked 
her about it, and she said she should be doing recruitment like what I am doing 
now. However, as the internal procedures are so complicated, she now 
commits almost all her time to dealing with things like E-flows. She told me 
that at the beginning, she actually did some recruitment-related work such as 
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posting vacancies online. However, as time goes by, she is now completely 
immersed in the dealing with internal procedures. She seems to be unhappy 
about this... I can feel that she wants to do something more interesting and is 
interested in recruitment. (Fieldnotes on May 23rd, 2014) 
 
Today a new (British) contract recruiter came on board…In the HR team 
meeting in the morning, the HRD passionately commented on the new 
recruiter and said that she could take on more responsibilities than Chinese 
employees, because she can do interviews, salary negotiation, etc. This made 
Lucy feel very bad. “Am I not important? ” Lucy asked me. I comforted her 
that what she is doing is more important, because internal communications 
with HQs and dealing with internal systems are so complex. “But they didn’t 
think this way,” Lucy said. Lucy predicted that in the future, the new 
contractor will actually work like Sarah, leaving all complex internal Chinese-
related work to her, which means that she needs to spend most of her time 
dealing with something difficult and useless in other organisations, and could 
not concentrate on what she likes, i.e. recruiting. (Fieldnotes on July 29th, 
2014) 
 
The story of Lucy is not uncommon in Teleman’s European office. Given the 
company’s bureaucratic control approach, local Chinese employees, to some extent, 
have become indispensable in helping expatriate managers and local employees deal 
with complex internal process and procedures. However, the resulting problem is that 
the longer they work in the position, the more contacts they build with headquarters, 
and the less possibility that they can leave their current role; or as Lucy puts it, ‘your 
boss never lets you go’, and ‘your career stops here’.  Therefore, to many local 
Chinese, the company’s complex reporting and approval systems are the major source 
of their daily suffering in the company. However, as further discussed in more detail 
in Chapter 8, due to personal, organisational and institutional factors, the local 
Chinese find it difficult to secure a better job in the external labour market. For this 
reason, they can do nothing but live with the company’s strong bureaucratic control, 
while voicing their unheard complaints and criticisms.  
 
The situation of the local Chinese is worsened by the company’s rigid yet ambiguous 
and ever-changing working procedures, which scare local employees away, thus 
leaving local Chinese alone to take on the compliance responsibilities. In the example 
of the purchasing process, I have demonstrated how complicated and long-winded the 
working procedure can be in Teleman. Under tight control from the China HQ, 
employees in overseas subsidiary units are required to follow these rules and 
procedures closely.  
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While most Chinese employees, including Lucy and myself, made efforts to figure out 
the most updated procedure and try to follow them, local employees tended to adopt a 
different strategy, that is, to ignore them. For example, Sarah, the British HR 
manager, always followed her own way in doing things. Regarding the use of an 
external recruitment agency, for example, Sarah tends to pick up several potential 
agencies, negotiate with them, reach an agreement, and then sign the contract. This is 
completely against the rules of the company. ‘She has her own logic,’ Lucy 
comments, ‘what she wants is to use these agencies to work for us right now. And 
what we are doing is to make everything look compliant to the policy. ’ My fieldnotes 
on May 22nd record another conversation on this topic.  
 
I asked Lucy’s opinion on how well local non-Chinese employees can deal 
with the internal procedures. ‘They might just ignore them.’ She said. ‘And it 
is our job to make a balance. Our goal is the same, to get things done. ’ 
Referring to Sarah, she said, ‘Her direction is correct, but we need to help her 
to work on the procedure.’ 
 
The outcome of Sarah’s non-compliant approach is that Lucy and I eventually 
frequently acted as fire fighters and take actions to rectify her mistakes. My fieldnotes 
on 30th May report one such incidence.  
 
In the afternoon, the HR director came to return to Lucy several copies of the 
signed contract. There was one contract, which was signed with W Group, and 
Lucy and I didn’t know how to deal with it. 
 
Lucy asked me whether I knew anything about this contract. I looked at the 
contract and it was new to me. It seemed that Sarah had worked out the 
contract by herself completely. We decided to ask Sarah what she wanted us to 
do with the contract. She said, ‘please do the online system’. Lucy and I 
looked at each other and became speechless. ‘You can tell Sarah about the 
procedure. She needed to be told again and again.’ Lucy told me later. 
 
The thing is that working on the online system is never the first step to use a 
supplier. We are required to provide all information to the system, and 
procurement people will decide whether we can use this supplier.  Signing a 
contract is the very final step.  
 
We later found out that this supplier was sourced for the company’s financial 
team in London. According to Lucy, the scenario might go like this: a hiring 
manager in the financial centre needs to recruit a new person, and he goes 
directly to the headhunting agency. The agency happens to provide a really 
good candidate, and the hiring manager takes the person in. Since the 
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company takes the person in, we need to make the payment, and before that 
the contract needs to be made.  
 
Interestingly, the non-compliance approach of local employees seems to have gained 
some consent and permission from the Chinese peers, i.e. the expatriates and local 
Chinese. For the local Chinese, probably because they are in lower positions and in 
most cases work under local employees, they see it as their job to assist local 
employees and help them out. For expatriates, they justify local employees’ non-
compliance as a different working style from Chinese people, and as an outcome of 
the different focus of their jobs, i.e. focusing on external rather than internal affairs.  
 
During my research, one thing I observed and that was mentioned by my interviewees 
is concerned with the ‘dual-track’ management approach taken by expatriates towards 
local employees and local Chinese. Whilst expatriate managers tended to manage 
local employees in a ‘semi-military’ way, as they manage people in China, they 
allowed much more freedom and autonomy for local employees. As one expatriate 
manager puts it, it is more about ‘milestone management’, which involves setting up 
KPIs, providing a general direction, and focusing on results. In other words, expatriate 
managers have a high level of tolerance to local employees not following rigid rules. 
The remarks below made by two expatriates shed some light on this mentality.  
 
‘Local managers have their own ideas and ways of doing things, and Chinese 
people can see on first sight that it won’t work and they don’t comply with 
HQs...Chinese people know the company better, and their ways of doing 
things tend to be close to HQs; but local managers are different. They are 
closer to clients’ requirements, and to the business needs. They don’t care 
much about the internal requirements. ’  
 
‘In Europe, local employees have their independent ideas. Therefore, we tend 
not to give orders, but to provide guidance. Many of our European employees 
have a strong background. For example, one of our directors used to be one of 
the 100 VPs in Company X. When you manage him, you will never do it in 
the same way as you do in Africa, because it won’t work. We are more like a 
student, consulting him... like would you please share with us your experience 
in Company X... we want him to give us suggestions, and in fact he did. He 
did bring up lots of good suggestions. ’  
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Expatriate’s respect for local employees’ ‘own ideas’ and tolerance to their non-
compliance to the company’s rules and procedures may be related to what Smith and 
Meiksins (1995) term ‘dominance effects’. Smith and Meiksins argue that ‘firms from 
countries lower in the hierarchy may perceive an interest in adopting practices from 
those based in more dominant economies. Conversely, firms in dominant economies 
may tend to assume that their practices are superior and capable of transfer to less 
dominant hosts’. In Teleman’s case, China’s lower position in the hierarchy may 
reduce the legitimacy of the working procedures and rules, which have been 
developed by China HQ. As a result, in daily management, Chinese managers tend to 
respect the tradition and culture of the local market, and tolerate local employees not 
following the rules and procedure. The implication, however, is that someone needs to 
do those bureaucratic jobs, and in most cases, it goes to the local Chinese.  
 
Of course, local employees are not free from the company’s bureaucratic formalised 
control at all. They are more or less subject to certain controls. For example, the 
company’s internal qualification system is something for all. While it is commonly 
recognised that getting a qualification is important for salary increase and promotion 
within the company, there are also agreements that they are not of much value in 
external labour markets. It is in this aspect that local employees voice their criticism. 
They not only question the values of the internal qualifications but also challenge the 
rationality and legitimacy of such a system. 
 
According to my interviewees, exams and tests to obtain the qualification are difficult, 
because they require, as several people put it, ‘comprehensive knowledge’. Such 
comprehensiveness not only refers to the universal knowledge and skills associated 
with certain jobs, but more importantly, to lots of company-specific policies, 
processes, and knowledge of operating the company’s self-developed systems and 
tools. For this reason, it is said that if someone wants to pass the tests and exams 
without reviewing online exam preparation materials, they need to stay with the 
company for at least 10 years. And for the same reason, one expatriate claims, an 
external senior project manager might not be able to pass the exams and tests for the 
Level 5 Project Manager qualification, because ‘the test involved process and the 
company’s internal requirements. There are lots of things he might not know’.   
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Given the difficulty and company-specificness of the exams, whether it is worth 
making the effort to take the exams and get a qualification becomes questionable for 
many local employees. After all, it is clear that such qualifications are not well 
recognised by the external labour market, and they might become totally useless once 
you leave Teleman.  
 
Therefore, according to the HR staff in charge of the internal qualification matters, 
local employees are ‘the most difficult group’, in that they are not willing to take 
exams. In other words, they are not willing to submit to the bureaucratic control of the 
company. To tackle this problem, the company has set up a target for each subsidiary 
unit. For example, the UK office has a target that 85% of its locally hired employees 
should take the exams and upgrade their qualifications regularly. According to this 
HR staff, this is her KPI, and her main responsibility is to ‘push these people’ to get 
things done. However, it seems that it is not easy to achieve, because of the resistance 
of local employees.  
 
‘Local people are like this; they don’t care. I have been working in the 
Telecoms industry for all my life, and you want me to certify myself and 
prove myself? They just don’t understand these things… I tell them if you 
don’t have a qualification, you won’t be able to get promotion and salary 
increase. This will scare them most. I used to tell them that doing a 
qualification can help you clarify your career development, and identify your 
weakness, your strength, and the areas you need to make improvement. They 
don’t like these things and listen to me. But when you tell them, no 
qualification, no salary increase they then really get nervous.’  
 
In addition to questioning the values of the internal qualification system, local 
employees also cast doubt on whether such a measurement is scientific and 
reasonable. For example, one local British team leader challenged that the system 
aims to make every single employee an all-round player, because if one wants to get a 
higher-level qualification, they need to deliver a good performance level in all 
required aspects. However, from a team manager’s point of view, he believed that a 
team should take advantage of each team member’s strengths, and avoid their 
weaknesses, rather than developing every aspect of a single employee. Under such 
circumstances, it is not fair to judge every employee with a single competency 
measurement framework.  
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6.4 Conclusion  
 
This chapter has focused on the bureaucratic formalised control in Teleman and how 
employees respond to such control. Through examining the reporting and approval 
system, the global job grading and internal qualification system, and the working 
procedures, I revealed the ‘rigid rule-changing rule- no rule’ paradox within the 
company, which, I argue, is a reflection of the inherent defects of Teleman’s 
management system due to its relatively short history and its rapid development in the 
past decades. Because of this paradox, Teleman cannot rely on its bureaucratic 
formalised management systems to exercise centralised control over its overseas 
subsidiaries, as US MNCs do. Instead, a large number of expatriates are used, which, 
in turn, can further be attributed to the ‘rigid rule-changing rule- no rule’ situation.  
 
This points to the dynamic relation between bureaucratic formalised control and 
centralised control in Teleman. The existing literature on organisational control tends 
to suggest that different types of controls co-exist in one organisation to support and 
supplement each other (Cardinal et al., 2010; Snell, 1992). However, in the Teleman 
case, bureaucratic formalised control and centralised control are in a more complex 
relation. On the one hand, the relatively low level of codification of Teleman’s 
management systems and the resulting low level of formalisation requires a large 
number of expatriates to be in the subsidiary units to make the management systems 
work. On the other hand, the extensive presence of expatriates in fact undermines the 
functioning of the management systems in that expatriates heavily involve themselves 
in decision-making, and therefore rules and working procedure are frequently 
changed because of their individual input and interference. 
 
Nevertheless, this chapter reveals that both local and the local Chinese employees 
experience the company’s matrix structure and bureaucratic formalised control with 
complaints and criticisms. In particular, for the local Chinese, they are required to 
follow the rigid yet ever-changing rules and procedures and to function as 
coordinators in the complex reporting and approval systems, whereas local employees 
tend to ignore the rules and are allowed to work in their own way.  
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Based on this chapter and the previous chapter on personal centralised control, it is 
clear that an essence of Teleman’s control system is its expatriate centricity. The 
company relies heavily on expatriates to exercise its centralised control and 
bureaucratic formalised control, despite the fact locally hired employees are largely 
marginalised and strongly express their dissatisfaction, complaints and resistance. 
This leads to the question: Can Teleman rely on its expatriates solely to run its 
overseas operations? If yes, how? The answers to these questions are related to the 
discussion of identity control (Chapter 7) and control by rewards (Chapter 8). As we 
will see, these two types of controls are largely limited to expatriates, and play critical 
roles in regulating expatriate commitment and retention. In other words, Teleman 
controls its overseas operations through effectively controlling expatriates with these 
two types of controls, with the former controlling their subjectivity, and the latter 
controlling their mobility power. The next chapter will focus on identity control.  
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Chapter 7 Identity control in Teleman  
 
7.1 Introduction  
   
This chapter focuses on how organisational control is accomplished through 
controlling employees’ identity. My analysis reveals four distinctive characteristics of 
identity control in Teleman: 1) the highly militarised nature of managerial discourses; 
2) employees as willing participants in the control programme; 3) weak resistance 
from employees; and 4) Chinese employees as the only control target.  
 
As argued by Costas and Karreman (2013, p. 398), identity control constitutes ‘the 
construction, production and maintenance of symbols infused with particular 
meanings and preferred interpretation’; essentially, it is about managing meaning. 
Therefore, this chapter starts with how Teleman manufactures meanings for the 
company’s official corporate value, Jian Ku Fen Dou, or ‘plain living and hard work’.  
 
Previous studies (e.g. Fleming, 2005; Musson & Duberley, 2007) indicate that 
meaning management is achieved through managerially inspired discourses, which 
produce ‘a particular kind of knowledge about a topic’ (du Gay, 1996, p. 43), and 
make ‘sense of the world for its inhabitants, giving it meanings that generate 
particular experiences and practices’(Phillips, Lawrence, & Hardy, 2004, p. 636). My 
research reveals that the strong militarised discourses initiated by Teleman have 
greatly expanded the original meaning of the term Jian Ku Fen Dou, and it is 
eventually transformed into something with more specific meanings, i.e. ‘hardship 
endurance and self sacrifice’.  
 
During this process, a distinctive social reality has been constructed within the 
company, where a good employee is equated with a ‘corporate soldier’, and taking on 
overseas assignments exemplifies a model corporate soldier. This chapter seeks to 
reveal how the ‘invisible identity cage’ is established in Teleman, and how the 
company seduces employees into ‘calibrating their sense of self with a restricted 
catalogues of corporation-approved identities’ (Alvesson, Ashcraft, & Thomas, 2008, 
p. 16), and turns them from ordinary employees to FD-Man, to Corporate Soldier, 
then to Model Corporate Soldier (i.e. expatriates). This chapter also discusses 
 
138 
employees’ responses to such identity control, with the focus on four types of 
employees: willing participant, strategist, negotiator, and cynic.  
 
7.2 Managing meaning through discourses  
 
Discourses have powerful normalising effects (Meriläinen et al., 2004). In Maguire 
and Hardy’s study (2009), discourses have changed three previously take-for-granted 
meanings of DDT, a top-selling insecticide (i.e. DDT was safe, effective, and 
necessary), and led to its final abandonment in the market.  
 
In an organisational context, organisations mobilise meaning systems through 
managerial discourses in the interests of powerful groups (Thompson, 1990). Such 
groups, often including senior managers, have the power to manipulate the meanings, 
and develop a dominant definition and interpretation of a certain subject, event and 
situation (Alvesson, 2002). Previous research on ‘paternalism’ (Fleming, 2005), ‘New 
Public Management’ (Thomas & Davies, 2005), ‘Enterprise Culture’ (Ainsworth & 
Hardy, 2008) and ‘participation’ (Musson & Duberley, 2007) shows how meanings 
have been managed by power groups and then introduced to organisation members to 
construct preferred social realities.  
 
In Teleman, the whole process of identity control starts with managing the meanings 
of the company’s official corporate value, Jian Ku Fen Dou. As my research reveals, 
such meaning management and manipulation is accomplished by strong managerial 
discourses led by the company’s founder.  
 
In Teleman, the founder is a spiritual leader for Chinese employees. Coming from an 
army background, he probably perfectly understands the importance of propaganda. 
During the past three decades, he has produced a large number of speeches and 
articles, which are published on the company’s in-house newspaper called Teleman 
People. Some of his articles are distributed to employees directly, and serve as 
learning materials on various occasions such as meetings and training. As I will show 
later, his works, which tend to be in a militarised style, have tremendous impact on an 
employee’s work identity.  
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This section and the next section will focus on his writings, explore the lexical 
register in these texts (Fowler, 1991), and demonstrate the role of managerial 
discourses in manufacturing meaning and constructing a particular social reality and 
identity for Teleman employees.  
 
7.2.1 JKFD as corporate values  
 
Corporate values guide organisational members in their selection or evaluation of 
behaviour, and have tremendous influence on critical processes and characteristics in 
organisations (Bourne & Jenkins, 2013). They occupy a central place in many 
organisational phenomena such as identity (Ashforth & Mael, 1989), and culture 
(Schein, 1985), and shape an organisation’s ethical stance (Finegan & Theriault, 1997) 
and employee commitment (Ostroff, Shin, & Kinicki, 2005). For this reason, it has 
become ‘a hygiene factor’ that organisations articulate and advertise their values 
(Jonsen et al., 2015). 
 
In Teleman’s corporate website and annual reports, six core values are listed: 
customers first, Jian Ku Fen Dou, continuous improvement, openness & initiative, 
integrity, and teamwork. Jian Ku Fen Dou is explained as the following:  
 
We don’t have any rare resources to rely on. Only Jian Ku Fen Dou can win 
respect and trust from clients. Fen Dou is reflected in any tiny activities of 
creating values for clients, and also in our efforts in improving ourselves when 
preparing to work. We stick to being Fen- Dou- man- oriented, and reward 
Fen- Dou- man reasonably.   
 
If Teleman’s other core values (i.e. customers first, continuous improvement, 
openness & initiative, integrity, and teamwork) may look nothing special and may be 
cherished and promoted by other companies, Jian Ku Fen Dou seems to be a very 
distinctive one for Teleman. 
 
Jian Ku Fen Dou (艰苦奋斗 in Chinese characters, short for JKFD hereafter) is a 
term without proper English equivalence. Jian Ku literally means harshness and 
hardship, and Fen Dou literally means working hard and fighting to achieve 
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something. In A Modern Chinese-English Dictionary, it is translated into ‘plain living 
and hard work’.  
 
JKFD has strong cultural and historical meaning, and is a term familiar to all Chinese 
people. It is generally believed that it first came from Chairman Mao’s 1936 work The 
Strategic Issues of Chinese Revolution Battle, Chapter 2, where he claims, ‘Without 
the JKFD of the Chinese communist party in the past 50 years, it would have been 
impossible to save the country from national subjugation.’  And right before the 
establishment of the new China in 1949, he says, ‘Chinese revolution is a great one, 
but the post-revolution road is longer, greater and harder. We must make it clear to 
the party so that our comrades must continue to be modest and humble, and must 
continue to keep the JKFD style.’ 
 
Since then, JKFD has become a critical part of the ideology of the Chinese 
communist party, and has been continuously emphasised to all community party 
members by every Chinese state leader. Because it is in the vocabulary list of the 
country’s propaganda efforts, it has been introduced to Chinese people through formal 
and informal education.  
 
In spite of the Party’s strong propaganda, or perhaps because of it, to most Chinese 
people, JKFD is a term that is more like a slogan, with little relevance to their daily 
life in modern society. The term is also very vague in meaning, subject to different 
interpretations: it can be an attitude, emphasising not being afraid of difficulties; it can 
be a work ethic, focusing on hard working; it can also be a value orientation, rejecting 
materialism or consumerism.  
 
Perhaps because of its ambiguous meanings and the fact that the term JKFD contains 
such ‘unpleasant’ elements as hard working, dealing with difficulties and anti-
materialism, to my knowledge, no other organisation in China has explicitly embraced 
it as an official corporate value and promoted it as corporate culture as Teleman has.  
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7.2.2 Articulating the meaning of JKFD  
 
Values articulation is commonplace in organisations (e.g. Kanter, 2008; Shapiro & 
Naughton, 2015), and it is accomplished through various ‘values management’ 
programmes (Paarlberg & Perry, 2007). In this complex process of ‘values work’ 
(Gehman, Trevino, & Garud, 2013), the critical role of senior managers in introducing 
values discourses has been widely discussed (e.g. Schein, 1985; Cheney, 1999). 
Through verbal or written statements and formal documents, senior managers’ 
‘narratives serve to encapsulate and entrench the values that are key to an 
organisation’s culture’ (Meyer,1995, p.210).  
 
In Teleman, managerial discourses centred around the company’s corporate value 
JKFD have been systematically orchestrated by the founder since the mid-late 1990s 
till today. The objective is to redefine the term, and give it a definitive and 
unambiguous meaning. Here, the old label of JKFD is stretched to incorporate new 
meanings (Albert, 1992; Gioia et al., 2000), and the new meanings are legitimised 
through associating them with the old labels and at the same time, resonating with 
historical and current social and economic situations (Goodrick & Reay, 2010). My 
analysis reveals that managerial discourses in Teleman have expanded the meaning of 
JKFD substantially to include the following:  
 
JKFD as source of historical success: In Teleman’s managerial discourses, JKFD is 
what makes Teleman today. In his speeches and writings, the founder frequently 
reviews the company’s history, and informs employees of first-generation employees’ 
extremely hard work and unlimited devotion. On various occasions, the founder 
emphasises the importance of JKFD to the company as a source of success. He notes 
that it is with the spirit of JKFD that the company has made today’s success; without 
people’s JKFD in the early days, the company would not have been able to survive.  
He, therefore, appeals to employees that everyone should ‘feel proud of JKFD’.  
 
For example, in a 2006 article he spends lengthy passages on reviewing the early days 
of the company:  
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Numerous good sons and daughters of Teleman have devoted their youth and 
blood, which laid the foundation of the company today. In the early days of 
the company’s establishment, we started with five or six people in the research 
and development team. Without any resources or good conditions, we upheld 
the spirit of JKFD …and work round the clock on products planning, 
developing, and testing. We didn’t have holidays or weekends, needless to say 
days and nights. When we felt tired, we had a nap on the mattress, then we 
woke up and continued. This was the origin of our ‘mattress culture’. Today, 
we use mattress for nap after lunch only; however, FD and fighting, which is 
reflected by the ‘mattress culture’ and passed down by the older generation of 
Teleman people, is our valuable spiritual wealth we should uphold and pass 
down.  
 
JKFD as the only way to continuous success and avoid crisis: Teleman has 
achieved tremendous success in its domestic market since 1996, and so in 
international markets in recent years. The founder seems to be particularly concerned 
with the fact that people might not continue to JKFD in view of success. Accordingly, 
in the managerial discourses, great efforts have been made to instill into employees’ 
minds the idea that Teleman is facing great risks, and crisis will come at any time; if 
we don’t continue to JKFD, we will lose in the competition, and the company will 
collapse. Here, JKFD is equated with the only way to maintain success and avoid a 
crisis. For example, the founder notes: 
 
Behind prosperities are crises. However, prosperities do not necessarily lead to 
crises; it is about people’s mindset when surrounded by prosperities. JKFD 
bring about prosperities, however, if we stop JKFD after prosperities, we will 
lose them… History is a mirror, which provides us with enlightenment. 
Forgetting JKFD is to abandon the culture of Teleman. (July 1996) 
 
In particular, he relates the necessity of JKFD to the nature of the Telecoms industry. 
To the founder and, therefore, to the employees, the IT/electronic/ telecoms industry 
is highly competitive and fast developing; as a newcomer with a short history and 
limited resources, Teleman people need to walk extra miles to survive. 
 
Different from the development law of a traditional industry, (the Telecoms 
industry) is marked with rapid technology upgrading and industry 
change…this makes competition in this industry more severe, and the 
elimination more cruel. Moving back is to die. In order to survive in this 
industry, only continuous innovation and JKFD work… we will be kicked out 
if we cannot make any progress any day... This is the harsh reality. (2006) 
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JKFD as a unique culture: Based on the available in-house publications, Teleman’s 
managerial discourses on JKFD can be traced back to 1994, seven years after the 
establishment of the company, when the founder published an article entitled ‘To all 
New Employees’. In the second paragraph, he writes: 
 
Teleman is a high-tech corporation, with high technologies as the starting 
point, and with a view of a big market, big system and big structure. To 
achieve its historical mission, it requires all employees to stick to the road of 
cooperation, and collective FD.  
 
This article has great significance to Teleman employees in China, because it is 
distributed to all new employees, and in recent years, as reported by my informants, it 
is used as one of the training materials for new employees during their first week in 
the company. It is reported that the founder updates this article regularly, and 
distributes it to all employees. On May 10th, 2005, an updated version was published 
in the newspaper, which explicitly pointed to an FD culture. 
 
Material resources will eventually die out, and only culture can live and grow 
in an endless succession. A high-tech corporation cannot be without culture, 
and only culture can support its continuous development. Teleman’s culture is 
FD culture. 
 
JKFD as a way to contribute to China’s rejuvenation: As mentioned earlier, JKFD 
has strong cultural and historical meaning in China, and the term itself frequently 
appears in the Party’s propaganda to call upon the public and the party members to 
take action against corruption, action for dedication to certain courses, action to fight 
against natural crisis, etc. Managerial discourses in Teleman draw heavily on such an 
invaluable cultural legacy, and most importantly, relate JKFD to the nationalism, thus 
importing more social meanings into the term. The central idea is that JKFD is a call 
by the Party, as well as by the company, to revitalize the Chinese nation. For instance, 
the founder writes:  
 
Our great nation is now full of vigor. All people across the country are, under 
the direction of the central Party, working hard to construct our country…We 
should learn from the predecessors of proletarian revolution the spirit of 
solidarity and JKFD, catch up and surpass the world advanced level, and fully 
satisfy the ultimate needs of clients. We should use our corporate culture, 
which is built on the basis of national culture, to glue employees together, 
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collectively FD, and work hard for the prosperity of our great nation, for the 
revitalisation of the Chinese nation, and for the happiness of yourselves and 
your families. (1995) 
 
In Teleman’s managerial discourse, the company itself is part of the national 
rejuvenation cause, and JKFD is in the interests of the individuals, the company, and 
the nation. Thus, managerial discourses in Teleman have redefined the meaning of 
JKFD. Originally referred to as ‘plain living and hard work’, it has now been given 
specific and unambiguous meanings: JKFD as a unique culture of Teleman, as the 
source for historical and future success; and as the way to contribute to China’s 
rejuvenation.  
 
Such practice of ‘normalising new meanings’ is also discussed in Goodrick and 
Reay’s (2000) study as a way of legitimising the new role identity for nurses. In their 
study, they find that discourses on nursing text books have redefined some terms. For 
example, whilst in 1950s ‘caring’ previously referred to a nurse’s deciding what 
constituted the best care for patients, it later became more about a nurse giving 
patients a strong voice. Similarly, the label of ‘professional’ changed its meaning 
from ‘a registered nurse who was formally educated’ to someone who has an 
independent body of knowledge, an ethical code and a sense of accountability.  The 
change in meaning provides a new template of role identity for nursing professionals.  
 
In the case of Teleman, managerial discourses have given new meanings to the old 
label of JKFD, and the normalising effects of discourses legitimise these new 
meanings. This lays a solid foundation for further legitimising the identity of FD-Man, 
and imposing ways of seeing, being and doing to employees (Alvesson et al., 2008). 
 
7.3 Creating invisible identity cage  
 
The purpose of managing meaning is to manage the subjective world. By doing this, 
take-for-granted social conditions are manipulated and manufactured, leaving ‘little 
room for any conscious awareness that social reality can be experienced and 
understood in radically different ways’ (Alvesson, 2002, p. 119). Thus, organisations 
provide individuals with ‘catalogues of corporation-approved identities’ (Alvesson, 
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Ashcraft & Thomas, 2008, p.16), enjoining them to engage in particular forms of 
identity work (Alvesson & Willmott, 2002).  
 
For example, in Costas and Karreman’s (2013) study on management consultancy 
firms, managerial discourses on CSR offer a clear definition of and instructions on 
how to be ‘good’, and serve to construct for consultants an identity of a socially, 
ecologically and ethically responsible organisational citizen, rather than just a 
‘money-hungry’ corporate worker.  
 
7.3.1 The identity of ‘FD-Man’ 
 
In Teleman, managerial discourses on JKFD have redefined the term and the 
meanings it has gained aim to create a single company-approved identity: ‘FD -man’, 
those who believe in the meaning and values of JKFD and readily walk them out. 
 
Unlike many organisations in other studies, where company-preferred identities tend 
to be implied and introduced implicitly, in Teleman, the identity of ‘FD- man’ is 
explicitly promoted by the company and supported by relevant HR practices.  
 
According to my informants and press reports in China, since 2010, Teleman 
employees in China are required to ‘voluntarily’ sign an agreement with the company, 
claiming that they apply to become an ‘FD- man’; for those who don’t take such 
action, they will automatically become ‘ordinary employees’.  
 
By applying to become an ‘FD-Man’, employees are willing to give up their annual 
paid holidays and overtime fee. As a return, FD-Man becomes the backbone of the 
company, and will be potentially provided with preferable treatments when it comes 
to performance evaluation, promotion, salary increase and stock share allotment. In 
contrast, ‘ordinary employees’ are entitled to those benefits such as paid holidays; 
however, expectedly, they will be in disadvantageous positions in terms of rewards.  
 
As reported by my informants, most employees sign such an agreement based on the 
idea that the benefits of being an FD-Man and the disadvantage of being an ordinary 
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employee are obvious, and that ‘even if you don’t become an FD-Man, you need to 
work long hours and won’t be able to have any holiday’.  
 
In various discourse sources such as in-house newspapers and corporate websites, 
Teleman claims that it is developing itself into a FD-Man oriented organisation. For 
example, in June 2008, the founder says, ‘after 20 years of painful struggle, we have 
finally established a corporate culture of Customer-centred and FD-Man-oriented. It 
helps the company slowly walk out of a difficult situation.’  
 
In fact, ‘FD-Man-oriented’ has become such important vocabulary in Teleman’s 
managerial discourse that it appears in the book title of two volumes, FD-Man 
Oriented: Principles of Human Resource Management in Teleman, the first books 
published by the company in 2014 on the topic of the company’s human resource 
management, which are available to purchase.  
 
Explicitly calling employees an ‘FD -man’ is what Alvesson and Willmott (2002) 
consider as one of the modes of identity regulation that can be done by organisations, 
that is, ‘defining the person directly’, which means ‘explicit reference is made to 
characteristics that have some validity across time and space and that distinguish a 
person from others’ (2002, p.629). In Teleman, ‘FD-Man’ is an approved identity 
which is different from the identity of ‘Ordinary Employees’.  
 
7.3.2 From FD-Man to corporate soldier 
 
As previous studies reveal, the purpose of identity control is to intrigue certain forms 
of subjectivity and provide directions for one’s feelings, values and behaviours 
(Alvesson, Ashcraft and Thomas, 2008).  
 
In Teleman, two moral and behaviour codes are clearly spelled out: hardship 
endurance, and self-sacrifice. Seemingly too ‘inhuman’ to be promoted, Teleman 
manages to give these two codes legitimacy through militarising the discourses, thus 
further turning FD-Man into a soldier.  
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The militarised nature of Teleman’s managerial discourses is distinctive. In Teleman, 
overseas markets are commonly called ‘front line’ (Qian Xian), supporting teams in 
China HQ are called ‘bureaucracy’ (Ji Guan) or ‘rear base’ (Hou Fang); therefore, 
expatriates are generally regarded as fighting on the front line, or ‘fighting for lands 
and food’, whereas people working in HQs are expected to provide service, or ‘supply 
gunfire’.  
 
Perhaps because the founder himself was an army officer in China before he set up 
the company, the communication style of managerial discourses led by the founder 
resembles that of Chairman Mao talking to the army soldiers, which tends to be in a 
popular and easy-to-understand language, although very inflammatory. Furthermore, 
military vocabularies and expressions are frequently used in the Founder’s 
communications, and what happens in the army is also frequently cited as examples to 
illustrate his points.  
 
For instance, when talking about the company’s internationalisation, the founder says 
it is not only about building factories or selling products abroad, but also about 
‘nurturing 50 to 60 “generals” who can command battles’ (1995). In commenting on 
the business activities in China, he claims that establishing regional client service 
offices is like building ‘bunkers’, while establishing joint-ventures with other 
companies is like building ‘trenches’; ‘as long as we can keep every bunker and dig 
through every trench, then we will have more profits’ (2001). 
 
Such a militarised approach taken by the company in managerial discourses has 
proved a novel and effective one. It constructs militarised social conditions where 
employees are imposed with a military way of seeing, being and doing. 
Unconsciously, employees are transformed from an FD-Man, which has a relatively 
vague meaning, to a corporate soldier, who is given clear orders in terms of how to 
behave: endure hardship and make sacrifice! 
 
In a meeting between senior managers and employees on January 28th, 2000, one 
employee asked: ‘How does Teleman create soil for employees’ development? If it is 
desert or rock, even if I am a good seed, I won’t be able to grow’. The founder 
answers: 
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If it is desert, it relies on you to turn it into soil. You should be brave enough 
to make your body into fertilizer, so that the desert can be turned into soil. 
You should have such spirit of sacrifice and spirit of devotion. If no one 
devotes, but just hoping the desert changes into soil where I can grow up 
quickly, and others sacrifice for me, then there will never be hope for you. 
Therefore, when we talk about spirit of sacrifice, it means to turn your body 
into fertilizer and transform the desert.  
 
Most importantly, the ability and willingness to endure hardship and sacrifice has 
become the precondition for a good career within the company. The company makes 
it clear that willingness to sacrifice is a core quality of a cadre. According to a 2001 
article written by the founder, there are four criteria to judge a good cadre: first, 
professional dedication; second, the spirit of sacrifice; third, a sense of responsibility; 
and fourth, a sense of mission. Accordingly, whether a person is willing to endure 
hardship and sacrifice for the company is regarded as the No.1 criterion to identity, 
select, and promote a cadre.   
 
It is impossible for our value assessment system to work in an absolutely fair 
way…I think a spirit of sacrifice is an important element to evaluate our 
cadres…A cadre must have the spirit of sacrifice. (2001) 
 
When we promote cadres, we cannot talk about skills first. The first thing 
should be morality. Morality is professional dedication, a spirit of sacrifice, 
and a sense of responsibility. (2013) 
 
What deserves special attention here is the distinction made by the company between 
‘cadres’ and ‘ordinary employees’.  On various occasions, the company claims that 
hardship endurance and a spirit of sacrifice are the requirements for cadres ONLY; for 
ordinary employees, they are not expected to follow this behaviour code.  
 
‘We require cadres to focus on the job, but this should be distinguished from 
ordinary employees, who are expected to combine work and leisure together 
and have a regular work schedule. Our strict requirement to cadres should not 
be applied to employees, and the relaxation enjoyed by employees should not 
be applied to cadres.’ (2004) 
 
Seemingly, Teleman does not require and expect hardship endurance and self sacrifice 
from its ‘ordinary’ employees; however, reading between the lines reveals otherwise. 
Here, the spirit of sacrifice is directly linked with the possibility of career 
 
149 
development. Not willing to endure hardship and sacrifice is equal to giving up the 
opportunity to move up the career ladder and become a cadre. Therefore, career 
prospects in Teleman is in fact a choice between identities. If one wants to advance, 
then an identity of soldier is proposed, i.e. willing to sacrifice for the company. Such a 
practice is what authors such as Costas and Karreman (2013), Alvesson and Karreman 
(2007), and Thornborrow and Brown (2009) term ‘ aspirational control’, an exercise 
of identity regulation, which involves ‘the engineered opportunity to realise objectives 
and rewards’, and particularly ‘linking a specific identity to a particular 
career/employment prospect and organisation’ (Costas & Karreman, 2013, p.398).  
 
7.3.3 Expatriates as model corporate soldiers  
 
As discussed in previous chapters and throughout this thesis, expatriates play a critical 
role in Teleman’s internationalisation strategy. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, 
large numbers of expatriates were sent to work in Russia, Latin America, Africa, and 
later to South East Asia, the Middle East, and Europe. During this period, the priority 
of the company was to open up overseas markets, and therefore, in the company’s 
managerial discourse, becoming an expatiate is to ‘share the company’s fate’ and 
‘save the company’s future’; in other words, whether a person is willing to endure 
hardship and sacrifice family life and be sent abroad to pioneer the overseas market is 
considered a No.1 criterion to measure his/her morality. Therefore, a good employee 
is an FD-Man, and a soldier; and a particular way to become a soldier is to become an 
expatriate, fighting in foreign lands. 
 
In Teleman’s managerial discourses, expatriation is like soldiers marching to the front 
line to join the battle. Therefore, it is natural that any employee, who has the identity 
of a corporate soldier, should go abroad, join the front line, and fight for the company.  
 
On December 27th, 2000, an event entitled Farewell Meeting for Soldiers' Overseas 
Expedition was held in Teleman, where 400 people were present, including company 
leaders and those employees who were soon to go abroad. Borrowed from the Battle 
Hymn of the Chinese People 's Volunteers in the Korean War in the 1950s, when the 
Chinese army fought against the USA, the founder starts his speech with the 
following paragraph: 
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Valiantly, spiritedly, marching across the Pacific, and, of course, the Atlantic 
Ocean and Indian Ocean. If you are heroic sons and daughters, you should 
step forward bravely and go to the place where the market most needs you, 
even if the environment there is tough, the work is very difficult, the life is 
lonely, and you are far away from your families. For the country’s prosperity, 
for the nation’s rejuvenation, for Teleman’s development and your happiness, 
let’s work hard and fight. If we FD, there will be sacrifices, sacrifices of 
youth, sacrifices of family and love. If we don’t FD, we have nothing. 
Bitterness always comes first before the sweetness.  
 
The founder continues his speech: 
 
… we need to shed our tears and sweat in the five continents and in Europe, 
America, Asia, Africa, and Latin America. This time, you go, it might be tens 
of thousands of miles away, and it might be 10 years or eight years. You might 
be returning home with red flowers in front of you. However, no matter 
whether you are wearing red flowers or not, we will forever miss you, care 
about you, and trust you. Even if you lose the battle, we will still receive you 
with wine, we will preen your feathers for you, and we will dry your sweat 
and tears for you. To save the company, you have devoted your youth and 
time with no shame and no regret, and your youth will be commemorated.  
 
After sending ‘troops’ of expatriates abroad, Teleman then repeatedly voices its 
requirements about how expatriates should behave when abroad. Expectedly, hardship 
endurance and self sacrifice are the behaviour codes. In this regard, one strategy is to 
tell people what a true soldier would do in a tough environment. For instance, when 
meeting expatriate representatives working in Africa in 2006, the founder says: 
 
Army training is very harsh. It needs to be difficult, be strict and be real to 
train troops. Have you seen Marine Corps training? On Hainan Island beach, 
under the scorching sun, they sit cross-legged, for hours.  Their shoulders, the 
first layer of skin dries off, then the second layer, the third layer, and the 
fourth layer... until revealing bloodshot. They are dropped on a desert island, 
given nothing to make a fire or to eat, then come back a week later. You need 
to think of your own way to survive, catching snakes, fish, or insects to eat. 
This is what we called difficult, strict and real, getting ready for war at 
anytime.  
 
In a similar fashion, stories about soldiers and the army are frequently referred to in 
Teleman’s managerial discourses. Thus, by engaging employees in a highly 
militarised organisational discourse, the company enables them to complete the 
‘reflexive process of self-identity’ (Alvesson & Willmott, 2002, p.622), from an 
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ordinary employee exposed to the JKFD discourses, to an FD-Man who accepts the 
new meanings of JKFD and internalises them, then to a Corporate Soldier who is 
ready to endure hardship and make sacrifice, and finally to a Model Corporate Soldier, 
i.e. an expatriate.  
 
Alvesson (2001) refers to this type of identity control as ‘subjectification’, where 
individuals are tied to a particular model of self-knowledge, and forge themselves as 
particular kinds of subject. Then the subjects ‘mould themselves around a specific 
self-definition’ (ibid, p.880). In this sense, discourses and non-discourse practices in 
Teleman work like a mechanism of ‘cultural matching’, where employees are given 
the chance to decide whether they match the requirement of the job and the company, 
and are ‘encouraged to define themselves as the kind of people who would have 
chosen this kind of work’ (ibid, p.881). Then such a definition produces standards that 
employees are expected to respect and follow.  
 
7.4 Trapped in the identity cage: confirming and resisting  
 
The variety and complexity of people’s responses to a particular discourse and thus to 
identity control are discussed in many studies (e.g. Down & Reveley, 2009; Fleming, 
2005; Mallett & Wapshott, 2015; Meriläinen et al., 2004; Thomas & Davies, 2005). In 
general, these studies emphasise the agency of actors, and show how they exert 
agency to make sense of and negotiate with the dominant discourses for their identity 
claim. For example, Fleming’s (2005) study shows that employees resist the 
managerial discourses of paternalism, which cast them as ‘irrational children’, whilst 
in Musson and Duberley’s (2007) study, supervisors who are subject to a managerial 
discourse of participation are able to exercise agency by appropriating certain 
discourses and rejecting others.  
 
Most of these studies reveal a common theme in identity control, that is, resistance. It 
is generally agreed that resistance in identity control is different from resistance 
activities in industrial conflict (e.g. strikes, sabotage, picketing), and takes more 
subjective forms such as cynicism, lampooning, humour and satire (e.g. Fleming, 
2005; Fleming & Spicer, 2003; Fleming & Sewell, 2002). In these studies, people’s 
agency and resistance are particularly stimulated by the contradicting, competing 
 
152 
discourses, which ‘are never completely cohesive’ (Musson & Duberley, 2007, p.161) 
and by the ‘contradictions, weaknesses and gaps between alternative subject 
positions’ (Thomas & Davies, 2005, p.687).  
 
However, my research on Teleman reveals a different picture. It seems that 
confirmation and celebration, rather than resistance, are a key theme of employees’ 
response to the company’s identity control, because the strong militarised discourses 
on JKFD within Teleman have achieved ‘a state of closure over the dominant 
meaning’ (Musson & Duberley, 2007, p.145), and are constraining in their effects on 
identity work (Alvesson & Karreman, 2000). As indicated by early discussions, a 
distinctive social reality is constructed with Teleman by the following simple logic: 
 
Because- 
JKFD=unique culture +sources of success +China rejuvenation 
So- 
A good employee= FD-Man = a soldier = hardship endurance + self sacrifice = 
expatriates  
 
Compared to other studies, identity control in Teleman appears to have received little 
resistance from Teleman employees, and ‘what is real, unreal, good, bad, sensible, 
problematic’ (Alvesson, 2002, p.119), which are defined by the company, seems to be 
taken for granted. Accordingly, the identity of the corporate soldier is largely 
welcomed by employees.  
 
In this section, I discuss four types of employees based on their response to the 
company’s identity control, i.e. the willing participant, the strategist, the negotiator, 
and the cynic. As I show later, even the cynical employees, who seem to be most 
cynical about the company’s management approach, are walking examples of a true 
corporate soldier.  
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7.4.1The willing participants  
 
One of the most distinctive features of Teleman people’s response to identity control 
is their high level of confirmation to, and most importantly, their active participation 
in the company’s control programme.  
 
Anyone who goes through Teleman’s in-house newspaper will be amazed by the large 
number of articles contributed by employees, and even by employees’ family 
members. Given the company’s emphasis on overseas markets since the late 1990s 
and early 2000s, and its rapid development particularly in recent years, and thus great 
demand for expatriates, it is not surprising to see that the majority of these articles are 
about their fighting overseas.  
 
Such a phenomenon of controlled members’ active participation in the controlling 
programme is discussed in several studies. For example, Grugulis, Dundon and 
Wilknson’s (2000) research on a consultancy reveals that employees become ‘willing 
participants’ in the culture management process when ‘the reality matches the 
rhetoric’ (2000, p.99). In Mills, Boylstein and Lorean’s (2001) study, the company’s 
consumers actively participate in telling organisational stories based on several 
manipulated themes to seek sense of community and belongingness, thus contributing 
to the building of the company’s organisation culture.  
 
In Teleman’s case, employee participation in the managerial discourses, first of all, 
represents an outcome of a specific identity control mechanism used by the company. 
According to my informants, the company had established an effective system to 
mobilise employee involvement in the discourse activity. First, each department/team 
has designated a person responsible for regularly writing articles about the team/ team 
members’ activities and achievements. Second, authors are paid RMB 500-700 (about 
£ 50-70) per 1000 words, and RMB 150-200 (about £15-20) per poem. Third, 
publishing articles on the newspaper is calculated as part of the ‘key events’, which 
will be taken into consideration when it comes to performance review. Finally, an 
editorial team consisting of about eight editors actively approaches model employees 
and invites them to share their stories. Therefore, the contents of employees’ 
storytelling have been censored and edited by the company.  
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However, I argue that an employee’s willing participation, more importantly, 
indicates a process of their identity work, which is based on a template provided by 
the company, and serves as a clear reflection of their strong confirmation to the 
corporate-approved identity.  
 
7.4.1.1 ‘We are soldiers!’ 
 
The most direct reflection of Teleman employees’ conformance to the given identity 
is that they commonly refer to themselves or their peers as ‘soldiers’. Plenty of 
articles published in the in-house newspaper tell stories about how the authors or their 
colleagues have developed from ‘little soldier’ to ‘old soldier’, and eventually to 
‘squad leader’. For example, in an article entitled ‘An Heavy Medal for Hero’, one 
employee, having been awarded a medal by the company for his hard work at a major 
earthquake rescue and relief project, tells a story about how he perseveringly fights 
against various difficulties during the project. He concludes his article with the 
following remarks: 
 
Within 8 years, I grew up to be an old soldier from a little soldier. I used to 
fight the battle alone, and now I lead a team of brothers to fight together. I 
thank the company for not forgetting us, a group of old soldiers. I will try my 
best to lead this group of new soldiers, born after 1985 and born in the 1990s. I 
will train well these soldiers, win the wars, and get ready for the company’s 
review and inspection. (2015) 
 
Rapid development from a little soldier to old, seasoned soldier is particularly 
common in current or former expatriates’ story telling about how they live up to the 
expectation of the company, that is, upholding the spirit of JKFD in an extremely 
tough environment such as the Middle East and Africa.  
 
For instance, in a speech entitled ‘I am a Happy Little Soldier’ in an awarding 
ceremony, published later in the internal newspaper, one expatriate shared his 
incredible work experience in Russia, Yemen, and Sudan. He vividly recalled how 
tough the working environment was: eating local foods with clients in a place where 
hundreds of flies were flying around; sleeping in the cellar because of the extremely 
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high temperatures; and at night he buried himself under the sand to keep warm 
because of the sudden drop in temperature in the desert.  
 
An amazing phenomenon in this regard is the involvement of male expatriates’ 
spouses, who call themselves ‘army wives’. Due to the company’s established system 
to motivate article contributions from grassroots, some employees’ family members 
also publish articles in the newspaper.  These articles have a common theme, i.e. the 
family support to employees’ hard work. Typically, it is the wife that shares her 
stories about giving up her job in China and accompanying the husband to a foreign 
country, thus becoming an ‘army wife’, or ‘army-accompanying family members’.  
 
For example, in an article entitled ‘The Happy Life of Army-Accompanying Family 
Members’, one woman claims that she ‘finally understands the meaning of an 
Teleman Army Wife’, and feels happy that her involvement in activities such as 
building the recreation room, organising festival celebrations, and holding sport 
competitions have made her own life and other people’s lives ‘happy, colorful and 
meaningful’ (January, 2009). 
 
As these stories indicate, Teleman employees seem to welcome the identity of 
corporate soldiers. In addition, their family members feel proud to be part of the 
Teleman corporate army.  
 
7.4.1.2 Living out the soldier identity 
 
In addition to directly referring to themselves as ‘soldiers’, Teleman employees 
celebrate the identity of corporate soldiers through living out the specified moral and 
behavioral codes.  This is done through their storytelling.  
 
As described in Chapter 4, expatriates of Teleman are seen working in extremely 
difficult natural environments such as deserts, plateaus, rain forests, oceans, 
earthquakes, and flood areas, as well as dangerous social environments plagued by 
wars, riots, and virus outbreaks. Therefore, a large number of stories are told by 
employees themselves, particularly expatriates, about how they survive those harsh 
environments and get things done; and more importantly, how they enjoy them. These 
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stories are closely centered around the corporate-subscribed theme, i.e. JKFD, or to be 
more specific, hardship endurance and self-sacrifice.  
 
Their storytelling, on the one hand, reflects the process of identity work, which is ‘a 
combination of writing one’s own story, being written by others and of seeking to 
write oneself into the stories of others’, and ‘a process of absorbing and personalising 
a general narrative’ (Beech, 2008, p. 54). On the other hand, it indicates employees’ 
active participation in and contribution to the company’s identity control programme, 
since storytelling is an interactive accomplishment, and ‘the storyteller and the 
listener are co-producers of the socially constructed organisational reality’(Mills, 
Boylstein, & Lorean, 2001, p.137). 
 
Holding firm on the battle field: As one can expect, a true soldier fights and holds 
his battlefield position until the last minute. To corporate soldiers in Teleman, this 
means continuing working for the company and the clients in front of risks and 
difficulties. This can be best illustrated by Teleman employees’ choosing to ‘stay’ 
even if their working environment suddenly become dangerous, threatened by wars, 
natural disasters, or virus outbreaks. For example, when a 9-magnitude major 
earthquake and Tsunami hit Japan in March 2011, several Teleman expatriates 
continued their testing work for a major client. According to the author, they had three 
opportunities to quit the job and go back to China; however, none of them did so 
(September 2011).  
 
Teleman people’s determination to hold fast their positions and their spirit of sacrifice 
can be best illustrated by the following application letter submitted by an employee in 
April 2011 when civil war broke out in Cote Wadi, West Africa.  
 
From the news and colleagues in Cote Wadi, I know the serious situation there. 
I feel very worried about the safety of colleagues staying there. At this critical 
moment, I applied to return to Cote and help everybody stay away from 
danger. I am also willing to stay till the end of the civil war to ensure the 
safety of the client’s network.  
 
I worked in Cote for 4 years and I am familiar with each region and the 
environment of Abidjan; therefore I leveraged on some resources to protect 
safety as much as possible. I worked in Nigeria in 2006 and experienced the 
riots in south Onisha, where over 200 people died during the conflict between 
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Christians and Muslims. I also worked in the southern city of Port Harcourt for 
over 9 months. I can remain objective and calm when facing such conditions, 
and make the right judgment. I hope everybody can consider comprehensively 
and give me this chance to contribute my part.  
 
Keep fighting until you succeed: stories under this theme are concerned with 
Teleman soldiers’ perseverance in getting business from clients and conquering 
technical challenges to meet clients’ demand. While the ‘harsh’ side of the natural and 
social environment was emphasised in the previous ‘holding firm the battle field’ 
theme, this theme focuses on the ‘harsh’ side of the position, which is often associated 
with projects in developed markets like Europe, particularly Western Europe, where a 
highly mature market exists with well established industry standard and seasoned 
industry players. Through telling stories about their fighting until they succeed, 
Teleman employees portray themselves as true soldiers who strive to make technical 
and business breakthroughs and win the severe war in Europe.  
 
For example, in Belgium, the Teleman team was issued a formal complaint letter by 
the client’s Chief Technical Officer for failure in testing. In order to conquer a 
technical issue, the author worked continuously for 18 hours (August 2011). In the 
UK, the Teleman team failed an important demonstration in front of an important 
client; in order to save the project, the project team worked nights and weekends 
(September 2012).  
 
Taking pain as pleasure: Working in a ‘harsh’ environment and ‘harsh’ positions 
needless to say is a great pain. However, to a corporate soldier, another required 
moral and behavioral code is to take the pain as pleasure, and enjoy it.  
 
To Teleman employees, such pleasure can come from the monetary returns. 
Different to many organisations where money tends to be taboo, Teleman explicitly 
points out the attractive monetary returns of working with the company. Employees 
joined this conversation through telling stories about how working at Teleman has 
changed their lives, and their families’ lives. In these stories, the identity of the 
corporate soldier is highly welcomed, because it helps their families escape from 
poverty, and brings them happiness.  
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For example, one expatriate recalls that he is from a ‘poor but warm’ family. When he 
was in middle school, his only food was rice and salted vegetables; and he needed to 
walk 15 miles over a mountain to carry some firewood to the school in exchange for 
student benefits. After joining Teleman, which offers a ‘high salary and good working 
and learning environment’, the life of his parents has been improved greatly, and he 
himself becomes a living good example for the students in the local village.  
 
Pleasure can also originate from personal and career development resulting from 
expatriation. Teleman employees excitedly shared their personal stories and 
demonstrated how much they have learnt overseas, and how much they benefited 
from such learning. One expatriate claimed that he joined the company in 2008 and 
was sent to Nigeria in the same year. Within 5 years, he transformed himself from a 
fresh graduate into a project manager leading a team and delivering projects with a 
total value of over USD 200 million.  
 
To summarise, my content analysis of the in-house newspaper shows that many 
Teleman employees largely welcome the ‘corporate soldier’ identity given by the 
company, particularly the expatriates. This is consistent with my participant 
observation in Teleman’s UK office. During my three-month stay, I was greatly 
impressed by expatriates I met in the office. One expatriate I had frequent contact 
with is Andy, a technical expert.  
 
When I met Andy in 2014, he was a father of a two-year old boy, and his wife was 
pregnant with a new baby.  He was sent to the UK to set up and lead the new R&D 
team in the UK. To complete this task, he was expected to stay here for about 2 years. 
Andy worked very hard and heavily involved himself in every aspect of new 
employee recruitment for the R&D centre. For example, on one occasion, he and I left 
the office at about 7am and drove 2 hours to attend a job fair in Bristol, which started 
at 9. When we finished work at 4pm, he drove back to the company again to continue 
his work. And later in the evening, he drove about 30 minutes to Heathrow Airport, 
where he met another expatriate and together they interviewed a high-profile 
candidate who had a tight schedule. Andy’s hard work greatly impressed a local 
Chinese employee, who says: 
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He is very strict to himself, and has high standards for others too. From all 
aspects, he is a typical Teleman person. They are so capable of eating 
bitterness… I sometimes really feel sorry for him, staying away from his 
family and living here alone. You know, he doesn’t speak good English, but 
he needs to work together with local people. It’s really not easy.  
 
My interviews with expatriates based in other offices in Europe led to similar findings. 
Teleman expatriates tend to display high internalisation of the company’s JKFD 
values, and strong identification with the company. They see great values in JKFD 
and attribute the company’s great success and their career development to sticking to 
such values. This indicates that Teleman employees closely conform to the company’s 
moral and behavior codes, i.e. hardship endurance and self-sacrifice. Whether they 
claim to be ‘soldiers’ or not, they lived up to the standards and expectations spelled 
out by such identity.  
 
Teleman people’s passionate celebration of being corporate soldiers reflects that their 
identity is an aspirational one, in which people are ‘earnestly desirous of being a 
particular kind of person’ and ‘self-consciously and consistently pursuing this 
objective’ (Thornborrow & Brown, 2009, p. 370). Aspirational identity is an outcome 
of the ‘normalisation’ process, which leveraged on people’s needs for public and self-
esteem, and needs to be ‘successful’. In Thornborrow & Brown’s study, paratroopers’ 
preferred conceptions of their selves as someone with professionalism, elitism, and 
machismo-ism is manufactured by the British Parachute Regiment discursive 
practices, i.e. rites of restricted entry to the Regiment, storytelling, and the 
maintenance of an informal culture of suspicion and surveillance. However, these 
paratroopers ‘characterised themselves as “smart believers” who had not been “duped” 
but “reasonably convinced”’ and they ‘claimed responsibility for their internal 
standards of self, potentialities and principles by which they structured their working 
lives’ (ibid, p.372).  
 
My research found that Teleman employees’ response to corporate soldier identity 
resembles these paratroopers. The corporation-prescribed identity is something 
welcomed and appreciated by these employees, and they feel proud to become one of 
them. This is reflected in their aspirational identity narrative, in which they cast 
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themselves as a hero who conquers a series of obstacles and challenges to succeed 
(Frye, 1957). 
 
7.4.2 The strategist, the negotiator, and the cynic 
 
Different from those enthusiastic conformists who passionately participate in the 
identity control programme through storytelling, other employees take ‘resistance’ 
approaches. By using the word ‘resisting’, I do not mean that they actively resist or 
subvert the managerial discourses. In fact, these people are also conformists to the 
corporate soldier identity and closely follow the corporate-prescribed moral and 
behavioral codes. However, I consider their response as resistance based on Edwards 
et al.’s argument (1995) that resistance allows employees to voice dissatisfaction and 
discontent, and enables them to create ‘space’ to exercise autonomy to better 
accommodate control.  
 
7.4.2.1 The strategists 
 
Strategists accept the social reality constructed by the company, and welcome the 
identity given by the company. They recognise the JKFD values, and highly identify 
themselves with the company. They fully follow the company’s logic, and recognise 
that an expatriate is a model corporate soldier, who is expected to endure hardship and 
make sacrifices. However, as their age increases, and they have more family 
obligations, they start to take on a more strategic approach in an attempt to have a 
better balance between personal and company interests.  
 
One good example to illustrate this point is about how strategist employees respond to 
the company’s expectation of ‘long-term devotion to overseas markets’. As 
mentioned earlier, since the last decade and particularly in recent years, Teleman has 
aggressively and successfully expanded its overseas markets, and as a result, 
expatriates are in great demand. For this reason, as illustrated in early discussions, 
Teleman has initiated strong managerial discourses to internally promote overseas 
expatriation, and to mobilise employees to become expatriates. Understandably, from 
the company’s perspective, it is in the company’s best interest if employees can stay 
overseas as long as possible. Therefore, while Teleman has made great efforts in 
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encouraging employees to go out (i.e. expatriation), it does not pay much attention to 
sending people back (i.e. repatriation).  
 
From the employees’ perspective, however, going back to China to re-join the family 
is something they have to consider after they have spent a couple of years fighting in 
foreign lands. However, how to go back becomes a tough challenge, given that the 
company intentionally discourages people to do so. As one expatiate puts it: 
 
The company normally won’t send you back. You need to fight for it…From 
the company’s perspective, four to five years of overseas work experience has 
just developed a talent, and it is the right time for him to continue to be further 
refined abroad and to contribute. 
 
According to my informants, going back to China is not easy, because expatriates 
need to secure their next position in China by themselves, i.e. find a team with a 
vacancy which is willing to take him/her on board. To make this happen, lots of 
personal connections and tactics are involved. 
 
An expatriate called Yong, who managed to return to China after 5 years working 
overseas, spent about one year making things happen through a ‘jumping board’ 
strategy. When he decided to go back to China, he was working in the Quality & 
Operations team in France. Realising that the Quality & Operations team in China 
was unlikely to have any vacancy coming up in the near future, he decided to change 
his role first and joined the Resource Management team, which, according to his 
connections in China, might need people like him. Then a couple of months after he 
joined the team, the China team leader happened to make a trip to France where they 
met and reached a deal. Six months later, Yong happily returned home. ‘You need to 
know people. If you don’t know people, how can you do that. Some people stay in 
Africa for 5 years or 6 years, and still cannot make it,’ he says.  
 
As we can see from the above stories, these strategist employees do not challenge the 
social reality constructed by the company, but have taken a more strategic approach to 
respond to the social reality, and think of ways to better adapt to it. This approach 
bears some similarity to the resistance in the form of ‘silence’ discuss
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and Duberley (2007), where managers adopt a ‘keep your head down’ strategy and 
work around the managerial discourse on participation in their own ways.  
 
7.4.2.2 The negotiators 
 
Negotiators share a lot in common with strategists. Both of them fully buy into the 
simple corporate logic, internalise the JKFD corporate values, and use them as 
guidance for their behaviours. Different from strategists who balance self interest and 
company interest strategically and quietly, negotiators choose to voice their thoughts.  
 
However, such speaking out, I argue, should not be taken as questioning or 
challenging to the ‘dominant ideologies’, which represent interests of powerful 
leaders (Alvesson, 2002). Rather, it represents a new form of confirmation, because 
negotiators choose to share their thoughts with colleagues and the management team 
when they have been mistaken for not being true soldiers. Therefore, the purpose of 
negotiators’ voicing is not to challenge, but to get an understanding and recognition 
from the company.  This point can be best illustrated by an incident involving an 
employee called Michael.  
 
In 2014, Michael, a former expatriate, was about to be sent to a country in Africa 
again, but he refused to go. Such a reaction is obviously very rare in the company, and 
it became a case study in a management team meeting. One senior HR manager wrote 
a long article, entitled ‘Why a Locomotive Engine Filled with Gas Stops Running’, 
and shared his thoughts on it.  
 
In the article, the HR manager claimed: first, regarding the company’s core values, 
Michael ‘has some problems in recognising these core values, and he does not really 
accept our culture of being customer-centred, FD-Man-oriented, and JKFD for a long 
period of time’. Second, when we are selecting cadres, we should evaluate multi-
dimensions, with ‘performance and capabilities as the foundation, and morality as the 
bottom line’. Third, the continuous good rating on performance results in a big ego, 
and we should ask whether the years of good rating on performance is fair and 
scientific.  
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Interestingly, also with a long article, Michael stood up and strongly argued against 
the HR manager. Citing his good performance for the past 6 years, he said he was 
shocked to see himself as a negative example being condemned by the company. 
Michael then explained what happened in his family: his new-born baby got sick, his 
wife emotionally broke down, and his mother also needed to see a doctor for her eyes. 
Because of these reasons, he submitted his application to not be an expat ‘at the 
moment’. He showed the application letter as below: 
 
Dear Leader x, 
 
After communication in the morning, I gave lots of thoughts on it again and I 
also talked with my family via telephone at noon. Due to the current situation 
in my family, after communication with my family, I need to stay in Shenzhen 
to look after my family and cannot go abroad to work.  
 
I understand that my action will result in comparatively big trouble for the 
department’s work, and I will accept the penalty from the department, and I 
am willing to work hard in the new role to compensate for the inconvenience 
caused by me. After the family issues are solved, I can accept expatriation 
again.  
 
Regarding my penalty, I have no objection to downgrading, a salary decrease, 
and a stock option adjustment. However, for the penalty of 2-year lock-up and 
the removal of FD-Man title, I earnestly request the team to re-consider 
whether these two items can be abolished.   
 
Thank you, 
 
Michael 
 
As indicated by the above story, clearly Michael was not a divergent. Instead, he was 
greatly offended when the HR manager portrayed him as someone who did not take 
the JKFD values seriously. He cherished his ‘FD-Man’ title, and believed that his 
refusal of expatriation was bad, causing negative consequences to the company. Thus, 
he was willing to accept the penalty, and eager to demonstrate his loyalty and 
commitment through expressing his willingness to accept an overseas assignment 
when his family situation got better. Therefore, negotiators’ speaking out is to refuse 
being denied a corporate soldier rank, and to seek recognition from the company.  
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7.4.2.3 The cynics 
 
Cynical employees are those that have somewhat different worldviews from most 
employees. They seem to disagree with the company’s JKFD value, and do not follow 
the company’s logic that a good employee is a soldier, sacrificing self interest for the 
interests of the company. During the interview, they try to emphasise individualism 
and show that they are able to stay away from the company’s ‘brain washing’.   
 
However, my analysis reveals that having a cynical view about the company’s 
policies and practices does not mean that they have become rebels. In fact, they are 
not different from strategists and negotiators. They obey the company’s decision on 
overseas destinations, they work long hours, and they keep fighting until the last 
minute to deliver projects to clients and to help the company succeed. Cynics 
unconsciously submit themselves to the corporate soldier identity approved by the 
company, and work in the right way as expected by the company. In fact, they 
themselves are the walking example of a true corporate soldier.  
 
One good example is an expatriate called Daniel, who seems to be most cynical about 
the company’s culture and its ‘brain-washing’ practice. For instance, referring to 
negotiator Michael’s story discussed above, he expressed strong disagreement with 
the company. He says: 
 
‘In this regard, I think our company is very wrong. First of all, an employee is 
a person. Before he becomes your employees, he is already a son, or a 
husband, or a father. This is in the first place. However, our company always 
puts the identity of employee in the first place. I think this is a fundamental 
mistake. But our company doesn’t want to change it. I don’t see our company 
will change this direction in near future.’ 
 
Daniel also questions the company’s prominent long-hours working culture and the 
strongly promoted spirit of sacrifice, because he believes that a great company’s value 
‘depends on innovation’, not ‘the low cost generated by over time working’.  
 
However, when criticising the company’s ‘disappointing management philosophy’, 
Daniel reported that he worked extremely hard. Since joining the company in 2008 
right after graduating from a top university in Shanghai, he has been sent to work in 
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over 20 countries, including Norway, Croatia, Bulgaria, Moldova, Iceland, Austria 
and Poland. According to him, the longest hours he once worked were 72 hours non-
stop for a project. When first interviewed in 2014, he commented on his hard work in 
a cynical but proud tone, ‘Look at me, I am only 27, and I have so many problems 
with my health (because of the work)… The pressure is big, too big. You cannot 
really bear it,’ he said. However, the truth is that as a true corporate soldier, he is not 
only able to bear it, but also to do it very well. Most likely because of his capability 
and willingness to endure hardship and sacrifice, in early 2015, he was promoted as 
the Technical Director in an Eastern European country. 
 
Daniel’s story makes him very similar to those cynical employees in Kunda’s (1992) 
study, who call the company’s culture ‘California bathtub crap’, but continue to 
deliver flawless performance continuously. Here I concur with Fleming & Spicer 
(2003) that cynicism is not ‘a way of blocking the colonisation of a pre-given self’; 
instead, it is a process through which ‘employees dis-identify with cultural 
prescriptions, yet often still perform them’. Cynics like Daniel may have the 
impression that ‘they are autonomous’, but still they ‘practice the corporate rituals 
nonetheless’ (2003, p.157). 
 
In summary, my research reveals that resistance to identity control in Teleman is 
weak. Neither strategists nor negotiators really question the existing social conditions 
constructed by the company. Their response to the control is not to deny or challenge 
it, but to better live within it. Therefore, their ‘resistance’ can not even be considered 
as resistance, but more like a modified form of confirmation. For cynics, the 
company’s mentality on JKFD is wrong, and they disagree with the company’s logic. 
However, in reality, they work exactly as the company expects, thus making them no 
different from other employees, who truly celebrate the identity of corporate soldiers.  
 
7.5 Absence of control in the UK and Europe  
 
In MNCs studies, the issue of identity control is seldom discussed explicitly, but 
sometimes mentioned as in the discussion of informal control or cultural control 
exercised by MNCs HQs to overseas subsidiaries (e.g. Harzing, 1999; Martinez & 
Jarillo, 1989). An underlying premise is that a strong culture unifies dispersed 
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organisation through aligning employees’ behaviours and commitment to a common 
purpose and shared values (Welch & Welch, 2006), and a unified corporate culture 
within MNCs facilitates the transfer of information, knowledge, resources, and people 
(Sorensen, 2002).  Therefore, it has been reported that MNCs seek to transfer 
corporate culture developed at HQs to their overseas subsidiaries in the hope that a 
particular culture and espoused values can be accepted and internalised by local 
employees. One effective way is to send out expatriates (Chang & Taylor, 1999; 
Groot & Merchant, 2000; Rosenzweig & Singh, 1991), because it is believed that 
expatriates have a good understanding and buy into the HQ’s procedures, values and 
goals (Doz & Prahalad, 1986; Kobrin, 1988).  
 
However, one important finding of my study is that Teleman’s identity control is only 
targeting its Chinese employees who join the company in China, and locally hired 
employees, including local European employees and local Chinese employees, are 
exempted from it. In other words, while the company expects these Chinese 
employees to JKFD and become a soldier, it does not have such requirement or 
expectation for locally hired employees.  
 
7.5.1 The company’s hands-off approach  
 
As discussed earlier, JKFD is vocabulary that is politically and culturally embedded 
in a distinctive Chinese social context. While the four Chinese characters 艰苦奋斗
are easily understood by Chinese people, it is difficult to put it into proper English; 
needless to say, to be promoted in an understandable way. On Teleman’s English 
version corporate website, JKFD is translated as ‘dedication’. It explains this core 
value as the following:  
 
We win customers’ respect and trust primarily through dedication. This 
includes every effort we make to create value for customers and to improve 
our capabilities. We value employees' contributions and reward them 
accordingly. 
 
Here we can see that JKFD has very different meanings from the Chinese version of 
JKFD. The sacrifice aspect of the core values is downplayed, and the FD-Man 
identity prepared and proposed for employees disappears. The replacement of JKFD 
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with ‘dedication’ indicates the company’s weak intention to ask for the same things 
from local employees as expatriates.  
 
In practice, it is also observed that limited efforts have been made by the company to 
introduce the JKFD value to its European offices and promote it. One example is 
concerned with new hires.  
 
In China, all new employees are required to attend intensive training courses in 
corporate culture; particularly for university fresh graduates, all of them are stationed 
in the company’s university for three months, where life and training are managed in 
a military way. For example, they live in a shared dormitory, need to get up at 6 am to 
attend morning exercises, and go to bed sharp at 10pm. Each new employee will 
receive the company founder’s important articles, including the critical one To All 
New Employees, which will be discussed in the classroom. However, in Europe, such 
orientation activities do not exist, and the To All New Employees piece is not 
distributed to new hires. In the UK, the only orientation programme for employees is 
a 2-hour lecture-style training course in a meeting room, where the British HR 
manager will briefly introduce the company’s history and products, HR general policy, 
etc. Information about the corporate culture such as JKFD is completely ruled out.  
 
Another illustration is concerned with the in-house publication. In 2009, a new in-
house magazine was published in English, which is 40 pages and carrying about 20 
pieces of articles and reports. It reports the company’s new products, shares 
employees’ stories, and covers employees’ activities around the world. The magazine 
is produced by an editorial team in China and is distributed globally within the 
company’s overseas network. It might be expected that this English magazine could 
be an important channel for promoting the company’s JKFD corporate culture, just 
like the Chinese in-house newspaper.  
 
However, a detailed examination reveals that between January 2009- June 2015, a 
total of 53 issues of in-house magazine were published; with over 1000 articles and 
reports, but only 16 of them containing such key words as ‘JKFD’, ‘FD’ or ‘FDZ’, 
including several pieces where ‘FD’ is just very briefly mentioned without any further 
explanation. This is in sharp contrast to the strong managerial discourse in China, 
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represented by numerous articles and stories written by senior managers and 
employees on the theme of JKFD. As my informants report, none of those passionate 
speeches by the founders is translated into local languages in Europe, or published.  
 
Furthermore, the expatriate’s role as a socialising agent or culture/value promoter, 
which is frequently discussed in the literature of (tacit) knowledge transfer (e.g. 
Chang, Gong, & Peng, 2012; Harzing, Pudelko, & Reiche, 2015) is not observed in 
Teleman. As discussed earlier, the divisions between expatriates, local employees, 
and local Chinese are remarkable within the company, and according to my 
observations, expatriates are not active in introducing new management practices or 
socialising with local employees to promote values and norms that are congruent with 
that of China HQ. On the contrary, many of them emphasise their ‘respecting the local 
way’ approach, which can be reflected by the ‘dual management model’ where 
Chinese and non-Chinese employees are managed differently, and their acceptance 
and tolerance of local employees not working overtime and different interpretation of 
some key philosophies of the company.  
 
 7.5.2 Employees’ responding to JKFD 
 
Given the company’s limited efforts to disseminate its JKFD value to its overseas 
subsidiaries, it is not surprising to see that employees’ responses to JKFD are various 
and ambiguous. Employees seem to have very different understandings and 
interpretations from Chinese expatriates. One expatriate manager shared his 
experience in Germany: 
 
‘One of our philosophies is JKFD. To Chinese people, the meaning is very 
obvious; this means working late and working overtime. However, one senior 
local manager actually shared his thoughts in a meeting. He said, it means we 
should have a strong will, and we should be determined to make things happen. 
Well, they can actually make sense of what they said. Anyway, they will never 
work overtime. ’  
 
Such different understandings and interpretation can be further observed in the above-
mentioned 16 articles/reports in the English magazine. For example, the HR Director 
of the UK office contributed an article in January 2010, where she shared her thoughts 
on FD.  
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‘FD’ does not have a direct translation into English, but I have translated it to 
define a team of people that will focus on achieving the goal, through team 
work, self development, and initiative.  
 
As we can see, such understanding of FD is far away from the meaning of hardship 
endurance and self -sacrifice proposed by the company.  
 
Some other interpretations include the following:  
 
What I understand from ‘FD’ is the core of team spirit. Without a working, 
collaborating team, completing a hard task can be a dream. I also think that 
effective communication is another essential concept of “Fen Dou”.  
                                                               --A Turkish employee (February 2010)  
 
My understanding of  FD is a way of life, a way to achieve results through 
each individual contribution.  
                                                                     --A French employee (August 2014) 
 
It’s all about a person’s ability to train their mind to look beyond obstacles and 
even failures, and focus on achieving positive results.  
                                                                      --A Kuwait employee (April 2014) 
 
The phenomenon of MNCs’ corporate values, strategy and other assets taking on 
different meanings by overseas subsidiary employees is explained by Brannen (2004) 
using the concept of ‘recontextualisation’. Drawing on semiotics, Brannen’s study on 
Walt Disney Company’s internationalisation in France and Japan reveals that 
meanings attached to objects and process change when they move from one culture to 
another. In Disney’s case, the company’s products, practices, and ideologies are 
interpreted differently by people in these three countries. Similarly, Gersten and 
Zolner’s (2012) study shows that corporate values developed by the Danish HQs take 
on new meanings when interpreted by local employees in India. It is argued that the 
prevailing meaning system, as well as their resources and strategies shape employees’ 
understanding of corporate values. 
 
In addition to these multiple interpretations of the JKFD value, local employees also 
question or at least distance themselves from the JKFD culture prevailing in China 
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HQ. For example, one local expert from France seems to associate it with the issue of 
efficiency, and asks the question ‘How can we become more efficient? ’ He says: 
 
We are famous for our (fendou) hard working attitude, but to become a 
US$70-100bn company I think we need to become more efficient with the 
people, processes and technology we have.  (July 2014) 
 
In daily life, as I observed when working in the company’s UK office, most local 
employees, by the company’s definition and expectation, do not JKFD at all. While 
the working hours are supposed to be between 9am-5pm, at around 4:30 pm, you can 
see some local British employees leaving the office. And in the company’s Bristol 
office, where a small R&D team is based, employees complained about the fixed 
working hours, and tried to negotiate with the company for flexible working hours or 
to work from home, on the grounds that flexible working hours is an industry norm in 
Bristol in the UK. 
 
While local (foreign) employees might not buy into the JKFD concept because of 
differences in value system, local Chinese tend to ignore such ideas on the grounds 
that what they pay is far more than what they gain. They may be expected by the 
company to work as hard as expatriates, but, as discussed in more detail in the next 
chapter, they are denied equal rights and access to career development and monetary 
rewards. In this situation, the concept of JKFD is not recognised by them, needless to 
say to be internalised.  
 
7.6 Conclusion   
 
This chapter focused on identity control in Teleman. It started with an introduction to 
JKFD as Teleman’s distinctive corporate value, and then showed how new meanings 
have been manufactured through senior manager-led organisational discourses. 
Through managing meaning, Teleman constructs a social reality where a good 
employee equates to a corporate soldier who accepts the JKFD value and behaves in 
the way required by the company, i.e. endure hardship, and make sacrifice.  
 
In the main, identity control in Teleman seems to be highly effective, producing a 
large group of homogenous employees with strong identification with the company. 
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In this thesis, I argue that such identity control is supplemented with another type of 
control, that is, control through providing employees with financial (e.g. stock option 
plan) and non-financial incentives (e.g. career development), which, different from 
identity control de-emphasising self, regulate employees’ behaviors through appealing 
to their self interests. This will be discussed in the next chapter.  
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Chapter	8	Control	by	rewards	in	Teleman			
8.1	Introduction		
	This	chapter	deals	with	the	final	type	of	control	in	Teleman,	i.e.	control	by	rewards.	In	organisation	studies,	rewards	are	rarely	examined	through	the	lens	of	control.	However,	as	Kerr	and	Slocum	(1987)	point	out,	an	organisation’s	reward	system	specifies	what	contributions	an	organisation	expects	from	its	members,	what	kind	of	values	and	norms	they	must	conform	to,	and	what	response	individuals	can	expect	to	receive	as	a	result	of	their	performance;	thus,	‘the	reward	system	is	a	primary	method	of	achieving	control’	(1987,	p.99).			This	chapter	looks	at	two	types	of	rewards:	monetary	rewards	and	career	development.	In	particular,	it	highlights	two	reward	programmes	that	distinguish	Teleman	from	other	Chinese	firms:	employee	stock	option	plan	and	expatriate	assignment	used	as	‘developmental	assignments’	(McCauley	et	al.,	1994).	My	study	reveals	that	these	two	programmes	play	a	critical	role	in	achieving	a	high	level	of	commitment	and	retention	of	expatriates.			Drawing	on	labour	process	theory	and	Smith’s	(2006,	2010)	concept	of	‘labour	mobility	power’,	I	argue	that	those	rewards	in	Teleman	function	to	weaken	the	threats	posed	by	employees’	mobility	power.	Reward	programmes	such	as	employee	stock	option	plan,	and	the	developmental	assignments	are	some	of	the	counter	strategies	taken	by	employers	‘with	the	aim	of	improving	retention	rates,	and	reducing	the	costs	that	flow	from	high	labour	turnover’	(2006,	p.391).	By	factoring	in	the	propensity	for	mobility	bargaining	into	rewards	programmes	and	retention	strategies,	Teleman	seeks	to	‘institutionalise	and	regularise	the	continuous	supply	of	usable	labour’	(ibid,	p.395),	in	the	face	of	a	highly	mobile	labour	market	in	China,	particularly	for	skilled	employees.			This	chapter	also	discusses	expatriate’s	resistance	to	the	company’s	control	in	the	form	of	complaints,	questioning,	criticism,	and	exit.	Furthermore,	my	analysis	reveals	that	local	employees	and	local	Chinese	are	exempt	from	such	financial	
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and	non-financial	control	because	their	quitting	does	not	have	much	material	effect	on	productivity	or	profitability	for	the	employer	(Smith,	2006).			
8.2	Financial	control:	the	monetary	rewards			Financial	control	through	offering	an	attractive	package	is	a	key	component	in	Teleman’s	control	system.	As	one	of	the	most	successful	high-tech	companies	in	China,	Teleman	has	long	been	recognised	for	its	above-market-rate	salary.	Take	its	salary	for	fresh	graduates,	for	example:	according	to	the	Chinese	national	media,	in	2014	the	company	offered	a	monthly	salary	of	RMB	9000	(£900)	to	fresh	graduates	with	Bachelor	degree,	and	a	monthly	salary	of	RMB	10,000	(£1000)	for	those	with	a	Masters	degree.		This	is	well	above	the	market	rate,	considering	the	fact	that	the	average	monthly	salary	for	Chinese	university	graduates	in	2016	was	RMB	5693	(£500)	(source:	China	Daily,	2016).		According	to	my	interviewees,	the	income	of	a	Chinese	employee	who	has	stayed	with	the	company	for	a	couple	of	years	is	normally	comprised	of	three	parts:	a	basic	salary,	an	annual	bonus,	and	a	stock	option,	and	the	percentage	of	these	three	elements	is	close	to	1:1:1.	Expatriate	employees	working	abroad	receive	an	extra	expatriation	allowance.			During	the	interviews,	the	generous	compensation	package	offered	by	the	company	was	commonly	recognised	by	expatriates.	An	expatriate	who	joined	the	company	in	2007	and	worked	in	Germany	and	the	Netherlands	commented,	‘the	income	offered	by	the	company	is	too	high,	and	lots	of	people	just	cannot	walk	away…	the	company’s	payment	is	very	high	in	the	industry.’		Although	the	issue	of	salary	and	income	is	quite	sensitive,	I	managed	to	get	more	detailed	information	from	a	couple	of	interviewees.	Daniel,	for	example,	joined	the	company	in	2008	right	after	undergraduate	study	from	university	and	claimed	that	in	recent	years,	he	could	save	RMB	500,000	(£50,000)	per	year,	at	the	age	of	less	than	30.	His	major	income	came	from	the	stock	option	and	the	expatriate	allowance.	What	is	more	important,	he	emphasises,	is	that	when	
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working	abroad,	he	does	not	need	to	pay	for	accommodation,	food	and	flights,	because	the	company	pays	for	everything,	including	3	flights	to	and	from	China.		Lilly,	meanwhile,	is	currently	working	in	Norway.	She	joined	the	company	in	2005,	and	celebrated	her	10th	anniversary	working	for	the	company	in	2015.	She	worked	in	Thailand	for	6	years,	and	started	working	in	Norway	in	2011.	She	seemed	to	enjoy	being	an	expatriate,	and	did	not	want	to	go	back	to	China.	When	asked	whether	income	was	a	factor	in	staying	abroad,	she	answered,			 ‘Income	is	an	important	factor	and	it	is	part	of	my	consideration.	The	compensation	and	benefits	are	pretty	good	in	our	company.	We	have	good	administration,	and	when	we	work	abroad,	the	company	provides	accommodation,	and	we	have	allowance	and	a	canteen.	We	have	canteens	in	every	country.	You	don’t	need	to	worry	about	these	aspects.	The	compensation	and	benefits	are	good.	All	you	need	to	do	is	to	focus	on	your	work.	You	are	free	from	hassles.	’			The	account	of	Tony,	a	technical	and	service	director	who	had	worked	with	the	company	for	6	years	in	Germany	and	the	Netherlands,	also	illustrated	‘the	higher	payment’	enjoyed	by	Teleman’s	employees.	Explaining	why	he	stayed	with	the	company	for	so	long,	he	pointed	to	three	reasons:	the	company	is	fair;	the	company	provides	lots	of	opportunities	for	young	people;	and	the	good	payment.			 ‘No	matter	in	China	or	abroad,	the	compensation	and	benefits	offered	by	the	company	is	relatively	competitive.	Therefore	after	working	for	the	company	abroad,	when	you	come	back	you	won’t	feel	you	earn	less	than	others.	Supporting	a	family,	and	living	a	decent	life,	all	these	the	company	can	offer	to	you.	Based	on	these	three	points,	I	am	quite	satisfied	with	the	company.’		A	frequently	mentioned	major	source	of	income	is	the	stock	option.	My	research	reveals	that	the	company’s	Employee	Stock	Option	Plan	plays	a	critical	role	in	maintaining	employees’	commitment,	and	contributes	greatly	to	the	retention	of	expatiates.	Similar	to	many	start-up	companies	in	the	USA	in	the	1980s	that	used	employee	stock	option	plans	to	preserve	start-up	cash	(Blasi	et	al.,	2003),	Teleman	implemented	its	employee	stock	option	plan	in	1990—	several	years	after	the	establishment	of	the	company	—in	an	effort	to	solve	the	capital	shortage	problem	due	to	the	difficulty	in	finding	financing	as	a	small	private	
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company.	In	1997,	Teleman	restructured	the	plan’s	model	by	shifting	its	focus	from	financing	the	company	to	incentivising	employees.	In	2002,	Teleman	further	reformed	its	plan	to	meet	relevant	regulations,	and	introduced	virtual	stock	options,	which	is	how	the	plan	works	today.	Under	this	new	virtual	stock	option	plan,	employees’	returns	are	not	fixed;	rather,	dividends	are	linked	to	the	net	assets	of	the	company	at	the	year	end.	In	2011	about	65,000	employees	participated	in	the	plan,	and	in	2014	approximately	80,000	employees	out	of	a	total	of	150,000	owned	shares	(information	in	this	paragraph	cited	from	national	and	international	media.	To	protect	the	confidentiality	of	the	case	company,	sources	are	hidden).		
	Different	from	some	share	options	plans	(e.g.	the	UK’s	Save	As	You	Earn)	where	employees	can	choose	to	participate	or	not	(e.g.	Pendleton,	2010),	the	employee	stock	option	plan	in	Teleman	functions	more	like	a	reward	programme.	In	other	words,	it	is	not	the	employees	who	decide	whether	to	participate	the	programme;	rather,	the	company	decides	who	is	eligible	and	how	many	shares	an	employee	is	entitled	to	purchase.	Given	the	company’s	highly	successful	business	since	the	2000s,	in	particular	in	recent	years,	the	returns	for	the	stock	option	(according	to	my	interviewees)	are	almost	guaranteed	and	the	dividend	of	each	year	is	impressive.	Therefore,	employees	in	Teleman	are	eager	to	participate	in	the	programme.	One	big	moment	of	each	year	for	every	employee,	according	to	several	expatriates,	is	when	his/her	managers	announce	how	many	shares	s/he	is	entitled	to	purchase.			Simon,	for	example,	is	a	37-year-old	male	middle	manager	who	has	worked	for	the	company	for	10	years.	Currently	working	in	the	company’s	China	headquarters,	he	spent	a	total	of	5	years	abroad,	including	2	years	in	France	and	Germany	respectively	and	one	year	in	Spain	and	Italy.	When	I	presented	him	with	a	media	report,	which	accused	the	company	of	encouraging	employees	to	buy	its	stock	shares	to	solve	the	issue	of	capital	shortage,	he	seemed	to	be	irritated.	He	said,				
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‘The	information	is	incorrect.	The	company	makes	lots	of	money	this	year,	and	the	project	teams	are	dividing	their	bonus	by	millions.	The	cash	flow	is	absolutely	not	a	problem…	the	stock	option	is	for	employees	with	good	performance	to	buy,	and	the	dividend	each	year	is	very	good.	It	is	not	that	everybody	can	buy	it…	Every	year	I	complain	to	my	boss	that	my	stock	shares	are	too	little.	I	am	begging	him	to	give	me	more	share	quota	to	buy.’			He	then	used	himself	as	an	example.	Currently,	he	has	about	200,000	shares	of	the	company’s	virtual	stock,	and	in	2014,	the	dividend	for	each	share	is	RMB	1.9,	which	means	that	he	earned	about	RMB	380,000	(£	38,000)	from	his	stock	shares	in	2014.			According	to	Simon,	after	an	employee	is	rewarded	with	a	certain	quota	of	stock	shares,	s/he	needs	to	buy	the	shares	through	internal	systems;	and	then	at	the	end	of	each	year,	the	dividends	will	be	paid	directly	to	the	employee’s	bank	account.	During	the	year,	the	employee	can	withdraw	from	the	Stock	Option	Plan	at	any	time	and	cash	out	the	shares	at	the	rate	of	current	share	price.	‘If	you	have	lots	of	shares,	like	the	President,	you	can	cash	out	one	third	of	your	shares	per	year.	But	for	people	at	my	level,	you	can	do	what	you	want.	There	is	no	impact	on	the	company.’		When	asked	about	the	importance	of	the	stock	shares	to	employee	retention,	most	interviewees	gave	similar	answers.	For	example,	Martin	joined	the	company	8	years	ago.	When	asked	whether	the	stock	share	is	an	important	factor	for	his	staying	with	the	company,	he	answered,	‘Yes.	It	constitutes	a	very	big	part	of	my	income.	The	basic	salary	itself	offered	by	the	company	is	not	competitive.	You	can	find	any	job	outside	and	the	salary	won’t	be	very	different.	But	when	the	stock	shares	are	included,	the	overall	income	is	good.’	Yet	another	expatriate,	having	more	than	100,000	shares,	bluntly	stated	that	he	would	not	be	able	to	find	another	job	which	could	offer	him	such	good	income.			Susan,	an	expatriate	HR	manager,	believed	that	the	stock	share	is	a	very	important	factor	contributing	to	the	long	stay	of	many	employees.			
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‘The	internal	stock	option	remains	a	very	important	attraction	for	core	employees	to	stay.	Some	“old”	people	leave	the	company,	but	the	overall	turnover	rate	is	only	2-3%.	I	understand	why	these	“old”	people	leave.	On	the	one	hand,	after	many	years	of	accumulation,	they	don’t	have	strong	desire	for	financial	needs	any	more;	on	the	other	hand,	they	cannot	advance	further	in	terms	of	position.’			She	later	clarified	that	the	2-3%	turnover	rate	refers	to	senior	people	in	the	R&D	teams	with	an	internal	job	band	of	17,	who	normally	had	been	working	with	the	company	for	over	10	years.	‘Even	when	we	include	all	people	in	all	job	bands,	in	China,	the	overall	turnover	rate	for	R&D	teams	is	about	6%.	’			Although	my	research	did	not	get	access	to	the	official	figures	of	the	turnover	rate	of	expatriates,	data	generated	from	interviews	indicate	that	it	is	low.	For	example,	Tina,	a	locally	hired	Chinese	woman	working	in	the	HR	team	in	the	company’s	UK	office	claimed	that	in	2014	only	two	expatriates	left	the	company	when	working	in	the	UK.	Another	expatriate	estimated	that	there	are	around	60	expatriates	currently	working	in	the	company’s	Norway	office,	and	many	of	them	have	stayed	with	the	company	for	15	or	16	years.			In	summary,	my	research	indicates	that	financial	control	through	monetary	rewards	is	prominent	and	a	highly	effective	strategy	at	Teleman	as	a	‘golden	handcuff’.	Through	providing	employees	with	a	generous	compensation	package,	particularly	with	stock	options,	the	company	has	built	a	relatively	stable	workforce	in	a	highly	mobile	labour	market	in	China	for	the	managerial	and	engineering	talent	(this	will	be	discussed	in	more	detail	in	the	next	chapter).	In	this	way,	costs	that	flow	from	high	labour	turnover	have	been	reduced,	and	a	continuous	supply	of	useable	labour	has	been	achieved	(Smith,	2006).			Such	findings	are	in	line	with	relative	research	on	the	incentive	and	motivational	function	of	money	(e.g.	Komaki,	Coombs,	&	Schepman,	1996;	Long	&	Shields,	2010;	Peterson	&	Luthans,	2006)	and	the	role	of	compensation	and	financial	rewards	in	attracting,	motivating	and	retaining	employees	as	well	as	reinforcing	their	performance	(Stajkovic	&	Luthans,	1997,	2003).	Particularly,	the	effectiveness	of	Teleman’s	financial	control	seems	to	support	Chiu	and	
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colleagues’	(Chiu,	Luk,	&	Tang,	2001;	Chiu	&	Kosinski,	1995)	claim	that	employees	in	China	have	a	‘cash	mentality’	because	Chinese	culture	deems	a	financially	independent	person	to	be	successful.			Regarding	the	Employee	Stock	Option	Plan,	a	key	element	in	Teleman’s	financial	control,	extensive	research	on	employee	financial	participation	has	demonstrated	the	positive	correlation	between	share	ownership,	‘psychological	ownership’	and	commitment	(e.g.	Culpepper,	Gamble,	&	Blubaugh,	2004;	McCarthy	&	Palcic,	2012;	Pendleton,	Wilson,	&	Wright,	1998).	The	success	of	Teleman’s	employee	stock	option	plan	seems	to	support	that	view	that	knowledge-intensive	firms	have	a	high	dependence	on	human	capital,	and	employee	ownership	is	an	effective	way	to	reward	their	knowledge	workers	in	the	face	of	tight	labour	markets	(Carberry,	2012;	Mygind,	2012).	From	an	organisational	control	perspective,	employee	ownership	is	a	‘carrot’	approach,	rather	than	the	‘stick’	of	monitoring	and	controlling	employees	(McNabb	&	Whitfield,	1998,	p.	173).			
8.3	Career	Development	as	a	control	mechanism			
	If	we	agree	that	rewards	are	part	of	the	organisation	control	system,	then	career	development	should	be	considered	as	a	specific	control	mechanism,	since	career	development	has	been	commonly	recognised	as	a	critical	element	in	an	organisation’s	reward	system	(e.g.	Armstrong	&	Stephens,	2005;	Kerr	&	Slocum,	1987).	In	fact,	the	controlling	effect	of	career	development	has	been	widely	discussed	in	the	HRM	and	organisational	psychology	literature,	which	claims	that	growth	and	development	opportunities	lead	to	organisational	commitment	and	retention	(Cao	&	Hamori,	2015;	Mathieu	&	Zajac,	1990;	Tremblay	et	al.,	2010;	Weng	et	al.,	2010).		It	is	argued	that	through	rewarding	employees	with	career	development	opportunities	for	their	performance,	organisations	create	a	mutual	investment	type	of	employee-organisational	relationship	(Tsui	et	al.,	1997),	which	leads	employees	to	feel	greater	compatibility	with	the	organisation	and	maintain	a	high	level	of	organisational	commitment	(Hom	et	al.,	2009).			
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My	study	on	Teleman	shows	that	providing	employees	with	growth	and	development	opportunities	is	a	critical	part	of	its	control	system.	Through	establishing	a	massive	internal	job	market,	and	enabling	internal	mobility	within	the	company,	Teleman	achieves	a	high	level	of	retention	and	commitment	from	employees.				One	of	the	key	mechanisms	of	encouraging	internal	mobility,	for	example,	is	the	creation	of	the	Internal	Talent	Market	in	China.	According	to	my	informants,	Teleman	first	established	the	market	in	China	in	2009	in	the	hope	that	employees	can	find	suitable	jobs	for	themselves	based	on	their	own	interest	if	they	are	not	happy	with	current	jobs.	According	to	the	company’s	policy,	as	long	as	employees	enter	the	market	and	secure	a	job,	their	line	managers	should	‘let	them	go	without	any	condition’.	‘Your	boss	cannot	stop	you	from	leaving.	This	is	the	company’s	policy.	It’s	a	message	to	managers	that	you	have	to	use	your	people	well	and	have	some	career	development	plan	for	them.	Otherwise,	he	won’t	stay	with	you.	If	he	can	find	a	better	job,	he	will	leave	you,’	one	expatriate,	who	works	closely	with	the	Internal	Talent	Market	team	in	the	HR	department,	commented.	According	to	him,	in	2014,	about	1000	employees	secured	a	new	position	via	the	Internal	Talent	Market,	and	this	figure	is	expected	to	double	to	2000	in	2015	since	the	company	has	stepped	up	their	efforts	on	promoting	the	market	in	order	to	stop	people	from	leaving	the	company.			Indeed,	compared	with	other	Chinese	firms	and	probably	most	western	MNCs,	Teleman	has	introduced	something	very	unique	to	attract	and	retain	its	employees,	that	is,	the	many	career	development	opportunities	that	have	been	created	by	the	company’s	aggressive	expansion	in	the	international	market	since	the	late	1990s,	and	particularly	in	recent	years.	Two	types	of	career	development	are	prominent	among	expatriates:	rapid	promotion,	and	internal	transfer.			
8.3.1	Rapid	promotion		
	Teleman	is	a	very	young	company	in	terms	of	employee	age.	According	to	the	annual	report	in	2014,	the	average	age	of	its	employees	is	29.	Therefore,	to	many	
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people	including	myself,	it	is	surprising	to	see	that	many	people	in	key	positions	are	extremely	young.	For	example,	in	2014	when	I	conducted	my	ethnographic	research	in	the	company’s	UK	office,	which	housed	about	1000	employees,	the	country	manager	was	32.	The	financial	director,	who	managed	a	team	of	about	20	people	including	several	local	British	employees	in	their	50s,	first	looked	to	me	like	a	fresh	university	graduate,	later	I	was	told	that	he	was	30.	Kenneth,	a	34	year	old	expatriate	noted:		 ‘The	company	gives	lots	of	opportunities	to	young	people.	It	doesn’t	use	old	people.	It	uses	young	people.	Most	of	them	graduated	from	university	just	3-5	years	ago,	and	some	of	them	are	fresh	graduates.	There	are	lots	of	opportunities	for	them.	He	works	for	a	couple	of	years,	and	if	he	does	really	well,	he	will	be	promoted.	These	opportunities	are	open	to	all	Chinese,	of	course,	foreigners	also	have	their	chance.	What	I	am	saying	is	that	for	Chinese	people,	there	is	no	glass-ceiling.	People	on	top	of	me	are	also	very	young,	and	they	become	department	managers	and	area	managers.	The	company	grows	fast,	they	grow	fast,	and	they	get	their	promotion	fast.’			Kenneth	himself	was	a	good	example	to	illustrate	this	point.	He	graduated	in	2005	and	worked	for	Intel	as	an	engineer.	In	2008,	he	joined	Teleman	and,	after	four	months	training,	was	sent	to	Germany	to	work	as	technical	service	manager.	Within	three	years,	he	became	Head	of	the	IT	service	for	West	Europe,	and	then	the	Solutions	Director	for	the	Netherlands.	Kenneth	had	obviously	worked	very	hard	to	earn	such	rapid	promotions.	He	says:		
‘The youngest foreigner in my team is 39, five years older than me, and other 
senior ones could be 47 or 48, more than 10 years older than me. How can you 
manage them? How will they respect you? If you don’t grow fast, you won’t 
make it. There is huge pressure. From the start, how you can cooperate with 
them and then how you can manage them. The company appoints you as their 
manager but it doesn’t mean you can be their manager. You need to convince 
them, and guide them. All these depend on your own efforts. For example, 
when you are meeting a client, as a foreigner, in order to earn the client’s 
respect, you offer him something more, you try a bit harder, you work longer 
hours, you respond faster, and do things more professionally. When the client 
accepts you, they will look at you differently and take you as their boss, and 
then you are the real boss and you make decisions. This takes time, and you 
need to work hard. It is very difficult.’		
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Another	good	example	is	Ben,	based	in	the	Netherlands.	‘Teleman	is	a	very	good	company,	to	young	people.	You	looked	at	my	career	profile.	I	got	promotions	every	year,’	he	claims.	Ben	does	have	a	very	successful	career	with	Teleman.	He	joined	the	company	in	2009	after	working	4	years	for	two	other	companies.	He	was	first	a	Wireless	Network	Design	Manager	in	Germany	and	one	year	later	he	became	the	Wireless	Bidding	Director	for	West	Europe	(at	the	age	of	28).	Staying	in	the	position	for	2	years,	he	was	relocated	to	the	Netherlands	to	look	after	the	Wireless	business	in	the	Benelux	area	as	Wireless	Solution	Sales	Director	and	one	year	later,	he	became	the	solution	director	for	a	major	account.			In	my	interviews	with	expatriates,	comments	like	‘lots	of	career	opportunities’	and	‘fairness’	were	frequently	heard.	Most	of	them	considered	Teleman	as	a	good	career	platform	where	lots	of	opportunities	exist	for	hard-working	employees.	One	expatriate,	for	example,	said	that	staying	with	Teleman	for	7	years	is	totally	out	of	her	expectation.	‘I	thought	I	would	stay	for	one	or	two	years…	I	like	Teleman,	because	it	is	a	large	platform.	There	are	many	opportunities	here,	and	the	evaluation	system	is	relatively	fair.’		
8.3.2	Internal	transfer			During	my	data	collection	period,	the	second	thing	that	surprised	me	was	the	different	roles	taken	by	individual	expatriates.	These	roles	sometimes	are	connected,	for	example	from	an	engineering	role	to	a	technical	sales	role,	as	illustrated	by	the	career	path	of	Kenneth	and	Ben	in	the	last	section.	Sometimes,	they	seem	to	be	unconnected.	A	good	example	was	Lilly.	Before	being	relocated	to	Norway	in	2011,	Lilly	worked	in	Thailand	for	6	years	as	product	manager	and	at	the	same	time	providing	technical	support	to	other	offices	in	South	East	Asia.	When	she	arrived	at	the	Norway	office,	she	found	that	the	role	of	product	manager	was	‘too	challenging’	for	her	due	to	her	having	a	‘not	very	strong	technical	background’.	Then	she	changed	her	role	to	branding	and	public	relations,	which	was	more	suitable	for	her	personal	interest	and	her	lifestyle.	Knowing	that	it	was	she	herself	that	asked	for	such	a	role	transfer,	I	asked	her	to	explain	how	it	happened.		
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	 ‘The	company	is	quite	good	at	respecting	personal	willingness	in	terms	of	roles.	It	is	quite	suitable	for	young	people.	If	you	are	not	performing	well	in	one	role,	it	will	give	you	a	chance,	and	you	can	try	some	other	roles;	that	is	the	company	can	give	you	many	opportunities.	After	I	came	to	Norway,	one	thing	is	that	it	was	tiring	being	a	product	manager,	because	it	involved	lots	of	bidding,	overtime	and	working	at	night.	I	am	a	girl	and	I	like	to	look	beautiful,	and	I	think	it	is	not	good	for	personal	health	condition	and	to	your	skin.	So	I	talked	to	my	supervisor,	and	told	him	that	I	had	been	working	as	product	manager	for	many	years,	getting	fed	up	with	it,	and	I	think	the	job	itself	is	too	challenging	to	me,	so	I	wanted	to	change	to	another	role.	At	that	time,	there	happened	to	be	such	a	vacancy.	There	were	no	full	time	people	looking	after	the	branding	and	PR	things	in	Norway.	I	just	talked	with	him,	and	he	thought	I	am	qualified,	and	I	changed.	There	was	no	great	difficulties	in	the	process.	’		Such	an	internal	transfer	happened	to	most	of	the	expatriates	that	I	met	and	interviewed.	For	example,	one	expatriate	had	stayed	with	the	company	for	14	years.	He	joined	the	company	in	2001	and	first	worked	in	the	after-sales	team	for	less	than	a	year;	then	he	joined	a	team	dealing	with	business	contracts.	In	2004,	he	was	sent	to	South	Africa	to	open	up	the	new	market	through	sales	activities.	Five	years	later,	he	was	relocated	to	West	Europe,	and	worked	in	different	roles	such	as	technical	sales,	services,	and	project	delivery	in	the	Netherlands,	France	and	Germany.			A	more	dramatic	role	change	was	witnessed	by	Simon.	He	joined	the	company	as	a	software	development	engineer,	and	then	became	a	project	manager.	He	later	joined	the	quality	and	operation	team,	and	then	resource	management	team.	Currently,	he	was	being	approached	by	the	Human	Resource	team	and	he	is	considering	whether	he	should	change	his	role	again	or	not.				According	to	my	interviewees,	Teleman	had	experienced	rapid	development	in	the	past	decade,	and	therefore	was	able	to	offer	many	career	development	opportunities	to	its	employees.	‘Teleman	cherishes	a	kind	of	mobility	culture,’	commented	one	expatriate.	Another	says,	‘Teleman	pushes	people.	As	long	as	you	are	good,	and	are	qualified,	the	company	will	push	you	forward.’			
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Teleman’s	approach	to	retaining	employees	through	pushing	them	to	learn	and	grow	can	be	explained	by	the	concept	of	developmental	assignments	(McCauley	et	al.	1994).	According	to	McCauley	and	colleagues	(McCauley	et	al.,	1994;	Ruderman,	McCauley,	&	Ohlott,	1999)	developmental	assignments	have	the	following	five	characteristics:	unfamiliar	responsibilities,	creating	change,	high	level	of	responsibilities,	working	across	boundaries,	and	managing	diversity,	and	it	is	argued	that	developmental	assignments,	first	of	all,	boost	management	competencies	and	managerial	learning.	For	instance,	developmental	assignments	facilitate	development	of	cognitive	leadership	skills,	because	they	require	individuals	to	think	critically	about	a	given	situation	and	to	process	ambiguous	information	(DeRue	&	Wellman,	2009).	Furthermore,	empirical	studies	show	that	developmental	assignments	decrease	turnover	intention,	job	research,	and	voluntary	turnover	(Bingham,	Boswell,	&	Boudreau,	2005;	Dong,	Seo,	&	Bartol,	2014;	Preenen	et	al.,	2011),	and	have	important	implications	for	organisational	commitment.			In	Teleman’s	case,	expatriations	are	unique	developmental	assignments	and	they	bring	both	invisible	and	visible	benefits	to	expatriates.	Different	from	western	MNCs	that	tend	to	send	seasoned	managers	to	work	overseas,	the	majority	of	expatriates	in	Teleman	are	young	people.	Many	of	them	become	expatriates	right	after	graduating	from	universities	and	joining	the	company	in	China.	As	discussed	in	Chapter	4	and	Chapter	7,	work	for	expatriates	is	not	easy	given	the	harshness	of	the	working	environment	and	the	job	itself.	Furthermore,	they	work	across	boundaries	and	need	to	deal	with	cultural	and	social	diversity.	Such	overseas	experience	undoubtedly	brings	‘invisible’	benefits	to	employees.	As	my	research	reveals,	many	expatriates	feel	grateful	for	what	the	company	has	provided,	and	claim	that	expatriation	has	changed	their	mind-sets,	upgraded	their	capabilities	and	skills,	and	transformed	their	lives.			More	importantly,	given	the	rapid	expansion	of	the	company’s	business	in	international	markets,	for	many	expatriates	managerial	learning	and	personal	improvement	brought	by	overseas	work	experience	tend	to	display	‘visible’	outcomes,	that	is	career	advancement.	In	Teleman,	overseas	work	experience	
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has	become	a	basic	requirement	for	many	managerial	positions.	The	following	comments	from	two	expatriates	illustrate	this:		 ‘The	company’s	policy	is	to	give	preference	to	overseas	people.	Not	only	salary,	bonus,	stock	options,	but	also	promotions.	If	you	haven’t	worked	overseas	as	an	expatriate,	you	are	not	allowed	to	take	on	a	managerial	position.’		Another	noted	that:		 ‘If	you	don’t	have	any	overseas	experience,	you	will	reach	a	bottleneck.	You	have	got	to	work	overseas	for	3	or	4	years,	this	is	the	basis	for	promotion.’		It	is	also	reported	that	in	recent	years,	due	to	the	rapid	development	of	overseas	markets	and	the	increasing	number	of	expatriates	in	the	company,	only	those	who	have	worked	in	a	number	of	specified	countries	are	eligible	for	managerial	roles.	Through	explicitly	pointing	out	the	visible	benefits	of	taking	on	overseas	assignments,	Teleman	has	sought	to	establish	a	strong	link	between	expatriation	(i.e.	developmental	assignments)	and	career	development	in	order	to	retain	expatriate	employees.			From	a	labour	process	perspective,	with	the	growth	of	the	labour	market,	‘the	employment	indeterminacy	of	labour	grew	and	one	side	of	their	labour	power	within	the	employment	contract	expanded’.	Under	such	a	circumstance,	providing	employees	with	career	development	as	well	as	good	monetary	rewards	are	some	of	the	‘control	strategies’	for	tackling	the	‘production	indeterminacy’	and	‘mobility	indeterminacy’	problems.	In	this	way,	costs	that	flow	from	high	turnover	rate	can	be	reduced,	and	continuous	supply	of	useable	labour	can	be	achieved	(Smith,	2006,	pp.398-9).		
	
8.4	Expatriates’	response	to	control	by	rewards		In	Smith’s	labour	mobility	power	thesis,	‘quitting’	and	‘the	threat	of	exit’	is	an	expression	of	the	conflict	within	capital-labour	relations.	Labour	uses	it	to	‘re-negotiate	the	internal	work	bargain	within	the	firm	–	improving	wages,	changing	jobs,	gaining	additional	training	resources,	changing	line	management’	(Smith,	
 
185 
2006,	p.	391).	Therefore,	quitting	or	the	threat	to	quit	is	regarded	as	a	form	of	labour	resistance,	appealing	‘to	change	the	internal	management	regime’	(ibid,	p.392),	and	‘highlighting	alternative	management	practices	in	other	firms’	(ibid,	p.394).			In	Teleman’s	case,	however,	quitting	or	threatening	to	quit	has	not	been	commonly	observed	among	expatriates.	As	demonstrated	earlier,	expatriates	tend	to	have	a	high	level	of	commitment	with	the	company,	and	many	of	them	have	tenures	of	10	years.	In	addition,	because	of	the	much	stronger	bargaining	power	enjoyed	by	Teleman	as	an	employer,	based	on	my	observations,	it	is	also	rare	to	find	employees	fighting	to	change	the	internal	management	regime	and	asking	for	alternative	management	practices.	Instead,	I	argue,	labour	resistance	in	Teleman	is	more	reflected	in	employees’	complaints,	doubts,	questioning,	challenging,	and	criticism.			
8.4.1	Responses	to	financial	control			In	Teleman,	as	we	have	seen,	a	generous	compensation	package	plays	an	important	role	in	building	a	stable	workforce	with	long-term	employment,	a	high	level	of	commitment	and	strong	identification.	Motivated	by	the	monetary	rewards,	many	talented	young	people	are	attracted	to	Teleman,	and	are	willing	to	work	overseas	to	support	the	company’s	internationalisation	strategy.	However,	can	such	high	payments	continue	to	attract	and	retain	employees	as	effectively	as	before	in	today’s	new	situation	and	in	the	future?	Can	high	payments	continue	to	motivate	current	employees	to	work	hard	and	contribute	even	after	they	have	already	secured	high	income	mainly	through	stock	shares?	Many	of	the	expatriates	I	interviewed	expressed	their	concerns.			For	the	first	question,	according	to	my	interviewees,	it	is	becoming	more	and	more	difficult	for	the	company	to	use	a	high	salary	to	attract	or	keep	people.	In	China,	Teleman	is	famous	for	its	‘high	income,	high	pressure’	culture,	and	it	is	common	knowledge	for	many	young	graduates	that	working	with	Teleman	means	long-hours	of	work.	Nevertheless,	in	the	past	two	decades,	Teleman	has	
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successfully	lured	many	talented	young	people	from	top	universities	to	join	the	company,	and	therefore	secured	a	high	quality	workforce.	The	popularity	of	Teleman	among	people,	one	expatriate	observed,	could	be	attributed	to	the	strong	financial	need	of	the	whole	generation	who	were	born	in	the	1970s	and	early	1980s.	This	expatriate	explained:			 ‘Usually	Teleman	people	were	poor	kids.	They	are	from	poor	families	and	come	to	work	to	make	a	living.	People	from	rich	families	won’t	come,	because	the	work	is	hard	at	Teleman.	Those	who	come	and	stay	are	those	who	can	eat	bitterness.	’		Such	a	point	is	strongly	supported	by	the	stories	I	have	discussed	in	Chapter	7,	where	employees	passionately	show	how	working	with	Teleman	changed	the	economic	situations	of	their	poor	families.	It	appears	that	the	effectiveness	of	the	company’s	financial	control	is	built	on	the	congruence	between	the	policy	and	the	economic	situation.	In	other	words,	the	financial	approach	has	been	tailored	to	cater	for	the	strong	financial	needs	of	Chinese	employees.	However,	given	the	rapid	development	of	the	Chinese	economy	and	society	in	recent	years,	and	particularly	the	explosive	growth	of	middle	class	families	in	China	(Goodman	&	Chen,	2013;	Ravallion,	2010;	Tsang,	2014),	the	continuous	effectiveness	of	Teleman’s	financial	incentives	becomes	a	major	concern.	According	to	a	report	by	McKinsey	(Barton,	Chen,	&	Jin,	2013),	by	2022,	more	than	75	percent	of	China’s	urban	consumers	are	expected	to	earn	RMB	60,000	to	229,000	($9,000	to	$34,000)	a	year.	Under	this	background,	it	is	questionable	whether	people,	particularly	a	younger	generation	born	in	the	1990s,	are	still	driven	by	economic	motive	as	strongly	as	the	previous	generation.	As	young	people’s	values	orientation	becomes	more	diversified	in	modern	China,	several	expatriates	suggest	the	monetary	rewards	associated	with	high	pressure	and	poor	work-life	balance	might	gradually	lose	their	attractiveness.			Even	for	current	employees,	from	an	economic	perspective,	working	for	Teleman	might	not	be	a	good	investment,	considering	how	much	effort	one	needs	to	make.	During	my	research,	the	high	pressure	and	long	hours	working	in	the	company	are	frequently	mentioned,	and	it	is	not	uncommon	to	hear	people	talking	about	
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their	frustration,	and	their	plans	to	leave	the	company,	although	in	most	cases	this	seldom	happens.			For	example,	Daniel,	the	cynic	appearing	in	Chapter	7	who	once	worked	72	hours	non-stop	for	a	project,	constantly	complained	about	the	huge	pressure	he	has	to	undertake	in	his	job.	‘(The	payment)	is	good,	but	I	need	to	be	alive	to	use	it,’	he	said.	Similar	to	several	other	expatriates,	he	considered	working	with	Teleman	as	‘eating	the	rice	of	youth’,	or	a	young	person’s	profession.	He	claimed	that	he	was	diagnosed	with	many	health	problems	in	his	annual	physical	check,	and	he	was	planning	to	go	back	to	China	to	‘recuperate’.			The	expatriate	HR	manager	shared	similar	views.	Although	she	personally	enjoyed	working	with	Teleman,	she	admitted	that	she	does	not	like	the	fact	that	‘the	whole	system	is	too	utilitarian’,	which	means	that	‘the	association	between	performance	and	rewards	is	too	strong’.	The	consequence	is	that	employees	work	under	huge	pressure	and	‘people	don’t	feel	safe’.				In	addition	to	expressing	their	dissatisfaction	about	their	jobs,	expatriates	also	point	to	the	drawbacks	of	such	a	reward	system.	According	to	my	interviewees,	one	major	downside	of	the	reward	system	is	that	it	easily	creates	a	comfort	zone	for	those	employees	who	joined	the	company	for	many	years	and	therefore	accumulated	large	amounts	of	stock	shares.	One	consequence,	according	to	one	expatriate,	is	that	while	the	company	is	making	efforts	to	transfer	itself	into	a	modern	and	international	company,	this	group	of	middle	managers	tend	to	refuse	to	face	the	challenge	and	undertake	the	pain	of	transformation.	In	this	sense,	the	financial	control	in	Teleman,	in	fact,	fails	to	achieve	the	goal	of	exerting	a	good	quantity	of	labour	effort	from	labour	to	make	a	profit.	The	financial	control	approach,	in	particular	the	stock	option	plan,	might	help	the	company	to	‘capture’	the	labour	itself,	but	it	might	not	allow	the	production	to	capture	the	surplus	value,	since	the	high-salaried	labour	bears	more	costs	(Smith,	2006).					
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8.4.2	Response	to	control	through	career	development			As	discussed	earlier,	the	career	development	prospects	for	expatriates	are	largely	based	on	the	condition	that	they	are	willing	to	become	expatriates	and	take	on	these	overseas	developmental	assignments.	However,	can	one	really	get	a	better	career	after	expatriation?	Is	it	right	for	the	company	to	send	people	around	the	world	without	listening	to	their	opinions?	Some	of	my	interviewees	cast	their	doubts	on	these	issues.			For	the	first	issue,	it	is	suggested	that	the	career	development	privilege	enjoyed	by	expatriates	is	being	diluted	by	the	rapidly	expanding	population	of	expatriates	within	the	company.	Since	the	late	1990s	and	early	2000s,	Teleman	has	been	sending	out	a	number	of	employees	to	work	in	overseas	markets.	My	interviews	indicate	that	approximately	30%	of	its	100,000	employees	based	in	China	have	overseas	working	experience.	In	some	departments	such	as	logistics,	almost	every	employee	worked	as	an	expatriate.	In	another	department	of	1000	employees,	70-80%	of	them	have	worked	overseas.	As	reported	by	my	interviewees,	the	advantage	of	being	an	expatriate	is	‘not	as	obvious	as	before’.	One	expatriate	observes:			 ‘The	time	is	different.	In	2003,	if	you	have	expatriate	experience,	you	can	go	up	quickly.	But	since	2007	or	2008,	it	has	changed	dramatically.	When	many	people	have	expatriate	experience,	you	won’t	stand	out	anymore.	’		In	addition	to	such	a	dilution	issue,	another	key	problem	is	concerned	with	how	to	get	back	to	China	and	how	to	get	a	(better)	job.	As	already	discussed	in	Chapter	7,	Teleman	has	an	underdeveloped	repatriation	system,	and	intentionally	discourages	expatriate	employees	from	going	back	to	China.		Therefore,	expatriates	need	to	rely	on	themselves,	and	use	various	strategies	to	make	connections	with	people	in	the	HQ,	and	secure	a	job	in	certain	departments	before	they	can	embark	on	their	home	journey.	However,	as	several	expatriates	suggest,	it	is	extremely	difficult	to	make	things	happen	because	in	the	China	HQ,	every	single	role	and	position	has	been	carefully	planned	and	set	by	the	company	
 
189 
for	cost-saving	purposes;	unless	someone	makes	a	move,	there	will	not	be	a	vacancy.	One	expatriate	questioned	the	possibility	and	feasibility	of	expatriates	getting	a	job	in	China.			 ‘I	don’t	think	it	is	realistic.	It	is	easy	and	simple	to	say	so,	but	in	fact,	if	you	want	to	go	back	to	China,	and	get	a	certain	role,	the	condition	is	that	the	place	needs	people.	If	there	is	no	vacancy,	who	will	take	you?	…	you	need	to	do	the	planning	at	least	one	or	two	years	in	advance.	Because	if	you	want	to	go	back,	it	has	to	be	that	department	that	has	a	vacancy.	But	how	could	it	be	possible	that	they	need	people	when	you	are	thinking	to	go	back?	Many	colleagues	who	want	to	go	back	to	China	are	delayed	at	least	one	year,	or	even	longer,	and	they	cannot	make	it…	therefore,	timing	is	the	most	important	thing.’		Here	we	can	see	that	the	linkage	between	expatriation	and	career	development	developed	by	the	company	has	been	challenged.	Employees	cast	doubt	on	the	outcomes	of	working	as	expatriates.	In	other	words,	Teleman’s	logic	of	exerting	non-financial	control	through	providing	expatriates	with	a	good	career	is	questioned.			Another	aspect	Teleman	frequently	receives	questioning	from	expatriates	about	is	the	company’s	autocratic	expatiation	approach,	that	is	expatriation	assignment,	based	on	the	needs	of	the	company,	rather	than	the	wish	of	the	individual	employee,	and	employees	having	to	go	wherever	and	whenever	the	company	wants	them	to.	For	example,	in	Chapter	7,	I	showed	how	cynics	respond	to	the	company’s	punishment	of	an	employee	called	Michael,	who	refused	to	be	sent	abroad	because	of	family	issues.	The	following	quote	from	Daniel	is	worth	repeating:			 ‘In	this	regard,	I	think	our	company	is	very	wrong.	First	of	all,	an	employee	is	a	person.	Before	he	becomes	your	employee,	he	is	already	a	son,	or	a	husband,	or	a	father.	This	is	in	the	first	place.	However,	our	company	always	puts	the	identity	of	the	employee	in	the	first	place.	I	think	this	is	a	fundamental	mistake.	But	our	company	doesn’t	want	to	change	it.	I	don’t	see	our	company	will	change	to	this	direction	in	the	near	future.’		
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As	indicated	by	this	quote,	Daniel	is	questioning	the	ethical	grounds	for	the	company’s	actions.	To	Daniel	and	some	other	expatriates,	Teleman	is	still	far	away	from	a	truly	modern	company	in	that	the	company	does	not	respect	an	individual’s	interests;	rather,	in	many	aspects,	the	company	requires	employees	to	sacrifice	their	interests	to	serve	the	interests	of	the	company.	Such	a	company-centred	philosophy	has	given	expatriates	lots	of	pressure	and	worry,	and	therefore	is	subject	to	heavy	criticism.			For	Peter,	a	former	expatriate,	however,	he	used	quitting	as	a	way	to	resist	the	company’s	control.	In	fact,	he	was	the	only	expatriate	among	my	35	expatriate	interviewees	who	left	Teleman	with	‘complex	feelings’	and	joined	a	Western	MNC	in	the	Netherlands.	When	asked	about	the	reasons	he	left	Teleman,	he	explained,			 ‘I	liked	the	change	of	roles	very	much,	but	I	didn’t	like	the	change	of	locations.	I	was	in	the	Netherlands	office,	and	made	some	project	deals.	Thus	I	became	a	talent	in	the	company.	Teleman	will	send	its	talent	to	places	where	more	project	deals	need	to	be	made.	So	after	I	got	some	project	deals	here,	I	will	be	sent	to	another	place	to	get	more	deals.	This	maybe	Britain,	Germany,	or	France.	I	had	been	working	in	the	Netherlands	for	a	while,	and	got	some	deals,	and	I	know	next	I	will	be	dispatched	to	another	place.	But	I	personally	had	already	made	lots	of	friends	here,	and	I	think	the	Netherlands	is	pretty	good.	So	I	want	to	stop	for	a	while,	settle	down	a	bit.	And	I	jumped	to	the	current	company.’		As	we	can	see	in	Peter’s	case,	Teleman’s	attempt	to	control	its	employees	through	providing	them	with	an	international	career	backfired.	Although	this	is	the	only	‘quitting’	case	in	my	study,	it	indicated	the	limitation	of	the	company’s	control	system	and	employees’	resistance	to	such	a	regime.	According	to	my	interviewees,	Teleman	began	its	aggressive	international	expansion	around	2005,	and	since	then	many	young	people	have	been	sent	to	work	abroad.	However,	today,	after	10	years,	this	group	of	employees	are	now	in	their	30s	and	40s,	a	time	when	they	have	their	children	and	parents	to	look	after.	In	a	Chinese	society	where	family	values	are	greatly	cherished,	a	company’s	requirement	of	100%	commitment	to	work	seems	unreasonable	and	unrealistic	for	more	and	more	people.		
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	In	summary,	although	the	company’s	control	system	provides	employees	with	high	income	and	potentially	good	career	development,	resistance	against	it	has	been	observed.	Regarding	the	monetary	rewards,	expatriates	complain	about	the	high	pressure	resulting	from	the	work,	and	re-evaluate	their	contribution	and	return;	they	cast	doubts	on	the	ability	of	Teleman’s	financial	incentives	to	attract	and	retain	young	generation,	and	at	the	same	time,	express	concern	about	the	downside	of	a	money-driven	reward	system.	Regarding	the	career	development,	expatriates	challenge	the	linkage	between	expatriation	and	career	development,	question	the	ethical	grounding	of	the	company’s	autocratic	expatriation	system,	and	criticise	such	inhuman	action.			
8.5	The	absence	of	control	in	the	UK	and	Europe			In	previous	sections,	I	have	shown	that	Teleman	has	adopted	a	reward	system	combining	financial	and	non-financial	incentives	to	constrain	the	mobility	power	of	expatriates.	In	this	section,	my	focus	will	be	on	the	UK	and	other	subsidiaries	in	Europe.	Does	Teleman	rely	on	the	same	reward	system	to	control	locally	hired	employees?	My	study	reveals	that	similar	to	the	absence	of	identity	control,	control	by	rewards	is	also	absent	in	Europe;	neither	local	(European)	nor	local	Chinese	employees	are	rewarded	with	as	good	a	financial	or	non-financial	package	as	expatriates	are.			According	to	Smith	(2006,	p.396),	labour	turnover	becomes	problematic	when	‘individual	differences	have	a	material	effect	on	productivity	or	profitability	for	the	employer’.	When	this	happens,	employers	will	adopt	various	strategies	over	‘labour	movement	and	retention,	selection,	reward	and	career	development’	(ibid,	p.391)	in	order	to	‘seal-in	labour	for	the	exclusive	use’	(ibid,	p.395).	In	Teleman’s	case,	I	argue	that	the	fundamental	reason	for	Teleman	not	to	introduce	a	reward	system	to	control	locally	hired	employees	in	Europe	is	that	their	exit	is	not	perceived	to	have	a	major	material	effect	on	the	productivity	or	profitability	of	the	company.	This	is	true	of	local	(European)	employees,	who	possess	a	high	level	of	mobility	power	originating	from	their	industry	experience	
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and	popularity	in	the	external	labour	market.	This	is	even	more	the	case	for	local	Chinese	employees,	who	have	a	low	level	of	mobility	power	due	to	personal,	organisational	and	institutional	constraints.		
8.5.1	Absence	of	control	on	local	employees			One	particular	feature	about	local	employees	working	with	Teleman	in	its	UK	and	other	European	subsidiaries	is	the	remarkably	high	turnover	rate.	When	I	was	conducting	research	in	the	Teleman	UK	office	in	2014,	on	one	occasion	I	was	told	that	on	average	10	local	employees	were	quitting	the	company	each	month,	with	many	of	them	leaving	in	the	probation	period,	and	others	within	one	year.		In	early	2015,	I	had	a	formal	interview	with	HR	staff,	and	was	told	that	in	2014	more	than	150	local	employees	had	left	the	company,	about	20%	of	the	total	workforce	of	the	office.	‘The	turnover	rate	in	the	industry	is	10%,	and	we	are	much	higher,’	the	HR	staff	said.	In	the	same	period	in	early	2015,	I	had	a	formal	interview	with	another	HR	worker,	who	claimed	that	the	turnover	rate	was	around	20-30%,	and	for	this	reason,	in	2014,	she	and	her	colleague	in	the	recruitment	team	recruited	about	300	people	to	fill	positions.	‘There	is	not	enough	time	for	hiring,’	she	said.			The	high	turnover	rate	does	not	seem	to	be	a	special	case	for	the	company’s	UK	office.	An	expatriate	recalled	that	when	he	was	working	in	Norway	two	years	before,	the	turnover	rate	was	‘at	least	over	50%’,	and	another	expatriate	revealed	a	similar	situation	in	Germany.	Here	I	argue	that	the	high	turnover	rate	is	closely	related	to	the	company’s	control-free	approach.			On	the	one	hand,	Teleman’s	limited	efforts	in	providing	local	employees	with	career	development	leads	to	their	exit.	In	Teleman,	a	‘high	payment,	high	position’	strategy	has	been	adopted	by	the	company	towards	local	employees	in	Europe.	Although	local	employees	are	not	given	the	access	to	the	company’s	Employee	Stock	Option	Plan,	they	are	compensated	with	a	basic	salary	of	above-market	rate,	and	in	some	cases	with	a	year-end	bonus.	Furthermore,	the	
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company	tends	to	staff	middle-senior	positions	with	local	non-Chinese	employees.		However,	as	discussed	in	previous	chapters,	Teleman	bases	its	operation	on	a	highly	complex	organisational	structure	and	centralised	decision	making	system,	and	it	is	the	expatriates	that	play	a	critical	role	in	this	process	and	make	the	whole	system	work.	Therefore,	high	payments	and	high	position	do	not	lead	to	local	employees’	high	involvement	in	daily	operational	work,	or	needless	to	say,	in	key	decision	making.	For	this	reason,	career	development	becomes	very	difficult	for	local	employees	to	achieve,	if	impossible.	And	when	this	happens,	quitting	becomes	a	natural	choice	for	them.			One	expatriate	manager	working	in	France	felt	frustrated	by	the	high	turnover	rate	of	local	managers.	For	example,	he	once	recruited	a	local	manager	with	a	strong	background	and	offered	him	a	compensation	package,	which	even	exceeded	the	local	manager’s	expectations.	However,	the	local	manager	only	stayed	for	a	few	months	and	left	the	company.	He	noted,	‘He	felt	he	was	not	recognised,	and	he	could	not	see	his	value...if	he	was	Chinese,	and	had	such	a	good	job,	an	easy	job	and	good	salary,	he	would	definitely	stay.	’			On	the	other	hand,	the	high	turnover	rate	of	local	employees	is	also	the	very	reason	for	Teleman’s	unwillingness	to	provide	them	with	a	good	reward	package.	The	following	remark,	made	by	an	expatriate	manager,	is	worth	careful	examination.			 ‘Generally	speaking,	there	is	little	chance	for	them	(local	employees)	to	be	promoted.	We	have	some	foreigners	in	senior	positions,	but	they	were	at	a	senior	level	before	they	joined	our	company.	They	may	be	senior	manager	from	our	operator	clients.	If	the	company	develops	Chinese	people,	they	might	stay	long	for	you.	If	you	develop	foreigners,	the	result	is	uncontrollable.	You	develop	them,	and	they	will	leave.	You	waste.’		From	a	labour	process	perspective,	this	quote	indicates	the	perceived	and	actual	mobility	power	possessed	by	local	employees,	or	their	power	‘over	where	to	sell	
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their	labour	services’	(Smith,	2006,	p.391).	In	Teleman,	most	local	employees	are	managerial	professionals,	and	normally	have	years	of	experience	in	the	telecoms	industry.	In	many	cases,	they	have	worked	for	telecoms	operators	(i.e.	Teleman’s	corporate	clients)	before	joining	Teleman.	Their	knowledge,	expertise	and	industry	connections	mean	that	when	they	do	not	agree	with	the	company’s	internal	management	practices,	such	as	heavy	involvement	of	expatriates,	centralised	decision	making,	or	limited	reward	in	terms	of	career	development,	they,	as	experienced	professionals,	can	simply	quit	Teleman.			The	strong	mobility	power	of	local	employees	is	undoubtedly	recognised	by	the	company.	For	Teleman,	a	decision	needs	to	be	made	regarding	whether	investment	in	local	employees	is	worthwhile,	and	how	much	to	invest	in	order	to	extract	surplus	value,	given	the	fact	that	local	employees	possess	strong	mobility	power	and	could	leave	anytime.	As	illustrated	by	the	above	quote,	the	company’s	hesitation	in	this	regard	is	clear.	Thus,	the	perceived	mobility	power	possessed	by	local	employees	makes	Teleman	reluctant	to	provide	them	with	career	development	opportunities.	An	important	implication	here	is	that	because	local	employees	are	not	provided	with	career	development,	and	thus	not	involved	in	major	decision	making,	they	are	not	considered	to	be	important,	or	to	be	making	important	contributions	to	the	company.	The	consequence	is	that	they	are	deemed	replaceable.			This	is	illustrated	by	an	expatriate’s	explanation	on	how	the	overseas	markets	were	opened	up.	According	to	him,	there	are	three	stages	during	the	opening	up	process.	At	the	beginning,	the	company	wished	to	rely	on	host	country	nationals	to	open	up	the	market	in	the	belief	that	they	understand	the	market	best.	However,	these	people	failed	because	of	the	relatively	less	advanced	products	of	the	company.	At	the	second	stage,	the	company	turned	its	attention	to	local	Chinese	employees,	who	were	expected	to	be	perfect	candidates	with	an	understanding	of	the	local	market	and	Chinese	culture.	Unfortunately,	the	local	Chinese	failed	to	meet	the	expectations	because	most	of	them	were	fresh	graduates	and	too	junior.	At	the	final	stage,	the	company	decided	to	use	its	own	people	from	China.	After	some	extremely	difficult	times,	these	expatriates	
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eventually	succeeded.	With	particular	reference	to	the	UK	market,	this	expatriate	claimed:		 ‘Generally	the	UK	market	was	opened	up	by	Chinese	people,	therefore	the	local	employees	are	not	highly	recognised	by	the	company.	The	turnover	rate	of	local	employees	in	a	certain	market	depends	on	the	overall	performance	of	the	first	batch	of	local	people	in	this	market.	If	the	performance	is	good,	they	can	quickly	become	top	managers,	and	this	will	have	an	impact	on	the	people	following.	If	he	just	sits	there,	but	doesn’t	contribute,	very	likely	he	won’t	stay	long,	and	people	following	him	might	follow	the	same	path…You	know	it	is	not	easy	for	Teleman	to	recruit	the	best	people	in	the	local	market.	In	China,	it	is	easy	for	you	to	get	people	with	outstanding	qualities,	and	then	you	send	them	abroad.	So	you	see	in	Teleman’s	overseas	markets	why	many	clients	are	broken	through	by	Chinese,	not	local	employees.	I	think	this	has	big	connections.	Because	in	China,	the	best	people	are	recruited,	and	even	when	they	are	sent	abroad,	they	can	be	considered	top	talent	in	the	local	market.	If	we	could	have	recruited	the	best	talent	in	the	local	market	and	they	could	fight	together	with	us	for	the	market,	I	think	today’s	situation	could	be	very	different.	’		Here	the	expatriate	attributed	the	local	employees’	gloomy	career	development	prospects	to	their	poor	performance	and	relatively	inferior	quality	as	employees.	Contributions	by	these	employees	have	been	downplayed,	which	indicate	that	they	are	considered	an	unimportant	group.	When	this	is	coupled	with	the	fact	that	they	might	leave	the	company	any	time,	an	expected	outcome	is	that	the	company	does	not	wish	to	make	an	effort	to	provide	local	employees	with	more	career	development	opportunities.	After	all,	when	one	is	unimportant,	and	difficult	to	control,	the	best	thing	you	can	do	is	not	to	control.			
8.5.2	Absence	of	control	on	local	Chinese			Similar	to	the	situation	of	local	employees,	the	local	Chinese	employees	are	not	provided	with	many	career	development	opportunities	within	Teleman	either.	Furthermore,	they	also	suffer	from	poor	pay.	There	is	a	common	reason	for	this.	Due	to	the	dominant	role	of	expatriates,	their	contributions	are	considered	insignificant,	and	they	are	considered	replaceable.	However,	different	from	local	employees	whose	situations	are	caused	by	their	high	level	of	mobility	power,	local	Chinese	employees	are	exempt	from	reward	programmes	because	of	their	
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low	level	of	mobility	power.	In	other	words,	the	company	sees	no	need	to	control	local	Chinese	with	financial	or	non-financial	rewards,	because,they	go	nowhere.		The	sharp	contrast	I	felt	between	talking	to	expatriates	and	local	Chinese	is	that	while	the	former	group	often	expressed	satisfaction	with	their	compensation,	the	latter	tended	to	criticise	the	company	for	poor	payment.			Juliet,	for	example,	is	in	her	early	30s	and	works	in	the	financial	team.	She	studied	in	the	UK	for	her	bachelors	and	Masters	degree	in	accounting	and	joined	the	company	about	3	years	before.	When	asked	about	her	feelings	of	working	for	a	Chinese	company	overseas,	she	said,	‘in	theory,	we	should	have	felt	like	a	host,	right?	It	is	a	Chinese	company,	and	we	are	Chinese.	However,	in	reality,	I	don’t	feel	that	way.’	She	believed	that	the	company	salary	for	local	Chinese	employees	is	‘lower	than	market	rate’,	and	they	are	treated	differently	with	more	workload.	In	addition,	local	Chinese	employees	are	not	included	in	any	bonus	or	stock	option	programmes.	In	2014	when	I	was	conducting	my	fieldwork	in	the	company’s	UK	office,	the	Employee	Stock	Option	Plan	was	implemented	in	China.	There	have	been	rumours	that	the	Plan	may	be	extended	to	the	company’s	overseas	offices;	but,	until	2016	when	this	thesis	was	being	written,	this	had	not	happened.	Therefore,	for	local	Chinese	employees,	the	monthly	salary	is	their	only	income.	They	do	not	have	any	stock	shares,	like	the	expatriates	do,	or	annual	bonus,	like	the	local	employees	do.	A	local	Chinese	employee	commented:		‘We	have	a	kind	of	feeling	that	the	bonus,	in	any	form,	has	nothing	to	do	with	us.	These	things	are	theirs,	and	we	have	nothing…people	say	the	company	is	doing	great;	but	even	if	the	business	is	better,	there	is	no	impact	on	us.	Good	or	bad,	this	has	nothing	to	do	with	us.’		Being	denied	good	compensation,	many	local	Chinese	employees	indicated	that	the	company	had	an	‘exploitive’	mentality,	taking	advantage	of	the	fact	that	many	Chinese	graduates	want	to	stay	in	Europe	after	studying,	and	need	a	relatively	decent	job.		One	of	them	noted:			 ‘In	Teleman,	speaking	Chinese	becomes	a	disadvantage,	because	you	speak	Chinese,	it	means	you	are	able	to	bear	it.	There	are	many	things	foreigners	cannot	bear,	so	you	need	to	use	good	career	opportunities	or	money	to	seduce	them	or	make	this	compromise…however,	they	think	
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that	the	local	Chinese	can	bear	it	and	you	should.	To	make	it	sound	bad,	it	is	like	you	are	born	to	be	cheap,	and	you	should	bear	it.	I	give	you	a	salary,	and	a	chance	to	work	for	Teleman,	such	a	big	company,	and	you	should	feel	grateful	and	work	hard,	shouldn’t	you?	So	for	local	Chinese	employees,	not	only	me,	but	those	in	junior	positions,	we	all	have	such	a	bad	feeling.’		This	reminds	me	of	a	story	I	was	told	when	I	worked	in	Teleman’s	UK	office.	The	HR	team	had	prepared	an	employment	offer	for	a	new	hire,	and	asked	the	country	CEO,	a	Chinese	expatriate,	to	sign	it.	However,	the	CEO	would	not	sign.		According	to	the	respondent,	the	reason	for	the	CEO’s	rejection	was	that	the	CEO	thought	the	Chinese	candidate	should	not	be	paid	that	much.	‘But	in	fact	the	guy	is	not	a	Chinese.	He	is	a	local	foreigner	and	has	a	Chinese	name,’	the	story-teller	said.	‘So	what	happened	then?’	‘We	let	the	boss	know	he	is	not	Chinese.’	Then,	the	offer	was	approved.			In	addition	to	absence	of	financial	control,	non-financial	control	is	also	missing	for	local	Chinese;	in	other	words,	they	are	not	provided	with	good	career	development	within	the	company.			As	mentioned	earlier,	Teleman	tends	to	staff	junior	positions	in	its	overseas	offices	with	relatively	cheap	labour,	i.e.	the	local	Chinese,	and	therefore	on	most	occasions,	local	Chinese	are	involved	in	relatively	low-skilled	work,	and	are	eventually	turned	into	‘position	fillers’,	where	they	will	perform	and	deliver	the	same	tasks	for	years.	Their	salary	and	job	bands	may	be	improved,	but	it	is	very	rare	for	local	Chinese	employees	to	be	promoted	into	managerial	positions	and	lead	a	team	or	to	be	transferred	or	rotated	within	the	company.	Sandy,	a	local	Chinese	worker	in	Teleman’s	UK	office	commented:			 ‘I	know	that	within	Teleman,	there	are	lots	of	opportunities,	and	you	don’t	need	to	do	one	job	all	the	way	through.	Like	the	person	you	mentioned,	he	started	in	sales,	and	then	eventually	he	wanted	to	do	HR.	He	got	the	chance	to	understand	products,	etc.	To	many	Teleman	people,	it	is	all	about	free	mobility,	and	you	can	do	what	you	want.	But	I	think	these	things	are	more	for	Teleman	expatriates	in	headquarters.’		
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However,	interestingly	and	surprisingly,	the	gloomy	career	prospect	in	the	company	does	not	lead	to	a	high	level	of	voluntary	turnover	of	local	Chinese	staff,	which	is	a	sharp	contrast	to	the	case	of	local	European	employees.	In	fact,	in	the	company’s	UK	office,	I	came	across	many	local	Chinese	who	have	been	working	for	Teleman	for	two	years	or	longer.	One	common	feature	of	this	group	of	employees	is	that	they	frequently	complained	about	their	poor	career	development	prospects	and	their	low	salary,	but	they	choose	to	stay.	For	Sandy,	who	had	been	working	with	Teleman	for	3	years,	stayed	because	she	needed	work	experience	with	a	‘famous	company’.	She	explained:			 ‘The	reason	why	I	am	still	here	is	because	I	need	the	work	experience.	After	all,	Teleman	gives	me	work	experience,	and	it	is	a	pretty	good	platform	for	people	who	have	just	started	working,	maybe	for	two	or	three	years.	If	I	stay	longer,	my	feeling	is	that	from	my	perspective,	I	don’t	think	I	will	have	much	development	here.’		For	others,	it	seems	that	they	do	not	have	many	better	choices.	In	fact,	as	my	research	reveals,	many	of	them	have	been	actively	exploring	external	job	opportunities.	However,	only	a	few	of	them	have	succeeded.	For	example,	in	2014	when	I	conducted	research	at	the	company’s	UK	site,	Juliet	in	the	Finance	team	tried	to	change	job	after	working	for	three	years.	Her	current	job	responsibility	was	to	deal	with	payment	and	reimbursement,	and	she	wished	to	work	on	something	more	strategic	like	financial	analysis.	Yet,	in	early	2015	when	I	conducted	a	repeat	interview	with	her,		after	applying	for	many	external	positions,		she	still	worked	in	the	same	position.	Similarly	in	the	HR	team,	Helen	has	been	actively	applying	for	external	jobs	for	almost	one	year,	but	had	still	failed	to	secure	a	new	position.			One	frequently	mentioned	factor	is	concerned	with	the	difficult	job	market	in	the	UK	and	in	Europe.	Our	interviewees	explained	that	because	of	the	overall	poor	labour	market	situation,	it	is	difficult	for	local	Europeans	to	secure	a	job,	needless	to	say,	it	is	difficult	for	Chinese	candidates.	Another	factor	was	concerned	with	the	personal	attributes	of	local	Chinese.	Because	the	bulk	of	local	Chinese	join	Teleman	right	after	their	study	in	Europe,	they	had	limited	work	experience.	More	importantly,	due	to	their	difficulty	in	getting	promotion,	
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internal	transfer	and	new	skills	learning	within	the	company,	their	skills	were	not	constantly	upgraded,	thus	lacking	competiveness	in	the	external	labour	market.			In	summary,	my	study	revealed	that	local	Chinese	employees	suffer	from	poor	career	development	prospects,	as	well	as	low	payments.	The	absence	of	financial	and	non-financial	incentives	indicates	the	company	pays	insufficient	attention	to	the	welfare	of	this	group	of	employees	who	possess	low	level	mobility	power	in	the	external	labour	market	thus	posing	weak	threats	to	the	continuity	of	production	and	profitability	for	the	company	with	their	exits.	In	other	words,	the	company	can	afford	to	lose	these	employees,	as	there	are	plenty	of	them	and	they	are	replaceable.			The	absence	of	financial	and	non-financial	reward	programmes	for	local	European	and	local	Chinese	employees	indicates	a	clear	distinction	between	core	employees	and	peripheral	employees	within	the	company	(e.g.	Hulin	&	Roznowski,	1985;	Lepak	&	Snell,	1999,	2002;	Pfeffer	&	Konrad,	1991).	Whilst	locally	hired	employees	are	peripheral	employees,	who	are	‘readily	replaced,	with	few	firm-specific	skills	and	with	little	dependence	from	the	firm	on	a	specific	employee’	(Pfeffer	&	Konrad,	1991,	p.	391),	expatriates	are	in	the	unchallenged	position	of	core	employees,	who	are	those	‘around	whom	the	organisation	is	built’	and	those	that	‘create	a	distinctive	competitive	advantage	for	the	organisation’	(Rousseau	&	Wade-Benzoni,	1995,	p.	308).			However,	different	from	most	studies	which	tend	to	discuss	the	distinction	between	fulltime	workers	as	core	employees	and	contingent	workers	as	peripheral,	in	Teleman’s	case,	all	three	groups	are	fulltime	workers.	A	plausible	explanation	is	that	they	have	different	levels	of	combinations	of	‘uniqueness’	and	‘strategic	value’	(Lepak	&	Snell,	1999,	2002),	that	is,	expatriates	with	high	strategic	values	and	high	uniqueness,	local	employees	with	high	strategic	values	but	low	uniqueness,	and	local	Chinese	with	low	strategic	values	and	low	uniqueness.	Accordingly,	they	are	subject	to	different	human	resource	configuration,	which	is	associated	with	different	control	and	reward	strategies,	
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i.e.	commitment-based	HR	configurations	for	expatriates,	productivity-based	ones	for	local	employees,	and	compliance-based	ones	for	local	Chinese.			From	a	labour	process	perspective,	however,	I	argue	that	an	important	difference	between	these	two	groups	is	the	different	level	of	mobility	bargaining	power	they	have	with	the	employer,	and	the	resulting	material	effect	they	can	make	on	the	production	process.	While	the	high	level	of	mobility	power	possessed	by	expatriates	urges	Teleman	to	take	on	a	series	of	financial	and	non-financial	counter	strategies	to	reduce	the	cost	associated	with	high	labour	turnover,	the	quitting	of	locally	hired	employees	does	not	have	such	a	material	effect	on	productivity	or	profitability	for	the	employer,	thus	failing	to	draw	attention	from	the	company.	In	other	words,	locally	hired	employees	are	in	a	weak	position	when	using	their	exit	or	threats	of	exit	to	bargain	with	the	employer.	Therefore,	from	the	company’s	perspective,	neither	financial	nor	non-financial	control	mechanisms	are	necessary.			
8.6	Conclusion			In	this	chapter,	I	have	discussed	how	financial	and	non-financial	programmes	have	been	utilised	by	Teleman	as	control	mechanisms	to	regulate	employees’	commitment	and	retention	behaviours.	From	a	labour	process	perspective,	I	argue	that	such	reward	programmes	are	developed	to	weaken	the	threats	posed	by	employees’	mobility	power,	the	power	over	where	to	sell	their	service.		Teleman’s	control	on	expatriates	through	financial	and	non-financial	incentives	indicate	expatriates’	strong	‘ownership’	of	their	jobs	(Smith,	2006)	in	the	Chinese	form	of	capitalism,	in	which	a	highly	open	and	mobile	labour	market	exists,	where	‘the	power	and	responsibility	of	selling	labour	power’	have	been	passed	to	workers,	and	workers	own	mobility	choices	and	manage	their	leaving	decision	(ibid,	p.397).	However,	the	increasing	power	of	labour	does	not	eliminate	the	fact	that	they	are	subject	to	tight	disciplinary	control	from	the	state,	and	from	the	employers,	and	they	have	no	ability	for	collective	resistance.	This	points	to	the	paradoxical	nature	of	the	Chinese	labour	market.	A	fundamental	argument	of	this	thesis	is	that	Teleman’s	organisational	control	system	is	the	outcome	of	its	
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interactions	with	the	institutional	environment	(e.g.	labour	market)	in	China.	The	next	chapter	will	offer	a	detailed	explanation	on	this.				
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Chapter 9: Understanding Teleman’s control system 
 
This study examines the international management and control system in Teleman in 
order to better understand how emerging market multinationals internationalise and 
how they manage such a process. The previous five chapters aimed to reveal how 
Teleman manages its overseas operations and employees with four types of control 
(i.e. personal centralised control, bureaucratic formalised control, identity control, and 
control by rewards). This task was accomplished through detailed accounts on how 
the control system works and how three different employee groups have experienced 
and responded to the system.  
 
From a critical realist perspective, however, this task of studying the social reality of 
the international management and control system has only been partly completed. 
Whilst the empirical and actual domain of reality has been understood by analysing 
employee responses to the management system (i.e. the empirical domain) and 
Teleman’s actual management and control practice (i.e. the actual domain), the real 
domain of reality remains unclear. The big question is: why does Teleman manage in 
this way?  
 
In this chapter, I attempt to reveal the real domain of social reality studied in this 
research, that is, the underlying generative mechanisms that produce the observable 
empirical events discussed in the previous four chapters. From an institutional 
perspective, this thesis argues that what we have observed about Teleman’s different 
types of control is concerned with institutional environments in China. However, it is 
not that they determine the international management and control system of Teleman; 
rather, the management system adopted by Teleman is an outcome of a process of 
interactions between Teleman as corporate actors and China’s different domains of 
institutions. To capture this process, an Actor/Institution Interaction Process Model is 
theoretically constructed to explain how two domains – the Chinese labour market 
and the politicised business environment - affect the behaviours and the management 
approach of Teleman.  
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9.1 The control system in Teleman: summary of key features  
 
In the previous five chapters, I have provided detailed accounts on four different types 
of control Teleman uses to manage its overseas operations and employees in Europe. 
In this section, I summarise three key features that make Teleman a unique and 
interesting case.  
 
Feature 1: Expatriate-centric 
 
The expatriate centricity in Teleman’s control system is striking. It reflects not only in 
the large population of expatriates in the company’s European subsidiaries per se, but 
more importantly in the fact that expatriates possess strong institutionalised and un-
institutionalised power in daily working life, and the fact that expatriates are central to 
the company’s corporate culture engineering system and reward system.  
 
As shown in Chapter 4, 5, and 6, expatriates are heavily involved in the daily 
operation in Teleman UK and Europe. Consisting of roughly 50% of the total 
workforce, they, first, sit in various connecting-points of the company’s highly 
complex organisational matrix structure, and enable the smooth functioning of a large 
bureaucracy of over 170,000 employees around the world; second, they closely 
monitor the whole work process to ensure that the company’s policies and procedures 
are respected and followed by subsidiary employees; third, they collect different sorts 
of information to enable China HQ to make decisions. Playing the roles of 
coordinators and controllers, expatriates in Teleman occupy important hierarchical 
and non-hierarchical positions in overseas operations, and are endowed by the 
company with institutionalised and non-institutionalised power, helping the company 
to exercise personalised control and bureaucratic formalised control over its overseas 
units. It is through this vast network of expatriates that the China HQ exercises 
control over its overseas subsidiary.  
 
Furthermore, as discussed in Chapter 7 and Chapter 8, expatriates are the main target 
for the company’s identity control and control through rewards. While expatriates are 
subject to strongly militarised organisational discourse on the JKFD values, and are 
required to endure hardship and make personal sacrifice as ‘corporate soldiers’, 
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Teleman adopts a relatively hands-off approach to its locally hired employees, leaving 
local British and local Chinese employees with multiple interpretations of JKFD 
values and multiple options for identity construction. Accordingly, however, these 
two employee groups are largely denied the access to equal monetary rewards and 
career development, with expatriates being the main beneficiaries of the company’s 
successful internationalisation in recent years.  
 
Feature 2: a highly centralised approach and China’s frequent, direct 
involvement  
 
Related to the expatriate centricity is Teleman’s centralised approach and its frequent, 
direct involvement in daily operations and decision making in subsidiaries. Such 
centralisation is achieved by the presence of expatriates acting as the agents of China 
HQ, and by various bureaucratic systems that ensure rules, process, and procedures 
developed at home are closely followed by overseas subsidiary units, subsidiary 
activities are in line with the interests of HQ, and all key decisions are centrally made 
by China.  
 
As discussed, Teleman has established a highly complex matrix structure in Europe 
and in the UK. It is ‘planned’ and ‘deliberately structured’, so that ‘participants’ are 
‘supervised’, ‘the supervisors themselves’ are supervised, and so on, ‘all the way to 
the top of the organisation’ (Etzioni, 1965, p. 650). Such a matrix structure spells out 
explicit multiple- command and multiple-boss requirements and expectations from 
employees, and lays out an organisational configuration where managers at the top, 
i.e. expatriates in regional HQs and China HQ, can easily interfere with the daily 
operations overseas and direct decision making on matters at subsidiary level.  
 
When such a matrix structure is coupled with various bureaucratic systems such as 
reporting and approval systems, global HR system, and large amounts of working 
procedures, it means that very little autonomy has been given to overseas subsidiary 
units, and China HQ can basically decide who to hire, who to promote, what can be 
done, and how it can be done in subsidiaries. This, as Chapter 5 and 6 indicate, can be 
illustrated by the fact that all hiring in the UK is subject to the approval of regional 
HQ in Germany, with senior positions subject to approval from China; or by the fact 
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that the purchase of a headhunting service by the UK HR team needs to go through 
eight steps and receive approval from Germany. In general, because of the little 
autonomy they enjoy, Teleman’s subsidiaries act more like a sales representative 
office, although there are in fact various types of business activities happening at 
subsidiary level ranging from sales to R&D, and from project delivery to post-sales 
services.  
 
Feature 3: the fundamental role of culture and rewards  
 
Teleman’s organisational control system cannot function without cultural and reward 
elements. With a strong corporate culture, which serves as ‘indirect social influence 
processes that de-emphasise the self’, and a highly-developed reward system, which 
appeals to ‘employees’ rational self-interest’ (Korsgaard, Meglino, & Jeong, 2010, 
p.222), Teleman exercises tight controls over expatriate employees, who in turn help 
the company to control its overseas subsidiary units effectively.  
 
As discussed in Chapter 7, the militarised discourse on hardship endurance and self -
sacrifice orchestrated by the company’s founder has constructed a distinctive social 
reality within the company, where a good employee equates to a corporate soldier, 
and taking on overseas assignments exemplifies a model corporate soldier. Such an 
organisational discourse is so strong and powerful that it has achieved a state of 
closure over the dominant meaning, and is constraining in its effects on the identity 
work of employees (Alvesson & Karreman, 2000). As a result, we see most 
expatriates internalise the JKFD values, and become true soldiers fighting for the 
interests of the company in the foreign lands.  
 
Furthermore, as Chapter 8 shows, expatriates are also strongly motivated by the 
company’s financial and non-financial incentives. Recognising the fact that Chinese 
employees enjoy increasing bargaining power in today’s open and mobile labour 
market in China, Teleman has developed a sophisticated reward system, and offered 
attractive total packages to its expatriates, which include above-market compensation 
and benefits (e.g. a good salary, bonuses, stock shares, an expatriation allowance, free 
accommodation, free food), and excellent international career development 
opportunities. The outcome of such a combination of identity control and reward 
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incentives is that a group of highly engaged and hard working employees are 
produced, who follow the orders of the company, go wherever they are asked to go, 
do whatever they are asked to do, and become the core force behind the company’s 
ambitious and successful internationalisation efforts.  
 
In summary, Teleman’s control system is characterised by distinctive features. To 
describe them in one sentence: it is a highly centralised system with expatriates being 
placed at the centre, who are motivated by strong corporate culture and a well-
designed reward system. I argue that the development of such a control system can be 
traced back to the distinctive institutional environments in China. This will be 
discussed in the following sections.  
 
9.2 Understanding the control system: an Actor/Institution Interaction Process 
Model 
 
Previous studies of control systems have tended to take a contingency approach to 
explain the selection of control mechanisms. For example, Ouchi (1977) identifies 
two antecedent conditions for the selection of control forms: knowledge of 
transformation process, and availability of output measures. Snell's (1992) empirical 
study indicates that a firm’s executive use of human resource management control 
systems is determined by the firm’s strategic context, i.e. product-market variation, 
work flow integration, and firm size. To Child (1984), these contingent factors 
include types of markets, employee skills and experience, environmental variability, 
task characteristics, and size of the organisation. In Harzing’s (1999) study, 
differences in control mechanisms found in MNCs are attributed to such variables as 
size, interdependence, uncertainty, and heterogeneity/diversity.  
 
In this thesis, I draw on the literature on home-country effects, and argue for a 
relationship between MNCs’ country of origin and their control system. Most 
importantly, I join recent discussions on the dynamic relationship between institutions 
and actors, which emphasise the creative, skilled, and entrepreneurial nature of MNCs 
(e.g. Aoki, 2007; Deeg & Jackson, 2006; Jackson, 2010; Morgan, 2005, 2007; Streeck 
& Thelen, 2005). For instance, highlighting the ambiguity of institutions, Jackson 
(2010) and Streeck and Thelen (2005) suggest that actors constantly reinterpret 
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institutional opportunities and constraints, and then adapt or modify institutional rules 
accordingly. Morgan (2007) emphasises the diversity of institutions and contends that 
in any particular society, institutions and logics are multi-levels, and pull in different 
ways, and actors can use this to develop their own distinctive trajectories. Similarly, 
Crouch (2005) looks at the heterogeneity and diversity of institutions and identifies a 
number of path-changing possibilities for actors.  
 
Following this group of scholars, I recognise that 1) home country institutions impact 
on a firm’s control strategy; 2) given heterogeneity and diversity of institutions in 
particular societies, a firm has strong capacity and agency to engage in various 
experiments with institutions in order to achieve its objectives. Based on this line of 
discussion and empirical data of Teleman, I have developed an Actor/Institution 
Interaction Process Model. With this Model, I wish to propose a three-step process of 
interactions between institutions and actors, and show how firms as actors develop 
their control strategies during this process (See Figure 9.1).  
 
 
Figure 9.1: Actor/Institution Interaction Process Model 
 
First, the relation between institutions and actors starts with the actors’ interpretation 
of institutions, an effort to distinguish two dimensions of these institutions: enabling 
dimension and constraining dimension. As illustrated later, every single institutional 
component has these two dimensions, and actors need to find out what aspects are 
positive for them, and what aspects are negative.  
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Second, after interpreting the existing institutions, actors make initial responses to the 
enabling and constraining dimensions respectively with particular plans, solutions and 
implementation. Some of the actions taken at this stage might be part of the control 
strategy.  
 
Third, actions taken to respond to the enabling dimension of institutions lead to two 
possible outcomes: positive and negative. For positive outcomes, actors will leverage 
the positive aspects and further develop specific control mechanisms. For negative 
outcomes, actors need to take further action to repair the damage and fix the problem. 
These remedy actions might also become part of the control strategy. Actions taken to 
respond to the constraining dimension follow the same process.  
 
As illustrated by this three-step process, institutions do not immediately or directly 
lead to a firm’s control strategy. Home country institutions impact on a firm’s 
development of the control system through intriguing its interpretation to the enabling 
and constraining dimensions of existing institutions. Therefore, a firm’s control 
strategy is not a direct result of the institutions; rather, it is the outcome of a series of 
activities starting from interpreting, to initial responding and implementing, and 
finally to developing or repairing. By going through these three steps, firms, as actors, 
become ‘active participants in their own fate’ (Morgan, 2005, p.417). 
 
As argued by Crouch (2005), institutional heterogeneity facilitates innovation, 
because it presents actors with alternative strategies when existing paths are blocked 
and it allows actors to make new combinations among elements of various paths.  
Therefore, it is expected that MNCs from societies with heterogeneous and complex 
institutional environments may display great creativity in responding to such 
institutional diversity and developing sophisticated control systems. 
 
In the following sections, the institutional environment in China will be examined. I 
will show how Teleman interacts with the Chinese institutions and develops its 
distinctive control system.  
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9.3 Variegated capitalism: Chinese institutional environments  
 
The institutional heterogeneity, complexity and diversity in China has frustrated many 
Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) scholars, who try to find a place for China on the LME 
(liberal market economy) – CME (coordinated market economy) axis; and for those 
who managed to do so, conclusions are inconsistent and even divergent (Peck & 
Zhang, 2013). For example, Witt (2010) concludes that China should be regarded as a 
quasi- LME, whereas Fligstein and Zhang (2011) define China as an idiosyncratic 
CME. While the Economist (2011, pp. 79–81) claims that ‘China’s remarkable 
success [is attributable] to an odd and often unappreciated experiment in laissez-faire 
capitalism’, Qin (2008) opts for ‘China’s rampant state-dominated, welfare-lite 
capitalism’ (cited in Peck & Zhang, 2013).  
 
China is indeed an ‘odd case’ compared with CME and LME models (McNally, 2006, 
2007). According to Zhang and Beck (2016), there are many idiosyncrasies and 
paradoxes of the Chinese institutional environment. First, in the area of industrial 
relations, labour unions in China are neither strong (as in the German model of 
stakeholder negotiation) nor weak (as in the US model of market-disciplined 
marginalisation), but different in that they operate with the consent of the Chinese 
Communist Party. At the same time, industrial relations in China is ‘marked by a 
volatile combination of repression and restiveness’ (ibid, p.59). Second, the Chinese 
education and training system is neither along the lines of Germany’s vocationally 
oriented model, nor the US market-based model; rather, under the varying degrees of 
state control and market exposure, it has developed quickly but causes serious 
problems of skill shortage and mismatch. Third, regarding inter-firm relations, there is 
extreme competitive exposure in some sectors, effective state control in other sectors, 
as well as interpersonal guanxi networks in both commercial and governmental 
transactions. Fourth, the Chinese form of corporate governance is characterised by the 
major roles of state-owned banks and at the same time a heavy presence of foreign 
investors and overseas stock market listings.  
 
Therefore, compared with countries such as Japan, Germany and the US, whose key 
aspects in the varieties of capitalism and national business systems have been 
generally agreed and are considered as relatively stable, the Chinese form of 
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capitalism is characterised by multiple, competing and paradoxical institutions. In all 
key political–economic realms such as industrial relations, education and training 
system, inter-firm relations, and corporate governance, idiosyncrasies and paradoxes 
exist. In the Chinese form of capitalism, multiple types of firms and institutional 
contexts co-exist, and there is a great deal of flux in how different regions, firms and 
sectors are organised, and connected with central and local governments. For this 
reason, it is better to understand China as a form of ‘variegated capitalism’ with 
diverse regional systems which are encouraged to experiment in different forms of 
firm organisation and firm ownership under the overall power and authority of the 
Chinese Communist Party (Peck & Zhang, 2013; Zhang & Peck, 2016).  
 
While it is difficult to give detailed descriptions to each domain of institutional 
environments in China given the limits of space, this thesis focuses on two aspects, 
i.e. the labour market and the role of state government, and then discusses how 
Teleman interacts with these two institutional domains, leading to the development of 
its control system.  
 
9.3.1 Chinese labour market  
 
A key characteristic of the Chinese labour market is concerned with its paradoxical 
nature. On the one hand, it is characterised by a surplus of labour, low salaries, the 
weak power of employees, long working hours, and strong disciplinary control and 
exploitation from employers. On the other hand, firms in China are now faced with 
great difficulties in finding skilled labour and retaining them. For certain groups of 
employees, compensation packages are extremely high. At the same time, due to the 
existence of the open labour market, employees have gained increasing power when 
negotiating employment contracts. To cope with employees’ low level of commitment 
and loyalty, and their high level of mobility, more and more employers have replaced 
the strong disciplinary control and the exploitation mentality with more sophisticated 
control mechanisms, aiming to retain talent and build an engaged workforce. Three 
paradoxes can be observed here.  
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Paradox 1: Labour surplus or labour shortage?  
 
Common knowledge about China is its billion-plus population. It has been widely 
recognised that China’s rapid industrialisation and economic development in the past 
three decades have relied heavily on low-cost exports, which has been made possible 
by China’s population and the seemingly endless supply of cheap labour (Chan, 
2010). However, in recent years, whether China now has a labour surplus or shortage 
has become a lively debate on media and among labour economists. While many 
Chinese and international media have reported the labour ‘shortage’ and ‘the end of 
surplus labour’ in China (e.g. Demick & Pierson, 2010), China’s state press reported 
that China has a sufficient labour pool for the next 40 years (China Daily, 2010).  
 
The debate among labour economists is mainly centred around the ‘Lewis turning 
point’ (Lewis, 1954), a point when dual rural- urban labour markets begin to merge, 
the supply of surplus labor from a country’s rural areas tapers off and a full-
employment ‘normal’ economy emerges (Chan, 2010; Huang & Jiang, 2010). 
Therefore, the discussion is mainly concerned with migrant labour from rural areas 
(e.g. Knight, Deng, & Li, 2011). Economists have been divided into two camps, with 
one arguing that China has now reached the Lewis turning point, and the other 
believing that there is still surplus, not a shortage, of labour in rural China (Cai, Du, & 
Zhao, 2007; Golley & Meng, 2011; Kwan, 2009). The most recent study, by Choi and 
Peng (2015), confirms labour shortages in South China, and reveals that strategies of 
managerial control in a labour- intensive factory system have been changed to adapt 
to this new situation.  
 
In addition to the migrant labour, the labour market for university-graduated talent, 
which is more relevant to my present case study, also represents a paradox. On the 
one hand, the width and depth of the Chinese talent pool has been well recognised, 
particularly in the field of science and engineering; on the other hand, shortage of 
talent is commonly recognised by researchers and practitioners. China produces 
millions of university graduates every year and the latest official figure for graduates 
in 2015 was 7.49 million (China Daily, 2016). Among them, a large portion of 
students take science and engineering subjects. As reported by Li et al. (2011), in 
2005, 41.3% of university students in China were enrolled in science and engineering, 
 
212 
and 50.1% of postgraduates undertook Doctor’s and Master’s programmes in science 
and engineering. According to von Zedtwitz et al. (2007), nearly 750,000 scientists 
and engineers graduate from Chinese universities every year, second only to the 
United States. At a higher level, the number of science PhDs produced by China is 
also impressive. Orr and Roth (2012) believe there are more than 10,000 science 
PhDs graduating from China’s universities each year.  
 
Despite the large production of university graduates and PhDs, research indicates that 
China suffers from a shortage of talent in key occupations such as finance, 
accounting, engineering, and business, as well as in the managerial sector. For 
example, it is estimated that China needs 75,000 effective managers over the next 10 
to 15 years; however, only 3000 to 5000 are currently available in the labour market 
(Farrell & Grant, 2005). The talent shortage has become a major problem for 
companies in China, and represents a threat to China’s continued growth (Ma & 
Trigo, 2008). While Hartmann, Feisel and Schober (2010) attribute the talent scarcity 
in China to the large amount of foreign direct investment China has received and the 
large number of multinational companies entering Chinese market every year, 
Beechler and Woodward (2009) point to the role of demographic trends in China ( i.e. 
increasing longevity and declining birth rates). It has also been argued that the talent 
shortage is aggravated by China’s poor education system, which fails to produce 
qualified graduates for work (Farrell & Grant, 2005). For example, McKinsey Global 
Institute reported that less than 10% of the Chinese graduates who applied for jobs at 
MNCs possess the right skills and qualifications to work there (cited by Beechler & 
Woodward, 2009).  
 
To tackle this talent shortage issue, companies in China have adopted various 
strategies to find, recruit and retain talented employees. Some MNCs with a long 
operating tradition in China develop an identified talent pool by strategically 
integrating their organisational structures and systems, and other smaller companies 
focus on compensation package design and the creation of organisational culture 
(Hartmann et al., 2010). Companies like Coca-Cola are taking a more ‘worldly 
approach’ (Beechler & Woodward, 2009, p.282) through sending their Chinese 
management trainees around the world to receive training. In Sheldon & Li’s (Li & 
Sheldon, 2010; Sheldon & Li, 2013) studies, MNCs respond to the talent shortage 
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issue by poaching employees from other firms in the same locality, intensifying inter- 
firm competition in local labour markets.  
 
Paradox 2: Disciplinary control, exploitation and powerless employees? 
 
In labour relation studies, Chinese employees are frequently portrayed as a powerless 
group, who toil in sweat-shops in export-oriented manufacturing industry (Chan, 
2001; Chan, 2010; Friedman & Lee, 2010; Gallagher, 2005) Common problems faced 
by Chinese employees include ‘long hours, low pay, employer failure to pay overtime 
and social insurance, wage arrears, lack of proper health and safety precautions, 
discrimination (ethnic, gender, etc.), illegal firings, and severe fines for common 
workplace errors’ (Friedman & Lee, 2010, p.513).  
 
An often-discussed and well-acknowledged reason behind these depressing facts is 
the lack of workers’ autonomous associations in China. The All-China Federation of 
Trade Unions (ACFTU), the single party affiliated union allowed in China, has been 
heavily criticised for ‘being structurally and politically bound by the Party-state’ 
(Cooke, 2014, p. 877). Financed mainly by the state and governed by local 
governments, the ACFTU exists to maintain labor discipline and social stability 
(Pringle & Clarke, 2011; Warner, 2008) with incentives that ‘come from the party 
above rather than from workers below’ (Howell, 2008, p. 861) For this reason, the 
ACFTU’s identity has been questioned by international trade union organisations and 
labour movement activists, and labour relation scholars ask ‘is the ACFTU really a 
union?’(Taylor & Li, 2007).  
 
Nevertheless, labour unrest occurs throughout the country due to the acceleration of 
privatisation, restructuring and redundancies in the state-owned sector, with 
unprecedented levels of insurgency witnessed in recent years (Friedman & Lee, 
2010). For instance, the number of ‘mass incidents’ (the state’s term for strikes, 
protests, and riots) was 9,000 in 1994, and it reached 87,000 in 2005, and jumped to 
120,000 in 2008 (Tanner, 2004; Wedeman, 2009). Elfstrom and Kuruvilla’s (2014) 
study reveals 763 instances of industrial action between 2008, and 2012, with a 
steadily increasing trend in strikes, from 3.6 actions per month in 2008 to 32.1 actions 
per month in 2012.  
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One important note that needs to be made is that labour discontent and unrest in China 
is ‘cellularised, localised and unco-ordinated’ (Friedman & Lee, 2010, p.507). 
Because of China’s under-developed social welfare system, particularly the extremely 
underfunded and geographically unevenly distributed social security provision for the 
elderly (Yip & Hsiao, 2009), for most Chinese employees, there is no welfare safety 
net to fall back on, and material aspirations for themselves and their family are high, 
therefore, they choose to become cooperative employees.  Particularly, for many 
unskilled employees this leads to acceptance of high levels of exploitation and poor 
work conditions in return for wages that are carefully saved and used by the family 
either to establish small businesses or to pay for the education and training of 
promising members of the younger generation.  
 
However, in recent years, economic development in China is bringing more powers to 
Chinese employees. Elfstrom and Kuruvilla (2014), for example, argue that a 
qualitative shift is underway in the nature of labor protest in China. According to 
them, since 2008, Chinese workers have been striking ‘offensively’, rather than in a 
‘defensive’ nature as characterised by prior literature, for more money, better working 
conditions and more respect from employers. The reason behind this phenomenon is 
that economic and political opportunities in China are sending ‘cognitive cues’ to 
Chinese workers, which include growing labour shortages, new labour laws, and new 
media openness. Thus, Chinese workers now employ various tactics, such as strikes, 
‘everyday resistance’, and seeking out emergent institutions outside the state and 
party-backed mass organisations, to fight for their demands. One of these tactics is 
‘exit’, that is, leaving current employers who pay badly or are abusive. In the study, 
one factory boss reported his plant’s turnover at 20%, which was considered low 
because his competitors were experiencing 60 to 70% turnover. The tactics employed 
by Chinese workers, the authors argue, represent ‘expressions of workers’ new 
empowerment’ (Elfstrom & Kuruvilla, 2014, p.469).  
 
Although Elfstrom and Kuruvilla’s (2014) study is mainly concerned with workers in 
manufacturing companies, the new empowerment through leveraging the external 
labour market is relevant to many Chinese employees as a whole, particularly for the 
growing number of Chinese employees with technical and managerial skills. As 
 
215 
suggested by Littler and Salaman (1982, p. 261), the most crucial dimension of the 
employment relationship is that of dependency, which is determined by two broad 
factors: ‘the capacity of subordinates to organise’, and ‘alternative sources of need-
satisfaction’, with the latter referring to the availability of alternative employment. 
Given the talent shortage problem in the Chinese labour market, many Chinese 
employees clearly know they are in great demand in the market, and realise how 
much power they possess over their employers. It is true that embedded in China’s 
political institutions, they are subject to tight disciplinary control from the state and 
from employers, and they have no ability to collectively resist. However, it is also true 
that they are not powerless in that they can take advantage of open labour markets to 
leave and look for new employment.  
 
As a result, China’s labour market is characterised by a high turnover rate. According 
to the China Daily (2008), the Chinese Party’s national press in English, Chinese 
employees’ turnover rate was highest in Asia, with 47 percent of companies surveyed 
having turnover rates of more than 10% in the past 12 months, and 13% of them even 
having a rate of over 20%. In another report in 2013, the newspaper, citing a research 
result by London-based recruitment group Hays, shows the frequency that Chinese 
employees change their jobs, with 35% of them having done so in the past two to four 
years, 14.5% in the past two years and 10.4% in the past year. 
 
This makes Schmidt (2011) argue that there is a battle for China’s talent among 
foreign and local firms. Building an employment brand, providing local development 
opportunities and viable career paths, offering smart payment and becoming a quasi-
local company are some of the methods offered by the author for companies to win 
this talent war (Schmidt, 2011). It has been reported that companies in China are 
responding to this by building new reward and appraisal systems that keep people in 
the firm so that valuable investment in skills and training is not lost (Cooke, 2009, 
2011; Warner, 2012).  
 
Paradox 3: a low wage labour market?  
 
Frequently associated with the image of ‘docile maiden workers’ suffering from 
despotic control in sweat-shops (Pun, 2005), Chinese workers are famous for their 
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cheap labour prices. In fact, ‘China price’, together with the price of oil and the price 
of capital (i.e. interest rate) are considered critical in today’s global economy, which 
reflects how the world has been accustomed to Chinese cheap labour during the past 
three decades (Chan, 2010; Harney, 2009).  
 
Cheap labour has played a central role in the Chinese success model in recent decades 
(Lin, Cai, & Li, 2003), and it has been discussed by many researchers (e.g. Chan, 
2010; Gallagher, 2005). For example, in 1994, China had the lowest manufacturing 
wage rate at $694 in U.S. dollars among five Asian developing countries (i.e. China, 
India, Indonesia, Philippines and Thailand), or about 17% of the wage in the 
Philippines (Li et al, 2012). In 1997, the minimum wages mandatory in Chinese 
Labour Law for a 44-hour week was RMB 420 (USD 54.00) for Shenzhen, RMB 290  
(USD 36.00) for Beijing, and RMB 315 (USD 45.00) for Shanghai. Even compared 
with the minimum wage of $45.00 for Ho Chi Minh City in Vietnam in 1997, these 
standards were poor, given the high living cost in these Chinese cities.  
 
The cheap status of Chinese employees is not only related to migrant workers who 
work in manufacturing factories, but also those white-collar employees who have a 
university degree, and even highly skilled engineers. Compared with their 
counterparts in the U.S. or Europe, Chinese scientists and engineers are much 
cheaper. For instance, it is reported that the monthly salary for an engineering 
graduate from China’s most prestigious universities such as Tsinghua University can 
be RMB 4,000 (about USD500), and when working for foreign firms, Chinese 
engineers earn about one third of what their American counterparts make ( von 
Zedtwitz et al, 2007). According to Zhang and Wu (2012), the cost of skilled 
scientists and clinical trials in biotechnology in China is about 10–30% that in the 
U.S. or Europe. It is argued that partly because of this, more and more foreign MNCs 
have built R&D centres in China in the past decades to fully tap into this high quality 
talent pool (Breznitz & Murphree, 2011; Orr & Roth, 2012; von Zedtwitz, 2004; 
Walsh, 2007; Wei et al., 2012). It is reported that by late 2005, there were about 750 
R&D centres in China established by foreign companies, concentrating on 
telecommunications, IT and manufacturing sectors (von Zedtwitz et al. 2007); this 
number increased to 1300 in 2013 (Mario, 2015).  
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However, another side to the Chinese labour market, which co-exists with its cheap 
labour, is the rapidly rising wage of factory workers and high salaries and attractive 
benefit packages to Chinese talent provided by foreign and local Chinese firms. For 
factory workers, wages have risen continuously in recent years. For example, in Li et 
al.’s (2012) study, while Chinese manufacturing workers had the lowest wage in 1994 
among the five Asian developing countries, their wages rapidly reached second place 
by 2008, below only that of the Philippines with a wage gap of 18%. India and 
Indonesia previously had higher wages than China; however, in 2006, they were only 
about 41% and 34% of China’s wages respectively. The increasing wage of Chinese 
workers made the Economist announce ‘the end of cheap China’, with an observation 
that labour costs for Chinese workers in Guangdong province rose 12% a year from 
2002 to 2009, and in Shanghai 14% a year, compared to only 8% in the Philippines 
and 1% in Mexico (The Economist, 2012). 
 
Chinese university-graduated employees, according to Tian, Harvey and Slocum 
(2014), have also witnessed salary increases at a ‘remarkable rate in China’. It was 
reported recently that their annual salary growth rate had reached 6-8%, much higher 
than that in other parts of the world. Behind the rapid salary increase is the war for 
talent. As discussed earlier, talent shortage is a serious problem faced by foreign and 
local firms in China. As a result, firms are competing with each other to offer high 
salaries to hire and retain talented employees.  
 
Tian et al. (2014) show that compensation is the most important retention approach 
adopted by MNCs in China to retain their talented local employees. Such generous 
compensation packages normally include high salaries, bonuses, stock options, and 
golden handcuffs (i.e. extra annual salary within certain contract period). These 
attractive offers have pushed up the expectation for salary increases in this group of 
Chinese employees, and they usually demand and receive 20-40% pay increases when 
moving to another company. Such a materialistic approach to talent management is 
also reported in Cooke, Saini and Wang (2014), where they discuss the centrality of 
materialistic values in the employment relationships in China. The study reveals that 
companies in China commonly adopt an individual-oriented reward system, which is 
underlined by pecuniary HRM practices, to motivate talented employees. 
Furthermore, it has been discovered that Chinese companies, such as large SEOs and 
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private companies, are very flexible and bold in creating favourable terms and 
conditions to attract external talent, and structuring total compensation with a variety 
of allowances and benefits, such as stock options and housing subsidies (Tian, et al., 
2014; Cooke, et al., 2014; Cooke, 2012).  
 
In summary, the Chinese labour market continues to be characterised by a large 
quantity of cheap labour, who are subject to strong disciplinary control and remain 
weak without union support; at the same time, talent shortage has given employees 
increasing negotiation power with employers. For many of them, this means relatively 
high salaries and high mobility. This paradoxical nature of the Chinese labour market 
provides Teleman with both opportunities and challenges, which will be discussed 
later.  
 
9.3.2 The role of state government and the resulting politicised business 
environments  
 
A large body of literature has pointed to the politicised nature of the business 
environment in China due to the active role played by the Chinese government in 
business activities (e.g. Nee, 2005; Nee, Opper, & Wong, 2007). It has pointed out 
that although China has undergone several decades of economic reform, and a market 
economy structure has been well established, the Chinese ruling Party remains highly 
interventionist (Witt & Redding, 2014) and it is still the government that determines 
resource allocation (Zhang et al., 2015).  
 
The politicised nature of Chinese business environments reflects itself in two aspects. 
The first is concerned with the sponsorship and support from the government, and the 
second is concerned with the balancing approach taken by Chinese firms to tackle the 
double-edged effect of state involvement  
 
9.3.2.1 The sponsorship and support from Chinese government  
 
Chinese firms receive sponsorship and support from the Chinese government for 
various reasons. It could be that the firm is fully or partly owned by the government  
(e.g. Morck, Yeung, & Zhao, 2008b; Shi, Markóczy, & Stan, 2014) or the firm has 
 
219 
political connections with regulative bodies (e.g. Cui & Jiang, 2012; Pan et al., 2014). 
On other occasions, it could that the firm is operating in an industry which is critical 
to the national interest (e.g. Breznitz & Murphree, 2011; Child & Rodrigues, 2005; 
Low, 2010), or the firm is so successful that it has the potential to become a national 
champion, which can further enhance the national interests (e.g. Li, Cui, & Lu, 2014; 
Luo, Xue, & Han, 2010).  
 
In the particular case of Chinese MNCs, many studies have revealed that Chinese 
firms benefit from government sponsorship and support in their internationalisation 
process (Hong, Wang, & Kafouros, 2015; Li, Cui, & Lu, 2014; Luo, Xue, & Han, 
2010; Pan et al., 2014; Wei et al., 2015). For example, it is argued that the support 
from the Chinese government enhances risking-taking capabilities of Chinese firms 
and reduces their reliance on prior international experience (Lu et al., 2014b). It is 
also reported that Chinese MNCs, particular state-owned companies, are dependent 
for resources on the home institutions because of their political affiliation with the 
government (Cui & Jiang, 2012), and such political affiliation and resource 
dependence, as argued by Buckley et al. (2007), can be conceived as a firm-specific 
advantage for many Chinese MNCs in that they enjoy low cost of capital as a 
consequence of home country capital market imperfections (also Scott, 2002; Warner, 
Ng, & Xu, 2004). Two types of government support are particularly relevant to my 
case study: the creation of a favourable policy environment, and direct sponsorship 
and support.  
 
Creation of favourable policy environment: In China, a favourable national 
environment for science & technology research and development has been 
encouraged by the state’s policy.  China’s national dream to become a technological 
and economic superpower dates back to the 1960s and 1970s when the ‘Four 
Modernisation’ (in the area of agriculture, industry, science and technology, and 
national defence) became a national policy (Breznite & Murphree, 2011). Since then, 
kejiao xingguo, or ‘Revitalising the Country through Science, Technology, and 
Education’, has become a development strategy of China, that is, to achieve long-term 
economic development with advancement in science and technology (Liu et al., 
2011). Particularly, over the past three decades, China has achieved rapid economic 
development; however, it is pointed out that such development is heavily based on 
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imported technology, and its own scientific and technological capacities lag behind its 
economic growth (OECD, 2007, cited by Zhang & Wu, 2012).  It is well recognised 
by Chinese leaders that in order to sustain long -term economic development, China's 
national innovation system must produce world-class science and technology (Zhang 
& Wu, 2012).  In 2006, China launched its 15-year 'Medium- to Long-Term Plan for 
the Development of Science and Technology', in an effort to make China an 
'innovation-oriented society' by the year 2020, and a world leader in science and 
technology by 2050 (Cao, Suttmeier, & Simon, 2006).  
 
Direct sponsorship and support: In many cases, direct sponsorship and support 
from the government is about providing capital or low-interest finance. For example, 
in a case study of China’s biotechnology industry, Zhang, Cooke and Wu (2011) 
demonstrate how the government cultivated R&D in the biotechnology industry 
through formulating strategy, providing state funding, attracting high quality 
researchers from overseas, commercialising research organisations, and forging high-
technology parks. In Shanghai, as reported by Zhang and Wu (2012), to build the 
Zhangjiang High-tech Park into a first-class science park, the municipal government 
developed the ‘Focusing on Zhangjiang’ policy and offered special funding to 16 
companies in 2004, and RMB 14.7 million to 59 new drug development projects in 
2005; in 2006, the first policy-directed venture fund of USD 125 million was set up to 
support start-up firms.  
 
Telecommunications, a politically sensitive industry in China, has particularly been 
endowed with economic, social and political objectives to serve China’s national 
interests (Zhang, 2002). To help to realise China’s ambition to ‘become a global 
technological force’ and ‘create globally competitive indigenous firms’ (Low, 2010), 
China’s telecommunications industry has long been characterised by strong state 
control and market closure to foreign investment, particularly before its joining the 
WTO in 2001(Loo, 2004; Mueller & Lovelock, 2000; Zhang, 2001, 2002). Even after 
China’s entry into the WTO, and despite efforts to make commitments to the WTO 
Reference Paper, the telecommunications industry is still ‘at best’ in the initial stage 
of transition from a central planning mechanism to a pro-competition market 
orientation (Zhang, 2001) in that the telecommunications market would be open in 
name but still exerts constraints and the Chinese government has actually increased its 
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control over business through political interference (Low, 2010; Low, Johnston, & 
Wang, 2007) China state government heavily involves itself in the business activities 
of firms in the industry through the following three means:  
 
First, financing and policy support in R&D research. It is reported that ‘national-
banner enterprises’ will be picked by the central government and related government 
bodies to enjoy financing from the state to work on new technology research. For 
example, the Ministry of Science and Technology provides financing to research 
groups and companies on research in next-generation telecommunications and 
services. The Ministry of Information Industry began sponsoring R&D activities for 
the creation of a domestic 3G standard in the 1990s (Breznite & Murphree, 2011).  
Furthermore, to facilitate knowledge transfer through policy, it is reported that the 
government has placed pressure on foreign companies to ensure knowledge transfer 
occurs, and often this has become a condition for foreign firms to establish in (Child, 
& Rodrigues, 2005; Low, 2010). 
 
Second, domestic market protection, which aims to protect domestic firms from the 
competition of foreign firms, and maximises the market shares of the former, 
particular of those national champions ‘deliberately cultivated and favored to emerge 
as the biggest and strongest in the market’, so that they can ‘better advance the 
nation's aspiration to become a global economic power in strategic, high-technology 
markets’ (Mueller & Lovelock, 2000). According to Mu and Lee (2005), to encourage 
telecoms operators to purchase equipment made by indigenous manufacturers, in 
1996, the Chinese government stopped the foreign government loans to import digital 
automatic switch equipment and began to impose tariffs on imported communication 
equipment. Such action dramatically increased the market share of local firms from 
63.1% in 1995 to 84.8% in 1996, and 94.9% in 1997. Since 1997, the Ministry of Post 
and Telecommunication, the then major regulatory body (which became the Ministry 
of Information Industry in 1998), has organised coordinating conferences every year 
where indigenous equipment is promoted through signing purchase contracts. It is 
reported that in the first conference, contracts for more than 5 million lines were 
signed, and more than 7 million lines of digital automatic exchange were sold; and in 
the second conference, the figure reached 18 million lines and 17 million lines for 
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digital automatic switch. National champions such as Huawei, ZTE, Datang and Great 
Dragon have clearly benefited from such market protection (Mu & Lee, 2005). 
 
Third, international market expansion support. In addition to protection in the 
domestic market, national champion firms also receive large amounts of support from 
the government in developing international markets. Such support can be subtle. For 
example, it is reported that senior managers from Huawei and ZTE are often invited 
to accompany Chinese officials in visiting other developing countries so that they can 
donate their products to these countries and further develop important business 
opportunities (Cooke, 2012). Government support can also be direct. For instance, the 
China Development Bank extended a credit facility of USD 10 billion to help 
overseas customers buy Huawei’s products. Similarly, a state-owned insurance 
company called Sinosure has helped Brazil’s biggest telecommunications operator 
Telemar NorteLeste SA to finance the purchase of Huawei’s equipment (Low, 2007).  
 
9.3.2.2 The double-edged effect of state sponsorship  
 
An important reflection of the politicised nature of the Chinese business environment 
is how Chinese firms deal with the double-edged effect of state sponsorship. In other 
words, because of the politicised business environment in China, Chinese firms need 
to do something different when conducting business overseas. Such a problem is 
rarely experienced by western MNCs given their non- or less-politicised business 
environment at home and their less ambiguous association with the state government.  
 
As observed by many researchers, a major problem resulting from the state 
government sponsorship is that many Chinese MNCs, particularly state-owned firms 
and national champion firms, are questioned on their legitimacy in host countries. For 
instance, Zhang, Zhou and Ebbers (2011) point out that although sponsorship and 
support from the Chinese state government, particularly in the form of financial 
support, enhance the competitiveness of Chinese firms, it also provokes a negative 
reaction from politicians and the public in the host countries. Citing a case of China’s 
MinMetals attempting to acquire Noranda, the largest Canadian mining company but 
failing to do so because of protests from the political right and left in Canada, the 
authors contend that the involvement of the Chinese government served to ‘stimulate 
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the political sensitiveness and public worry, for ideological or other political reasons’ 
(2011, p.230).  The quotation below from the local Canadian press showed how the 
China MinMetals being a state-owned firm caused concern for the Canadian people.  
 
. . . [There is] good reason for the Canadian government to be wary of China’s 
apparent move to secure Canadian resources via ownership. Whether it’s 
MinMetals in mining or other companies digging into Canada’s oil and gas 
operations, there is no economic justification for the Chinese government 
taking up ownership. Natural resources and raw materials can be bought all 
over the globe on the open market. If China were to become a private market 
economy, where private investment decisions drive ownership, then its private 
sector companies could join the international community of takeover players’’ 
(Financial Post Investing, March 15th, 2005, cited by Zhang et al., 2011)  
 
The observations made by Zhang et al. (2011) are echoed by other studies. It is argued 
that Chinese firms, particularly SOEs, are granted monopoly privileges and other 
support by the government on the condition that they serve certain national strategic 
goals. For this reason, Chinese firms are under suspicion that they are not really 
market-oriented or profit-driven; instead, their business activities are motivated by a 
political agenda (Li, Cui, & Lu, 2014; Luo, Xue, & Han, 2010). Globerman and 
Shapiro (2009), for instance, observed that acquisitions by Chinese firms backed by 
the Chinese government have become a concern for US policymakers and 
policymakers in other developed countries because Chinese MNCs are believed to 
acquire companies to ‘pursue non-commercial objectives’, thus imposing costs and 
risks on the hosting countries. In this sense, sponsorship and support from the Chinese 
government for Chinese firms lead to fear and concern from the authorities of the 
hosting countries, and create an unfavourable environment for Chinese MNCs 
(Zhang, Zhou, & Ebbers, 2011).   
 
A well demonstrated case is the decision by the US that Chinese telecoms firms 
Huawei and ZTE pose a security threat to the US and should be barred from any US 
mergers and acquisitions. The congressional panel says the firms failed to allay fears 
about their association with China's government and military (BBC, 2012). A more 
recent case is concerned with China General Nuclear Power (CGN), a state-owned 
energy giant, which has been accused by the US of leading a conspiracy to steal 
American power industry secrets to speed up the development and production of 
Chinese reactor technology; and it is suspected that due to national security concerns, 
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the Hinkley Point power station deal in the UK, in which CGN is an investor, has 
been delayed by the UK government (Pagnamenta & O’Neill, 2016; Swinford & 
Gosden, 2016).  
 
Therefore, coming from a politicised business environment in China, a crucial issue 
faced by Chinese MNCs is ‘whether they can balance the dual competing demands of 
home country and host country governments’ (Li, Cui, & Lu, 2014, p. 995). This is 
also a task of balancing governmental support and strategic freedom. As argued by 
Zhang and Van Den Bulcke (1996, pp. 141–164), there are two factors determining 
whether Chinese firms can stand out among their Chinese peers: ‘the influence of the 
governmental bureaucratic system’ and the ‘development of a real entrepreneurial 
logic’; and ‘those enterprises that developed an early link between these two factors 
are likely to be more successful and competitive than those which have based their 
international business strategy only on the privileged position which they received 
from the government.’ 
 
9.4 Understanding Teleman’s control system: interactions with the paradoxical 
labour market in China  
 
In this section and the next section, I relate the above-discussed distinctive 
characteristics of Chinese institutional environments to the Actor/Institution 
Interaction Process Model, and show how Teleman’s interactions with them leads its 
control system. This section focuses on the paradoxical labour market, and Section 
9.5 deals with the politicised business environment.  
 
To Teleman, the Chinese labour market has two dimensions. The enabling dimension 
is concerned with the cheap labour, labour surplus, and relatively powerless 
employees without the protection of unions, and the constraining dimension is about 
the talent shortage, and high mobility of talented employees, which gives increasing 
negotiating power to employees. Embedded in such institutional settings, Teleman has 
implemented different strategies to leverage the enabling dimension, and at the same 
time mitigate the impact of the constraining one. These implementations lead to either 
positive outcomes, which in turn provide further support to the development of the 
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company’s control strategy; or negative outcomes, which Teleman needs to fix 
through other control mechanisms. This process is illustrated in Figure 9.2.  
 
 
Figure 9.2: Teleman’s Interactions with Chinese Labour Market 
 
9.4.1 Leveraging the enabling institutional dimension  
 
Given the lack of union representation in China and millions of fresh graduates 
flooding into the labour market every year, it is not surprising that employers in China 
tend to have strong negotiation power over employees. Particularly for famous 
companies like Teleman, graduates fight for a position there.  
 
As an elite company in China, Teleman is famous for its ‘high salary, and high 
pressure’ working life. For many employees, ‘high pressure’ has become a ‘take-for-
granted’ fact, which is frequently associated with incredibly long working hours, even 
on weekends and holidays. As discussed in Chapter 7 on identity control, employees 
are ‘encouraged’ to apply to be a ‘FDZ (fighter)’ with a written statement declaring 
that they are voluntarily giving up statutory holidays. It was also reported that in 2007 
the company forced more than 8000 employees with long tenure to resign and re-join 
the company so that accumulated tenures for these employees were reduced to zero. 
According to the company claims, this was to break the culture of complacency 
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among these long-serving employees. But to many people, this was to avoid the legal 
constraints imposed by the new Labour Law effective from 2008.  
 
Another example of Teleman’s strong disciplinary control over employees is the 
autocratic nature of its expatriation system. Employees in Teleman cannot choose 
their destination overseas, and even if they have been working in a certain country for 
years and wished to settle down, they have to go to a new place if required by the 
company. The only way to escape such constraint is to leave the company.  
 
Arguably, Teleman’s semi-military management and strong disciplinary control over 
employees does not really make it much different from those sweatshops in the 
manufacturing industry in China, and clearly, it shows how Teleman leverages on the 
enabling dimension of the labour market, i.e. taking advantage of the abundant cheap 
and powerless labour in China.   
 
Teleman’s response to this enabling dimension of China’s labour market has led to 
two outcomes: positive and negative, and each of them has important implications for 
its control system.  
 
On the one hand, Teleman’s strong disciplinary control over employees has produced 
tens of thousands of Chinese employees who are obedient to the company’s orders 
with limited resistance, and are willing and ready to go anywhere required by the 
company. This lends strong support to the company’s expatriate control over the 
subsidiary units, and makes possible the centralised, bureaucratic control. As shown 
in Chapter 4 and Chapter 7, the working environment for expatriates can be extremely 
harsh, with their working location in deserts, plateaus, rainforests, or oceans. Many of 
them are also required to deliver projects in areas suffering from wars, riots, and virus 
outbreaks.  When natural disasters such as earthquakes and flooding break out, it is 
the right time for them to go to these plagued sites and restore telecommunication 
lines and get them back working. Without a huge group of obedient and relatively 
cheap and young employees, I argue, it is hard to imagine that the company can rely 
on such an expatriates-centric approach to manage its overseas subsidiary units and 
business. 
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On the other hand, Teleman’s response to China’s labour market in a semi-military 
way could have also resulted in a potentially negative outcome: an uncommitted or 
disengaged workforce. However, my research reveals that this potential issue has 
been effectively mitigated by the company’s strong corporate culture, and well-
established reward system. In other words, an effective identity control and reward 
system has been used to reduce the negative effect brought by the company’s 
autocratic response to the enabling dimension of the labour market in China. Based on 
Teleman’s organisational discourse, working in a harsh environment in regions such 
as Africa or the Middle East is not a simple individual action; rather, it reflects the 
values, loyalty and commitments of the individual. Devotion and sacrifice is not a 
personal thing anymore, but an issue concerned with a nation’s rejuvenation and a 
society’s prosperity. Through de-emphasising the self, the company legitimates its 
autocratic expatriation mechanism and its strong disciplinary control over weak 
employees. Furthermore, Teleman actively responds to employee self-interest through 
providing them with high payments and international careers, which few employers in 
China can offer. Such a combination of identity and reward control enables Teleman 
to repair the possible damage to employee commitment and engagement, thus 
ensuring the smooth running of the company’s centralised and expatriate-centric 
control system in its subsidiary units.  
 
9.4.2 Tackling the constraining institutional dimension  
 
Like many companies in China, Teleman is also faced with the constraining 
dimension of Chinese labour markets, that is the shortage of talent and the increasing 
mobility and bargaining power of Chinese employees. Similarly, how to attract, 
select, develop and retain talented employees has become a critical issue for Teleman. 
In this regard, Teleman excels over other employers in China in several ways.  
 
First, the company’s highly successful business in domestic and international markets 
means that it is able to offer above-market compensation and benefits packages to its 
Chinese employees. With high salaries and big bonuses, particularly the stock option, 
Teleman has successfully attracted many  talented young people from top Chinese 
universities. As shown in Chapter 8 on reward systems, the excellent package offered 
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by the company has played a very important role in keeping these talented employees 
from joining other companies. 
 
Second, the company’s rapid development in overseas markets also means that it can 
offer incomparable career development opportunities to its Chinese employees. 
Different from western MNCs that tend to send seasoned managers to work overseas, 
Teleman is eager to send out young employees to work globally. As my research 
reveals, the majority of expatriates in Teleman are young in terms of both age and 
organisational tenure, with many of them becoming expatriates right after graduating 
from universities and joining the company in China. One notable feature here is that 
overseas expatriation is first of all a talent selection method, then a development 
programme. Becoming an expatriate does not automatically guarantee good career 
prospects; but once an employee has delivered super performance and proved his 
capability and loyalty, he/she will be eligible for rapid promotion and frequent 
internal transfer, a process to prepare for managerial roles. In addition, an ‘Internal 
Talent Market’ has also been developed within the company to facilitate internal 
mobility. It is reported that about 1000 employees changed their job through this 
internal talent market in 2014, and the number was expected to jump to 2000 in 2015.  
 
Third, Teleman has also made tremendous efforts in building up a strong corporate 
culture in the hope that employees identify themselves with the company. Although 
several expatriate interviewees expressed their disagreement with the company’s 
values, my analysis reveals that most expatriates have highly internalised the 
company’s values, and identified themselves with the company. Many of them see 
great value in JKFD and contribute to the company’s great success and their career 
development in sticking to such values.  
 
Similar to its response to the enabling dimension, Teleman’s response to the 
constraining dimension of China’s labour market leads to positive and negative 
outcomes, which provide further guidance on the company’s actions, either an action 
to enhance, or an action to repair. In terms of positive outcomes, a strong team of 
expatriates and international managers has been developed in Teleman. As illustrated 
in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6, expatriates enjoy high status and possess great power in 
subsidiaries, and within the company, and there seems to be a consensus that it is 
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expatriates’ hard work and devotion that help the company to achieve what it has 
today. For example, expatriates played critical roles in opening up the international 
markets in the early years. The interviewees generally reported that expatriates saved 
the company from crisis in the mid-late 1990s when the company experienced great 
difficulty in domestic markets due to a series of reasons such as the restructuring of 
the industry led by the nation, the limited domestic share increase, and state-owned 
competitors fighting back. As one expatriate puts it, ‘Generally the UK market was 
opened by Chinese [expatriate] people’.  
 
Today, Teleman relies heavily on this huge network of expatriates and international 
managers to manage its subsidiaries around the world. These expatriates not only act 
as doers and deliver projects on ‘the front line’, but more importantly, help the 
company to exercise personal centralised control and bureaucratic formalised control 
to subsidiary units and local employees.  In other words, Teleman’s efforts in 
responding to the talent shortage problem in China have enabled it to exert effective 
controls over its overseas operations.  
 
Regarding the negative outcomes brought by its response to the constraining 
dimension of China’s labour market, clearly locally hired employees, including local 
British and local Chinese employees, have not been benefiting from the company’s 
talent management efforts. For example, as illustrated in Chapter 8, neither British 
employees nor local Chinese are provided with much career development 
opportunities within the company. Particularly for local Chinese, they are faced with 
great difficulties in promotion, internal transfer and new skills learning; furthermore, 
they are paid at under market rates, and have no access to extra income such as 
bonuses and stock options. The consequence is that both local British and Chinese 
employees, who consist of 50% of the total workforce in the UK, have low level of 
morale and commitment, and the turnover rate of British employees is very high in 
the UK and other European offices. This stops the company from benefiting from the 
local talent markets, and has created a vicious circle between localisation and the 
company’s expatriate-centric control system.  
 
Based on my Process Model, such problems should have drawn the company’s 
attention and actions need to be taken to repair the damage. However, my research 
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reveals that so far limited efforts have been made to tackle this issue. During my 
research on site, there were rumors that the stock option programme might be 
extended to local top talent; however, it had not been confirmed when this thesis was 
being written.  
 
9.5 Understanding Teleman’s control system: interactions with the politicised 
business environments in China  
 
Previous research had revealed that the politicised business environment has 
important implications for their management approaches. For example, in Indonesia, 
business groups are found to adopt loosely-coupled organisational structures to 
facilitate the management of political ties. In the case study, Salim Group uses a 
fragmented, compartmentalised organisational structure as a major mechanism for 
reducing dependence on the ruling Suharto regime and thus protecting themselves 
against the negative effects of political ties (Dieleman & Boddewyn, 2012).  
 
In the specific context of China, Chen, et al. (2011) find that corporate political 
connections lead to a high level of concentration in the Chinese firm control structure; 
that is, controlling owners of politically connected firms tend to concentrate their 
shareholdings and dominate the board of directors by occupying the position of either 
chairman or CEO, so that decisions on deals with government officials can be made 
swiftly and in a covert way. For strategic management, it is found that diversification 
opportunities are rare in China and local governments play a significant role in 
allocating resources; therefore, firms with political connections tend to have higher 
levels of diversification (Zhang et al., 2015). As revealed by Warner et al. (2004), the 
politicised nature of Chinese firms also means that they tend to assign more 
headquarters personnel to the overseas subsidiary, and these senior managers are 
required to make frequent duty visits to the headquarters. Similarly, my analysis 
shows that the politicised business environment in China also has a great impact on 
Teleman’s control strategy and practices. Teleman’s interactions with a politicised 
business environment in China are illustrated in Figure 9.3. 
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Figure 9.3: Teleman’s Interactions with Politicised Business Environment  
 
9.5.1 Leveraging the enabling institutional dimension 
 
A favourable policy environment, protected domestic market, and direct sponsorship 
and support are enabling institutions every firm wants to leverage. Teleman’s 
leveraging of the Chinese politicised institutional environment is best illustrated by 
two actions.  
 
The first is about its global asset concentration in China. As mentioned previously, 
telecommunications is a politically sensitive industry in China. Despite China’s entry 
into the WTO, the Chinese telecoms market remains largely close to foreign 
companies. As a key player in the domestic market and a national banner in 
international markets, Teleman has actively leveraged its political resources, and has 
gained access to numerous preferential policies and support from central and local 
governments.   
 
For example, in the R&D area, it has benefited from the state financing on R&D 
activities on domestic 3G standards. It also gains its competitiveness in the global 
WCDMA marketplace due to central government pressure on its foreign venture 
partners to force knowledge transfer (sources are hidden deliberately to protect the 
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anonymity of Teleman). Given the favourable policy environment and state 
sponsorship in different forms, it is not surprising to see that Teleman, like many 
other Chinese MNCs, has concentrated its global assets such as R&D and 
manufacturing facilities in China, and maintains overseas subsidiaries as sites for 
sales and project delivery, in an effort to fully capitalise on the favorable institutional 
environment in China.  
 
According to my informants, although a number of R&D centres have been 
established in Europe, the USA and other locations, critical R&D projects are done in 
China by a Chinese team called ‘Lab 2012’. Therefore, the company’s core 
technologies are all in China and, as my informants put it, if there is any new product 
or technology coming out of the company, it is Chinese engineers that first come to 
know it. The following remark by an expatriate technical director illustrates 
Teleman’s China-centred global asset configuration approach.  
 
‘China back home provides huge amounts of support in terms of resources, 
and this is the competitiveness of Chinese companies… For example, Nokia 
can run the whole range of activities in Europe for its mobile phones, from 
design, raw material purchasing to manufacturing, sales and post-sales service. 
However, Teleman and X company basically only do sales and after-sales 
here. The rest of the activities are all in China. From the process management 
point of view, it is long and relatively risky, but cost and the effect of 
economic scale is the basic competitive advantage of Chinese products in the 
European and American markets, which should not be given up.’ 
 
The second is concerned with Teleman’s efforts in extending its political 
connectedness to the international level. Teleman has been well connected to 
governments and industry authorities in different countries through participating in 
political events at state level initiated by the Chinese government. For example, 
according to news reports and the company’s internal newspaper, senior managers of 
Teleman were delegates of the Chinese president’s 2015 state visit to the UK. 
Similarly, in the 2015 Johannesburg Summit of the Forum of China-Africa 
Cooperation organised by China Ministry of Commerce, Teleman’s senior manager 
was the only keynote speaker from the telecoms industry.  
 
Because of this relationship with the Chinese government, Teleman has been provided 
with privileged access to political networks at international levels. Thus, many of its 
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clients at subsidiary levels are central government or governmental agencies of the 
host nations, particularly in developing countries. In more developed countries like 
Germany and the UK where market mechanisms prevail, Teleman’s investments have 
also been given political meanings in that they have been considered as a token of 
stronger economic and political ties between China and the foreign country. For 
example, according to the central government’s official website, the then managing 
director of Teleman UK had been commended as an ‘Icebreaker’ for his ‘outstanding 
contribution to the promotion of Sino-British friendship, and economic and trade 
cooperation’ by the then Chinese Ambassador (April 27, 2012). 
 
An article in the company’s internal paper in March 2012, entitled ‘Teleman People 
on Stamp’, can best illustrate this point. The article interviewed an expatriate manager 
who led a project in Cameroon in West Africa, and because of the success of the 
project, the project team was featured on a Cameroon stamp. An expatriate explained:  
 
‘The project built a system which enables telephone lines, internet, banks, 
schools, medical service and other units in Cameroon to transport data and 
information. Cameroon’s telecoms industry will make big improvements, and 
the economic development will be pushed forward greatly…Last year marked 
the 40th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between 
China and Cameroon, and the Cameroon government proposed that the 
Chinese embassy provide some photos as tokens of Sino-Cameroon friendship 
to be made into stamps. And because our project had the largest scale and best 
delivery, and has been highly regarded by our client, we were asked to provide 
some photos. The working scene you see in the stamp is a project team 
working led by the PCM. This is the pride of the whole project team and the 
pride of the representative office.’ 
 
The above quote shows that the company’s services seem to be part of the political 
ties between Chinese and foreign governments. In other words, leveraging the 
enabling dimension of the politicised business environment in China, Teleman 
expanded its political and business network beyond the national boundary to the 
international level. 
 
Positive outcomes and the resulting control strategy: The above-discussed two 
actions taken by Teleman have helped it to grow into a highly successful company 
within a relatively short period (i.e. less than 30 years). The China-centred asset 
configuration allows it to benefit from favourable domestic policies to promote 
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science and technology advancement in China, and at the same time enables Teleman 
to maintain the competitive advantage in its products, which has resulted from 
reduced labour costs and effect of scale economies. With its expanded political 
connections at the international level, Teleman has also been able to effectively tap 
into foreign markets, and generated enormous business and profits. Therefore, 
through leveraging the positive dimensions of China’s politicised institution 
environment, Teleman has quickly developed into a highly successful, R&D driven, 
and technology-centric company, with distinctive political meanings attached to its 
products and services. These are positive outcomes.  
 
With reference to the control strategy, three arguments can be made here. First, given 
Teleman’s expanded political network in foreign markets, managing business 
activities overseas is not the job of certain subsidiary units anymore; rather, it has 
become a ‘national’ and ‘international’ issue. It is ‘national’ because it is concerned 
with China’s national interest; it is ‘international’ because it involves international 
governmental bodies and the company is now in a wider international political 
network. Under such circumstances, it is not surprising that a highly centralised 
management approach has been taken by Teleman to ensure that firstly, all decisions 
concerned with activities at subsidiary level are made correctly in line with the 
political agenda; secondly, all decisions are made swiftly to keep up with any change 
in political and commercial networks; and thirdly, all decisions are made based on 
comprehensive knowledge of the overall situation at home and abroad.  In other 
words, other important stakeholders are involved in Teleman’s business decisions.  
 
Second, the concentration of assets in China means that the company’s global 
business activities are coordinated by the China HQ, and naturally decisions regarding 
these activities, no matter whether they happen at subsidiary or HQ level, are 
centralised to China and made by a group of senior managers, who have a more 
comprehensive view of the overall business situation.  
 
Third, accordingly, a large number of expatriates are needed to ensure such global 
configuration works efficiently. In Teleman, expatriates are sent around the world to 
firstly, collect information to facilitate senior managers’ decision-making at HQs; 
secondly, to coordinate activities between China HQ and local subsidiary units, and 
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among sister subsidiary units in different countries; and thirdly, to get things done and 
deliver the project. Their role in this aspect of control and coordination is similar to 
what has been discussed in previous studies (Belderbos & Heijltjes, 2005; Kabst, 
2004; O’Donnell, 2000) ; particularly, their roles as boundary-spanners  is critical to 
the company’s global asset configuration strategy (e.g. Au & Fukuda, 2002; Johnson 
& Duxbury, 2010;  Thomas, 1994).  
 
Negative outcomes and the resulting control strategy: Teleman’s response to the 
politicised institutional environment with a China-centred asset configuration and 
extended political network has also led to negative outcomes. One of the most 
important ones is that the development of human resources within the company has 
failed to keep up with the rapid business development, and as a result, the company 
relies on many expatriates to manage and control its overseas subsidiaries.  
 
Due to its political connections with Chinese central and local governments, Teleman 
has benefited from efforts in various forms taken by the governments to push local 
Chinese companies to become global ones. As discussed earlier, these include 
creating a favourable policy environment for high-tech companies, providing capital 
or low-interest finance for R&D and international expansion, and protecting the 
domestic telecoms market. Such strong government support has undoubtedly 
contributed to Teleman’s rapid emergence as a national champion and international 
major player in the telecoms industry. For example, it is reported that Teleman did not 
start to produce large-scale central office digital automatic switches until 1995; but in 
1998, it became the largest manufacturer in China, surpassing Shanghai Bell, a joint 
venture, which had been the leader in the previous years. Behind this dramatic success 
was the government imposing tariffs on imported equipment in 1996, and organising 
coordinating conferences to promote indigenous equipment through signing purchase 
contracts since 1997.  
 
In the international market, meanwhile, Teleman did not start its internationalisation 
efforts until the late 1990s; however, in 2005, it achieved more revenues from 
overseas market than the domestic market for the first time. And in less than 10 years 
it has become one of the biggest international players in the industry. Such a 
development at unusual speed leads to a big problem, that is, the shortage of talent, 
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both a shortage of Chinese managers with international management experience, and 
shortage of local talent in foreign subsidiaries.  
 
To cope with the shortage of Chinese international managers, one solution taken by 
Teleman is to train managers as quickly as possible through ‘throwing lots of people 
to a foreign land’, as one expatriate described it. The following quote offers us more 
insights into how this ‘thrive or die’ approach worked.  
 
‘When I first came to the  UK, I was 27 or 28, and all my foreign colleagues 
were 10 years older than me. The first thing is about being equal. They are all 
industry experts, and if you need to cooperate with them, you have to quickly 
develop yourself, and it takes lots of effort. The second thing is about 
managing them. Now, the youngest foreigner in my team is 39, five years 
older than me, and other senior ones could be 47 or 48, more than 10 years 
older than me. How can you manage them? How will they respect you? If you 
don’t grow fast, you won’t make it. There is huge pressure. From the start, 
how you can cooperate with them and then how you can manage them. The 
company appoints you as their manager but it doesn’t mean you can be their 
manager. You need to convince them, and guide them. All these depend on 
your own efforts. For example, when you are meeting a client, as a foreigner, 
in order to earn the client’s respect, you offer him something more, you try a 
bit harder, you work longer hours, you respond faster, and do things more 
professionally. When the client accepts you, they will look at you differently 
and take you as their boss, and then you are the real boss and you make 
decisions. This takes time, and you need to work hard. It is very difficult… 
Have you had arguments with your housemates? I improved my English 
rapidly when having arguments with British people when I was in the UK.’ 
 
As indicated by this quote, the personal experiences of this group of expatriates are by 
no means enjoyable, as many of them were not even able to speak fluent English. 
However, through sending out a large number of young employees to work abroad, 
Teleman managed to build a strong team of international managers in a short period. 
Therefore, the use of expatriates is to fulfil ‘management development’ purposes 
through giving managers international experience to prepare for future important tasks 
(Edström & Galbraith, 1977). This is consistent with Sparrow et al.’s (2004) study, 
which found that management development (i.e. career development and creating an 
international cadre of managers, in total 95.3%) represents the most important reasons 
for MNCs using expatriates (Collings & Scullion, 2006). However, as we can see, the 
scale of expatriation in Teleman is much larger, due to its rapid development over a 
short period.  
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The second type of shortage, the shortage of local talent, seems to be a common 
problem faced by many MNCs when they enter a new market, where qualified local 
individuals are not available or easily trained; therefore, expatriates are sent from HQs 
to fill positions (Edström and Galbraith, 1977). This is often discussed in the case of 
Western MNCs when they come to a developing country where the local labour 
market cannot provide enough qualified workers. However, in Teleman’s case, the 
situation is different. In Europe, particularly in West Europe, telecoms is a highly 
mature industry, and the market is well established. One simple illustration is the long 
history of Ericsson, one of the biggest players in this industry, which was established 
in 1876. Therefore, I argue that the reason for Teleman relying heavily on expatriates 
is not because of the lack of qualified local talent; rather, it is because the unusually 
fast development of the company results in two problems: first, the insufficient time 
and investment in training local employees, and second, the under-developed working 
process; and they both lead to the same consequence, the use of expatriates.  
 
First and foremost, Teleman is a very young company, particularly in Europe. It 
entered the UK and German markets in 2001. It would be understandable if it was not 
able to develop a strong local team within just 15 years, who are familiar with the 
company’s products which are all designed and made in China. Most importantly, due 
to the rapid pace of the company’s development, the workloads for both local and 
expatriate employees are very large, which means there is limited or inadequate time 
for knowledge transfer or training. The following remarks made by an HR manager to 
a candidate in an interview illustrate this point: 
 
‘Teleman is developing at light speed, and we are too busy to have the time to 
train a new employee before he starts to work. We mainly train on the 
job…the working hour is from 9 to 5:30; however, in our company, we pay for 
performance, we pay for your hard work. The more you work, the more you 
learn, and the faster you develop.’ 
 
Teleman seems to be dealing with a dilemma. To cope with the rapidly expanding 
business, the company needs to train a group of local talent to deliver the project. 
However, at the same time, everybody is too busy at work to train people. At the 
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current stage the company has solved this problem with a ‘quick fix’ solution: 
expatriates.  
 
Secondly, because of the short history of internationalisation but the rapid 
development of the company, working processes and systems are not well established 
in Teleman. Rather, as I discussed in Chapter 6, they are fragmented and ever-
changing, thus the ‘rigid rule – changing rule – no rule’ paradox. On many occasions, 
employees need to spend time and make an effort figuring out what things can be 
done. This under-developed work process, as I discussed in Chapter 6, has brought 
confusion and frustration to local (British) employees. Suffering from poor career 
development prospects within the company, many of this group of employees have 
eventually chosen to quit.  
 
9.5.2 Tackling the constraining institutional dimension 
 
As illustrated by Figure 9.3, the politicised environment also contains constraining 
dimensions, which Teleman is expected to respond to with actions. My data in this 
regard, however, is limited. Therefore, the following paragraphs are speculative and 
indicative.  
 
The constraining dimensions of a politicised institutional environment, I argue, is 
concerned with first, the interference from central and local governments in business 
operations; and, more importantly, second, the double-edged effect discussed earlier. 
Whilst the first issue is more hidden and there is little data or evidence to support my 
speculation, the second issue has received frequent media coverage in recent years. 
Although Teleman is not a state-owned enterprise, it has been labelled as a national 
champion since the late 1990s because of its huge domestic success. When 
conducting business in overseas markets, Teleman has been frequently portrayed as 
being backed by the Chinese government and representing the national interest of 
China. Because of its ambiguous relationship with the Chinese government, Teleman 
has been accused by the US government of acting in the interests of the Chinese 
government, and posing a threat to US national security, therefore blocked from 
entering the US market.  
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Accordingly, as a business corporation, Teleman has responded to this constraining 
institutional environment with great efforts on proving itself as an independent firm 
which is market-oriented and profit-driven, rather than having a political agenda. For 
example, in 2014, the company, for the first time, allowed a foreign journalist from 
the Financial Times to look at the books containing ownership details, an effort to 
rebut criticism that the company is not transparent and to prove that it is a private 
company owned by its employees. In the UK, Teleman went even further to have a 
cybersecurity centre established to combat the risk of surveillance and hacking attacks 
from China. According to the author (2016), the centre is overseen by a board that 
includes directors from GCHQ (British intelligence and security organisation), the 
Cabinet Office and the UK Home Office, and was ‘created as a compromise – 
between the security concerns of intelligence agencies and the private sector’s desire 
for cheap imported technology’ (source is deliberately hidden	to	protect	the	confidentiality	of	the	case	company). 
 
A positive outcome of its efforts to de-politicise itself is that Teleman has been 
welcomed in the UK and continental Europe by governments and has been increasing 
its investment in the region in recent years. For example, in 2012, the company 
announced a new £1.3bn investment in the UK as part of talks between the company’s 
founder and British government officials. A Financial Times article reports that the 
company considered the UK and Europe as having ‘strategic importance’, due to the 
fact that it has met obstacles in the US and Australia amid concerns about cyber-
security. However, the then British Prime Minister David Cameron ‘welcomed’ 
Teleman’s investments.  According to the company’s corporate website, Teleman 
currently has 15 offices across the UK, employing 1,100 employees, one of the largest 
investors from China. With reference to the negative outcomes, I suspect that due to 
the company’s de-politicising efforts such as establishing the cybersecurity centre, the 
operation costs for Teleman in this region might increase. It is also possible that 
Teleman might end up giving up some sensitive, government-associated projects in 
China as a result of distancing itself from the Chinese government.  
 
These outcomes have important implications for the company’s control strategy. 
Given its success in Asia, Africa, and particularly in recent years the UK and Europe, 
the company has focused its business in overseas markets in recent decades. In 2014 
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and 2015, over 60% of its revenue was generated from overseas markets. On the one 
hand, the company continues to send out more expatriates abroad to manage the 
increasingly expanding business in different locations, and tighten its control over 
subsidiary units through centralised decision making and bureaucratic mechanisms. 
On the other hand, the business success also provides a solid foundation for reward 
control, continuously motivating its employees to become expatriates and fight for the 
company in foreign lands.  
 
In terms of identity control, it is predicted that as Teleman is becoming more and 
more internationalised and emphasising its status as an independent firm, it might 
reduce the national pride element in its organisational discourses on JKFD as a way to 
contribute to China’s national rejuvenation. However, as discussed in Chapter 7, this 
is not the case as the company is still repeatedly making explicit links between 
personal sacrifices, the success of the company and the national interest of China. 
This, from another angle, reflects the prevailing politicisation in the Chinese business 
environment.  
 
9.6 Conclusion 
 
The chapter has aimed to answer the central question: why has Teleman managed its 
European subsidiaries and employees in the way discussed in the previous four 
chapters? An institutional perspective has been adopted to explain the underlying 
generative mechanisms that lead to the empirical events observed. In this thesis, I 
have argued that Teleman’s international management and control system is the 
outcome of its interactions with the institutional environment in China. To illustrate 
this point, I have conceptualised the Chinese institutional environments as a form of 
variegated capitalism, and developed an Actor/Institution Interaction Process Model 
to capture how Teleman interacts with the enabling and constraining dimensions of 
the Chinese labour market, and the politicised Chinese business environments, and 
develops a unique control system to serve its business purpose.  
 
This chapter and the previous five data chapters provide us with rich knowledge about 
the internationalisation of Chinese firms, a relatively new and understudied 
phenomenon in recent years. Looking through the lens of the control system, this 
 
241 
study offers detailed accounts on micro-level internal organisation and management 
within the company, thus contributing to a deeper understanding of how firms 
actually become internationalised. Furthermore, with the three-step Interaction 
Process Model, this study captures the interactions between institutions and actors, 
and opens the black box of how institutions shape the behaviours of MNCs.  In doing 
this, this study demonstrates how studies of emerging market multinationals can 
contribute to the extension of existing theories in IB. This will be elaborated further in 
the Conclusion chapter.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
242 
Chapter 10: Conclusion  
 
The internationalisation of EMNCs has been one of the most notable dynamics in 
international business in recent years (Kostova et al., 2016). Despite the fact that there 
has been a growing literature over the last few years, which has generated 
considerable knowledge about the motives of internationalisation and the competitive 
advantages, entry strategies, and performance, we know very little about how EMNCs 
actually organise their work and manage their employees globally. With EMNCs 
taking their first steps towards internationalisation, studies of these infant firms may 
yield insights about how firms become internationalised and provide us with a unique 
opportunity to challenge and extend existing IB theory (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2012, 2016; 
Mathews, 2009; Ramamurti, 2012).  
 
It is for these two reasons that this study has investigated the international 
management and control system of Chinese MNCs, a move to better understand how 
EMNCs like Teleman internationalise, and how they manage this internationalisation 
process. Drawing on an immersive ethnography of Teleman, this study, first of all, 
enhances our understanding of the internationalisation process and behaviours of 
EMNCs and MNCs in general; but more importantly, it contributes to the extension of 
existing IB theories, which have been developed based on the studies of MNCs from 
advanced markets (AMNCs).  
 
In this concluding chapter, I relate the Teleman case to the on-going debate about 
EMNCs in IB study, and demonstrate the values of studying EMNCs. I provide 
answers to three important questions frequently asked by IB scholars:  
Do EMNCs internationalise differently from AMNCs? Can existing theory explain 
EMNCs’ differing behaviours? And how can studying EMNCs contribute to theory 
extension? This chapter also makes remarks on the limitations of this study and 
suggestions for future research.  
 
10.1 Do EMNCs internationalise differently from AMNCs?  
 
Existing studies on EMNCs tend to support the view that EMNCs internationalise 
differently from AMNCs. For example, in terms of motives, it has been argued that 
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EMNCs go abroad to acquire strategic assets in order to overcome latecomer 
disadvantages and address competitive weakness (Agyenim, Wang, & Yang, 2008; 
Boisot & Meyer, 2008; Child & Rodrigues, 2005; Deng, 2009; Awate et al., 2015; 
Cui et al., 2014). They also internationalise for knowledge-seeking purposes in order 
to improve their technological and commercial capabilities ( Luo & Tung, 2007; 
Mathews, 2006; Jindra et al., 2016; Thite et al., 2016). Regarding entry strategies, it 
has been reported that aggressive M&As are particularly favoured by EMNCs (Aybar 
& Fecici, 2009; Deng, 2009; Gubbi et al., 2010). Guillen and Garcia-Canal (2009) 
make attempts to summarise the difference between EMNCs and AMNCs as 
illustrated in Table 10.1. 
 
Dimension EMNCs AMNCs 
Speed of 
internationalisation 
Accelerated Gradual 
Competitive advantages  Weak: upgrading of resources 
required  
Strong: required resources 
available in-house 
Political capabilities  Strong: firms used to unstable 
political environments  
Weak: firms used to stable 
political environments  
Expansion path Dual path: simultaneous entry 
into developed and developing 
countries 
Simple path: from less to more 
distant countries  
Default entry modes External growth: alliance and 
acquisitions 
Internal growth: wholly owned 
subsidiaries  
Organisational adaptability High, because of their meagre 
international presence  
Low, because of their ingrained 
structure and culture  
 
Table 10.1: EMNCs compared to AMNCs (source: Guillen and Garcia-Canal,2009 ) 
 
Although there is little research on how EMNCs manage their overseas subsidiary 
units and employees, it is plausible to make a prediction that their approach in 
management and organisation would be different from AMNCs, given that they have 
different capabilities and competitive advantages, and different motives for 
internationalisation (e.g. Ramamurti, 2009, 2012, 2013; Williamson et al., 2013).  
 
This study on Teleman lends support and provides empirical evidence to the view that 
EMNCs behave differently in their internationalisation process. It reveals that the 
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internationalisation process of Teleman is characterised by the following features, 
which does make it different from AMNCs.  
 
First, the internationalisation of Teleman has been driven by a strong organisational 
culture, which is uniquely blended with nationalism, militarism, and materialism. 
From the very beginning, Teleman has relied on large numbers of expatriates going 
abroad to explore new markets in Russia, Latin America and Africa. This task of 
initial internationalisation was undoubtedly difficult, given the close-to-zero 
reputation of the company at that time and the bad image of made-in-China products 
and, understandably, it was difficult to mobilise employees to go abroad and take on 
this task. However, Teleman did successfully accomplish its initial phase of 
internationalisation through building a strong team of ‘corporate soldiers’, i.e. 
expatriates, who were driven by a militarised culture, a mission of China’s 
rejuvenation and of course, material rewards (good salary and good career 
development prospects). Even today, with Teleman a global leader in the industry, the 
company still heavily relies on this group of expatriates to manage its overseas 
operations, with the company constantly emphasising its unique corporate culture to 
its Chinese employees. This nationalism, militarism, and materialism of the corporate 
culture make Teleman different from its western counterparts.  
 
Secondly, the internationalisation of Teleman has been driven by a high level of 
personalisation and centralisation. Consequently, the internationalisation has not led 
to high levels of localisation and formalisation as we observed in many AMNCs. As 
discussed in previous chapters, expatriates play critical roles in Teleman’s European 
subsidiary units in that they work as both coordinators and controllers, helping the 
China HQ to make decisions. Furthermore, the HQ is also frequently involved in 
direct decision making. Such a personal centralised approach endows expatriates with 
institutionalised and non-institutionalised powers, yet excludes the other two 
employee groups (the local British and local Chinese) from participating in decision 
making and does not allow them to benefit from the internal career development 
opportunities and financial returns brought by the company’s successful international 
business. Although Teleman has been highly successful in its internationalisation, its 
management system is not formalised, codified or reproducible, as we observe in 
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many AMNCs. Instead, Teleman’s system remains highly personalised with large 
amounts of individual input from expatriates and from China HQ.  
 
Third, the internationalisation of Teleman reflects a strong pragmatic mentality of the 
company, leading to a low level of localisation and embeddedness in host countries. 
This can be seen in the way it allocates its global resources and assets, locating major 
R&D and production facilities at home whilst designating for example, foreign units 
more as sales representative offices and sites for delivering projects. It can also be 
seen in the way it staffs its subsidiaries, hiring experienced local British staff at above 
market wage rates to capitalise on their personal connections and market knowledge, 
and hiring local Chinese with low salaries to leverage their language skills. In the 
whole internationalisation process, Teleman heavily relies on expatriates, and 
considers them as core employees, while local British and local Chinese employees 
are largely marginalised. The company’s pragmatic approach has, however, had 
negative consequences, such as a high turnover rate of local employees and the low 
morale of local Chinese. However, as discussed in Chapter 8, it seems that the 
company feels reluctant to invest in and develop these two local employee groups, 
since their reactions and responses do not exert major material effects on productivity 
or profitability for the company. Compared to western MNCs that tend to become 
more localised and more embedded in the local markets when the level of 
internationalisation increases, Teleman has continued to show a low level of 
localisation and it remains a Chinese company with a strong sense of ‘Chinese-ness’.  
 
These three features of Teleman’s internationalisation process seem to confirm the 
view that EMNCs do behave differently in the process of internationalisation; but an 
even more important question is why. This leads to the second frequently discussed 
question.  
 
10.2 Can existing theories explain EMNCs’ differing behaviours? 
 
Answers to this question are inconsistent. Whilst authors such as Luo and Tung 
(2007) and Mathews (2006) contend that new theories are needed to explain EMNCs’ 
behaviours, others such as Narula (2006) and Rugman (2010) argue for the adequacy 
of existing theories.  Based on the findings of this study, I take a middle ground 
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position proposed by Cuervo-Cazurra (2012), Ramamurti (2009, 2012) and others.  I 
contend that existing IB theories provide only partly satisfying explanations to some 
of the puzzles about Teleman, and efforts need to be made to extend and modify them 
in order to offer complete explanations about what is happening in Teleman. For 
example, as mentioned earlier, Teleman’s internationalisation is driven by a strong 
organisational culture. Adopting Dunning’s (1977) OLI framework, we can argue that 
one of the core ownership advantages (the O element) of Teleman is its strong culture, 
which has played a critical role in motivating and retaining expatriate employees. 
From a theory point of view, the O argument does hold up well here. However, what 
has not been explained is: how can Teleman possibly build such an organisational 
culture which blends nationalism, militarism and materialism in a way western MNCs 
are not able to imagine succeeding? Put another way, can a British MNC create a 
similar culture? If so, can such a culture function in the same way to motivate its 
employees? The answers to these two questions seem to be ‘no’. This shows that the 
explanation offered by the OLI framework is incomplete; only when we engage with 
other theories or make extensions to existing theories can we have full understanding 
of the behaviours of EMNCs.  
 
I now elaborate this point by trying to explain one of the most unique behaviours of 
Teleman. As discussed in the previous chapters, one of the defining characters of 
Teleman’s control system is expatriate centricity. Such centricity is not only reflected 
by the population of its European subsidiaries per se, but also by the institutionalised 
and non-institutionalised power possessed by expatriates in daily working life, and by 
the company’s corporate culture and reward systems, which are largely tailored to 
target expatriates, either through identity control de-emphasising the self, or through 
appealing to their materialised self interests. One big question here is why does 
Teleman use so many expatriates in its overseas operations?  
 
One way to answer this question is to turn to existing theories and frameworks on 
international staffing in MNCs. In this regard, two often-discussed frameworks are 
relevant, which I label as a functional framework and a situational framework. The 
functional framework, established by Edström and Galbraith (1977) provides three 
reasons for why MNCs use expatriates: (1) filling positions; (2) management 
development; and (3) organisational development. Based on this framework, later 
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studies have identified other reasons for the use of expatriates, such as cultural control 
(Chang & Taylor 1999; Groot & Merchant 2000; Rosenzweig & Singh 1991), and 
knowledge transfer (e.g. Bouquet, Hebert, & Delios, 2004; Hocking, Brown, & 
Harzing, 2004). However, these reasons, although with different names, can all be 
broadly grouped into Edström and Galbraith’s organisational development category 
(Brewster et al., 2014).  
 
Based on this functional framework, the management development purpose is to give 
managers international experience to prepare for future important tasks, particularly in 
the area of international business. In the case of Teleman, given the short history of 
the company and its global ambitions, it is plausible that the company attaches great 
importance to learning and therefore sends many expatriates overseas for ‘competence 
development’ and ‘career enhancement’, the learning -driven purpose identified by 
Evans et al. (2002). Stories discussed in Chapter 7 on career development support this 
point.  
 
Another purpose in the framework, organisational development, is concerned with 
controlling the foreign operations through ‘modifying and sustaining its structure and 
decision process’ (Edström & Galbraith, 1977, p.253). As we have seen in previous 
chapters, Teleman is a highly centralised organisation, with all key decisions to be 
made in the China HQ; and expatriates play a critical role in controlling the 
subsidiaries and coordinating the business operations. However, using this 
framework, we know little about why key decisions are all made in the China HQ, 
and why there is so much internal communication and coordination work.  
 
Similarly, the third purpose, position filling, cannot be adequately explained by this 
framework either. Based on Edström and Galbraith (1977), when qualified local 
individuals are not available or easily trained, MNCs can rely on expatriates sent from 
home. In the case of Teleman, one puzzle is why there are so many middle level 
managers and working level engineers working in overseas subsidiaries. Given the 
much more developed telecom industry in Europe, it is difficult to accept the ideas 
that Teleman cannot find qualified local individuals for its middle and working level 
works. Therefore, here we can see that the functional framework can best explain the 
behaviours of Teleman from the perspective of learning and manager competency 
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building, but it cannot fully explain why these middle and working level expatriates 
are sent abroad, and why China HQ make all the key decisions.  
 
Now let us examine the explanatory power of the situational framework. The 
situational framework seeks to answer the ‘when’ question, exploring the contextual 
and situational factors. Researchers have examined different but similar groups of 
factors. Three factors, namely the industry, the stage of globalization, and the 
international strategy are often discussed (Harzing, 2001; Bonache & Pla, 2005). 
 
Industry: Previous research has revealed that industry factors, such as the industry 
competition, the specific sector, the R&D intensity, the level of innovation, and the 
level of product customisation, have a great impact on the firm’s decision to use 
expatriates or host country nationals (e.g. Hamill, 1989; Harzing, 1999, 2001; Welch, 
1994). The general idea is that if a firm is in an industry required to respond to local 
needs, and therefore rely on local talent for their information and knowledge 
pertaining to the local environment, then it tends to reduce the level of expatriates and 
host country nationals. On the contrary, if the firm is in an industry that requires a 
high level of global coordination and high level of reliance on the resources from 
HQs, then the firm tends to adopt an ethnocentric orientation. The former can be 
considered as globally integrated industries, and the latter locally responsive 
industries (Barlett & Ghoshal, 1989; Prahalad & Doz, 1987). 
 
Seemingly, the industry factor offers good explanation for the heavy use of 
expatriates in Teleman. Teleman is in the telecommunications industry, and it boasts a 
wide range of products and services with core business being equipment 
manufacturing for telecommunication operators such as BT, Vodafone and O2 in the 
UK.  Although the main parts of equipment are standardised based on common 
industry standards, each telecoms operator has their individual networks and systems, 
and therefore requires tailor-made equipment and services. This suggests that the 
industry Teleman is in belongs to a globally integrated industry with a high level of 
R&D intensity and innovation. This may lead to intensive use of expatriates. 
However, I argue that the industry factor cannot fully explain what happens, because 
such a high level of use of expatiates obviously has not been observed in other 
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Western or Japanese MNCs which are also in a globally integrated industry with a 
focus on R&D.  
 
More importantly, the industry factor alone will not be able to explain MNCs’ 
international staffing strategy, as other variables will affect their decisions. Even in 
the same industry, because of the roles of other variables, MNCs might adapt different 
staffing orientations. One example is Boyacigiller’s study (1990), which, 
contradictory to ethnocentric approaches common in financial industry (Harzing, 
2001; Welch, 1994), suggests that in a very competitive local environment, a branch 
of a major US bank relies heavily on the host country nationals to link the bank’s 
services to the local business community and get new business.  A study by Bonache 
and Pla (2005) also reveals a much more complex picture. Their study shows that 
when innovation is important for the firm, the probability of using expatriates 
decreases, and the use of expatriates is mediated by the company’s strategy.  
 
The stage of internationalisation: According to the dominant Process Theories of 
Internationalisation (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977, 1990), a firm’s internationalisation 
unfolds in an incremental manner. It takes place along the establishment chain, from 
‘no regular exporting’, ‘independent representative (agent), to ‘sales subsidiary’ and 
‘production’ in the final stage (Johanson & Vahlne 1977, p.24). Accordingly, at 
different stages of the internationalisation, firms have different staffing policies to 
respond to the challenges encountered in the international environment and the 
specific organisational needs at each stage (Welch, 1994). According to existing 
studies, a general belief is that the level of expatriate use is negatively correlated to 
the stage of internationalisation. This means that at the early stage of a firm’s 
internationalisation, firms emphasise control and therefore tend to take an 
ethnocentric approach by appointing expatriates to key positions in overseas 
subsidiaries; as time goes by and the level of internationalisation is intensified, the 
firm will adopt polycentric staffing policies, promoting home country nationals to 
managerial positions. When MNCs grow even more internationalised, they will opt 
for regiocentric and finally a geocentric policy (e.g. Adler & Ghadar, 1990; Farndale, 
Scullion, & Sparrow, 2010; Farndale et al., 2010; Kelly, 2001).   
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However, such an argument is problematic itself, and fails to explain the high level 
use of expatriates in Teleman. First, no researcher has ever tried to specify how long it 
takes for a firm to move from one stage to the next stage of internationalisation, and 
we therefore have very little knowledge of the time needed for an ethnocentric 
approach to be replaced by polycentric or regiocentric ones. It looks more like an 
assumption than a reality. Second, the measurement for level of expatriate use in this 
argument is mainly concerned with managerial positions.  
 
In the case of Teleman, I find it difficult to locate it to a particular stage of 
internationalisation. As discussed in previous chapters, the company was established 
in 1987, started its internationalisation efforts in the late 1990s. In 2005, the 
company’s international sales exceeded domestic sales for the first time. And today, it 
is one of the biggest players in the international arena. In 2015, over 60% of the 
company’s revenues were generated from overseas markets. Therefore, one possible 
explanation is that Teleman uses large numbers of expatriates because it is in an early 
stage of internationalisation. However, given its global presence, and its highly 
successful international business, I feel suspicious about this statement. 
 
Furthermore, the stage of internationalisation and the use of expatriates might be in a 
more dynamic co-relation. For example, Franko (1973), after studying 25 European 
and US multinational enterprises, found that at the initial export stage, it is true that 
expatriates occupy the managerial roles. However, when the firms reach the 
production stage, the highest level of internationalisation based on the process theory, 
the use of local nationals in top positions actually drops to around 25%, which is 
contradictory to the arguments we discussed. Then subsequent to this process, the 
author found a ‘re-emergence’ of local managers to head subsidiary operations. 
Therefore, it seems that the stage of internationalisation could be a general indicator 
of the presence of expatriates, but might not be a decisive factor for the use of 
expatriates.  
 
Competitive strategy: According to Bartlett and Ghoshal (1989), MNCs could 
follow four different strategies: multidomestic strategy, international strategy, global 
strategy, and transnational strategy. The linkage between MNCs competitive strategy 
and the choice of expatriates has been theoretically and empirically explored. For 
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example, Edstrom and Lorange's (1984) study on Swedish MNCs reveals that firms 
following a global strategy have a higher level of expatriates in their subsidiaries than 
those that followed a multidomestic strategy. In contrast, MNCs following a 
multidomestic strategy tend to treat overseas operations as independent business, and 
the subsidiaries tend to operate in a rather decentralised manner and can be relatively 
self-sufficient (Schuler et al., 1993).  
 
In this regard, as discussed in previous chapter, Teleman has adopted a ‘global’ 
competitive strategy in Bartlett and Ghoshal’s (1989) categorisation.  Although 
Teleman runs business in over 170 countries through a network of 100 overseas 
subsidiaries and 14 regional headquarters, the company’s overseas subsidiaries are 
more like ‘sales representative offices’, where people win business deals, pass the 
deals to China, wait to get products manufactured by China, and then deliver the 
products and services to clients.  
 
Following a global strategy, Teleman seems to take global efficiency as its top 
priority, and they manage their overseas subsidiaries in a standardised manner to 
achieve efficiencies and economies of scale. The configuration of assets and 
capabilities is centralised and globally scaled, and the role of their overseas 
subsidiaries is to implement parent company strategies. Like other MNCs following a 
global strategy, Teleman organises its international activities based on a hub-and-
spoke model in which many strategic functions are centralised at headquarters and 
overseas subsidiaries are mainly acting as pipelines of products and strategies, thus 
leading to the fact that overseas subsidiaries have a high level of dependence on HQs 
and are subject to heavy control from HQs (Harzing 2004, Bartlett & Ghoshal 1989, 
Porter, 1986). 
 
Given that global staffing as part of human resources management strategy should 
support the firm’s competitive strategy, it is expected that Teleman will put great 
emphasis on effective integration and coordination among their foreign subsidiaries 
and between subsidiaries and HQs, thus the company relies on large numbers of 
expatiates in overseas offices to facilitate the complex bureaucratic procedures, 
centralised decision-making and top-down communications.  
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The linkage between competitive strategy and use of expatiates seems to be well 
established; however, the problem is that it does not offer much insight about why the 
company chooses a particular strategy. In the case of Teleman, it does not explain 
why the company adopts the global strategy, therefore I argue that such an 
explanation fails to reveal the true reasons for the high level use of expatriates.  
 
In summary, either the functional or the situational framework offers complete and 
satisfactory explanations to the expatriate-centric-ness in Teleman. It is for this reason 
that in this thesis institutional theory has been introduced into the analysis. As shown 
in Chapter 9, the behaviours of Teleman such as expatriate staffing and different kinds 
of management and control practices can be best understood as the outcomes of its 
interactions with the Chinese institutional environment. By engaging institutional 
theory in analysing Teleman’s internationalisation process, not only can we provide a 
much more convincing explanation to the behaviours of the company, but more 
importantly, during this process, an Actor/Institution Interaction Process Model has 
been developed, which extends the original institutional theory in the study of MNCs. 
This is related to the next question: how can studying EMNCs contribute to theory 
extension?  
 
10.3 How can studying EMNCs contribute to theory extension?  
 
The purpose of studying EMNCs is not only to generate empirical knowledge about 
how EMNCs behave differently from AMNCs, but more importantly to use EMNCs 
as a laboratory to extend theories. By describing how Teleman’s international 
management and control system works, and explaining why Teleman adopts such a 
management and control system, this thesis argues for a dynamic relationship between 
institutions and actors, and develops the Actor/Institution Interaction Process Model 
to capture the process in which actors interact with institutions in three steps: 
interpreting, initial responding & implementing, and developing and repairing.  
 
It is with this three-step Interaction Process Model that my study of Teleman extends 
existing institutional theory in the study of MNCs. As discussed in the literature 
review section, although comparative institutional studies often stress the prerequisite 
importance of the home country’s institutional environments for MNCs and make 
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connections between firms’ behaviours and the features of dominant institutions, most 
of the studies suffer from a lack for systematic analysis on institutional settings and its 
impacts on the behaviours of MNCs. Without identifying what elements of national 
institutions they refer to, and giving detailed accounts on how these elements 
influence the behaviours of the firms, these studies only achieve the task of revealing 
observable patterns of management in MNCs from a certain country, but fail to 
provide convincing explanation. However, my study of Teleman and the resulting 
three-step Interaction Model makes a contribution to existing institutional theory 
through filling this gap. This Model has a number of strengths:  
 
First, it describes the steps and process in which the interactions between institutions 
and actors take place, thus opening the mysterious black box of how exactly 
institutions affect the behaviours of firms. With this model, we now understand that 
institutions do not determine firms’ behaviours directly; instead, institutions provide 
different kinds of resources to firms, and firms are expected to exercise their agency 
to make the best out of these institutional resources.  
 
 Accordingly, the second strength of this Model is that it provides clear guidance on 
studying institutions. Whilst institutional environments in any society are undoubtedly 
complex and thus pose great difficulty in studying them, one approach is to focus on 
one or several domains of these institutions, identify the enabling and constraining 
dimensions of each domain, and then examine the positive and negative outcomes of 
firms’ actions on the two dimensions. In this way, the grand task of studying 
institutions will be simplified into small and concrete actions.  
 
Finally, because it outlines the interactions between institutions and actors in a 
general way, and provides clear guidance on how to study institutions, this Model 
possesses strong generality. It can be applied, for example, to compare the behaviours 
of Chinese firms and Brazilian firms in the UK, and such a comparison would 
generate insights into how actors interpret and respond to the same institutions 
differently or in a similar way. It can also be applied, for instance, to study the 
behaviours of one Chinese firm in the UK and in Brazil, and such a study would 
provide us with knowledge about the difference and similarity of these two societies, 
and how such difference and similarity in institutions can lead to similar or different 
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actions. Based on these three strengths, I believe that this model constitutes a good 
theory extension since it ‘delves into underlying processes so as to understand the 
systematic reasons for a particular occurrence or nonoccurrence’ (Sutton & Staw, 
1995, p. 378), and it explains, predicts and delights (Weick, 1995).  
 
In this study, answering the central question: how can studying EMNCs contribute to 
theory extension? is achieved by focusing on the uniqueness of two domains of 
China’s institutional environments, and by exploring their impacts on the behaviours 
of Teleman. Therefore, I agree with authors such as Meyer and Peng (2016) and 
Cuervo-Cazurra (2012) that contextual variation and context-specific should be at the 
centre of EMNCs study when theory extension is sought. As Cuervo-Cazurra (2012, 
p.162) argues, the ability to use EMNCs to extend theory ‘depends on whether 
researchers focus on the specific differential conditions of the home country and how 
these affect the internationalisation of the firm’, or whether they merely analyse how 
EMNCs behave. In research practice, it requires the researcher to ‘be explicit about 
which conditions of the country of origin they study and explain how they impact firm 
behaviour’. His argument is in line with the broader discussions of placing ‘contextual 
variations at the centre of explanations of business phenomena’ in ‘emerging 
economy business research’ (Meyer & Peng, 2016, p.3) and in ‘strategy research in 
emerging economies’ (Hoskisson et al., 2000; Wright et al., 2005). As this study 
illustrates, such an approach is fruitful, and allows researchers to contribute to the 
extension of existing theories.  
 
To summarise, this study draws on a single case of Teleman to participate in the on-
going debates in the IB field about EMNCs. Although Teleman’s ways of doing 
things might not be generalised to other EMNCs, it provides empirical evidence and 
theoretical dividends to current debates. It suggests that theory development and 
extension in the IB field has been hindered by researchers’ reluctance and incapability 
in going deep and analysing work place phenomena at a micro level. Taking a 
qualitative case study approach, which ‘investigates a contemporary phenomenon in 
depth and within its real-life context’ (Yin, 2009, p.19), this study has been able 
assess the strength and weakness of current debates, and open up issues of how MNCs 
and EMNCs can be studied in a new way.  
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10.4 Limitations of this study and suggestions for future research  
 
This study can be broadly located in the field of comparative institutional analysis, 
which examines ‘how the forms, outcomes, and dynamics of economic organisation 
(firms, networks, markets) are influenced and shaped by other social institutions (e.g. 
training system, legal system, political system, educational systems, etc.) and with 
what consequences for economic growth, innovation, employment, and inequality’ 
(Morgan et al., 2012, p.2). With particular reference to MNCs, this study, following 
other research in this field, takes an ‘institution-based view of strategy’ (Peng, 2001, 
2003), and explores the relationship between countries’ institutional environments and 
firm’s international business strategies (e.g.Kostova, 1999; Kostova & Zaheer, 1999; 
Meyer & Nguyen, 2005). 
 
A limitation of this study is that by focusing on home country effects, it does not 
examine the impact of institutional environments in host countries, or host country 
effects. However, a large body of literature has pointed to the prominent role of host 
country institutional environments in shaping MNCs’ business strategy and 
management practices in host countries, and in many cases through the lens of local 
legitimacy searching (e.g., Meyer, Mudambi, & Narula, 2011; Siegel & Larson, 2009; 
Xu & Shenkar, 2002).  
 
Therefore, an area that requires further study is the dynamic interplay of home 
country effects and host country effects in MNCs’ internationalisation process. A 
number of studies have discussed this issue and illustrate the multiple levels of 
embeddedness experienced by MNCs (e.g. Ferner, Quintanilla, & Varul, 2001; 
Almond et al., 2005; Edwards & Ferner, 2002). This line of enquiry, as proposed by 
Ferner et al. (2001:279), can ‘focus on home and host country institutions and see the 
nature of employment relations within the foreign subsidiaries of MNCs as the result 
of calculation about how to balance these sets of influences’. Studying the interplay 
between home and host country institutions could be particularly interesting in the 
case of EMNCs, because existing studies tend to reveal the strong impact of 
institutional environments at home; and as discussed earlier, scholars such as Cuervo-
Cazurra (2012) advocate that the potential of using EMNCs to extend theory depends 
on whether the focus is on the uniqueness of home country environments. Questions 
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worth exploring are: to what extent do host country effects reflect EMNCs’ 
internationalisation? And how do EMNCs balance these two sets of influences? In my 
study of Teleman, I feel that host country institutions do exert some influence on 
Teleman’s international management approach. For example, it originally planned to 
locate its two new R&D centres both in Cambridge, but later decided to locate one of 
them in the city of Bristol mainly due to two institutional factors: the talent pool in 
Bristol and more importantly the influence of the British government which was 
hoping Bristol would become a new Silicon Valley and was trying to bring more 
high-tech companies into the city. However, my study reveals that the home country 
effects are much stronger in Teleman’s case, which, for example, can be reflected by 
the fact that the expatriate-centric control system has been implemented not only in 
the UK, but also in other European countries, regardless of the institutional diversity 
in this region. In the early stage of internationalisation, home country institutions play 
a bigger role in MNCs’ behaviours, and future research on other EMNCs can test this 
argument. 
 
10.5 Concluding thoughts  
  
This study offers detailed accounts on how Teleman internationalises, how it 
organises work on a global scale, and how it manages employees. It enhances our 
knowledge about the behaviours of EMNCs and MNCs in general, and contributes to 
the extension of institutional theories in MNC study. The in-depth discussion on 
Teleman and the insights generated from this discussion would not have been possible 
without the immersive, ethnographic approach.  
 
Ethnographic research, like other forms of qualitative research, is rare in the IB field. 
Some of the reasons have been mentioned in Chapter 3, such as difficulty in getting 
access, time consuming data collection, and institutionalised assumptions of its low 
legitimacy as a science. In the process of conducting this research on Teleman, the 
biggest difficulty I experienced, however, was the dilemma of making decisions 
between sticking to some methodological principles which I have been taught in class 
and doing something which I think can better serve the research purpose. Like many 
junior researchers, I have been trained to conduct research starting from research 
design to data collection, and then to data analysis; I have been trained to develop a 
 
257 
research question and write a literature chapter before entering the field; and I have 
also been trained to use computer software to analyse data. However, as I discussed in 
Chapter 2, what I have done was very different from what the conventional textbook 
says. The study of Teleman has taken the form of a funnel, starting with broad 
curiosity of what Chinese MNCs are doing in the UK. Then it gradually developed 
into an inquiry of the international management and control system. Expectedly, I did 
not have clear research questions at the beginning of this project. Data collection and 
data analysis are intertwined in this study; in fact, in the final data analysis, one step is 
theoretical sampling, i.e. going back to the field to collect more data.  
 
By pointing out all these seemingly unconventional actions I took to complete this 
study, I had no intention to claim that what I have done is unique. Instead, as I 
illustrated in Chapter 3, all my actions followed guidance from established scholars 
and are confirmed by previous studies. However, these effective methodological 
principles and guidance are barely featured in ‘mainstream’ IB journals or textbooks. 
This, I argue, to some extent leads to the black box situation of ethnographic study 
and qualitative research in general, with their legitimacy frequently questioned. 
Challenging the dominant positivist paradigm in the IB field is undoubtedly difficult; 
but I think what we can do is to claim a stronger, legitimated position for qualitative 
research. To do this, I believe one important thing we need to do is to further clarify 
methodological issues in qualitative research and develop qualitative research into a 
field with clear guidance on research design, data collection and data analysis. Just 
think: how many ethnographers explain the process of their data analysis? And how 
many PhD students realise that memo-writing is one of the steps in the data analysis 
process? I believe that only when clear rules and guidance are established in a field, 
can the field claim its legitimacy; and only when a researcher convincingly 
demonstrates how he/she collects and analyses data, can his/her research findings 
become convincing to others. And I hope that this thesis on Teleman can serve as a 
good example for such efforts.  
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